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
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Library of Philosophy.

EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A.

ERDMANN'S
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
VOL. III.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY is in the first instance a contribution to the History of Thought. While much has been done in England in tracing the course of evolution in nature, history, religion, and morality, comparatively little has been done in tracing the development of thought upon these and kindred subjects, and yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution."

This Library will deal mainly with Modern Philosophy, partly because Ancient Philosophy has already had a fair share of attention in this country through the labours of Grote, Ferrier, and others, and more recently through translations from Zeller ; partly because the Library does not profess to give a complete history of thought.

By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this plan, it is hoped that a completeness and thoroughness of treatment otherwise unattainable will be secured. It is believed, also, that from writers mainly English and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it has hitherto received from the great German Histories of Philosophy may be looked for. In the departments of Ethics, Economics, and Politics, for instance, the contributions of English writers to the common stock of theoretic discussion have been especially valuable, and these subjects will accordingly have special prominence in this undertaking.

Another feature in the plan of the Library is its arrangement according to subjects rather than authors and dates, enabling the writers to follow out and exhibit in a way hitherto unattempted the results of the logical development of particular lines of thought.

The historical portion of the Library is divided into two sections, of which the first contains works upon the development of particular schools of Philosophy, while the second exhibits the history of theory in particular departments. There will also be a third series, which will contain original and independent contributions to Philosophy.

To these has been added, by way of Introduction to the whole Library, an English translation of Erdmann's "History of Philosophy," long since recognised in Germany as the best.

J. H. MUIRHEAD,
General Editor.

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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By DR. J. E. ERDMANN.

English Translation. Edited by PROFESSOR W. S. HOUGH, Minneapolis, U.S.A., in 3 vols. Vol. i. and ii., each 15s.; vol. iii., 12s.

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"The translation into English of Erdmann's *History of Philosophy* is an important event in itself, and in the fact that it is the first instalment of an undertaking of great significance for the study of philosophy in this country. Apart, however, from its relation to the Library to which it is to serve as an introduction, the translation of Erdmann's *History of Philosophy* is something for which the English student ought to be thankful. . . . A History of past endeavours, achievements, and failures cannot but be of great use to the student. Such a History, able, competent, trustworthy, we have now in our hands, adequately and worthily rendered into our mother-tongue."—*Spectator*

A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

EDITED BY

WILLISTON S. HOUGH, PH.M.

Assistant Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Minnesota

IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOL. III

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE HEGEL

SECOND



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APPENDIX.



GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

SINCE HEGEL.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

SINCE HEGEL.

§ 331.

INTRODUCTION.

I. THE decided ascendancy which, particularly about the middle of the first twenty years of the century, was conceded to the Hegelian philosophy over all contemporary systems, is to be explained by the fact that it was a philosophy corresponding to the momentary lull which had followed the fierce conflicts in the political, religious, and ecclesiastico-political spheres ; a philosophy which enemies by way of blame, and friends by way of praise, called a Restoration philosophy. This it is to a far greater extent than those who invented the name supposed. There are three points, namely, in which Hegel restored what previous to his time had been put in a tottering state,—especially by Kant, to whom, just on this account, Hegel is often unfair. First, he had attempted to restore to philosophy her “Holiest of holies,” a Metaphysic, or Ontology, of which Kant had robbed her. The aim of his *Logic* was to give again to philosophy a Foundation Science, by showing what the Absolute is, and that it can only be reached by the dialectical method, the method, namely, which coincides with the self-movement of the content. Kant had, moreover, in his *Critiques* so strongly emphasized the legal (moral) element in Religion, that he was almost at one with the men of the Enlightenment, and their religion of good works ; and even in his *Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason*, where he parts company with them, the glad tidings of the Gospel appear almost like a fable invented in the interests of morality. Hegel seeks to restore a positive relation precisely to the theoretical element in Religion, and to do so not simply to the story of salvation as related in the Bible, but to

the doctrines developed with and in the Church. He boasts, therefore, of his philosophy, because it is so much more orthodox than the modern intuitional or scriptural theology, which is indifferent to dogma. Finally, in the third place, Kant, in the individualistic spirit of the eighteenth century, had in his doctrine of law put the individual person, and in his theory of morals the private conscience, so much in the foreground, that in contrast to this Hegel again took as the central point of his ethics the ancient notion of the moral organism, the dominating right of the whole, which is essentially different from the sum. The reproaches which were brought against him on account of this threefold restoration,—that he was predestined to be a new Wolff, that he had made the world a present of a new Scholasticism, that he had come forward like a new Herr von Haller in opposition to Liberalism,—may be accepted as correct if the proper emphasis is laid on the word “new.”

2. The year 1830 saw the beginning of a series of events which proved that the restoration and consolidation of what had been previously shaken fell far short of being so definite as had been hoped. The revolutions in France, Belgium, and Poland, the revolutionary movements connected with these in Germany, as well as the Parliamentary reform in England; the sharp points of difference in the various creeds, which once more came to light owing to the Papal bulls on mixed marriages, and to the celebration of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession; finally, the almost unheard-of attempt which was made, particularly in Prussia, by the ecclesiastical corporations and courts, to possess themselves of rights which the State had always exercised, such as the introduction of agenda or the control of the professors of theology—all proved that there might be a dissolution of what seemed to have been so perfectly put together. It will be easily understood that Hegel greeted none of these phenomena with pleasure, and met many of them with decided dislike. He could not help foreseeing—what soon also happened—that, as the foundations of what had hitherto been accepted were shaking, the foundations of reasoned existence could not escape being subjected to new tests; and he felt, too, that many amongst his younger friends would regard with pleasure what only pained him. Both things happened. Works appeared which attacked the foundations of his doctrines, and to which he replied in a collective criticism. But this came to a stand-still before he

had reached the most important of these works. An unpleasant encounter with his hitherto intimate friend, Professor Gans, which was occasioned by the political questions of the day, also occurred, and embittered the last weeks of his life.

3. The words spoken at his grave, to the effect that the satraps would have to share Alexander's kingdom amongst them, were followed by a war of succession more quickly than the speaker had imagined. The process of dissolution began in the Hegelian school soon after the death of its founder. Accompanying this dissolution, which is the negative side of the process of philosophical development after Hegel, we undoubtedly have, as its positive complement, the construction of new systems. Apart from the fact that most of those who assumed the latter work had been actively engaged in the process of dissolution, it will facilitate our survey if we first group together those phenomena which it can be proved all led to a common goal. This certainly involves the drawback that many authors will be discussed in two different parts in the treatise. By any other method, however, it would be still more difficult to find one's way through the labyrinth of post-Hegelian literature. But such a separation has been resorted to only when it appeared absolutely necessary. Where it was not necessary, and where a philosopher was mentioned for the first time, I have at once said everything regarding him that I had intended to say in this book. With this explanation we may turn to our double task. In accordance with our method, it will first be shown how the three points just referred to, in which Hegel had proved himself a restorer, were again brought into question after his death. They arose in the order in which they have been enumerated above, and indeed, so that the interest of the philosophical public in each of the three questions was sustained for pretty nearly the same period. After the logico-metaphysical question alone had been ventilated for about half a dozen years, the question raised by the philosophy of religion came suddenly to the front, to give place after about the same interval of time to the politico-social question. We have thus given in advance the three divisions into which the negative part of this investigation is divided.

FIRST DIVISION.

Dissolution of the Hegelian School.

A.—PHENOMENA IN THE LOGICO-METAPHYSICAL SPHERE.

§ 332.

I. SINCE the Hegelian school had the conviction that the logical foundation laid by Hegel was unshakable, it had no occasion to apply any test to show whether the content of the fundamental science had been properly constructed, whether its relation to the other parts of philosophy had been properly conceived, whether the method it had adopted did really harmonize with the self-movement of the object, and was therefore universally applicable. It is accordingly natural that in this group of phenomena, the anti-Hegelians in particular should take a prominent place, while to Hegel's followers there falls the rôle of defenders, who partly explain the teaching of the master, and partly give it greater definiteness in those points in which it had been left indefinite. The first attacks on Hegel's *Logic* appeared already during his life, and his intention was to have reviewed five of these together in the *Berliner Jahrbücher*. He let the matter rest, however, after having criticized the first two of those about to be mentioned. The work of Hülsemann, *On the Hegelian Theory, or Absolute Knowledge and Modern Pantheism* (Leipsic, 1829), which appeared anonymously, expresses by its title the objection it made to the system whose method it combated, and to which it opposed the distinction between reason and cause, a distinction which had been already made by Jacobi. To Hegel's not very friendly critique,—which, on account of its unctuous tone, was conjectured to have had a Catholic priest for its author,—Hülsemann replied in his work, *On the Science of the Idea* (Breslau, 1831). Along with this work, Hegel criticized Schubart and Carganico's work, *On Philosophy in General and Hegel's Encyclopedia in Particular* (Berlin, 1829). Schubart, in reply to this criticism, published his *Explanation to Hegel*. According to Schubart, philosophy is in no way a healthy manifestation like art, morality, religion, and empirical science, but a symptom of disease. It consists in the deification of the All, which, as the object of philosophy, is put by the ancients before the world, by modern philosophy and specially

by Hegel, in the world, and by Kant beyond the world. Hegel's fundamental error was, that he stretched too far the law of metamorphosis discovered by Goethe, a law which is confined to nature; and that thus he arrived at a theory which denied immortality and was revolutionary in politics, or at any rate decidedly anti-Prussian. This last objection is further developed in the pamphlet, *Hegel and Prussia* (Frankfort, 1841). The anonymous work of Kalisch, *Letters against the Hegelian Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* (two Parts, Berlin, 1829, 1830), was taken little notice of. This was not the case with the work of General Rühle von Lillienstern, a soldier distinguished alike for intellectual power and learning: *R. v. L. On Being, Non-being, and Becoming* (Berlin, 1829). In this work, to begin with, Hegel's claim that his system was a circle of circles was rejected as inconceivable, and then special stress was laid on the point that, as there is only one single thought which by simple repetition gives something new, namely, Nothing,—which, thought of as nothing, gives us affirmation,—we ought to begin with this, and not with Being.

AC⁵2. Of far more significance than all these works was that of a young man who was soon to belong to the weightiest opponents of the Hegelian philosophy. CHR. HERMANN WEISSE (born at Leipsic on August 10th, 1801; qualified as *Privatdocent* there in 1822; and died when full Professor of Philosophy on the 19th of September, 1866), in his work, *On the Present Standpoint of the Philosophical Sciences* (Leipsic, 1829), declared himself a follower of the Hegelian *Logic*, which he asserted had for its result what the System of Identity had begun with, and just for this reason counted all opponents of the latter as its own. The one omission in the *Logic* was, that it did not include within its province time and space, which, exactly like the other categories treated of by Hegel, belong to the necessary elements of thought. On the other hand, Hegel made far too large claims for his *Logic*; for although it is simply the groundwork of the real parts of philosophy, which has to do only with the universal forms of all reality, yet he placed it on an equality with these forms, and even set it above them, since he purposed by starting from the forms of being to reach in a logical way what exists in these forms, to get to matter, in fact. Since matter is not something absolutely necessary, but exists owing to the determination of some Being, we require here a higher form of cogni-

tion in which logical and actual knowledge interpenetrate, so that Nature and Spirit are recognised as what is higher, as contrasted with the logical Idea ; and speculative theology, which Hegel identifies with logic, is made the keystone of the system. Weisse took up pretty much the same standpoint in his *System of Æsthetics* (Leipsic, 1830), where, besides the objection that Hegel's doctrine, by overvaluing logic, results in a logical Pantheism, fault is found with Hegel because in his theory of Absolute Spirit he places science above art and religion, instead of closing his system with the latter, and because he puts the theory of cognition, or the science of knowledge, before both. In connection with his *Æsthetics*, Weisse has achieved the merit,—a merit recognised even by thinkers of an opposite school,—of having in the First Part, which treats of beauty in its universality and subjectivity, thoroughly examined the notion of the Ugly, apart from which, amongst other things, the humorous cannot be understood. The Second Part treats of the Beautiful in its special forms and objectivity in the separate arts ; and, finally, the Third Part, which treats of the Beautiful in its individuality, or where beauty has a subjective-objective existence, paves the way, by considering the nature of genius, moral beauty, and love, for the transition to speculative theology. Before Weisse, however, published this work, Hegel had died ; and he brought out a work entitled, *On the Relation of the Public to Philosophy at the time of Hegel's Decease* (Leipsic, 1832). The indifference which the public was beginning to show in regard to philosophy, Weisse explains from the fact, that what the preceding period had sought after, philosophy up to this time, working in harmony with the heroes of literature, had accomplished. It had consistently worked out the thought of an organic unity of reality or of nature. To the need, now awakened, of giving to the Godhead the proper place in the system, philosophy does not respond. Hegel in particular substituted the Absolute Idea for the Godhead, and thereby reached a logical Pantheism ; and Weisse no longer allows, as he did above, that Hegel's Absolute Idea is the same as the Absolute of the System of Identity. The true system should undoubtedly be divided into Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. Time and Space ought, however, to be treated of in the Logic, and in the Philosophy of Nature, in what Hegel calls the Swoon of Nature, the

system ought rather to recognise the freedom which goes beyond what is logical; and the Philosophy of Nature ought to be, therefore, no longer merely logical construction, but a philosophical empiricism. He thinks that the Philosophy of Spirit in particular ought to get a wholly different form from what it has in Hegel. In the Anthropology and Psychology, sense-perception, understanding, and reason ought to be deduced *a priori*, while at the same time justice ought to be done to empirical observation. The doctrine of Objective Spirit would give an account of language, the State, and universal history; and would represent the last-mentioned as a teleology of the spirit, in which there is a striving after what is reached by science, art, and religion. The treatment of these would fall to the doctrine of Absolute Spirit, which corresponds to the Ideas of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. Thus the lowest place would be occupied by an encyclopedia of the sciences, the second by æsthetics, the third by the philosophy of religion, which coincides with ethics, and which, in opposition to pantheism and deism, must hold fast by a personal God and moral freedom. As the defender of Hegel against all these writings of Weisse, there now came forward the man whom the master's previously mentioned "shake of the hand" (§ 329, 10) had so ennobled in the eyes of his School, that they awaited the appearance of his work with the greatest expectation and greeted it with applause. Göschel's *Monism of Thought* (Naumburg, 1832), which called itself an Apology by Modern Philosophy at the grave of its Founder, seeks to prove to Weisse that he had fallen into the hands of the arch enemy of all philosophy, into dualism. By his separation of the formal and the real sciences, he separated form and matter, that is, thought and being, whose unity is maintained by the more recent philosophy, according to which our thought is a reflection of creative thought. Since its method consists in the self-formation of the matter of thought, it has thereby surmounted formalism and materialism, into both of which precisely dualism falls, and dualism is absolutely incompatible with the Hegelian logic and method. The last remark bore very strongly on the circumstance, at all events striking, that Weisse, in word and deed, had shown himself to be a follower of the method which was intended to be the self-movement of the content, and yet demanded a philosophy with a wholly different con-

tent. And Weisse felt this so keenly, that in his next work, *The Idea of the Godhead* (Dresden, 1833), he let the dialectic method, which, according to his whole theory, ought to be employed above all in Logic, fall into the background. This work constitutes only the first part of Weisse's speculative theology. The second part, which was to have contained the philosophy of religion as a development of the historical forms of the religious consciousness, and the third part, which was to have contained the Ethics, did not appear. The pretentious tone manifest, not only in the preface to the book,—in which Weisse compares himself to the sibyl, because he concedes to the Hegelian philosophy a smaller and smaller amount of truth at the price of ever greater concessions,—but also in the book itself; and the oft-recurring remark, that here for the first time this or that difficulty is solved, not only drew down on Weisse some bitter attacks, but also resulted in his book being far less read than, for instance, Billroth's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Leipsic, 1837, 2d ed., 1844), which I edited, and which in reality merely repeat the thoughts first expressed by Weisse. The line of thought pursued in Weisse's book is as follows: The opposition between the ideas of the True and the Beautiful, which lies at the basis of that between science and art, is done away with in the idea of the Good. This is the leading idea in the ontological argument which, while uniting perfection and existence, unites beauty and truth without knowing it. Pantheism, as represented in the history of philosophy by Plato and Spinoza, does not get beyond this idea, which binds those two together in an immediate unity. If, on the contrary, the unity of both is thought of, not as an immediate existing unity, but as a unity of the underlying principle, then we are led to Deism, whose argument is the cosmological one, and whose philosopher is Leibnitz. The Christian idea goes beyond both of these one-sided conceptions, and has hitherto been grasped only by some mystics. It corresponds to the teleological argument, and demands that the doctrine of the Trinity be put on a speculative basis, by means of which,—in contrast with Deism, which sees in the world a mere piece of God's workmanship, and with pantheism, which sees in it simply a result of God,—we are enabled to comprehend creation, and redemption which is its goal, as well as immortality, though only that of the regenerate; while the antinomies of time and eternity, etc.,

are also harmonized. Weisse's book was an attempt towards this, though he afterwards confessed that he had done violence to the historical material.

3. Before passing on to the work which is Weisse's public disavowal of the Hegelian philosophy, mention may be made of certain publications the influence of which upon him is established beyond doubt by the alteration which they occasioned in his terminology. In North Germany, Schelling's influence in Munich had become something almost mysterious; and the way in which he treated those who, like F. Kapp,—who afterwards certainly took a terrible revenge,—told tales out of school, did not serve to spread his doctrines more widely. FRIEDRICH JULIUS STAHL (born on the 16th of January 1802, in Munich; died when Professor in Berlin and a member of the Prussian Upper House, at Brückenau, on the 10th of August, 1862), in the critical part of his *Philosophy of Law from an Historical Point of View* (2 vols., Heidelberg, 1830, 3rd ed., 1854), was the first to call attention to the fact, that while Hegel maintained the standpoint of the System of Identity, according to which the universal impersonal Reason comes to constitute individual personalities, and is thus the process by which the Absolute becomes personal in man, Schelling himself had gone beyond this. This is evident from the fact that he constructs philosophy,—which knows nothing higher than reason, and is thus rationalism with an analytic method,—of one part which may be called the negative part, because, for reason, that only is valid which cannot *not* be—*i.e.* bare necessity; while to this he adds as its complement a second positive part, in which speculation gives a true doctrine of freedom, and in which the place of the process in the former part is taken by divine action and will. That Schelling did not, as in Kapp's case, come forward with threats against this publication, renders it probable that he approved of it, or at any rate that he did not see in it any misrepresentation of his views. This became still more probable when the general introduction of J. Sengler's work, *On the Signification of Speculative Philosophy* (Heidelberg, 1837), appeared, which was followed later by the special introduction. In this, the true philosophy, which begins where rationalism ends, and conceives of the world as a free creation, was contrasted with rationalistic speculation. All doubts, however, disappeared when Schelling himself gave expression

to his views in almost identical terms, in his Preface to H. Becker's *Translation of a Fragment by Cousin* (Stuttgart, 1834), which, owing to the bitter manner in which he treated his former friends, gave just offence to the Hegelians. According to the *Preface*, philosophy must begin with the necessary element in thought, or just with what cannot *not* be thought, and which is thus of an entirely *a priori* character,—pure rationalism in fact,—because this absolutely necessary element, without which nothing is, is what is absolutely prior to God Himself and constitutes the peculiar possession of reason. With this, however, there is only given, to begin with, the negative *conditio sine quâ non* of knowledge; and the transition from this to positive philosophy, which is the most difficult point in the whole system, is made by getting a thorough grasp of the real process. Hegel, who wished to make the transition from the logical to the real in a logical way, never gets beyond Logic, or if he does, it is only by sophisms. He turns the process of reality into a wholly absurd process of the Notion, and predicates of mere being what has meaning only in reference to actual existence. True philosophy, therefore, rises superior to the opposition of rationalism and empiricism. If the empirical moment is let go, as is done by Hegel, then philosophy is changed into rationalism. The less there was to be found in these words of anything really definite, as to what positive philosophy should contain, and as to how the transition was to be made to it from the negative part, made it all the more easy for every one to picture a Schelling according to his own taste. Accordingly there scarce ever was a time when Schelling was so much praised from quite opposite quarters as then, when nobody knew what he taught. In a style which often reminds us of Goethe's *Grosskopftha*, all anti-Hegelians appealed to Schelling. The empiricists saw in him a convert to empiricism; the pectoral theologians rejoiced over his attack on the deification of the Notion; the orthodox appealed to the fact that he put what was positive above all else; in short, every one believed that he might close his statements with the remark, that Schelling would doubtless say the same thing. This is true to a certain extent even of Weisse, whose *Outlines of Metaphysic* (Hamburg, 1835) showed that Tarquin must still have been stiff-necked, since so much of what had been previously conceded to Hegel was now taken back; and certainly, along

with this, much that Weisse had previously taught was retracted. He seeks to set up in opposition to the Hegelian system of necessity, a system of freedom, which in its concrete parts deals with what cannot also be otherwise than it is, and with what may also be otherwise; and he holds that the Metaphysical part, which has to do with what cannot not be otherwise and what cannot be otherwise, must be preceded by a science of self-explanation, by a Logic in fact, which by an analysis of consciousness must establish the importance of the negation of the negation, as well as the applicability of the dialectical method to all parts of philosophy. How it accomplishes this, is discussed in a paper in Fichte's *Zeitschrift* belonging to the year 1837: *On the Three Fundamental Questions of Contemporary Philosophy*. A start is made with the known fact that it is impossible to abstract from certain forms which belong to all reality, and that these may be treated scientifically. Such forms are: Number, which constitutes the subject of arithmetic; Space, which constitutes the subject of geometry; and Time, which constitutes the subject of pure mechanics. These, then, are the central categories in the three parts of metaphysics, which sets up a system of those forms which underlie all reality when it exists, and therefore with hypothetical necessity. Since number with Hegel, too, occupies a central place, Weisse, in the *first* Part of the *Metaphysics*, which treats of the doctrine of Being under the headings of quality, quantity, and measure, shows but little divergence from Hegel. The divergence is much greater in the *second* Part, in the doctrine of Essence, where the specific units of essentiality, the categories of the notion of space and the fundamental characteristics of what is corporeal, make up the sections. The divergence is greatest of all in the *third* Part, in the doctrine of Reality, which treats of the categories of reflection, of the notion of time, and finally of the fundamental characteristics of living existence. It closes with the absolutely free spiritual essence, from which as a free Creator the world gets its reality. Owing to the fact that Weisse expressly connects the first part with the earlier ontology, the second with cosmology, and the third with psychology and theology, and now treats of cohesion, gravity, and so on, in the second part of the fundamental science, and of spirit in the third part, the questions continually force themselves upon the reader: What is still left, then, for the

concrete sciences? and, How far can gravity and cohesion be called forms of *all* existence and therefore, too, of immaterial existence? The first question is met by the statement that here we have to do, not with actual gravity, but with the notion of gravity. The second question remains unanswered.

4. Before Weisse again appears in another place, mention must be made of what was accomplished by one who afterwards stood in a very close relation to him, IMMANUEL HERMANN FICHTE (born 1797; made professor in Bonn in 1835; from 1842 till his retirement in 1865, professor in Tübingen; was raised to the rank of a nobleman, and is still living in Stuttgart.) [Fichte died at Stuttgart, Aug. 8th, 1879.—Ed.] He had already at an earlier period made himself known by his *Propositions towards a Propædæutic of Theology* (Stuttgart, 1826), and still more by his *Contributions to the Characterization of Modern Philosophy* (Sulzbach, 1829. 2nd ed., 1841), which, as the title itself suggests, have as their problem the mediation of opposites. In the *first* section, the merit of Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume is stated to consist in the fact that they brought into the fore-ground the question of the origin of knowledge. In the *second* section, it is further shown that Kant, who found in this a point of contact with the latter, as well as Jacobi, who supplemented Kant's views, both fell into a contradiction, the former into that of the thing-in-itself and appearance, the latter into that of faith and knowledge. The Science of Knowledge began to solve this contradiction; and for this reason, accordingly, in the *third* section (in the form, however, in which Fichte stated it in Berlin, *vid.* § 315, 2), it is given the place of honour as beginning the present period. The System of Identity, which is closely connected with the Science of Knowledge, approaches too near to Spinozism, although its transformation into the science of logic, especially by the improved application of the dialectic method, constitutes the highest point reached by the philosophy of the present day—a point from which alone any further development is possible. What is to be expected from this philosophy, is shown in the *fourth* section, which finds fault with all previous systems for making too little of individuality. This comes from their not rising to the thought of a free creating God, who wishes to see His image in free spirits. But because what originates in freedom is not to be determined *a priori*, the development of the Notion

stops short here, and requires to be supplemented by the perception of reality ; and the philosophy of freedom must at the same time be a science of experience of the most real sort. Fichte expressed himself regarding Hegel in quite a different way and much more sharply in another work, which he himself calls a continuation of the *Contributions* and at the same time the first part of his system : *On the Contrast, Turning Point, and Aim of Contemporary Philosophy* (Heidelberg, 1832). Of the three tendencies in philosophy, the *objective* tendency, or the one-sided theory of being, has partly a constructive character, as in the case of Spinoza, Schelling, Oken, Wagner, Blasche, Hegel, and others, and partly a mystical character, as in the case of Baader, Günther, Görres, St. Martin, Schubert. Amongst these tendencies, the system of Hegel, that "masterpiece of erroneous consistency or consistent error," is treated in greatest detail, as the pantheism which does not indeed make God all things, but certainly makes Him all spirits. There is common to both groups the presupposition of the identity of thought and being. In contrast to them, accordingly, stands the *subjective* or reflective tendency, of which the chief representatives are Kant and Jacobi, and along with them Fries and Bouterwek, whose views are closely connected with theirs. This tendency finally results in a subjective scepticism. The third *mediating* tendency is represented chiefly by Troxler and Krause, whom Fichte rightly calls the special pioneers of his own efforts, the former on account of the matter of his theories, the latter because in his system the first part has an analytic-inductive character. In fact, the true philosophy, just as it binds together experience and the Notion, must also unite the doctrine of being and the doctrine of knowledge, and thus not simply be a theory of knowledge, although in the first part it has to be this. Fichte says of this true philosophy, that it is not put forward as a new system in opposition to previous systems, but comprehends them all, while it is at the same time a history of philosophy. This remark stamped him in the eyes of many as an eclectic. In reality, Fichte himself, in spite of the fact that this name annoyed him, showed himself to be an eclectic, when in one of his later works he speaks of his intention "of conducting my own philosophical investigations historically only." One who, like Fichte, so readily appropriates every new thought of another, and indeed every new

interpretation of thought quite foreign to his own, in order "to supplement it," "to get a deeper grasp of it," "to carry it further," cannot very easily find a place amongst the philosophers of modern times. By following this method he has caused a good deal of irritation, and has not always steered clear of the rocks against which he warned Sengler in the Circular Letter he addressed to him. Fichte also repeated afterwards, that the time for founding schools and systems was at an end, although intimations are not wanting that the different equally warranted systems should first start from his own, while progress would consist in their co-operation. And now to pass to the system itself. It is in accordance with what has just been said, that in Fichte's *Outlines of a System of Philosophy* (Heidelberg, 1833), the first part treats of *knowledge as knowledge of self*. It is here shown that the inner dialectic urges consciousness to raise itself from the stage of perception to that of knowledge. The exposition, which often reminds us of his father's *Pragmatic History of Intelligence* (*vid.* § 312, 4), and still more of Schelling's Transcendental Idealism (*vid.* § 318, 1), which it follows even in its confusion of epochs and periods; and finally, frequently of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (§ 329, 2), distinguishes in each of the four stages through which consciousness passes (perception, presentation, thought, knowledge), three sub-stages, and closes by showing that the one-sidedness of rational perception (Troxler), and the one-sidedness of speculative thought (Hegel), are done away with in the speculative intuitive knowledge, which thinks upon what was originally thought in God. Thus the contrast of *a priori* and *a posteriori*, of philosophy and theosophy, disappears; and in particular this result is reached, that there can be no talk of a contrast of thought and being when we have arrived at absolute being. Accordingly, Fichte is able to sum up the results of this part as follows: Knowledge is not simply knowledge of self, but as such proves itself at the same time to be knowledge of truth, of being. From this point onwards philosophy is knowledge of being, or ontology, which constitutes its second division. He presents at the same time its further development as follows: Within ontology the same course of progress holds good; the thought of primal being unfolds itself by means of ever richer mediating determinations into that of primal spirit; from knowledge of being is produced knowledge of

God ; from primal truth comes what is the highest and at the same time the richest truth, and this again diffuses itself in the revelation it gives through the world of nature and spirit ; in the knowledge of which consciousness goes completely round its philosophical cycle, and yet remains absolutely with itself. It was natural, owing to the position which Fichte had assigned to Hegel, that he should have hailed with delight the objection expressed in Schelling's Preface, that Hegel did not get beyond Rationalism. The little work, *On the Conditions of a Speculative Theism* (Heidelberg, 1835), grew out of a notice of this Preface. We may certainly regard it as a mark of the influence of Schelling's Preface, that Fichte thereupon censures Hegel so severely for not duly separating being from what actually is, *i.e.* the existent ; a separation which up to this time Fichte had not made himself. This took place most notably in the *Ontology* (Heidelberg, 1836), which appeared as a second part of the *Outlines*, though not in quite a complete form, as the third part, the doctrine of ideas, was at first held back by Fichte. Besides taking up the *Logic* of Hegel, the starting-point of which Fichte admits that he takes, a great deal of consideration was given to Weisse's *Metaphysics*, without its being actually mentioned. Just because the former of these works was made the starting-point, Fichte's relation to it is mostly polemical, while he is in agreement with the second work in some very essential points. Thus, for instance, *Ontology* is to Fichte the science only of the forms of existence, infinite as well as finite. It does not have to do with the positive constituent parts of divine reality, so that it requires to be supplemented by the concrete and real parts of philosophy, which comprise experience, and show not only what belongs to real being, but that there *is* something real. His agreement with Weisse is seen most of all in the fact that he reckons Time and Space amongst the universal forms of existence or reality, and proposes to treat them, just as he did Number, in *Ontology*. Just as Hegel, in the first exposition of his *Logic*, notwithstanding the trichotomy, classed together the first two parts as Objective Logic, Fichte, too, who, in the headings Doctrine of Being (§§ 1-125) and Doctrine of Essence (§§ 126, 304), was quite at one with Hegel and Weisse, brought together these two parts under a common name. Of course, since according to his arrangement the greater part of what Hegel treats of in the

"Subjective Logic" fell to the theory of Knowledge, he was not able to retain this name, and just as little that of Objective Logic. In contrast, accordingly, to the Doctrine of *Categories*, which embraces the *first* two parts of the Ontology,—which at first appeared alone,—he brings forward the third part in the form of a Doctrine of *Ideas*. Categories, then, are forms of all reality, forms of existence; Ideas, on the other hand, are forms of every real system, world-forms. With reference to the first part of ontology, the Doctrine of Being, or the "sphere of simple notions," Fichte here, and also in a later work, lays stress on his divergence from Hegel, inasmuch as he treats quantity before quality. But, since he makes all those categories which Hegel had called categories of quality, precede quantity as the original categories, the difference between him and Hegel is not so very great. In fact, it seems to disappear altogether when Fichte, in the later work just referred to, puts it thus: quantity presupposes the qualitative. Connected with this there is the awkward circumstance, that Fichte now treats under the heading of quality categories which, as he himself allows, are notions of relation; and yet, according to his own express declaration, their sphere ought to constitute the second part, the doctrine of Essence. More important are still other points of difference, which at the same time concern Fichte's most essential doctrines. Fichte repeatedly asserts that no real contradiction arises, but only an ontological one, when thoughts which we employ show that they stand in need of a complement, and without which therefore they are mutually contradictory; as, for instance, predicate-notions without subject, formal notions without matter, effects without causes, and so on. This assertion, with which he connected his discussions on the dialectic method, led many of Hegel's followers to reproach him with having made of this method a purely regressive process by means of determinations of reflection. If at this point it was the formal methodological difference between the two systems which came especially into view, the material difference appeared particularly in the anti-Spinozistic zeal with which Fichte, with frequent appeals to Leibnitz, maintains the reality of many primal positions and monads, by means of which ground is gained for a philosophical view to which Fichte soon begins to attach the title of a system of individuality. This name, as also the way in which he emphasises the eternal nature

of the primal-positions, together with the distinction he makes between these and the (uniting) monads and (conscious) spirit-monads, belongs to a somewhat later time. In the ontology, the primal-positions which are to be conceived of as the work of the primal-Spirit, are especially spoken of as a means of deliverance from Pantheism ; and in this connection Herbart alone is credited with having recognised a part of the truth. It was unfortunate both for the reception and the comprehension of Fichte's system, that the *Ontology* appeared without the parts constituting the Philosophy of the Real ; for when in the former mention is made of assimilation, soul, spirit, primal-spirit, and so on, little help is to be got from the repeated warnings that all this must be understood only ontologically, and not at all in the sense of a Philosophy of the Real. Even those who interested themselves in Fichte could not get rid of the feeling that it was unfortunate that he did not even prepare for his own use an encyclopedic survey of his system, and thus avoid including in formal philosophy what belonged to the Philosophy of the Real. It was still more unfortunate that the doctrine of Ideas, about which he had remarked that it coincided with speculative theology, did not appear simultaneously with the doctrine of Categories. To assert that speculative theology was a formal science, did not please the one side ; to say that in it the negative dialectic was to make way for the positive, appeared to the other side to separate it too much from the rest of ontology. Finally, still others saw in Fichte's remark, that after formal philosophy was completed, there still remained, as real objects, God, nature, and spirit, the announcement of two different theologies, a formal and a real. His essay, written in 1838, *On the Relation between Formal and Real Principles*, which was the above-mentioned Circular Letter to Sengler, did not satisfy even his friends, who advised him to finish his system with speculative theology, and not, as he here does, with the philosophy of history. The points of contact between Fichte and Weisse were so many, that when the former founded the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und speculative Theologie* (appeared from 1837-42 in Bonn, and then in Tübingen, and from 1847 in Halle under the editorship of Fichte and Ulrici, who were joined by Wirth in 1852), and Weisse became one of the most constant contributors, the public got accustomed to regard the standpoint of the two men as one and the same. This feeling

was strengthened by the mutual acknowledgement of what each had got from the other. Weisse confessed that it was by Fichte's influence that he had been brought to separate the theory of knowledge from metaphysics, while Fichte, on the other hand, praised Weisse's theory of time and space and bore testimony to the fact that his friend was the only one who was able to write an encyclopædia of philosophy, and so on. It had not been noticed by readers of the *Zeitschrift* that soon after it started some differences of opinion had been referred to; and so people went on mentioning Fichte and Weisse together as if they were one man, till at last Weisse in his Circular Letter to Fichte, *The Philosophical Problem of the Present* (Leipsic, 1842), publicly forbade this, not altogether to Fichte's satisfaction. Fichte, too, must here be left for a time, till his later works come under discussion (*vid.* § 346, 4).

5. Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, which had originated in conscious opposition to Hegel, became, as will readily be understood, the audience-chamber of all anti-Hegelians. For this reason CARL PHILIPP FISCHER, who was formerly at Tübingen and is now at Erlangen [Fischer afterwards removed to Kunnstatt, and died at Landau, Feb. 25, 1885—Ed.], became one of the contributors. In spite of many points of contact between his views and those of Weisse and Fichte, he differed from them to this extent, that he did not take Hegel as his starting-point, as had been done by the former, nor the later form of the *Science of Knowledge*, as had been done by the latter, but Schelling's *Munich Lectures*, along with those of Baader and Oken which he had also attended. From the first he was influenced by Hegel merely in a formal way. His work: *The Freedom of the Human Will in the Progress of its Moments* (Tübingen, 1833), develops the thought that the creative will of God,—the will which God has, as distinguished from the will by which God is and which He is,—is the only reality. This will shows itself in the animal merely as something impelling, as impulse. In man, however, it shows itself in such a way that at first, as primitive man, he rather repeats it in himself unconsciously, and then, since he is able to set himself in opposition to it, he actually does so, but finally, by the help of the Redeemer, in whom the Son of God is one with God the Son, he attains to perfect freedom. This work was followed by *Outlines of the Science of Metaphysics* (Stuttgart, 1834). In complete contrast to Fichte and Weisse as influenced by Fichte, both

of whom censured Hegel for claiming that his Metaphysic was a Logic as well, Fischer allows that Hegel had given a Logic, *i.e.*, a science of the subjective forms of thought, but no Metaphysic. This last, as the general foundation of the real sciences,—the philosophy of nature, of subjective and objective spirit, and of religion,—is accordingly divided into the four parts of cosmology, psychology, pneumatology, and theology. In a way which shows that his attendance on Baader's lectures had borne fruit, Fischer in the First Part carries out more fully, and at the same time more definitely, the thoughts which had been developed in his first work, particularly the distinction made between primitive man, in whom the processes of creation and self-creation are still one, and man as he appears in history. The Second Part defines feeling, imagination and reason as stages in the liberation of the will as it manifests itself in the subjective spirit, and closes with the relation of man to God. Pelagianism and Augustinianism are refuted by the doctrine of freedom, and the passing through the stage of Polytheism is laid down, as in Schelling's *Philosophy of Mythology*, as a condition of the appearance of the Son of God. The Third Part, the doctrine of objective spirit, is almost exclusively occupied with history, the three periods of which take the form of the kingdom of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus they are not revelations of an hypostatized abstraction, such as Hegel's World-Spirit is, but are the revelations of a creative will. In the Fourth Part, finally, from the life of man as consisting of essence, soul, and spirit, and as the image of God, is inferred the triple personality of God Himself. The Creation, the Fall, and Redemption are also discussed, though not without a repetition of what was contained in the First Part. In the real creation of primitive man, God became conscious of his being, in the Redeemer's existence in time of His will, and in the completion of the objective spirit, of His idea—conscious, that is, in the actual way in which He loves and is loved, knows and is known. The feeling that here metaphysics, even if only in outline, contains all that was to have been looked for from the parts of the philosophy of reality, is perhaps the reason why Fischer later (*vid.* § 346, 8), when he wrote an encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences, let the latter go. What distinguishes him,—not to his disadvantage, be it said,—from Fichte and Weisse, with whom the reading public associated him, is, that he allowed

himself to be influenced, to a much greater extent than either of these, by Oken, and particularly by Baader.

6. CHRISTLIEB JULIUS BRANISS (born on the 18th September, 1792, in Breslau, where he was Professor of Philosophy from the year 1826 until he was pensioned in 1870, and where he died in 1873), brought himself into notice by his successful prize essay : *Logic in Relation to Science* (Berlin, 1823), and still more by his highly brilliant and able work : *On Schleiermacher's Theory of Faith* (Berlin, 1824). In this latter work he showed that, according to Schleiermacher's principles, the perfect man could not appear in the middle but only at the end of history. Braniss was looked upon, and is still by many, as a disciple of Steffens. He is not exclusively so at any rate, as is proved by his *Outlines of Logic* (Breslau, 1830), in which from the logic of the notion of sense-perception and understanding he passes to the logic of the notion of reason, and comes to the conclusion that scientific thought consists merely in the fact that the subject carries into execution the self-movement of the idea, and that logic has to describe the form which this act on the part of the subject takes. Accordingly it is shown that every finite notion is only a relative unity of thought and being, and that owing to this relativity it is in contradiction with itself and demands the removal of this contradiction in a higher notion. Since the contradiction repeats itself in this higher notion, the way leads from the false or abstract to what is true, and its goal is the totality of all those notions, the Idea, namely, as the absolute unity of thought and being. This process is entitled by Braniss, construction, and not dialectic, as Hegel called it. In the closest connection with the *Logic* stands Braniss' *System of Metaphysics* (Breslau, 1834). After a most delightful introduction,—and introductions are Braniss' strong point ; for his most widely-read book, *The History of Philosophy since Kant* (Königsberg, 1842), does not get beyond the Introduction, and does not even finish that,—and by means of a preamble appended to it, Braniss reaches the following conclusions : Free thought by an act of resolution is enabled to abstract, first of all, from any given content. This, however, appears still in the form of a negative relation to such content, and must therefore also abstract from it. This done, nothing is left remaining but that act, hence pure action, and with this we ought to begin, and not with pure being, as Hegel does. Absolute action by being thought

is made into an object, and is therefore a form of being. We thus get two opposite determinations, action and being, and these when united give us being which has resulted from its act, *i.e.*, the positing of self or consciousness, so that the absolute act presents itself as absolute spirit. Since, however, it may be further shown that this absolute spirit can only be thought of as existing, a fact which seems to vindicate the ontological argument, we therefore pass from the absolute act in which, to begin with, the notion of God did not occur, to God. The *first part* of metaphysics is thus ideal theology, which finds no contradiction in the result arrived at, and therefore no dialectic motive for going further. It explains the idea of God in its several parts, and thus comes to the conclusion that God is to be thought of as a creating created personality, who embraces the Notion of Himself. Reflection on one's own being, however, as distinguished from that content, gives rise, in the first place as actual fact, to a knowledge which has for its content : There is an other besides God ; and since there is no existence except what is posited by Him, God posits an other than Himself. The *ideal cosmology* gives the explication of this proposition as the second part of Metaphysics. Since it is here evident that the activity of God in positing His "other" is an activity which shows itself in negation, and that in virtue of this, what is external to God is shown to be nothing, the act of positing turns out to be a positing out of nothing, *i.e.*, creation. Since, further, the creative act comes to an end in the creature and yet remains, we get in this way a graduated series of created things (cf. Schelling in his *Philosophy of Nature*, § 318, 4). These are first considered only in reference to their form in *ontology*, which thus develops all the categories that follow from the notion of the creature, and that arrive at the category of Ideality as the highest of all, *i.e.*, at what the creature ought to be. In getting so far, however, metaphysics has reached a point at which, because it lays the basis for ethics, just as ontology does for physics, it is called by Braniss, *Ethicology* (Teleology would perhaps have been better). As it was shown in the Ontology that it lies in the notion of the creature to originate, to continue, to be manifold, separate, and so on, the Ethicology shows how action realizes itself in three stages,—in the form of existence which results from the action of opposing forces, namely, matter ; in the action which sets itself an end, namely, life ; to whose highest stage, which

goes beyond the life of plants and animals, this action raises itself, so as to do away with the inner opposition; that is, it raises itself to the stage of spirit. Spirit itself passes through the stages of the soul, the thinking and willing subject, in which the ontological forms become forms of thought, and whose subjective desires become objective, and finally through the stage of free spirit, in which God reveals Himself as in something that is a reflection of Himself. The active form assumed by the free spirit in morality, where cognition becomes recognition of God, and volition obedience to the Divine will, is the realized end of the world, in which the act of God and the act of self are brought into harmony. The question whether this end is immediately reached by the spirit's negating itself and allowing the affirmation of God to be realized in it, or whether the spirit does not permit this, and thereby becomes evil, so that the realization of the end of the world becomes possible only by means of redemption, is not one to be decided *a priori*. This question, accordingly, leads to the consideration of the Idea in the actual world, *i.e.*, it takes us from metaphysics or ideal philosophy to the philosophy of the Real, which treats of nature in its actual form and of history. Braniss has not, however, given us the philosophy of the real, and has thus left it with each reader of his *Metaphysics* to answer for himself the question whether, had a philosophy of the real been forthcoming, the same thing would not have happened with Braniss as with Weisse, Fichte, and Fischer, namely, that a great deal would have disappeared from the ideal philosophy, or would have appeared twice in the system.

7. The school of Hegel did not remain silent in presence of any of these attacks. The *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* in particular, then undoubtedly the foremost journal of learning, espoused the cause of its spiritual father. In reply to the work of Rühle von Lilienstern it was observed by K. R. (Rosenkranz?) that philosophical conceptions were not to be constructed according to geometrical methods (June, 1835). Weisse's works were criticized by Gabler (September, 1832), and indirectly by Hinrichs also, when he (July, 1832) wrote a notice of Göschel's *Monism*. Both repeat in reality only what the last-mentioned had said. The attacks made from the neo-Schellingian standpoint gave special provocation to the School. Stahl was attacked by Feuerbach (July, 1835) in a witty but coarse manner; Sengler, by the author of these

Outlines (April, 1835) with the assurance which is unfortunately wont to characterize the criticisms of budding authors. Schelling's *Preface* called Hinrichs to arms (February, 1835), and Gabler (October, 1835) considered it was his duty not to be behind him. Weisse's *Metaphysics*, which has many points of contact with the views of Schelling, found in Rosenkranz (April, 1835) a bitter critic. Fichte's *Contributions* were criticized by Michelet (May, 1830) and his *Contrast and Turning-point* by Hinrichs (November, 1832, and May, 1835). The former finds fault with Fichte's transcendentalism, the latter with his dualism. The first-mentioned is silent as to the charge of pantheism made against Hegel, the second energetically repels it. Fichte's *Ontology* was discussed in detail in a book by Schaller which will be immediately mentioned. Of the writings of Fischer mentioned above immediately after those of Fichte, the first was very favourably dealt with by Göschel (November, 1833), and the larger work, the *Metaphysics*, was treated in a thorough manner by Schmidt in Erfurt, who recognised its merits even when he was finding fault with it. Objection was especially made to Fischer's way of looking at everything as the product of will, and at the same time as dialectically necessary. Braniss, finally, found a critic for his *Metaphysics* in Rosenkranz (March, 1835), who took up his *Logic* at the same time. He finds fault with some things, but welcomes the book because he says there is philosophy in it, and not mere talk about philosophy. JULIUS SCHALLER (born in Magdeburg in 1810, died in 1868 when professor of philosophy in Halle) defended the Hegelian standpoint against all these attacks at once, not only in a separate criticism, but in a work of his own. His *Philosophy of Our Time* (Leipsic, 1837), after an historical introductory section, seeks to refute the objections which had been brought against the Hegelian philosophy, namely, that it was dogmatism and formalism, that it denied freedom, and left no personality to God. In this connection questions were touched upon which will more properly be discussed in the second group of phenomena. An attempt is made to show that the opponents, who think that by means of Hegel's method they can arrive at results different from his, are really employing another method, that *Logic* does not have to do with forms only, and that the neo-Schellingian opposition of freedom and necessity does away with the former. Finally, a detailed analysis of Fichte's *Ontology*

is given ; and in connection with this the wish is expressed that the philosophy of the real might at last appear, so that we might see what formal philosophy had left for it to say.

§ 333.

1. Amidst all the bitterness with which the strife between the men just mentioned and the Hegelian school was carried on, both of the opposing parties occupied one and the same standpoint, in so far as monism, as expressed by Göschel, was regarded by them as the theory which alone could satisfy the demands of reason. The combatants accordingly considered an opponent as already beaten, when once they had established against him the charge of dualism ; as the Peripatetics formerly did in the case of their opponents, when they had shut them up to the doctrine of endless progress. Now, however, men appeared who combated just the very point both parties held fast by. They accordingly made hardly any distinction between Weisse and the Hegelians, but saw similar errors in both, whether they described them according to what they might teach as Pantheists, or according to the sensation they had made, as representatives of the "fashionable" philosophy.


2. Mention may be made first of CARL FRIEDRICH BACHMANN (born 1785, died when professor in Jena, 1855), who, at first an enthusiastic follower of Schelling and pupil of Hegel, had shown himself to be in close agreement with both in some lectures which he published under the title of *Philosophy and its History* (Jena, 1811). In his second work, *The Philosophy of our Time* (Jena, 1816), he showed that he departed considerably from the ideas of both, until psychological studies and a thorough acquaintance with the Aristotelian Logic brought him to the view that Hegel's influence threatened logic with destruction. The results of these studies were given to the world in his works : *On the Hope of a Union between Physics and Psychology* (Utrecht, 1821), and the *System of Logic* (Leipsic, 1828). His work, *On Hegel's System and the New Transfiguration of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1833) was the fruit of his conviction with regard to Hegel's influence. In this work fault was found with the presupposition of the identity of thought and being, as being the cardinal error, which was bound to lead and had led to the identification of

logic and metaphysics, and to contempt for empirical knowledge. To the criticism by Hinrichs (*Berliner Jahrbücher*, May, 1834), as well as to a Circular Letter addressed to him by Rosenkranz, *Hegel, A Circular Letter to Dr. C. F. Bachmann* (Königsberg, 1834), he replied in his *Anti-Hegel* (Jena, 1835) in a style for which the jocose tone of Rosenkranz's Letter had undoubtedly given occasion.

3. Bachmann's objection to the Hegelian philosophy was, that in laying down being and thought as one, all philosophy was turned into logic. From a different quarter, on the other hand, it was objected, as regards both Hegel and his monistic opponents, that the laying down of all existence as one, led to the theory that all is one, to pantheism in fact. ANTON GÜNTHER (born on the 17th November, 1783, in Lindenau in Bohemia; died on the 24th February, 1862, in Vienna as a secular priest) is worthy of note on account of the fact that he was the only one who, in this period of the *Epigoni*, succeeded at once in founding a school. Decisive in this regard was the fact that he had as his associate JOHANN HEINRICH PABST (born in 1785 in Linda in Eichsfelde; Doctor of Medicine, and for a long time Austrian military surgeon; died in Vienna in 1838); for his own peculiar way of treating everything as a humorist, which reminds us at once of Jean Paul, Hamann, and Baader, but in which he excels all three, extends even to the titles of his works, and would have frightened away many whom Pabst won over to his theory, or at all events whom he filled with respect for it. Günther's works are: *Elements of the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity* (Vienna, 1828-29, 2nd ed., 1846-48), *Peregrin's Banquet* (Vienna, 1830), *Southern and Northern Lights on the Horizon of Speculative Theology* (Vienna, 1832), *Janus-heads* (edited by himself and Pabst, Vienna, 1834), *The Last Creed-maker* (Vienna, 1834, on Baur and Möhler), *Thomas a Scrupulis* (Vienna, 1835, on Weisse and Fichte), *The Juste-milieu in German Philosophy* (Vienna, 1838), *Eurystheus and Hercules* (Vienna, 1834), *Lydia*, a philosophical "Keepsake," edited in company with Dr. Veith (Vienna, 1849-52). Of works by Pabst there appeared: *Man and his History* (Vienna, 1830), *Is there a Philosophy of Christianity?* (Cologne, 1832), *Adam and Christ, a Contribution to the Theory of Marriage* (Vienna, 1835), besides essays in the *Janus-heads* and in some Journals. Amongst the men who ranged themselves along

with Günther and Pabst may be mentioned the celebrated preacher Veith, then CARL VON HOCK (died on the 2nd Jan., 1869, when president of the *Oberst Rechnungshof* in Vienna). His *Cholerodea* (Vienna, 1832) is written in imitation of the master in its tone as well as in its ideas, while his *Cartesius and his Opponents*, but especially his *Gerbert, or Pope Silvester II. and his Century*, contain some very thorough and purely historical investigations. J. Merten, in his *Chief Questions of Metaphysics* (Trier, 1840), shows himself a decided follower of Günther. Volkmuth received an impulse from Günther, as is evident from his work, *The Trinitarian Pantheism from Thales to Hegel* (Cologne, 1837). Later, however, he not only parted company with him, but quite turned against him. Kreuzhage took up a half-friendly position with regard to the School in his *Communications on the Influence of Philosophy upon the Development of the Inner Life* (Mainz, 1831), and in his work, *On the Knowledge of Truth* (Münster, 1836). He was evidently helped to his religious philosophy in contrast to "the very logical but erroneous Hegelian philosophy," more by Baader than by Günther. When the works of Oischinger (1852), and Clemens (1853) appeared, attacking Günther's orthodoxy, and which were perhaps designed to evoke a severer Papal decree than the one which actually came forth, Knoodt, in Bonn, in his *Clemens and Günther* (3 vols., Vienna, 1853-54), and Baltzer, in Breslau, in his *New Letters to Dr. Anton Günther* (Breslau, 1853), came forward simultaneously in opposition to these attacks. Michelis, in his *Critique of Günther's Philosophy*, Paderborn, 1864, appears certainly as an opponent of Günther, but as a worthy and respectful one, who does not seek to take revenge for the disdainful way in which Günther had treated him. The study of Hegel, especially of his *Phenomenology*, had brought Günther as early as the year 1820 to seek in Descartes a protection against what appeared to him the pantheistic teaching of Hegel. He sought this in Descartes just because, after the first period in the process of the comprehension of Christ, the period of the construction of dogmas, had been closed by the Council of Trent, it was Descartes who within the Catholic Church introduced the second period, that of speculative theology. The fact that Descartes takes his stand on self-consciousness would not in itself have afforded him the protection he sought, for it is recognised on all hands that Hegel

does this as well. It was the dualism of Cartesianism, however, which was selected for praise as its supreme merit, as being the peculiarly Christian standpoint, and of which also the transcendentalism of semi-panteists is a residue. The starting-point in self-consciousness and the dualism are harmonized by means of a proposition which originated with Fichte, a fact which Günther does not recognise. It is as follows : Self-consciousness is not possible without the excitation given by another self-consciousness, an excitation which each man receives from another man, while the first or primitive man receives it from God. It is not so much the not-I, but rather the I-not, which is the indispensable correlate of the Ego. In saying this, however, you already say that the Ego is finite both as regards its appearance and manifestations, and hence limited, and finite also as regards its being, and hence conditioned. From the first statement it further results that I am sacrificed to another, and therefore exist for this other and not for myself. In this way we get what is material, what assumes a bodily form, and I thus find myself in virtue of my limitation to be body. But since I thus find *myself*, I exist for myself ; I am the opposite of matter, namely, spirit. I, as the individual man, am thus a synthesis of body and spirit. As body, I am a part of nature, as spirit, I am a part of the world of spirits. That Descartes posited mere dead extension instead of body, is to be explained as a remnant of the scholastic way of viewing nature. To body belong life and animation, and nature accordingly is something which organizes, which is an effort to reach self-consciousness, and which finally, in sensation, attains to the possession of an inner power of formation that must be called consciousness. Pabst very often calls it self-consciousness, too ; Günther does this more rarely, and mostly with the addition of limitations, such as "figurative," and so on. Both, however, employ the formula that, when all is said, there is no existence which is not self-conscious existence, without stating, as Baader had done, that it originated with Fichte. The distinction between absolute and relative self-consciousness rests upon this, that the former posits itself, while the latter finds or comprehends itself. For this reason, accordingly, Pabst declares that one might quite well accept Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. On the other hand, Hegel conceived quite falsely of the relation between spirit and the essence of nature, when



he defined them as stages, *i.e.*, as quantitatively different. On the contrary, they are qualitatively, essentially, different substances, and the denial of their substantial difference brought him too, as it has so many others, to Pantheism, which may take a materialistic as well as a spiritualistic form, as is shown in the instances of Hobbes and Leibnitz. The essence of nature manifests a generic life, a life of the species; spirit, a personal life; and thus also the self-consciousness which we can attribute to nature, and which shows itself, for instance, in instinct, etc., is *its* and not the consciousness of individuals, while the spirit is *for itself*, and has consciousness. The thoughts of nature are therefore notions, and hence Hegel was able to conceive of them correctly; and his mistake is only that he has put nature in the place of the totality of being. Thoughts of nature are notions, while on the contrary the thoughts of the spirit are *ideas*, and therefore both should certainly not be thought of as forms of existence of one and the same essence, but rather, as they are mutually opposed in their essence, so also are they in their manner of working. Nature as the impersonal or generic, manifests emanation (production), spirit manifests immanent working (creation). As from the limited nature of self-consciousness must be inferred the dualism which is in it and in the world, so from its nature as conditioned must be inferred a second dualism which still more directly cuts at the root of Pantheism. By negating the negation which lies in the nature of the finite, we reach the thought of something which is in no way limited or conditioned, and therefore is in every respect the opposite of that from which we started. If we have here different substances bound together in personal unity, so in the other case we have different persons in one substance. If we have in the finite either emanent or immanent activity which are united in man only in time, in God the emanation of the Son is eternally united with the creative activity of the thought of the world, and so on. Just as this inductive analytic path leads us to the opposition of the finite and the infinite, so exactly the same result is reached by the deductive and synthetic path, when it is seen that in the distinction of persons there clearly lies a three-fold negation, so that in this way God, by thinking Himself, thinks at the same time what is the negation of the Triune God, the non-Ego of God, which He can posit. Since it is unthinkable that God should think eternally what He might posit and not

actually posit it, the thought of God leads to a real non-Ego of God in which, since in Him emanation and immanence are one, either emanation without immanence, or immanence without emanation manifests itself, and so on. Therefore the world is not, as Pantheism teaches, to be conceived of as an emanation but as a contraposition of God, and hence so far from its being correct to say that God realizes Himself or even comes to consciousness by the creation of the world, we ought on the contrary to maintain, that if God posits Himself He does *not* produce substances, and if He creates, He does not posit Himself. Those who make God come to self-consciousness or become a person in man, are pantheists, those who hold that there is a gradual increase of consciousness in Him, are semi-pantheists or Pantheists of personality. Monadism constitutes the direct opposite of Pantheism, as for instance the monadism of Herbart, which has no place for God. Christian monotheism is superior to both, and ought in quite a special sense to be called Theism. On account of this contraposition, God, as the manifoldness of essence in formal unity, stands in contrast to this unity of essence which manifests itself in formal manifoldness, that is, the creature. Thus the same result is reached by the regressive and progressive paths, namely, that the Creator and what is created manifest no unity of essence, so that God can be called spirit only in the sense of His not being nature. Strictly taken, there is contained in this statement a spiritualism which is as open to censure as the naturalism of Baader, who places nature in God. In contrast to this, the true philosophy teaches the double dualism between Creator and creature, and within the latter, between nature and spirit. With the exception of his theory of creation, there is no point with which Günther occupies himself so much as the theory of Incarnation, which in his *Elements* forms a second part to the doctrine of creation, as a first part. In connection with this, the view is strongly maintained that the Incarnation is the completion of Creation, and is therefore not dependent upon the accident of the Fall. The fact that man, as a part of nature, is a generic being and as spirit is a person, renders possible the original sin which was transmitted from the first Adam, as well as the original grace which appears in the second Adam. This emphasizing of the human personality in the God-Man, as well as his divergences from ecclesiastical and scholastic terminology,

involved Günther in controversies which have only a theological interest and may be passed over here.

4. Bachmann, who had gone back to Kant, urged the necessity of holding to the dualism of thought and being, and therefore to the separation of logic and metaphysics, while the dualistic school of Vienna, on the other hand, maintained that we must regard existence, not as one, but as various, as God, spirit, nature. Herbart (*vid.* § 321, 2-8), again, went beyond both in these demands, and his system is accordingly designated by Günther as the diametrical opposite of Pantheism. Up to the time when MORITZ WILHELM DROBISCH (born in 1802 at Leipsic, where he is professor of mathematics and philosophy) criticized his psychological works, Herbart had remained quite unnoticed. He now sought,—after his important works had not proved a success,—to give to the world for once a thoroughly weak production, and he really made a hit: *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1831) was much more read than the *Introduction*, and was by many even quite confounded with it. Almost contemporaneously with his retirement to Göttingen, it became evident that a Herbartian school was forming. After his death it increased still more, and owing to the almost masonic way in which the members held by each other, it has attained an influence to which many, especially in Austria, can testify. Drobisch, who rightly stands at the head here, issued his *Contributions to the Elucidation of Herbart's System of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1834), *A New Account of Logic* (Leipsic, 1836), *Quæstionum Mathematico-Psychologicarum*, Fasc. V. (Leipsic, 1836), *Elements of the Philosophy of Religion* (Leipsic, 1840), *Empirical Psychology* (1841), and *First Principles of Mathematical Psychology* (1850). Griepenkerl wrote, *Letters to a Young Scholastic Friend on Philosophy and especially on the Doctrines of Herbart* (Brunswick, 1832). Roër in Berlin wrote, *On Herbart's Method of Relations* (1834). Strümpel wrote, *Explanations of Herbart's Philosophy* (1834), *The Main Points in Herbart's Metaphysics* (Brunswick, 1840), and later, when professor in Dorpat, compends on *Logic*, *Ethics*, *University Studies*, and the *History of Philosophy*. Hartenstein (born 1808, for a long time professor in Leipsic) wrote *Problems and Principles of General Metaphysics* (Leipsic, 1836), *On the Most Recent Estimates of the Philosophy of Herbart* (1838), and *The Fundamental Conceptions of the Ethical Sciences* (Leipsic, 1844). If,

following the example of the master, a polemic was carried on in all these works against the Hegelian method, especially against the important place assigned in it to contradiction, which Herbart teaches should be avoided, while Hegel "takes pleasure in it," Allihn, Exner, and in part also Taute, appeared to see in these attacks almost their one object in life. Owing to Exner's influence, the Austrian professors in particular went over to the school of Herbart, the most distinguished names amongst whom are at present those of Zimmerman, Lott, and (until lately) of Volkmann.

5. As the *Berliner Jahrbücher* had served to defend the Hegelians against the attacks of the metaphysicians who thought on monistic lines, so also it was of service in defending them against the attacks of dualistic and pluralistic thinkers. Hinrich's criticism of Bachmann, whom Schaller, too, noticed in his book mentioned in the previous section, has been already referred to. A companion to it is to be found in the critique of Feuerbach, whose notice of Rosenkranz's *Circular Letter* to Bachmann (April 1835) has far more to do with the person addressed than with the writer of the *Letter*. The Vienna dualistic school was repeatedly noticed in the *Jahrbücher*. Of all the criticisms, that by Rosenkranz (August 1831) on Günther's *Elements*, on Peregrin's *Banquet*, and Pabst's *Man and his History*, turned out to be the least favourable. Marheineke (December, 1832) expressed himself in a much more friendly way regarding the work, *Is there a Philosophy of Christianity?* and Göschel (May, 1834) wrote in a particularly friendly tone on *Adam and Christ* (January, 1836), and on the *Janus-heads*. In both criticisms it was recognised that *this* dualism much more closely resembled the Hegelian monism than certain forms of a crude pantheism which were making a stir at the time. Feuerbach, it is true, expressed a different opinion in a criticism of Hock's *Cartesius* (April, 1836), whom he did not forgive in particular for having emphasized the Catholicism of Descartes. In reference, finally, to the Herbartian school, it may be said that Herbart's *Encyclopedia* was criticized by Hinrichs in a way which showed that he had not wholly forgotten that the Hegel whom Herbart frequently classed amongst the "fashionable" philosophers, and who found pleasure in contradictions, had been his revered teacher and paternal friend. On the other hand, there appeared a general critique by Weisse of the first

works of Drobisch, of the works of Roër, and of some of the principal works of Herbart which had appeared at an earlier time. Weisse rightly recognised that in this point his cause was identical with that of the Hegelians. He here seeks to prove that the system of Herbart, in seeking to escape from the principle of contradiction, places itself on the standpoint of the abstract understanding, and thus puts itself outside of the number of all really speculative systems.

§ 334.

1. In spite of this contrast, which Weisse had shown to exist between Herbart and all the systems hitherto mentioned, there was still a standpoint, considered from which, Herbart and the "fashionable" philosophers whom he combated, might be regarded as labouring under a perfectly similar error, inasmuch as they wished above all to be metaphysicians. This standpoint, with which, in its purity at all events, Germany up till that time had not been acquainted, since its influence on the German spirit had given rise partly to the realistically coloured eclecticism of the popular philosophy (§ 294, 3), and partly to criticism (§ 298, 1), found a representative in FRIEDRICH EDUARD BENEKE (born on the 17th Feb., 1798, at Berlin, where when extraordinary Professor he was drowned, or, as was thought, drowned himself, on the 1st March, 1854). Already in his first works: *The Doctrine of Cognition* (Jena, 1820), *The Doctrine of Mental Experience as the Basis for all Knowledge* (Berlin, 1820), and the *New First Principles of Metaphysics* (Berlin, 1822), he took up a position of decided antagonism to every philosophy which pretended to be anything more than an attempt to make intelligible by means of hypotheses what had been discovered by observation. In consequence of the appearance of his *Elements of the Physics of Morals*, which was issued in 1822, the authorities did Hegel, who disliked him, the favour of removing him from his chair as a lecturer. Hegel's acquiescence in this act is a blot upon his memory. Beneke, suddenly become famous, owing to this incident, went to Göttingen, after publishing a *Defence* of the work attacked, and *Contributions to a Purely Mental Scientific Treatment of the Diseases of the Mind* (both Leipsic, 1824). During the time that he was lecturer at Göttingen, he published his principal

work on psychology, *Psychological Sketches* (2 vols., 1825–27), and *The Relation Between Body and Soul* (1826). On his return to Berlin, besides his adaptation of Bentham's *First Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation* (Berlin, 1830), he published in quick succession his Jubilee memoir on the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kant and the Philosophical Problem of our Time*, Berlin, 1832), his *Logic*, 1832 (which appeared in a more extended form as *The System of Logic*, in two volumes, Berlin, 1842), *Philosophy in its Relation to Experience, to Speculation, and to Life* (Berlin, 1833), and his *Handbook of Psychology as a Science of Nature* (Berlin, 1833). (When this last-mentioned work appeared in a second edition in the year 1845, Beneke published along with it his *New Psychology*, a series of essays in which, among other things, he discusses his relation to other psychologists). This work was followed by *The Theory of Education and Instruction*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1835–36 (2nd ed. 1842), together with the *Elucidations*, etc., which belong to it (Berlin, 1836), and next, *Our Universities*, etc. (1836). Then appeared the *Outlines of the Theory of Morals* (2 vols., 1837, 1840), and the *Outlines of Natural Law* (1838), which remained unfinished. These together made up the outlines of the natural system of practical philosophy. There next appeared the *System of Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion* (1840), and the *Reform and Standing of our Schools* (1848). The *Pragmatic Psychology* (1850), the *Archive for Pragmatic Psychology* (in the years 1851–53), and the *Handbook of Pragmatic Psychology* seek to make psychology as thus placed on a new basis, fruitful in its effects on practical life. Besides the writings here referred to, Beneke wrote a large number of criticisms, especially on foreign philosophy and on German psychological works. He was a frequent contributor to several periodicals.

Cf. J. G. Dressler : *Kurze Charakteristik der sämtlichen Werken Beneke's*. Berlin, 1869.

2. Beneke had often declared,—in the *Jubilee Memoir* among other places,—that in true philosophy the English, the French, and even the Italians were in advance of us, because we had not so thoroughly broken with Scholasticism as they had. Our philosophy had remained speculation ; that is to say, it cherished the delusion that existence can be comprehended by means of conceptions, with which there was at

the same time closely connected the false view that the right method is that according to which the particular is deduced from the universal. Bacon had already pointed to the right course in what he says of experience and the inductive method; and the English and French philosophers had, at any rate, never forgotten that philosophy ought to be a comprehending of what is real. Among the Germans, Kant, by his strict analyses and happy syntheses, has won for himself a meritorious position. His greatest merit, however, namely the limitation of knowledge to the sphere of experiences, as well as his appeal to the ordinary moral consciousness, has been forgotten by his followers, and only what survived of the scholasticism under which his teaching laboured has been further developed. This was done by Fichte more than by any one else, and he was essentially the originator of all the errors and extravagances from which German philosophy has suffered since his day. Schelling, who supplemented his ideas, and Hegel, who went back to him, followed the same course. The only philosophers who at least gave hints of something better were Ænesidemus-Schulze and Jacobi, because they approached to the views of the Scotch school. Philosophy is a pure science of experience, and differs from Physics only in so far as it rests on inner experience. The matter with which it deals, accordingly, is constituted by what is given in consciousness. It must always place itself at the point of view of the ordinary consciousness, and differs from the latter only in that it analyses the highly complicated processes of which it consists into their simplest ingredients, and synthetically joins together again into a system what presents itself in the ordinary consciousness as isolated. Just because it attaches itself to inner experience, philosophy is safe from the extremes of sensualism and materialism; and here it recognises that Kant was justified in conceiving of all that is given in external experience as appearance. On the other hand, we must regard it as thorough-going scepticism when Kant, by his false view of the inner sense, ends by calling also the individual soul simply an appearance. We ought rather to extend to the entire self, to the entire soul, what Schopenhauer says of will. It is only our soul which we know as it is in itself; and Descartes felt this when he maintained that the soul is better known to us than what is perceived by means of the senses. What is thus perceived contains distorting additions supplied by sense, and is there-

fore not perceived as it is. Such an addition is present, for instance, when we see and touch, in the form of space, or extension in length, breadth, and depth. When Kant took this as a form of every external sense, he forgot that neither what is smelt nor what is tasted is long, broad, and deep. Still less is this the case with the immediately perceived soul, which has no *where*, that is, which is immaterial, for by the material we understand what exists in space. In this way, not only is the absurdity of the coarser form of materialism laid bare, but also the error of those who, in order to explain mental processes always have recourse to bodily processes, and would thus elucidate what is better known to us by means of what is more unknown. On the contrary, since there is, to begin with, no single presentation in which the real nature of what is presented is known, except that of the individual psychical being, we must start from it in the attempt to press on to the knowledge of the unknown; and first of all, therefore, from the knowledge of our bodily existence, that is, of ourselves as appearance, or as what is extended. The circumstance that there is no bodily development which cannot on occasion become a conscious (psychical) one, ought itself to be a hint that what we perceive of our body by means of the senses and commonly call our body, might be only a sign, or something representative of an inner being of the body behind this, or a being of the body in itself, which might consist of forces different certainly from those which constitute the soul, but still of forces which would be similar to these. The certainty of the existence of the individual psychical self united with the perceptions of the individual bodily existence, brings us, further, to the certainty of the existence of other souls similar to ourselves, a certainty which is grounded in analogy. From bodily existence, when once known, we shall be able again to mount further to what is pure body, in which we must in the same way suppose the existence of forces which form the ground of its appearance, *i.e.*, the existence of something that is akin to souls or spirit. When Beneke and his admirers call this view Spiritualism, because bodily existence is here explained from forces of a spiritual kind, in contrast to the diametrically opposed procedure of the materialists, and boast that while materialism sees in the soul something corporeal endowed with potency, according to their view the body is subordinated to what is spiritual, they perhaps too entirely

forgot that the difference between $a = b^n$ and $b = \sqrt[n]{a}$ is not very great. It is certain, however, that by adopting this view the influence of the body on the soul and *vice versâ*, and particularly the signification for the soul of sleep, can be much more easily explained than they can be from many other standpoints. What is really characteristic and new in Beneke's standpoint is to be seen far less in his position with regard to materialism and spiritualism than, as he has always himself expressed it, in the fact that he regards psychology as the starting-point and foundation of philosophy. By psychology he means what he calls the new psychology—new, that is, because, avoiding the wrong paths hitherto taken, it follows wholly the example of science; and, exactly as science does, searches out the laws for the given facts, and for the laws, what makes them intelligible. With such a psychologism—as we would prefer to name his theory—it must appear to him an absurdity that Herbart should base psychology on metaphysics. The latter, on the contrary, like all other philosophical sciences, is only applied psychology. Logical right and wrong, the beautiful and the ugly, the moral and the immoral, everything in short which may be a problem for Philosophy, is first given as a psychical act, or as an image in the soul. When we clearly understand what form these images have, and the way in which they originate in all men, we possess a Logic, an Æsthetics, and an Ethics. But just on this account it will be fitting in describing Beneke's theory not only, as will at once be understood, to consider his psychology first; but, as was done in the case of Kant, where, in § 299, 5, the *Metaphysics of Nature* was taken along with the *Transcendental Analytic*, and in § 300, 6, that of *Morals* with the *Transcendental Dialectic*, to insert always at the point in his psychology to which he attaches his account of another part of his system, a short sketch of the same.

3. Those who wished to go into his theory were referred by Beneke himself when they asked about it, to the *Sketches* and the *Handbook* as the chief sources of his *Psychology*. He thus left it to each reader to judge according to his liking whether the full but more aphoristic account given in the former of these books, or the shorter but more systematic account given in the latter, was the best with which to begin. We shall confine ourselves here mainly to the *Handbook*. Locke and Herbart are recognised in this work as the pioneers of modern philosophy; the former, because he demolished

innate ideas, the latter, because he demolished the old theory of faculties of the mind. Unfortunately, with what Locke accomplished there was connected the error of supposing the soul to be a *tabula rasa*, and with what was done by Herbart that of supposing the soul to be simple, something to which no faculties at all were to be attributed. On the contrary, nothing takes place in the soul in such a way as to leave it quite passive. The stimulus given is accompanied by an act of reception or appropriation. As this, like everything that takes place, must have a force or faculty for its cause, and, since, further, different stimuli are received, we are bound to suppose that there are many original forces or original faculties in the soul which are its elementary constituent parts. We must suppose that there are already in each sense many such faculties for receiving stimuli, so that there is all the less reason for regarding the soul as simple. In order to get at these original faculties, it is necessary first of all to carry the given facts back to certain fundamental laws which govern all that happens. These are discovered by reasoning deductively from the complex processes of the soul in its natural state. It thus becomes evident that where the satisfying stimulus meets with the hungering receptivity which corresponds to it, sensuous sensations, that is, psychical elements arise, into which the stimuli have been converted. Further, as is proved by the fact of receptivity for new stimuli, new original faculties are constantly being acquired by the soul, or, what is the same thing, accrue to it. The soul shows at a later stage a faculty for receiving an impression which at an earlier stage it was not able to receive. The product of the stimuli and of the original faculties of the first, as well as of those which grow up afterwards, may be called an act or creation of the soul. Since in such a product the two factors are sometimes more firmly sometimes less firmly bound together, *i.e.* are movable, we reach a third fundamental law of the psychical life, namely that the movable elements of all mental creations mutually strive to balance each other, and to flow over into each other. The fact of the reproduction of presentations which had vanished, proves that the universal law of nature, according to which what has once arisen continues to exist, until in consequence of the operation of special causes it is again destroyed, holds good in reference to the creations which arise in the soul. This fact is explained by the third fundamental law, that what

has been consciously perceived can allow so much of its movable elements to be left over that this residue remains in the soul as an unconscious element, or as a trace. Because it contains the possibility of being reproduced, and because this possibility is something which has arisen gradually, it may for this reason, in order to distinguish it from the germ, be called a rudimentary something which has been *made* what it is. Trace, therefore, or the rudimentary something which has been *made* what it is, is just the same thing thought of in a different relation, that is, as turned backwards or forwards. Exactly in the same way as the original faculties before they have received the impression make an effort towards it, and after they have received the impression make an effort to go after it, the creation of the soul which has become a trace, that is, something between production and reproduction, remains in the soul in the form of effort, so that the soul essentially consists simply of efforts, of a pure striving. The union, partly of conscious psychical creations, and partly of the traces, in themselves and among each other, is referred to the fourth and last fundamental law, according to which the creations of the soul attract each other in proportion to their similarity, or strive after a closer union in the points in which they resemble each other. We have experience of the validity of this law in the case of witty combinations of ideas, in the formation of comparisons, and the like. Besides the original faculties and those four fundamental processes, we must lay down as originally innate only the varied power, animation, and capacity to receive impressions, which belong to these. All other differences, such as those of talent and genius, have arisen out of, and are to be deduced from, the combination of those elementary creations of the soul. The powers and faculties of the soul in its matured state consist only of traces of formations previously caused, and may therefore be constructed from these. Conversely, we may reason from them back to the original essence of the soul. By following this latter method we are able to determine the difference between the human soul and the soul of the brute, as consisting in the spirituality of the former, *i.e.*, in its clearer or more comprehensive consciousness. By this is not to be understood something original or innate, but something which has come to be what it is. It is thus not something absolutely different from the unconscious or what is not yet conscious,

but only something which has gradually become different, *i.e.*, it is that stage and clearness of presentation, feeling, etc., which corresponds to the excitability, or to the strength of the psychical being itself. Animals never raise themselves to this stage, and children only when they are older; and it is impossible exactly to define the point at which what is close to consciousness actually gives place to consciousness.

4. For the attainment of the stage of clearness denominated consciousness, what Beneke calls the constructive forms of the soul, are of the utmost importance. By these he understands the different relations in which the two factors of the one psychical act or creation may stand to each other. He distinguishes five such forms. Where the stimulus is too slight, the faculty which appropriates it makes an effort to reach a higher realization of its nature, and the result is a feeling of dissatisfaction. The suitability of the stimulus to satisfy the faculty gives the sensations and ordinary perceptions or, speaking more generally, the fundamental form of presentation. An extraordinary fulness in the stimulus gives the fundamental relation which constitutes sensations of pleasure. A gradual increase in the stimulus until it reaches excess, gives the fundamental form of satiety or blunted appetite; and, finally, a sudden excess in the stimulus gives the sensation of pain. Of these constructive forms, the presentations most quickly and most easily reach the stage of clearness which we call consciousness. Accordingly, the products of presentation are treated first and in greatest detail, while the others, the emotional products or products of moods, are treated further on and far less fully. The distinction between these two establishes the distinction between theoretical and practical procedure, which, however, does not justify us in referring without further ado the highly complicated processes of thought and will which appear in the soul in its maturity, back to two imaginary faculties, as ancient philosophy does. There are no such faculties, any more than there is a *fuga vacui* in nature. As this has been forgotten, since we have gone back to the simplest processes which lie at the basis of the more complicated, it is time to banish the faculties also, which are only hypostatized class notions of phenomena very closely combined, and to make an attempt to show whether these processes may not be explained from stimuli, traces, and the excess of their elements. Beneke first makes this attempt when he comes to consider the production

and reproduction of single sensations and perceptions ; and he reaches the conclusion that, instead of speaking of *one* power of memory, we must rather attribute to each presentation a memory of its own, *i.e.*, the active effort it makes towards reproduction. The same holds good of the powers of recollection and imagination, words to which a rational meaning can be attached only when, in the case of memory, we think of those reproductions in which it is their strength, in the case of recollection, of those in which it is their liveliness, in the case of imagination, of those in which it is the susceptibility of receiving impressions, that is the assisting gift of nature. (Here at all events, as also elsewhere, he confines the differences of innate endowments within very narrow limits.) In the second and third chapters of the *Manual*, where the production and reproduction of presentations are discussed, reference is constantly made to the emotional constructive forms, because moods, too, are reproduced, and desire is just remembrance of sensations of pleasure. In the fourth and fifth chapters, however, where the combinations of the separate products are discussed, Beneke draws a much sharper distinction. The first of these two chapters treats of the combinations of similar presentations into notions, and supplies the foundation on which he constructs his *System of Logic*. While he defines thought as the object of logic, he separates the psychological and the logical treatment of thought in such a way that the former simply describes what takes place in thought, while the latter also maintains the ideal point of view and shows what ought to take place, and is thus an art. It defends itself against the charge of giving laws which have no foundation in fact, by taking up and solving its problems in a psychological and genetic way. It is accordingly first shown, that similar presentations by being fused together attain to such a strength and clearness that they become notions, the possession of which is what we call understanding. As they themselves contain only what entered into them from the particular presentations during that process of fusion, it follows that Understanding and the doctrine of thought have essentially to do with what is produced from these presentations, and will therefore not pretend to deduce the particular from the notions. In the course followed by the *Logic* we get three principal parts. In the first Part are discussed the forms which are peculiar to thought, notion, judgment and syllogism. The second Part

treats of what is contributed by the rudiments of cognition, and also of what thought constructs out of these rudiments, *i.e.*, it treats of the rudiments and the development of cognition. In order to complete both investigations, the cases are collected together in which thought and knowledge are in close connection with something different from themselves; *i.e.*, the co-operation of the internal and external elements is considered. In connection with the first part, which corresponds to what is otherwise known as elementary doctrine, it is to be observed that Beneke does not identify the fusion of presentations into notions with judgment, and therefore he censures those who insist that we ought to begin with the judgment. He further holds, that in every judgment the predicate-notion is already contained in the presentation which the subject forms, and that it is thus analytic. Finally, he declares that the theory of the syllogistic figures hitherto held rests too much on purely verbal distinctions, while the view that the substitution which we call syllogism can only take place where the new element in no way exceeds the old, and is therefore the same as it is, or a part of it, supplies a thoroughly regular schematism, and presents in a clear light the growth of syllogisms. The most important result reached is, that by means of all those forms new matter or content is never added, but only a greater clearness in the presentations is gained. How we get at matter or content is shown in the second principal Part, the doctrine of knowledge. This, in contrast to analysis, which makes the process of knowledge clear, treats of the syntheses which add to our knowledge; but just for this reason it often wanders aside into metaphysical investigations. Induction, the deductive syllogism, hypotheses, and, finally, scientific methods, constitute the outstanding subjects here. The third principal Part, which treats of the united life of thought and knowledge, attempts first to comprehend thought as determined, that is as being, and therefore in its objective relation, or as cognition. From this it goes on to treat more directly of the different perfections of cognition, universality, universal validity and necessity. With this part of the subject he connects the investigations into the organization of science and the relation of knowledge and faith. The development of thought on its subjective side is then discussed, advice given in reference to the acquisition and growth of the powers of thought, and the

principal hindrances thereto examined. References to what has been already developed serve as a foundation here.

5. Just as the investigations in the fourth chapter had afforded the foundation for logic, so in the fifth chapter of the *Manual*, Beneke seeks to lay the foundation of *Metaphysics*, which is also treated by him in a special work. As the notion, *i.e.*, the combination of similar presentations, constituted the starting-point for logic, so metaphysics has to do with what springs from the combination of dissimilar presentations, that is, from groups and series of presentations. Here, more than in any other part of philosophy, the close connection between it and psychology comes into view. To begin with, the very first fundamental problem of Metaphysics, which is concerned with the relation of presentation to being, can be solved only by the aid of psychology. The objections of idealism are too weighty to allow of our supposing, with ordinary realism, that our mental representation contains exactly the same as is contained in existence. On the other hand, the "full" idealism is equally untenable, both in the form in which it is held by Kant, who doubts if any being exists for us at all, and in the form in which it is held by Fichte, who denies that there is any such being. Since notions are not invented, but constructed out of presentations, the fact that we have a notion of being is a proof that *a* being at all events is given to us. That is our own Self; and it is shown above how, starting from this, we can be sure, not indeed by a process of reasoning, but instinctively and always in an indirect way, of the existence of other persons, and further of things without a self. It is pointed out that we thus have, not knowledge of effects only, or, are not confined to the knowledge of phenomena, but possess knowledge of being, or know the In-itself; and thus the possibility of metaphysics is proved. After solving this problem, the *Metaphysics* (Second Part) has to investigate the forms and relations which lay claim to reality. Among these the most important are, first, the universal fundamental relation of the thing and its qualities (substance and accidents), and connected with this, space and time, which have more of an external character, and causal relations, which have a more internal and active character. With reference, now, to the first of these relations, the relation of things within each other, it is shown that we have in the self, of which alone we possess a metaphysically

true knowledge, a collection (of original faculties, capacities, etc.). This we transfer to the external world in such a way as to suppose hypothetically that in the *appearance* of things related within each other there exists an analogous being-for-itself with internal relations, and thus we distinguish between substance and accidents, *i.e.*, whole and parts, or the permanent and changing. In connection with the unity given in ourselves, is discussed the important psycho-metaphysical problem of the Ego; and it is shown that although what presents the idea, as well as the idea presented, are continually changing, one thing remains constant, the fact, namely, that they are both one. This identity, which arises late in the process, is to be regarded as what is really permanent. There is no contradiction whatever in it. Just as, in connection with this first fundamental relation, Beneke directly and indirectly carries on a constant polemic against the positions of Herbart, so he does against Kant, when he comes to space and time. The necessary nature of the idea of space does not prove that it exists in us *a priori*, prior to all experience, for ideas which have been originated can also become so firmly fixed in the mind that they cannot be got rid of. It is quite incorrect to speak of *one* external sense, since there are five, of which only two allow us to conceive of their objects as extended, and lead us to get by abstraction from many extended things the notion of extension, which, it is true, precedes all (new) experiences, but itself originates from perception. It further follows from this, that sight and touch turn what is perceived into something extended; but it does not follow at all that all objective reality starts from space. Our self-consciousness informs us of a real (though, to be sure, not spatial) co-existence (of presentations, etc.), in ourselves, and there is much which seems to support the idea that there is likewise in things in themselves something akin to this, but which becomes spatial to the perceiving subject. Kant was brought both by his false theory of an inner sense as well as by his love of symmetry to class time along with space. On the contrary, succession is the form of all that takes place, both of phenomenal existence and of existence-in-itself, which we perceive in ourselves. As the views of Herbart and Kant were combated in the explanation given of these two relations, the views of Hume are combated in connection with the third relation, that of causality. The fact that we make ideas pre-

sent to our minds, proves that we *are* causality; and thus there is constituted this relation to an inner given something, which, exactly as in the case of inherence mentioned above, is then, by a process of transference, hypothetically assumed to be in existence external to ourselves, and in which we see succession in time. The fact, however, that the very first time we have these ideas we do not doubt but that it is we who call them into existence, refutes Hume's theory of habit. Although Beneke has often declared that religion does not rest on a purely theoretical basis, but on a practical and æsthetical basis as well, he has nevertheless incorporated his philosophy of religion with the *Metaphysics* as a third Part. Therewith, the question, in how far we have in religion a real knowledge, *i.e.*, a knowledge with an objective basis, is brought to the foreground. Since the philosophy of religion, like philosophy in general, must be limited to what is of universal human value, any reference to positive religions is of course excluded, and the investigation is confined to the question of the existence and essence of God, and to the immortality of the soul. The latter investigation, just because the soul is actually given us in experience, lies closer at hand, and is the easier of the two, and therefore we begin with it. It shows that the materialistic objections to the immortality of the soul are by no means convincing, because from the decay of the external life of the soul no conclusion can be drawn in reference to the inner (unconscious) being of the soul; and the dependence of the soul on the body may very appropriately be compared to that of the plant upon the soil from which it draws its nourishment. In the latter case it is by no means impossible that a plant, if transferred to a different soil, may continue to grow, or even that something new may spring from it through its becoming a productive soil itself. In reference, finally, to the knowledge of God, Beneke is never tired of extolling Kant for having demonstrated the impossibility of reaching the truth of the existence of God by means of notions. But since God is not given in experience, the question arises: From what that is given in experience are we to start, if our thought is to carry us to the First Cause of all being? The answer is, From the fragmentary character of all that is given. This necessitates the supposition of something that is of the nature of a complement, and the attachment to this of predicates which are derived partly from being in general, partly

from nature, and partly from ourselves. Neither materialism nor pantheism can accomplish what is best attained by means of theism, which, it is true, is satisfied with the confession that in this matter very little can be known, and that there is thus all the more left to be believed and expected. Our beliefs and hopes regarding the existence of God are based especially on feelings, among which the feeling of dependence is not religion, but is much rather that above which religion raises us.

6. As the doctrine of the fusion and grouping of presentations formed the psychological foundation for logic and metaphysics, as the principal parts of theoretical philosophy, so we find a foundation for the remaining parts of philosophy, and especially for *Practical Philosophy and Aesthetics*, in what is taught regarding the combinations of the emotional constructive forms, or constructive forms of mental moods. Of these the impulses precede (chap. 6) the feelings (chap. 7) in the *Manual*, while the *Sketches* begin with the natural theory of the feelings. As Beneke had hitherto always opposed to the theory of an innate understanding, etc., which produces notions, the theory that memory first originates with the individual reminiscences, and understanding with the notions, and that they consist of these reminiscences and notions, so he now denies the existence of any innate faculty of desire or feeling. The impulses or efforts, such as the original faculties and capacities had proved themselves to be, become desire by means of the recollections of pleasure, and desire again becomes volition when a series of presentations is attached to it in which, what is desired is represented as realized. The sum of the separate volitions is called will, which is therefore to be deduced from them, and not they from it. The origin of volition, of inclinations, of general principles, and so on, in the elementary formations of the soul, supplies the foundation for practical philosophy. Here, however, at the same time, those feelings are to be examined which are distinguished from the other creations of the soul by the fact that they do not consist so much of single acts, but are rather the immediate consciousness of a relation. They reveal to us, that is, the contrast between our mental condition and any creation of the soul (the basis of feeling); and the more striking this contrast is, the stronger they are. Like the presentations and desires, the feelings too are only combinations of the original

faculties. All three are distinguished from each other by the fact that in the origin of the first it is their force which is the determining factor, in that of the second their liveliness, and in that of the third their susceptibility to stimulus. The feelings which form the psychological basis for the æsthetic notions are of equal importance for practical philosophy, since they make what is morally beautiful and elevated intelligible to us. It is in them in fact that the moral relations first reveal themselves, and only later that from them spring moral conceptions, then moral judgments, and finally the system to which these all belong, namely the moral law. To begin with the latter, which is the most complicated of all the elements, is absurd. The very first question therefore to be established is, According to what standard do we estimate the value of things? Only according to the intensification and depression of the psychical products which are occasioned by them. We prefer what intensifies our desires, etc. This is in the first place a purely subjective standard of valuation. We ascribe objective value to what, in the course of natural development, has been universally and by all men held to be of value. Accordingly, it holds good objectively, that the sensations of sight have more value than those of taste, that the exercise of the intellect is superior to indulgence in the pleasures of sense, and so on. Just because this preference is based in the very nature of the soul, it announces itself to us as a compulsory duty which, as has been remarked, is first felt, and is then grasped as an idea. But we must be careful here, too, not to invent an innate moral feeling or indeed law. Moral feeling, conscience, and so on, have arisen according to the universal law of development. If in accordance with what was once the prevailing linguistic usage, we call the highest development of thought and of volition, reason, then the moral law can be described as a demand of reason. Only we must not forget here, either, that reason is not anything innate, but that it consists only in the possession of the clearest thoughts, the purest feelings, the most worthy volitions; that man, therefore, is not a rational being, but is in process of becoming such.

7. From a standpoint from which, in the case of all the investigations made, we are led to the result that what is generally regarded as innate has come to be, or has been made to be what it is, education must necessarily be considered

of the highest importance, seeing that its aim is to make men rational. This accounts not only for the industry and care which Beneke has himself bestowed upon his *Theory of Education and Instruction*, but also for the acceptance which his theories found, especially among educationalists. Among these, no one has contributed more to spreading the fame of his master than Dressler. Ueberweg, too (died when professor in Königsberg on the 9th Jan., 1871), has been pointed out as one upon whom Beneke's educational theories in particular had a lasting influence. He shows, however, that he was influenced by Beneke in other subjects, as appears especially in his treatment of logic. If the educationalists gladly welcomed a doctrine which promised them an unbounded field of activity—since, according to it, there were no longer any innate talents or genius, no evil dispositions, etc., and that at most, nothing remained but differences of temperament,—those too, whose religious needs found satisfaction only where the self-activity of man is reduced to a minimum, namely, in pietism, considered it a doctrine which they might well adopt. They did this all the more readily, as Beneke had always spoken against valuing too highly the Notion, and had in religious matters left so much room for faith and anticipation at the expense of knowledge. Odd as it may now seem, the hatred felt against the Hegelian “deification of the Notion,” actually led many well-known theologians to designate as “Christian Philosophy” works in which the sensualism of Beneke was blended with pietism. This happened, among other instances, in the case of EDUARD SCHMIDT (died when Professor in Rostock), when he published his work, *On the Absolute and Conditioned*, (Rostock, 1834), which in many points reminds us of Poiret, (§ 278, 4), though no such excuse can be made for it as for the work of Poiret, who did not yet know the consequences of the empiricism he was the first to prepare for. The *Outlines of a History of Philosophy*, which Schmidt afterwards wrote (Berlin, 1839), were meant to show how the blunder of turning philosophy into speculation has only had the negative use of bringing it face to face with an empiricism which renounces everything *a priori*. This latter work was warmly welcomed by Beneke, as a proof that there were still thinkers who did not side with the fashionable folly of speculation.

8. It was not to be expected that also these attacks upon the whole post-Kantian philosophy should remain unanswered

on the part of the Hegelian school. Beneke was criticized first by Schmidt in Erfurt (February, 1833), then by Hinrichs (December, 1834). The former charged him with misunderstanding Kant, with ingratitude for what had been done by Kant's successors, and with un-German exaltation of foreign second-rate wisdom. The latter sought to prove to him that, without knowing it, he had employed a number of categories which did not in any way originate in experience. The author of the present work criticized (September, 1834) Schmidt's above-mentioned work, and attempted to prove that the separation of the object and the idea of it, when carried to such an extreme, does not only make knowledge impossible, but also involves a number of contradictions. These replies had of course special reference to the points in which Hegel's teaching had been attacked. The School did not pay any attention to what was original in the psychologism of Beneke, or at least did not pay sufficient attention to it. The foregoing account is an attempt to make good this injustice, hence its fulness. If, in connection with this, points have been mentioned which have nothing whatever to do with the Hegelian school, and which therefore belong to the second part of this Appendix, the excuse offered is, that to have separated subjects which Beneke treats of together, would have resulted in useless repetitions.

9. Alongside of Beneke, OTTO FRIEDRICH GRUPPE is to be mentioned, not in order to signify thereby how he reached his views, but because of the points of contact which, as he has himself avowed, exist between his views and those of Beneke. Born at Danzig in the year 1804, he was for many years connected, as Secretary, with the Berlin Academy of Art, an office which he retained until his death in the year 1876. Although during his student days an assiduous attendant of Hegel's lectures, he was never an adherent of his teaching. (In the anonymously published comedy, *The Winds*, which is a brilliant piece of persiflage on Hegel, some pretended that they recognised the co-operation of Lachmann, to whom Gruppe had at an early period attached himself.) A many-sided culture enabled Gruppe to appear as an author in connection with a large variety of subjects. His works, *On the Tragic Art of the Greeks* (1834), *On the Roman Elegy* (1838), *On the Fragments of Archytas* (1840); the two brochures, *On Academic Freedom of Teaching* (1842-43), and those, *On*

the Cosmic Systems of the Greeks (1852), do not come under consideration here. His *Antäus*, however, which appeared shortly before Hegel's death in 1831, his *Turning-point of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century* (1834), and his work written at Schelling's death, *Present and Future of Philosophy in Germany* (1855), may be referred to. In all three works the author occupies the same standpoint. Not only does he assert towards the close of the second, that all that it contains had been already said in the *Antäus*, but the eleventh section of the third work, written a quarter of a century after the first, contains over again in a clear and complete summary the principal thoughts to be found in the two others. Although in the *Antäus*, which is a correspondence between an enthusiastic young Hegelian and an older man who represents Gruppe's views, the attack is directed against the chief points of the Hegelian system, the Method, the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Religion and the History of Philosophy, still the sole aim of the book is not to combat this system, indeed that can scarcely be called its principal aim. Rather, it is the whole of speculative philosophy, and metaphysics in particular, which are combated in the Hegelian system, as representing their culminating point. By metaphysics he understands the attempt to create knowledge out of pure notions, whether by the aid of logical syllogisms or by construction. Although this attempt is not new, but is almost as old as philosophy itself—the history of which is a history of error with occasional flashes of light—none the less, it is pure nonsense, and therefore speculative philosophy constitutes the diametrical opposite of science. The evil course was taken when the Eleatics declared war against what can be perceived by the senses; a great advance in error was made when Plato stamped as the only reality the specific ideas gained by abstraction; and then Aristotle quite logically declared that erroneous form of thought which passes from the universal to the particular, to be true knowledge. In the period which followed upon this, Aristotle held sway for centuries by means of his *Organon*, and thus the error referred to also continued to hold sway; and it continued to do so even after, in the writings of Bacon, one of those rare flashes of light had broken in upon the history of philosophy. Many circumstances unite to make it intelligible, even to make it excusable, that the philosophers of antiquity

should have come to hold such absurd views. To begin with, their science of nature was in the highest degree defective, and especially the almost complete absence of experiment in their investigations made it well-nigh impossible for them to take up a right attitude towards the methods followed by the investigator of nature. Then the Greek knew only a single language, and his own belonged to those which may be called concrete, in which, owing to the close cohesion of words originally separate, the wealth of grammatical forms prevents us from seeing the copulative parts which have revealed to our comparative science of language, the mysterious essence of language. This once discovered, any one can now recognise it, if he watches how our children learn to speak. Finally, the circumstance that Pythagoras, Plato, and others were great mathematicians, occasioned their belief that what was warranted within the sphere of mathematics held good outside of it also, a belief which was injurious to the interests of truth. With regard to this distinction, the matter stands thus: all abstract notions are expressions which help us to state our meaning, are abbreviations which are adopted as giving facilities for calculation, and they are verbally expressed in order that these notions may be communicated. Just for this reason, they are only signs for values, but have no value in themselves, and ought to be applied only in so far as they still remain in relation to the concrete, from which they have been got by a process of abstraction. (The healthy human understanding is well aware of this, and accordingly fills up the expression which is always inadequate, and does this differently according to different circumstances. "Large" means something quite different according as it is understood of a man or of a house.) When this relativity of notions is forgotten, and when they are taken as something complete and absolute, we have the error which is called *ignorantia elenchi*. Geometry, because it applies conceptions only within the small sphere of spatial quantity, never loses sight of them, and so never falls into this error, but errs only because it does so confine itself. When metaphysics appeals to geometry, and following its example, lays down strict definitions, etc., it turns the exception into the rule, and naturally falls into error. Its doctrine of method, *i.e.*, the Aristotelian *Organon*, is like metaphysics in this. A new *Organon*, such as Bacon indeed demanded, is therefore still a necessity at the present time.

10. Gruppe gives hints towards such a reformation of logic in the second of the works mentioned, and repeats them in his third work. Logic, he says, ought to be a theory of cognition, and it therefore asks first of all ; How does an act of cognition in general originate ? and receives for answer : By means of that synthesis which we all call judgment. (Notions first arise out of judgments, and not *vice versa*.) A judgment, however, is not, as most seem to believe, an equation, like mathematical propositions ; for in that case it might be reversed. But if, in order to learn what its nature is, we place ourselves at the point of view of the physicist in what he does, we find that every judgment is a comparison of one object with another, and that the latter thereby becomes a predicate. (Glass is electric, equals : Glass is like amber.) If in addition, we reflect on verbal expression, and attend to what comparative philology teaches us, which is confirmed by the observation of children (who ask, What is the name of uncle's John ?), we arrive at the result, that in such a synthesis, both predicate and subject get another meaning, and that, for this reason, general terms, marks, in short, all notions, are seen to be nothing else than formulæ, which, just because they are abstract, *i.e.*, have been got by abstraction, have only the appearance of being simple. It is only when we reverse the correct method that they can be taken as starting-points—what speculative philosophy has hitherto always done. It was confirmed in this course by the Aristotelian Organon, which, by the emphasis it lays on affirmation and negation, proves itself to be the offspring of Eleatic-Platonic dialectic, and in the use it makes of the syllogism shows that it had been led astray by putting too high a value upon mathematical methods. It moreover comes into contradiction with itself, inasmuch as at one time it contrasts induction with the syllogism, and at another time subordinates it to it. To what speculative philosophy has come, by adhering to its rules, is strikingly shown in the views held by philosophers on space and time, for in these views, from the chaos of Hesiod to the theories of Kant and Hegel, simple relations amongst things have been turned into the fundamental causes of the existence of things. The fact that the views maintained by speculative philosophy have reached the form of the Hegelian absurdities, according to which the notion is no longer the creation of our thought, but its creator, and the *contradictio in adjecto* is

a proof of truth, etc., is a decided gain. For owing to this, a turning-point has been reached, and there is a prospect of having a philosophy which will certainly not contain either a system, or a metaphysics and a philosophy of religion, but which, on the contrary, while taking as its starting-point the given real world, will stand in a friendly relation to science—taking that word in the sense in which it is understood by the French and the English.

II. Gruppe's peculiar doctrines, like those of Beneke, received little attention from the Hegelian school. It is true that a criticism on the *Turning-point* by Rosenkranz appeared in the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, but it does not enter very much into the consideration of the positive positions taken up. In philosophy, too, Gruppe experienced what he did not escape in the sphere of philology, namely, that the simple fact of activity in different departments raised the suspicion of dilettantism. In both departments, however, many who called him a dilettante were not thereby prevented from appropriating a thought here and a thought there out of his books.

B.—PHENOMENA IN THE SPHERE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

§ 335.

I. Weisse had declared himself to be in agreement with the substance of the Hegelian logic, and with the method which it recommended; Fichte, Fischer, and even Braniss had shown that they quite approved of the method, and yet they partly demanded and partly gave a wholly different philosophy of nature and of spirit. Günther and Pabst, again, with a totally different logic and method, reached a philosophy of nature the agreement of which with the Hegelian they admitted. All this,—but especially the fact that Göschel and Schaller came forward as defenders of the Hegelian school and did not employ the dialectic method,—necessarily made the proud proclamation of the unshakable foundation of philosophy, and of the method which harmonizes with the movement of the object, appear doubtful, to say the least. Just as this makes it clear that the interest in metaphysics,—that is, in the first point in which Hegel had shown himself to be a restorer,—was on the wane; the fact, again, that the Hegelians began to occupy themselves exclusively with that

wherein the master had wrought a second reform, helps to explain why the question of a logical foundation and of dialectical development was so soon regarded with perfect indifference.

2. This second work of restoration consisted in the fact that, as Hegel often expressed himself, his system was orthodox. Still more frequently there occurs in his writings the formula—a formula untenable according to his own *Logic*—that his philosophy has the same content as (the Christian) religion, and differs from it only in respect of form. What he meant by both formulas was, that his system made it once more possible to prove that there was a rational meaning, not so much in Bible doctrine—for even Kant and Fichte had reproduced the Johannine prologue—as in ecclesiastical dogmas and in the creeds. Hence his incessant gibes at three theological tendencies—at rationalism, which places religion in morality only; at supernaturalism, which sees in the dogmas only what has been handed down, and not what is deducible; at the theology of feeling, which puts subjective piety in the place of the Confession of the Church. So long as the School thought that the way in which Hegel reproduced the dogmas philosophically was the only correct one, it could feel no need of having a thorough revision of its position; and accordingly it confined its activity at this time to the task of proving that the standpoints upon which the master had poured out his mockery deserved it. Marheineke's preface to the second edition of his *Dogmatics*, which even those who do not side with him have pronounced to be a splendid epitaph placed over the graves of departed rationalism and supernaturalism, proves to both parties that their views are one-sided. Isaac Rust, in his frequently reprinted work, *Philosophy and Christianity* (Mannheim, 1825), points out to the rationalists; Göschel in his *Aphorisms* before-mentioned (§ 329, 10) points out to the literalist supernaturalists; Kasimir Conradi (lived and died a clergyman in Derxheim), in his *Self-consciousness and Revelation* (Mainz, 1835), points out to the theologians of feeling, that if they rightly understood their own views they would find themselves compelled to adopt a speculative theology in the Hegelian sense. The criticisms in the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, by Lehnerdt, on Rust's book, and by Hegel himself on Göschel's, and the delight with which the younger men among the Hegelians greeted Conradi's book,

proved what a deep interest was felt at the time in the question of the relation between faith and knowledge—a circumstance to which such an immature production as my *Lectures on Faith and Knowledge* (Berlin, 1837) owed the very friendly reception it met with among the professors, and what was at any rate the fairly good reception it got from the reading public.

3. It was necessary, however, that sooner or later, particularly after the death of the master, attention should be transferred from this preliminary question to the why and wherefore of the so frequently lauded reconciliation of faith and knowledge. Hegel himself, when he spoke of the orthodox character of his philosophy, that is, of its character as justifying dogma, had very often explained it by saying that it united the thought of substantiality with that of subjectivity, as was fitting, or to put it more shortly, that it made substance subjective. A great deal may justly be said against the reduction of such concrete relations as those with which we are here concerned to abstract logical categories, which do nothing more than constitute the basis of these relations. It was not only, that when Hegel first used that formula every one reflected that Spinozism and the System of Identity had ended in Pantheism because they had conceived of the absolute as substance, and that, on the contrary, the eighteenth century and Fichte had quite lost sight of God because He had become for them something purely subjective (an aspiration of the heart or a moral requirement); but it was seen that all the questions, the answers to which, given by the Fathers of the Church, supplied the Church with its dogmas, may really be reduced to those abstract formulas, and therefore, too, all the problems which a speculative theology has to solve. The logical question, whether and how substance can be subjective, undoubtedly lies at the basis of the question which, because it concerns the being of God, may be called the *theological* question. This is the question which, during the period of the construction of dogmas, was known as the Trinitarian (§§ 139, 140), and which, in modern theology, has taken the form of the question regarding the personality of God. The further question, namely, the *anthropological* one, with which the active movement in the construction of dogmas reached its close, asks for information as to whether man is something independent, something self-asserting,—and this may be conceived of either as self-assertion against compulsion, and there-

fore as freedom (§ 144), or as self-assertion against destruction, and therefore as immortality,—and may be easily formulated thus: Does substantiality belong to the subject, or is it a pure accident? Finally, the *soteriological* or *christological* question, which was taken up and answered in the period of the construction of dogmas between these two (§ 142), may be reduced to the question: How does (the Divine) substance appear in the (human) subject? Here, also, the christological question appears between the two others, only the anthropological question now emerges first, and the theological question, although it moves side by side with the others, is, along with consciousness, made the hinge upon which the others turn, but only quite at the end.

4. That within the School itself the necessity should have arisen of undertaking a revision of opinion on these points, was a consequence of the indefiniteness in which Hegel, in his *Logic*, had left the very categories with which we are here concerned. In passing from the Second Part of the *Logic* to the Third—from essence to notion, from necessity to freedom,—he had shown that the contrast between substantiality and what is of the nature of accident so equalizes itself that the former enters into the Notion as universality, and the latter as particularity, and that the Notion in this way comes to be concrete subjectivity. Instead of this expression, he commonly uses the word individuality, in deference to the ruling usage of the School-logic; and, although he warns us against confounding the unmediated individual with the true individual, since, in the common usage of language, we never understand by the individual anything but just that unmediated individuality, there was a possibility, nay, a likelihood, that when Hegel spoke of the individual, or even of the subject, this would be taken to mean an individual copy which could be duplicated. This copy, just because its substantiality lies outside of itself, is accidental and transitory, instead of a real subject, which is individual and not capable of being repeated, because it is its own *substans*, and subsists through itself. Whoever, in contrast to this, emphasized the fact that, according to Hegel, the individual no longer has its substance opposed to itself (outside itself), and now maintained with regard to the individual that it was more than a copy, that it could not be replaced, etc., was perhaps in closer agreement with the master than those others. Since the latter, however,

spoke like the rest of the world, it will be easily understood why everybody credited them with understanding Hegel better.

§ 336.

1. The *immortality* of man, which the System of Identity had joined Spinoza in ridiculing, and in place of which both had put the present possession of true ideas, was for the eighteenth century, and therefore, too, for Fichte at the beginning, the dogma *par excellence*. Hegel himself had seldom expressed his views on this point. He did this most definitely in his criticism of the work of Schubart, who charged him with denying immortality. In this criticism, he says that in his philosophy "spirit is lifted beyond all those categories which include the ideas of dissolution, destruction, dying, etc., not to speak of other quite as express determinations." Other expressions, such as, that immortality is "quality in a definite form of being" might, like Fichte's, "No man can be saved by being buried," be understood to mean, that death does not interrupt salvation, or to mean, that after death there is no salvation. In the School this point was treated as an *ἀπὸρρητόν*, and continued to be so even after one of the School had given expression to his views upon it. LUDWIG ANDREAS FEUERBACH (born July 28th, 1804, at Anspach; studied in Heidelberg and Berlin; was for a time *Docent* in Erlangen; lived after this for a long time on his own property in Bruckberg as a prolific author, and died on the 12th of September, 1872. His collected works were published in Leipsic by Otto Wigand), issued anonymously his *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* (Nürnberg, 1831), in which, instead of turning death into a mere sham-death as the doctrine of immortality did, he sought to restore it once more to a place of honour, and to prove that it was the necessary dissolution of the finite in the infinite, and that the continued existence of man consists in historical remembrance. Feuerbach, accordingly, describes his theory as pure undisguised pantheism. It was not only on account of the invectives against Marheineke and some allusions which might be taken as referring to Hegel that the book made no impression on the rest of the Hegelians, but in particular because its arguments rested wholly on the contrast of infinite and finite, essence and appearance, etc., beyond which, according to Hegel, only the abstract

understanding does not get. The question acquired greater prominence in the School through the works of Blasche, a follower of Schelling (*vid.* § 319, 2), inasmuch as Michelet and Marheineke brought them into notice. Since, however, they did this in the way of pure opposition, the matter still rested as it was. The School was more directly brought to take up a decisive attitude on this question through the appearance of the following works of FRIEDRICH RICHTER of Magdeburg: *The Doctrine of the Last Things* (first vol., Breslau, 1833; second, 1844), and *The New Doctrine of Immortality* (Breslau, 1833). (The later writings of the author: *On the Notion of God and Majesty*, the discourses on *Continued Personal Existence*, and *On the Messianic Idea*, attracted no such attention.) In these works, Richter seeks to prove that, according to Hegel's principles, an enduring personal existence is out of the question,—what, for the rest, could be desired only by the egoist, who is incapable of an act of resignation. Weisse, who criticized this work in the *Berliner Jahrbücher* (September, 1833), justly remarked that there was no resignation whatever in desiring annihilation where there was inner emptiness; that the principles of modern philosophy supply us with data for deducing the immortality of the regenerate; and that, besides, it showed a certain crudeness to discuss such questions in popular books which were read by those who were incapable of speculation. Owing to this last statement, Weisse was charged by Richter (in *The Secret Doctrine of Modern Philosophy*, Breslau, 1833), and also by others in different quarters, with concealing his own want of belief in existence after death. Weisse, accordingly, wrote likewise a *Philosophical Esoteric-Doctrine* (Dresden, 1834), in which he attempted to show that Hegel was compelled to arrive at a denial of personal immortality, although he had never stated his denial from a praiseworthy regard for the consciences of others. The results of modern philosophy may, however, be employed in quite a different and much better way, if the Absolute is assumed to be personal. We may thus save immortality; of the truth of which we are certain, not indeed *a priori*, but by means of our religious and moral experience, and in which, moreover, only the regenerate will share.

2. While Weisse was occupied with this work, there appeared a criticism by Göschel (*Berl. Jahrb.*, January, 1834) of the works of Richter mentioned above, which, not unreason-

ably, had been anxiously awaited by the School ; for it is from its appearance that the split in the School dates which, ever since Strauss uttered his witty conceit, has been known as the contrast of the Right and Left sides. In virtue of the superiority which Spirit has over Nature, according to Göschel it passes beyond the insurmountable opposition of the universal (of species), and the particular (of the individual copy) which exists in nature, and is particularity, individuum, personality. Pantheism is unable to conceive of these ideas, and it is to pantheism that not only Richter but many others as well reduce Hegelianism. Göschel, just as Feuerbach and Richter, followed Hegel in employing the expression individual for what would have been better called subject. This led in his case to attributing eternal existence to something which, because man therein shows himself to be what is capable of reproduction, to be a copy, in fact, is perishable and fleeting. Those, accordingly, were right enough who said that he made man immortal even to skin and hair, while according to Feuerbach and Richter, not so much as a human hair would continue to exist. This question was more fully developed by Göschel in his work, *On the Proofs for Immortality*, etc. (Berlin, 1835), wherein he distinguishes three principal proofs, which are put on a parallel with the three proofs for the existence of God, and which are represented as corresponding to the three stages of individuum, subject, and spirit. The fact that many attacked only the outworks of this book, an edifying Easter-study which formed the preface, and the supplement, in which among Hegel's sayings one was quoted which the editors of Hegel's Works had erroneously incorporated in the same, did not say much for the thorough study of a work which was at any rate a remarkable one. Göschel seemed especially pleased with that very Preface, for the *Seven-fold Easter Question* (Berlin, 1837) appeared in the form of a commentary upon it. Opponents of the Hegelian school paid almost more attention to Göschel's theories than the members of the School ; but while professing that they agreed with Göschel's main positions, they denied that these represented the Hegelian doctrine. This was the position taken up by Weisse, and by Fichte both in his criticism of Richter's book (*Blatt für Lit. Unterh.*, 1833) and in his own work, *The Idea of Personality* (1834 ; 2nd revised edition, 1855), and also by a follower of the Neo-Schellingian doctrine,

Hubert Beckers, in *On C. F. Göschel's Attempt*, etc. (Hamburg, 1836). Hinrichs combated these positions (*Berliner Jahrb.*, April, 1836), and asserted the Hegelian character of Göschel's works, although he found fault with them for their lack of strict method.

3. How very strongly, quite apart from the position of the Hegelian school, the question of immortality stirred men's minds at that time, is evident from the charming little work which, under the name of "Mises"—a name celebrated in humorous literature—FECHNER (*vid. infra sub* § 347, 10), published as *The Booklet of the Life after Death* (Dresden, 1836). In this we have the first germs of the thought which was later so ably developed, concerning the psychical nature of what had been considered to be without a soul, and the penetration of the lower organism by the higher. Partly by way of refuting these ideas, and partly by way of supplementing them, Weisse wrote, this time under the pseudonym of Nicodemus, *The Booklet of the Resurrection* (Dresden, 1836). According to this book, as an embryonic life in the form simply of body precedes the earthly life, so the heavenly life ought to be preceded by a Hades-life in the form simply of soul. Man, who is by nature mortal, becomes immortal by partaking of spirit. Thus those who are wholly devoid of spirit pass away, those who willingly accept spirit are saved, and those who accept it unwillingly are damned. If Weisse here seeks an intermediate standpoint between the views of Fichte, Blasche, and Richter, who deny to man any kind of existence after death, and those of Göschel, who, as it seemed to many, allowed him to take everything with him at death, a similar attempt to reach an intermediate view was made simultaneously in the Hegelian school. K. Conradi's *Immortality and Eternal Life* (Mainz, 1837) has, besides its many other merits, this one, that it separates the two conceptions specified in the title from one another, so that any one who with Weisse denies to man eternal life, does not therefore deny to him immortality also. This work, perhaps the most important on the subject, was taken very little notice of by the Hegelians. The reason of this undoubtedly was, that Conradi, whose first work above mentioned had been correctly described as a phenomenology of the religious consciousness, in this work also so entirely identifies the phenomenological moment with the real, that is, the necessity of belief in immor-

tality with immortality itself, that it often looks as if he wished to justify the former without asserting the truth of the latter. There was a still stronger reason for his book being overlooked, this namely, that the interest felt by the Hegelian school in the philosophy of religion had been transferred from the anthropological question to the christological, in connection with which, much more than in connection with the other, the gulf which separated the two sides from each other was to become visible.

§ 337.

1. *Christology* became the essentially burning question in the Hegelian school owing to the appearance of *The Life of Jesus Critically Treated* by DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS (Tübingen, 1835-36). The author (born in Ludwigsburg on the 27th January, 1808, died in his native town on the 8th February, 1874), when no longer a personal auditor of Hegel's but, as *Repetent* at Tübingen, the real representative of the Hegelian philosophy there, had already in two critiques in the *Berliner Jahrbücher* during the years 1832 and 1834, given expression to the two fundamental thoughts which at a later period formed the dogmatic and critical basis of his famous book. In the first of these critiques, that on Rosenkranz's *Encyclopedia*, the view is advanced that, since the philosopher treats of the world before taking up the absolute spirit, he ought to see in it nothing more than the Idea manifesting itself in an external form, *i.e.*, Nature; and that thus the conception of creation does not exist for him. But if miracle is an interruption of the course of nature by means of creative activity, we can only call it a consequence of what has just been said when we find that this Critique takes up a most decided attitude of opposition to miracle. The second critique, that on Sieffert, Schneckenburger, and Merz, exults over the contradictions in the Biblical narratives, and still more over the artifice of reason which leads one exegete to sacrifice the Synoptics to John and another to sacrifice John to the Synoptics, and thereby advances the education of humanity from the stage of the letter to that of the spirit. The work just mentioned develops the consequences which follow from these thoughts. It criticizes with equal severity the standpoint of the supernaturalistic and rationalistic Bible exegetes,

who are agreed in holding that the Bible, especially the New Testament, contains history, while the greater part of it consists of myths, the authors of which, inspired with the spirit of the Christian community, invented by a process of unconscious symbolizing what was felt by the spirit of the Church to be ideal truth. In this way the historical fact that the greatest of all religious genuises, Jesus, was brought, particularly by the influence of John the Baptist, first to expect the Messiah and then to feel himself to be the Messiah, supplied the point of attachment for these myths, while the garb in which they were clothed was supplied by the prevailing Messianic ideas. It is impossible that these narratives can have any reality in them, because they relate what is physically and psychologically impossible (miraculous). Still, they contain truth, because the Infinite does really flow over into finitude, though certainly not into one single example; and not indeed one man, but *Humanity*, truly united with God, lives on in spite of death. Schleiermacher with his distinction between the ideal and the historical Christ, Kant with his explanation of dogmas, verged on the truth. The former was untrue to himself, since he admitted the impossibility of the two Christs being found together, and yet maintained that this impossibility was the only real miracle. The latter, again, fell into the error of conceiving of the union of God and man as simply something which ought to be. In short, a dogmatic which in the *locus* of Christ stops short at the individual, instead of going beyond this to the idea of the human species, is no dogmatic but only a sermon. (It did not show gratitude on the part of Strauss, that in his closing dissertation he made no mention of Schelling's historical construction of Christianity. At a later time, he called it the only bit of free thought which Schelling ever wrote.)

2. The reception which this book met with from the side of the theologians does not belong to the present discussion, although it had a decisive influence on Strauss' fortunes, since it was owing to it that he first lost his place as *Reptent* in Tübingen, and then a professorship in Zürich, and that afterwards he lectured on his own account in Stuttgart, Heilbronn, Weimar, Cologne, Heidelberg, Bonn and Darmstadt. In the philosophical world, Hegel's opponents in particular were delighted at all this, as for instance Eschenmayer (*vid.* § 313. 3). Within the Hegelian school an ever-increasing divergence

of opinion manifested itself. F. Chr. Baur, Strauss's teacher, asserted in his work, *The Christian Gnosis* (Tübingen, 1835), which appeared simultaneously with the *Life of Jesus*, that Hegel maintained the existence only of a divine humanity, and not that of an individual God-man. WILHELM VATKE, again (born 1806; at that time a *Privatdocent*, and at present a professor in Berlin [died in Berlin, April 19, 1882.—Ed.]), a personal friend of Strauss, gave expression to his views in *Biblical Theology*. In the first and only volume, which takes up the religion of the Old Testament (Berlin, 1835), Vatke asserts, in opposition to Baur, that the sensuous manifestation of the God-Man, which in any case is not what is highest, is conceived of as mythical. BRUNO BAUER, who was at that time a colleague of Vatke's (born Sept. 9th, 1809; from 1834 to 1839 a *Privatdocent* of theology in Berlin; from 1839 onwards in Bonn, where in 1842 he was deprived of his office as *Docent*, and afterwards lived privately in Berlin [died on April 13th, 1882, at Rixdorf near Berlin.—Ed.]), in a review of Strauss's book (*Berliner Jahrbücher*, December, 1835), took up a most decided attitude of opposition to Strauss. In the year 1836 he also started the *Zeitschrift für speculative Theologie* (3 vols. with four parts in each, Berlin 1836–38), which became the organ of those Hegelians who were averse to the direction Strauss's views were taking, and in which many of the works that later appeared first came out, though only in a fragmentary manner. Gabler, who also was on the list of the contributors, declared himself in his Latin inaugural address (1836) as strongly opposed to the views of Strauss. A collective review (I., 1) which I wrote of the works mentioned in the previous Section, contains some of the thoughts which at a later time were more fully developed in a paper specially intended for the Journal, *Body and Soul* (Halle, 1837, 2nd ed., 1849). Göschel contributed (II., 2) an Essay entitled, *First and Last*, a confession of faith of speculative philosophy, which contains as its main thoughts what was more fully developed in his *Contributions to Speculative Theology* (Berlin, 1838). In this work he attempts to show that, as a kingdom becomes a unity through the monarch, humanity becomes a unity through primitive man, who lives as a moment in God and at the same time as soul in created humanity. In a paper (III., 1), *On Contradictions in Christian Doctrines*, I sought to show that the philosophical treatment of the question to which we are driven by the co

traditions in religious ideas results in a mythical (*i.e.* a mis-) interpretation, only in circumstances such as find no place in the Christian religion. Schaller contributed (III., 2) an essay, *On the Characteristics of the Mythical Explanation of the Evangelical History*, out of which at a later time grew the work entitled *The Historical Christ and Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1838). In this book he finds fault specially with the application of the generic notion to spirit, and seeks to prove that the historical Christ, in whom the thought of divine humanity came to light, can alone be the real God-man. In the same way Conradi's essay, *On the Pre-existence of Christ* (III., 2), later became the work, *Christ in the Present, Past, and Future* (1839), in which it was granted to Strauss that it was the Christian community that was the one which had risen from the dead, and was a worker of miracles, etc.; but it was concluded from this, that also its founder must be thought of in this light. Here, even more than in the work on immortality, the phenomenological and metaphysical ways of regarding the subject were confounded, so that some gathered from the book that Conradi, like Strauss, taught nothing more than that the Christian community *saw* the God-man in Christ, while others emphasized the fact that he said Christ *must* have been so conceived of, and that what must be thought of, certainly is. No such double meaning could be put upon the essays of Bauer, the Editor. Although the laudatory notice of Tholuck's work, written in opposition to Strauss, enters upon the New Testament question, these essays have reference mostly to the Old Testament, and were preliminary studies for *The Critique of the History of Revelation*; Part First (in two volumes), *The Religion of the Old Testament* (Berlin, 1838). Bauer here comes forward in opposition to the negative results reached in particular by Vatke, and supposes the existence of prehistoric and mythical elements only to the time of Abraham, and even in the case of these insists that we may gather real history from them, particularly as to the condition of the period in which they arose. The patriarchal standpoint, that of the law, the contrast between law and self-consciousness, and finally prophecy, constitute the divisions of this work, in the introduction to which Bauer gives detailed expression to his views on the relation of Christianity to Judaism, Hellenism and Roman civilization, all three of which co-operated in the construction of dogmas.

3. Strauss himself gave expression to his views on his relation to the Hegelian school in the 3rd No. of his *Controversial Writings* (Tübingen, 1837). He acknowledges that Hegel's distinction between notion and presentation brought him not only, like Marheineke and others, to purify the presentation somewhat, but really to get beyond the form of presentation. Hegel himself, who was a thoroughly anti-critical, anti-revolutionary philosopher of restoration, would hardly have admitted that he agreed with these conclusions, which were thus drawn from his statements. They did, however, follow from his principles; and therefore Strauss declares that he had not reverted to the views of Schleiermacher, as Rosenkranz had reproached him with doing. On the contrary, the anti-critical Hegelians were guilty of having gone back to the views of Schelling. As to the school of Hegel, that, like the French parliament, was breaking up into two sides. On the Left he himself sits, if he is allowed, that is to say—while Göschel, Gabler, Bruno Bauer, occupy the Right, and Rosenkranz takes the Centre. This witty comparison met with so much approval that it has maintained itself down to the present time. Michelet (*vid.* § 329, 10), carried the conceit still further. In his *History of the last Systems of Philosophy in Germany* (2 vols., Berlin, 1837–38), he reminds himself that the earlier pupils of Hegel likewise belong to the Left, then proposes that the Centre should enter into a coalition with the Left, so that it may no longer be neither fish nor flesh; and by wholly disregarding the points of Strauss' comparison promises to this coalition the leadership which had belonged to the departed master, and along with it an imposing majority. That there might be no doubt of his belonging to the Upper House of the Hegelian parliament, he appeared with proxies, and substitutes for Gans, Vatke and Benary. Rosenkranz, who protested strongly against the validity of the principle of majorities, treated Strauss's conceit from a humorous point of view in a comedy, *The Centre of Speculation* (Königsberg, 1840), in which, in a tone of almost frivolous self-mockery, he said things which gave an inveterate opponent occasion to declare that this self-knowledge disarmed criticism. If we keep to Strauss' description, it will be understood why Schaller, who granted to Strauss a great deal to which Göschel and Bruno Bauer were opposed, was placed beside Rosenkranz, *i.e.* in the Centre. Vatke, who criticized Schaller's *Historical Christ*

in a thorough-going way in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* (1838, p. 2271), said nevertheless that the latter had reached the extreme limits of concession in reference to presentation, and had thus manifestly placed himself nearer Strauss. It is interesting to note in this criticism, how Vatke asserts that the indignation occasioned by the idea that the infinite spirit first reaches consciousness in the finite, rests partly on the misunderstanding by which the finite spirit was understood to mean only the human spirit. God is personal even before the human spirit comes to know Him, but not apart from the finite spirit, and Vatke holds that in the conception of the angels of the Bible, which have sprung from the star-spirits, there is more truth than many imagine. Although, as was said at the time, this thought was originally due to Strauss, Vatke was likewise regarded as holding an intermediate position. There could be no doubt on this point so far as Conradi was concerned, for in his work he declared himself to be as much opposed to Strauss as to Göschel. Superficial readers imagined they observed, even in the case of Strauss himself, a return to a middle position when his essay, *On the Permanent and the Perishable in Christianity*, appeared in the third part of the *Freihaven*, and especially later, when one of the *Two Peaceful Papers* came out, in which, starting from the fact that we do not erect any cathedrals, but do erect statues and monuments without number, Strauss proclaimed the worship of genius as the religion of the cultured, and in the Pantheon of this religious community along side of Raphael and Mozart gave a place also to the religious genius of Jesus.

4. In the conflict between the two sides of the Hegelian school, their opponents took part in such a way that, so far as regards the substance of the theories, they agreed with the Right, but on the other hand allowed that the Left represented the peculiarly Hegelian theory. The organ for these utterances was Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, previously referred to. The contributors whose names stood on the title-page, agreed in scarcely anything else. In it appeared Weisse's criticism of Tholuck's book (I., 1), which identified the standpoint of Strauss entirely with that of Hegel, and also Nitzsch's notice of Gabler's inauguration programme (II., 1), which did not go so far, but advised the Hegelian philosophy to abandon the claim of having made no assumptions. Here, too, appeared Krabbe's article on the *Relation between Philosophical and*

Christian Ethics, in which he places Leibnitz above Hegel, because, according to the latter, God first attains to consciousness in man; Fichte's treatise on *New Systems and the Old School* (II., 2), which describes Strauss and Michelet as genuine Hegelians, and points out that the Right Wing went beyond the master; Vorländer's essay on *Strauss* (III., 1) according to which Strauss had made the conflict between Hegel and Christianity apparent, and had shown that salvation was to be found only in returning to Schleiermacher; and, finally, what Weisse (III., 2), pretty much on the same lines as the utterances of Fichte just referred to, wrote on the *Personality of God*, a paper which was occasioned by the work of Frauenstädt and the accompanying preface by Gabler.

5. The position that Weisse himself took up with regard to the christological question appears from his *Evangelical History* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1835), with which Fichte declared he was in essential agreement. He explains that his aim in this book is to restore the historical figure of Christ by getting rid of the covering of indistinctness with which it had been surrounded in early times by tradition, and later, by the dogmas of the Church. At one with Strauss in denying all that is miraculous, he admits the possibility of cures, and of a power of perceiving what was future and distant on the part of Christ, and even of appearances of Christ after death; because what in the case of others is a sign of disease, such as somnambulism and walking about after death, was in his case a manifestation of the most perfect health. Agreed, further, with Strauss, in holding that a mythical element is mixed up with the evangelical history, he contends that in this we are to see historical myths, *i.e.*, myths which contain the philosophy of history in a symbolical form. Thus, for instance, in the tracing of Christ's genealogy to David, the historical connection of Judaism and Christianity is recognized; in the narrative of the Magi, the idea is expressed that the religion of nature also points to Christianity; while from the fact that the relation of Christ to Moses and Elias was perfectly evident to the Disciples, there arose, according to him, the myth of the visible transfiguration, and so on. In opposition to the pantheistic assertion, that God first becomes a person in man, and to the mystic assertion that He first becomes a person in Christ, Weisse lays down the position, that it was not God in

His individuality and entirety who attained to personality and self-consciousness in Christ, but the God who is within the world, as distinguished from the personal Father, the Logos in fact, who also in pre-Christian times lived in man, but first came to personal consciousness in Christ, so that since Christ's time, most men become partakers of salvation only by conscious repetition of the image of Christ; most men, he says, for the limitation of salvation to believers appears to Weisse to constitute the chief difference between the ecclesiastical and the cultured consciousness. As there was a way of salvation before Christ, so too, after him, there is a possibility of being saved without having heard of him. Throughout the entire work there runs a polemic directed against the notion that in the work of redemption the regular course of history was interrupted, and that God had appeared as a *Deus ex machina*, although Weisse admits that by the entrance of sin the conflicts of the history of the world have taken the place of the fixed laws of nature. (The question as to whether the acceptance of the idea of something unnatural, of evil in fact, the existence of which is denied by Pantheism, has not for its necessary correlate the supposition of something above nature, *i.e.* of miracle, does not seem to have presented itself to Weisse).

§ 338.

1. Since all religious differences ultimately rest on the different ways of conceiving the idea of God, in discussions on the anthropological and christological questions, the *theological* question must, incidentally at least, be touched upon. It was forced into the foreground once more, owing to a book by Strauss; and along with it the two other questions were naturally also subjected to a new scrutiny. If in this case also, as in that of the two others, the contrast between the two sides of the School were to repeat itself,—seeing that this question includes all religious questions,—on the one side would stand those who maintain with the master that their philosophy is orthodox, because dogma is rational, while on the other side, the Left Wing, would stand those who assert the impossibility of uniting dogma with philosophy, faith with reason. Since, according to the Hegelian formula quoted above (§ 334, 3), this latter statement amounts to saying that the substantiality and subjectivity of the absolute are incom-

patible—or to express it in a more concrete form—that they do not neutralize the pantheism of the System of Identity and the atheism of the Science of Knowledge—it can be understood why the Left Wing of the Hegelian school manifests two diametrically opposite tendencies, which have been superficially regarded as one; because they both attack religion, and still more, the defenders of religion amongst the Hegelians. Pantheism in the Hegelian Left is represented primarily by Strauss, while Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer represent the diametrical opposite of pantheism.

2. Strauss, in his second famous book, *The Christian Doctrine of Faith in its Development and in its Conflict with Modern Science* (2 vols., Tübingen, 1841–42), first of all defines his relation to Hegel quite differently from the way in which he had hitherto done. According to him, there could be no doubt that his conception of the Hegelian theory was the only correct one. (Properly speaking, as in the case where a Whig ministry follows a Tory, what had hitherto been called the Opposition ought from this time forward to have been called the Right.) The other side, above all, Göschel and Bruno Bauer, were covered with scorn. Schleiermacher received almost similar treatment, perhaps because Strauss was compelled to hear, oftener than he liked, that he had gone back to Schleiermacher's views. The Christian religion and modern philosophy were opposed to each other as theism and pantheism, because Spinoza was in a special sense the father of the latter. Any attempt to blend the two only results in such ridiculous productions as the works of Weisse. Dogma is the product of the uncultured consciousness; and when a philosopher calls himself a Christian, he may have his reasons for so doing, but *reason* certainly not. The consciousness which does not understand itself places the infinite content which it feels within itself as a vague impulse, outside of itself, because it knows itself at the same time as sensuous and empirical, so that it has what is one and the same thing twice over, in the form of something beyond the world, and of something present in the world. The philosopher who recognises that both are one, has on this account no worse enemy than what is beyond the world, which he has to conceive of and to represent as something which is present here and now. Since history has already accomplished this process of destruction, the criticism of dogmas coincides with the account of their

history. Strauss for this reason takes up each dogmatic *locus*, discusses the first traces of its origin in the Bible, shows how ecclesiastical dogma has grown out of biblical doctrine, how with the Reformation the process of breaking up begins, how the incomplete views of the Reformers were improved upon by the Socinians and Arminians, by Spinoza and the English Deists, how these last again were further improved upon by the French and German Enlightenment, until, in the joint Pantheism of Hegel and Schelling, the result is reached, that the one Infinite which manifests its energy in the finite, takes the place of God and the world. He further shows, that there is no other God than the thought which is in all thinking beings, that there are no attributes of God which are other than the laws of nature, that in the All there is no sign of increase or diminution, that the Absolute reflects itself from all eternity in ever different finite spirits, like a large orange-tree in which we always see buds, blossoms, and fruit, though these are never the same. Whoever has accomplished something may die calmly. The positions of the first work are maintained in this book to be incapable of refutation. If attention was called above to the agreement between these and the theories of Schelling, it must here be regarded as characteristic that Blasche in particular is referred to, and that, although in reference to Spinoza, it is said that there is wanting in his Substance the negativity which necessitates the positing of the individual, and which meets its due in Hegel, still fault is found with Hegel for the very thing by which he surmounted crude Pantheism, namely, his disregard of endless progress, and of the dilemma. It is not only in regard to this last point that the views of Michelet in his work, *On the Personality of God and Human Immortality* (Berlin, 1841), are closely connected with those of Strauss. When he declared that *also* is the most unphilosophical of words, perhaps he was thinking of what Hegel had said, that it was the *aut aut*. Michelet differs from Strauss, in that the latter, in order to escape having to lay down a beginning for the conscious existence of the Absolute, refers, like Vatke, to spirits in other stars, in which it knows itself eternally, an idea which Michelet pronounces to be transcendental superstition. Conversely, Strauss recognises in what is revealed to us by the strata of the earth, monuments of an earlier past, while Michelet, on the contrary, despatches the whole history

of the earth with the remark, that it transforms the co-existent into what is successive, forgets that Nature presents us only with what is "splendid as on creation's day," and which was therefore perfect from all eternity. Michelet does not wish, as Strauss does, that this theory should be called Pantheism; and he maintains that it satisfies the needs of the religious consciousness. In a later work, *The Epiphany of the Eternal Personality of the Spirit* (Nürnberg, 1844), he says, that since God comes to consciousness and exists, not only in one man, but in humanity, every one can say that God is (for him) a transcendent existence, that he may pray to Him, etc. (Exactly in the same way Berkeley held that things existed only in minds, and yet were external to us. *Vid.* § 291, 6.) Baur, agreeing more or less with Strauss and Michelet, taught in his *Christian Doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation of God* (3 vols., Tübingen, 1841-43), that Trinity and creation were the same, that the Son was only the world conceived of *in abstracto*. Fr. Theodor Vischer, celebrated later as a writer on æsthetics, expressed himself still more decidedly, partly in his characterization of Strauss in the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, partly in other essays, to the effect that true philosophy was incompatible with religion. Georgii opposed the two to each other as pantheism and dualism; and that Märklin, at all events latterly, thought of them in the same way, is evident from the biography by which Strauss did honour, both to his friend and to himself. The Critical school, usually called the Tübingen school, received a powerful impulse from Strauss, but only through his *Life of Jesus*. Thus we find, as the positive complement of his negative assertion, that these narratives were not historical, the view that we can nevertheless gather real history from them, a view partly suggested by the history of mythology,—since Ottfried Müller had taught that in the histories of the gods the history of the forms of worship which displaced one another, could be recognised,—and partly borrowed from a man in regard to whom this school is accustomed to be very reserved, namely Bruno Bauer.

3. We might recognise a chemical law in the fact that, as in the Hegelian theory it was only the moment of Pantheism, contained in it in a latent state, which had been liberated, now it is the other opposite moment which is set free in the same way; so that, in contrast to the former one-sidedness, Hegel's

theory is now changed into a pure theory of egoism. Amongst those who effected this was Feuerbach, who had still held fast by the pantheistic standpoint from which he combated immortality in the first volume of his *History of Modern Philosophy* (First Volume, from Bacon of Verulam to Benedict Spinoza, Ansbach, 1834). This is especially evident in his panegyric account of Spinozism. We may therefore doubt whether he was in real earnest when he gave expression to the orthodox views which appeared two years later in a criticism he wrote in reference to the personality of God. When the continuation of the history appeared as, *The Description and History of the Philosophy of Leibnitz* (Ansbach, 1837), not only does the fact that he no longer holds that modern philosophy begins with Bacon show a change of standpoint, but his entire theory of the universe is different from what it was. As in the former instance he was enthusiastic about Spinoza, he is here enthusiastic about views which present a diametrical contrast to those of Spinoza, about a system of which he himself says, It has no place for a divinity. This at all events helped to bring him to give great prominence in this book to the contrast between philosophy, in which man and therefore theory hold the place of authority, and religion, in which the individual person and therefore practical necessities take the lead. He gives to philosophy in its relation to religion the task of explaining the origin of religion, but declares that every one who tries to prove that there is anything rational in the elements which compose it, is only a half or a three-fourths philosopher. He expressed himself still more decidedly in his *Pierre Bayle* (Ansbach, 1838). Here, too, the greatest stress is laid on the fact that, in religion personality is placed in the foreground, and thus even the highest thing that exists, namely the Good, is changed from being a *neutrum*, which it is, and reduced to something personal. The first step, therefore, to scientific knowledge, is an atheism like that of Fichte's, and nothing which is contained in Christianity can be compared to the lofty ideas contributed by this atheism. Even the heathen, as for instance Seneca, to whom the Good was not merely a predicate, had profounder thoughts than those supplied by Christianity, which but for reminiscences of the ideas of the pagan philosophers, would very soon have become an idolatry. Dogma is an express prohibition against thinking; and hence

it is, that everything in which there is an absence of thought, such as the miraculous, is of such importance to dogma. For this reason even sensuous pleasure, into which the spirit which has freed itself from dogma plunges, is more rational than faith. The task of philosophy is therefore not the justification of dogma, but the explanation of the illusion in which it originates. The essay, *On (i.e., against) Speculative Philosophy*, which appeared in the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, and which was occasioned by the writings of Sengler, Günther, and Baader, and the essay entitled *Philosophy and Christianity* (Leipsic, 1839), which was likewise intended for the same Journal, but which, owing to difficulties in connection with the censorship of the press, appeared as a separate work, develop the idea that speculative philosophy in general, but particularly when it appears as speculative theology, is a drunken philosophy and needs to become sober. It simply aims at self-mystification,—of which faith consists, which at bottom only reveres itself,—but does this in such a way that it misunderstands itself, and instead of perceiving that for it self-consciousness is the Absolute, begins to say: the Absolute is self-consciousness, instead of explaining and justifying its origin. It fails to perceive the diametrical opposition that exists between philosophy and religion, which stand related as thought and fantasy, as the healthy and unhealthy states of mind. The Hegelian Philosophy of Religion is not open to the objection of putting the human species in the place of the Godhead, but it is indeed to the opposite objection, that it does not sufficiently regard the notion of the human species as the only absolute, an idea which has been gained for thought especially since the time of Kant. In the year 1841, finally, appeared Feuerbach's most celebrated work, the frequently republished *Essence of Christianity* (Leipsic, 1841), in which he seeks to show that religion consists in the fact that man makes his essence, his generic nature, objective, though certainly without knowing what now confronts him. Thus all theology is anthropology, a truth which Schleiermacher, just because he was certainly an atheist, came far more near recognising than Hegel, who reversed the important proposition that man knows only himself in his God, and said that God knows himself in man. If each religion sees in the one that has preceded it the deification of man, philosophy sees this also in the highest of all religions. It is owing to this uncon-

sciousness in reference to its own actions that religion in all its statements is seen to contain what are simply *contre-vérités*, which become truths so soon as subject and predicate are allowed to change places. From the statement, Compassion is divine, religion frames the proposition, God is compassionate. Since the statement, Love is divine, is turned into the proposition, God is love; and since love, apart from a sensuous nature and capacity for suffering, is unthinkable, there arise the dogmas of the Incarnation and of a suffering God. The Catholics are more logical than the Protestants, since they deify not only the love of the Father and the Son, but also the mother's love. Because it appears to man to be something divine that all wishes should be fulfilled, by simply converting this thought the idea originates, that God fulfils our wishes, performs miracles, hears prayer, etc. That God in reality is only the affirmative answer to our own wishes, is most plainly seen in the dogma that we can be saved without works, that is, without trouble, and in the dogma that man is immortal. Up to this point it might seem as if Feuerbach were not teaching anything very different from what Fichte had taught in his first work (§ 310), with which Feuerbach's book agrees often even to the very wording of the thoughts. The difference, however, is, that in Fichte that "divesting" which was held to be necessary for most, was looked on as harmless for all. Feuerbach takes quite a different view. Just because that of which man divests himself when he makes himself objective, is his essential nature, is the universally human element in him, religion makes humanity unhuman, limits it, abandons the universal and only increases egoism. It is in faith, therefore, that the evil principle essentially lies. Even when the Christian religion in a thoughtless fashion praises love, it makes of this a love which is confined to fellow-believers. Hence the horrors which have sprung from religion. The practical direction is, that we should convert all the statements of religion, and then we would get at the truth. What is true in the doctrine of the sacraments is, that eating and drinking and the bath are divine things.

4. It could hardly have been believed that Bruno Bauer, who had been treated, especially by Strauss, but by others as well, as the scapegoat of the Right Wing, would reach similar results. Just when Michelet had prophesied that he would very soon ally himself wholly with Hengstenberg, Bauer's

Dr. Hengstenberg, a Contribution to the Criticism of the Religious Consciousness (Berlin, 1839), appeared. In this book a searching light was thrown upon the artifices of modern apologetics, particularly in connection with the Old Testament. In the following year there appeared anonymously *The Evangelical National Church of Prussia and Science* (Leipsic, 1840), with which is closely connected by way of a supplement, the essay, *On the Christian State*, which was printed two years later in the *Hallische Jahrbücher*. In these the union of the two evangelical confessions is celebrated,—seeing that a Church exists only by creed and sacrament,—as the destruction of the Church; whereupon, the attempt to acquire greater independence for the Church is described as an antiquated proceeding. There is no longer any Church. Religion at the present day is absorption in self-consciousness. The State, which was Christian when it was Byzantine and in the first period of the Reformation, when dogma conditioned the political situation, is now what the Church formerly was, the manifestation of the infinite self-consciousness. Religion exists only as religiosity, *i.e.*, as thoughtless self-abandonment; and there is only one power to which to-day we ought to abandon ourselves, and that is the State. Accordingly in the conflict between it and the Church, science takes its side; and when, to please the Church, it puts a check upon science, it is doing injury to its own flesh. *The Critique of the Evangelical History of John* (Bremen, 1840), which has nothing to do with philosophy, and insists that we ought not to regard what is the pragmatism of a later member of the Christian community, a pragmatism crammed with reflection, as the complement of the Synoptics, was followed by Bauer's most celebrated book, which, however, cost him his lectureship in Bonn—*Critique of the Evangelical Narratives of the Synoptics* (3 vols., Leipsic, 1841-42). The polemic against Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, which runs through the whole book, is directed in the first place against his critical presuppositions, in connection with which he reproaches Strauss with not having made use of the discovery by Weisse and Wilke of the priority of Mark to the other Synoptics. He next attacks his historical presuppositions, on the ground that there were no such highly-developed Messianic conceptions amongst the Jews; and, finally, he attacks his mythological presuppositions, on the ground that to find the origin of the myths in the unconscious

process of symbolizing prompted by the spirit of the Church, gives us nothing better than what was given by the old inspiration theory. The Biblical narratives are, on the contrary, to be regarded as the product of a conscious pragmatism, as fictions with a purpose. In spite of their sources, however, they give us historical information, since from such an artistic production we may gather what the condition of the period was in which it arose. To describe these poetical productions on this account as deception, because, taken as representing reality, they would be absurd and even horrible, would be as foolish as if we were to call Raphael's Christ-child a lie, in regard to which the same holds good. They contain truth, even what may be recognised as historical truth. Thus, in the history of the Temptation, the struggles and collisions which had agitated the Church, and in which its presence of mind achieved the victory because it turned back in fear from the abyss before which it stood, are represented as an incident in the life of Jesus into which they have been changed. The most important element in his writings, from a philosophical point of view, is to be found in Bauer's utterances with regard to the religious spirit. These under the form of "resting points" interrupt the critical discussions. The religious consciousness is opposed to the free consciousness as an alienated consciousness, and therefore to morality as well. In accordance with this, since what is theological is just what is not human, the perfection of religion is placed at a point at which nature, the family, the State, world-dominion, are no longer the essentially dominating powers revered as divine, and therefore not at a point at which the chains of the enslaved spirit appear any longer surrounded by the flowers of family and State interests, but where war has been declared against all these. So now, after the vampire of spiritual abstraction has sucked all the blood and life out of humanity, and has left behind the emaciated Ego as the solitary power, the spirit is not yet capable of doing without the illusion that its essential nature is an objective power (God) standing over against it. The position here referred to is the one occupied by the Christian religion. Its God, Christ, is born contrary to the course of nature, and works against it. He belongs to no family, to no nation, etc. As an historical existence, he would be a horrible being; as the peculiar essence of man in an objective form, set free from any connection with the sub-

stantial forces in human life, the essence of purely abstract selfhood, he is the culminating point of all religion. He is certainly its end as well; for when criticism, by proving the impossibility of such a subjective existence, denies any objective reality to what composes it, it has driven self-consciousness back upon itself, and like a Ulysses returned home it will show that it can still bend the bow. A chorus of admiring bawlers was gathered round Bruno Bauer by this book, and also through the injustice shown by a ministry which deprived him of a lectureship it had not bestowed. Since amongst these admirers the Semitic race was strongly represented, they were somewhat dejected by his *Jewish Question* (1842), in which he came forward in opposition to the cry for the emancipation of the Jews, because he held that it was utterly unreasonable to ask that those who excluded themselves and wished to be the chosen people, should not be excluded. The Jews, in order to arrive at perfect freedom, that is, at a state in which they would have no religion, would have to take many more steps than the Christians, who had almost attained it. Perhaps *Christianity Unveiled* would have conciliated those who had been startled. It was confiscated, however, in the book-shop; and only a single copy, so far as is known, has been preserved. It works out what is in substance the same thought, that the Christian is in the most favourable position for rising to the freedom enjoyed by Atheists, while the Jew has scarcely any alternative but to pass through Christianity.

5. Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer do not however stand to Strauss only in a negative relation, as is implied in what was often asserted at the time, that Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* leaves Strauss' *Doctrine of Faith* as far behind as Bruno Bauer's *Synoptics* does his *Life of Jesus*. Their position rather is the direct opposite to his, as they themselves declared when they said, that while he calls himself a pantheist they call themselves atheists; and every one will agree with Feuerbach (*Thesis towards a Reform of Philosophy*), that Atheism is just Pantheism reversed. If, accordingly, Feuerbach does not, like Bruno Bauer, conduct a polemic directly against Strauss, he does so indirectly, since he attacks just those very Hegelian propositions which Strauss most firmly maintained, as for instance, amongst others, that God knows Himself in man. From this contrast between them

it necessarily follows that Strauss, to whom every man is merely a specimen, should despise the masses, should be conservative in politics, should place above all else that form of thinking which is free from all idiosyncrasy, should write with a plastic, unimpassioned calm, should live in Spinozistic seclusion. Feuerbach, again, who so often repeats the statement that the subject cannot be repeated, that it is difficult to understand how he can escape immortality, is destructive in politics, always writes with passion, must have company (subjects) about him, even though it is thoroughly bad; and Bauer identifies things to such an extent with a subject as to speak of the "seven-year-long sufferings of science" exactly in the style of Feuerbach, when he renounced his professorship and said, "Philosophy has now ceased to be a profession." Bauer's style, too, mirrors the constant self-absorption of the subject in itself. Thus, for Strauss, philosophy became a doctrine of "all is one," while for the two others it was a doctrine of self-consciousness or of personality. For this reason the former exalts Spinoza especially, while the two latter find their spiritual comrades and models in the eighteenth century. Up to this point there is no other sign of difference between Feuerbach and Bauer, than that which necessarily arose from their entirely different individualities, and just because their standpoint is subjectivism. In one point, however, they soon differ. Bruno Bauer, in the two anonymous works, *The Trumpets of the Judgment Day on Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist* (Leipsic, 1841), and *Hegel's Theory of Religion and Art Judged from the Standpoint of Faith* (1842), seeks, under the mask of a pietist, to prove that Hegel agreed entirely with the atheists of the eighteenth century, and that therefore the present Bruno Bauer was a pure Hegelian. Feuerbach, again, when the authorship of the *Trumpets* was attributed to him, wrote an essay entitled, *An Estimate of the Work: The Essence of Christianity* (1847), in which he says that his present teaching, so far from being an unfolding of Hegelian theories, on the contrary originated in opposition to these theories. If any one is to be called his forerunner, let it be Schleiermacher. Hegel's theory, he asserts, is entirely religious, and therefore it belongs to the Old Testament of philosophy. (He afterwards said that the so-called Right Wing of the Hegelian school was the one which was in complete harmony with the master.)

6. This splitting up of the Hegelian Left into Pantheism

and Atheism was far from adding strength to the Right. The result rather was, that the latter was placed between two fires, and, owing to the undeniable fact that the more brilliant talent was on the side of the opponents, fell into a not very flourishing state. It is true that the Right was no more silent in reference to the theological question than in reference to the others, but its voice died away pretty much unheard. Hinrichs, in a criticism on Michelet's *History of the Last Systems* (*Hallische Jahrbücher*, 1839, p. 457 ff.), expressed himself in regard to this pretty much after the fashion of Göschel. I attempted in my work, *Nature and Creation* (Leipsic, 1840), and in a treatise closely connected with it, though published at a much later date : *The Philosophy of Religion as Phenomenology of the Religious Consciousness* (in : *Vermischte Schriften*, Leipsic, 1845), to develop a cardinal point of this question, namely, the idea of creation, in such a way as to show how the relation between the physical and religious ways of looking at things, as well as the idea of miracle, might be made intelligible. I sought also to prove that, since the different religions show different stages of consciousness, the philosophy of religion, just because it is at one point necessarily an explanation of myths, absolutely may not be this at another. Gabler contributed *The Hegelian Philosophy, Contributions towards a Right Judgment and Estimate of the Same*, First (and only) Part, Berlin, 1843. This was originally a criticism of Trendelenburg's *Logical Investigations*, and in it the Hegelian philosophy was given a place nearer to Mysticism than to unbelief, while Pantheism was described as error, and Atheism as absurdity. Reinhold Schmidt, a native of Livonia, and Joh. Wilh. Hanne, a native of Brunswick,—both of whom afterwards abandoned this standpoint, but went in quite different directions,—wrote respectively, *The Christian Religion and the Hegelian Philosophy* (Berlin, 1837), and *Rationalism and Speculative Theology in Brunswick* (Brunswick, 1838). Göschel's book has been already referred to above. Even if,—which was not the case,—the Right Wing of the Hegelian school had been able to bring men into the field who could have coped with Strauss and Bauer in theological learning, even if it could have arrayed against them an acuteness such as was possessed by the former and which constantly reminds us of Lessing, a gift of musing self-absorption such as characterized the latter, or finally, the force of a Feuerbach, which, though it early showed a certain

tendency to cynicism, was always full of power,—it would have fallen far short of the Left, in so far as influence upon the reading public was concerned. The reason of this lies in the fact, that Hegel's teaching had been taken up by the Left in a one-sided and abstract way ; and the great majority of people always prefer what one can become fanatical about, and this is never anything but what is abstract. The concrete, in which opposite determinations are united together, appears to most, according as the ethical or the intellectual standard is applied, to be either a timid half-measure or confused thought. The man who definitely takes up one side everywhere gains the day. If Strauss, in reference to the Dilemma, reminds Hegel that it is not only profound thinking which disregards contradiction, the majority of people still ignore the fact that profound thinking also does it ; and acuteness, which, in order to make absurdity impossible, renounces profound thinking, is—as it was also in this instance—sure of success.

7. In what was last remarked is also involved the reason why the works of two men who have already been referred to several times as disinclined to extremes, were so little studied in a thorough way, when they published books in which all the questions hitherto discussed were treated in a style which was generally associated with the Centre of the School. Vatke's book was at least praised ; but how little it was actually read, is evident when we remember that in Schwartz's much-lauded *History of the most Recent Theology*, at all events in the first edition, it was not once mentioned. Conradi's book found quite as few readers, and not even a single appreciative one. Weisse's opinion, that Vatke's book was the most solid one which had appeared for years in the Hegelian school, may be supplemented by mentioning Conradi's alongside of it. K. Conradi, in his *Critique of Christian Dogmas According to the Method of the Apostles' Creed* (Berlin, 1841), holds that the evangelical history should not be criticized, but only dogmas, and so takes up the latter in their most primitive form and where they have just sprung out of history and are still held together by historical threads, namely, in the Apostles' Creed. He then shows how in each *locus* which is examined in accordance with the three articles, reflection discovers contradictions which are done away with by means of speculation. To the difficulty which lies in the subject itself there is added in Conradi's book the further difficulty, that his manner of uniting phenom-

enological and ontological investigations, which has been already twice remarked upon, is in no work carried so far as in this one. He has here made use of the right he claims of touching quite shortly on what he had previously more fully developed; and he exercises this right even where his views have in the meantime undergone alteration. This is a point to which Weisse, in his review in Fichte's *Zeitschrift* (VIII., 2), rightly called attention. Thus it has come about, that people have read out of,—or, as he would perhaps say, read into,—his profound constructive ideas and his acute denials, both Strauss' worship of Genius and Schleiermacher's impersonal but person-making Saviour, the orthodox doctrine of immortality, and the assertion that Christ, in order to be a Redeemer, had to be the greatest transgressor. While Conradi's work already proclaims by its title that all dogmas are to be discussed in it, this is really done also in Vatke's work, although it is brought forward only as a monograph on *Human Freedom in its Relation to Sin and Divine Grace* (Berlin, 1841). He declares at the very beginning, that he is equally opposed to the standpoint which passes for orthodox, according to which God is regarded as finite individual personality, and to pantheism, which looks on the personality of God as the sum of human personalities. He further opposes the view, which was at all events supported by Hegel, that the philosophy of religion has to get a grasp only of the subject-matter of dogmatics, not also of that of theological ethics; while at the same time he maintains that religion in its innermost essence is worship, is an inner reconciliation of self-consciousness and will with God, with which speculation can never come into conflict, though it certainly may do so with dogma. The investigation is divided into three sections, of which the first treats of the will in general, the second of the will in the sphere of subjective religion, and the third of the will in the sphere of objective morality. In the first section, it is specially worthy of note, that he lays stress on what most Hegelians forget, holding, that by the Absolute,—he ought to have said, by the Absolute Spirit,—speculation understands, not what according to religious conceptions is called God, but the kingdom of the spirit, God in unity with his kingdom. (If Vatke had not made such repeated mention of God wheré he ought to have said kingdom of heaven, there would not have been such an outcry about his statement, that the Absolute Spirit is not

personal, but more than personal). The second section is the most important, but also the most difficult. He goes over all the single moments of the subjective will which constitute the presuppositions necessary for those complicated relations in connection with which we can first begin to speak of good and evil. (Accordingly, in the narrative of the Fall, what lasted through centuries is compressed into a moment.) It is then further shown how, through the relation to God and His law, evil becomes sin, and he maintains that the latter is necessary only that it may cease to be. The ideal of human development would be reached, when evil entered into the will only in so far as was necessary to awaken conscience, but in that case existed only as something which had been overcome and was simply a possibility. The impossibility of such religious strength of mind, particularly under special circumstances, cannot be demonstrated. He then takes up the one-sided methods of explaining the origin of evil, and the equally one-sided views as to the relation of human freedom to divine activity, and at the same time discusses trinitarian and christological questions, and the different way in which God works in nature and in the sphere of freedom, from which the impossibility of miracles is supposed to follow. The third section shows how, by means of a religious transfiguration, moral communities become a kingdom of God, in which, as in the glorified Christ,—though not in Christ as reduced to a single personality,—the fulness of God dwells through the manifoldness of spiritual gifts. To evil and to sin, as mentioned in the first section, there corresponds here the immoral, in the destruction and utilizing of which Providence consists. The final result is, that the kingdom of God, once become a Church, transforms everything, art and science, into a means of grace, and, while at once militant and triumphant, approaches nearer to the goal where God is free Spirit for free spirits, where His will is recognised and willed as the will of free spirits, and where His love is concentrated in the focus of grateful reciprocal love. Even those who are of opinion that Vatke here approaches too near to pantheism, will feel themselves essentially benefited by the thorough study of his work, of which not even a careful epitome, much less a mere table of contents like the above, can give an idea.

C—PHENOMENA IN THE SPHERES OF ETHICS AND POLITICS.

§ 339

1. Every one will at least have become doubtful of ascribing an orthodox character to the school in which only the small handful composing the Right Wing keeps to orthodoxy; and, indeed, the most celebrated member of this side, Göschel, often does not know what to think, not of orthodoxy, but of the Hegelian philosophy. With the destruction of the second work of restoration, the first was not in any way thereby re-established. The dialectic method passed into entire oblivion in the disputes which have been characterized. Strauss never employed it in his writings; and if he reminds us of the dilemma of Hegel, he at the same time also hinted that the solution of contradictions was not the chief thing. On the other side, Gabler seeks to escape the reproach that the Hegelian God was just the Hegelian method, by pronouncing it to be of secondary importance. But if it is all over with the logical foundation of the system, and with its orthodoxy, then there remains only the third point, which was brought forward (§ 331, 1) in order to show how Hegel was a philosopher of restoration. If in the discussions on the fundamental principles of the moral life, views should be broached which unite atomistic ethics and revolutionary politics with the negative position in the two points already treated, there will be no reason whatever for asserting that these views are in agreement with those of Hegel. At most, the honour will be left him of having been the starting-point. This is the reason why, if in the first section the anti-Hegelians monopolized the discussion, and the Hegelians in the second, in this section that will be done by those who go beyond Hegel, and are thus ultra-Hegelians.

2. RICHARD ROTHE'S *Beginnings of the Christian Church and of its Constitution* (first volume; Wittenberg, 1837), appears as a prophetic announcement that scientific interest will soon be diverted from religious to political questions. (Rothe was born January 28, 1799; in 1823 he became chaplain to the Prussian Embassy; from 1828 to 1837 he was professor in the Seminary at Wittenberg; from 1837 onwards, with the exception of the years 1849–54, when he was in Bonn, he was professor in Heidelberg: he died in this capacity on the

20th August, 1867.) In this work a man, celebrated for his gifts as a preacher, and for his thorough piety, sought to carry out the thought that the Church no longer corresponds to the Christian life, as a form in which it can be realized, but that the State alone does this, though certainly not a State which has any kind of Church attached to it, but one which has absorbed the religious life after the dissolution of its ecclesiastical setting. The fact that it is just the cultured who are becoming estranged from the Church, and are turning full of hope to a State-life, presents an approach to that condition of things which the seer beholds, in whose new Jerusalem there stands no temple. This State of the future will, as the Church did formerly, overleap the limits of nationality, not in the form of a universal State, but as an organism of States. This State, which undoubtedly lies beyond the present, though not beyond the earth,—but, on the contrary, is always realizing itself more and more on the earth,—has, along with the religious element, absorbed the artistic element as well; and national festivals constitute its proper form of worship. In the course of the investigation, Hegel and Schleiermacher are designated as those who had the profoundest conception, the one of the State, the other of religion. This book of Rothe's, which was described by many at the time as the counterpart of Strauss' *Life of Jesus*,—because it annihilates the Church just as Strauss' book annihilates the Founder of the Church,—was just for this reason hailed with delight by many anti-Hegelians, because they said it shows to what the Hegelian philosophy leads, namely, to pagan deification of the State.

§ 340.

1. The very thing which Rothe's book announced as likely to happen, actually did take place through the instrumentality of the HALLISCHE JAHRBÜCHER, the history of which, as the Editor afterwards said, is really a part of the history of the time. The originality of the two principal editors, ARNOLD RUGE (born 1802; from 1832 to 1841 *Privatdocent* in Halle; lived afterwards in Dresden and Paris, and finally in England [Ruge died Dec. 31, 1880, at Brighton.—Ed.]), and THEODOR ECHTERMEYER (Teacher in the normal school at Halle, then in Dresden, where he died in 1842), each of whom was the complement of the other, and the fact that they had an ener-

getic publisher in perfect sympathy with them, enabled them to bring out this journal under the most favourable auspices, on January 1st, 1838. The very first article, on the Halle University, which was the joint composition of the two editors (1838, pp. 1 ff. and 665 ff.), shows that the standpoint of the *Jahrbücher* was that of the Hegelian philosophy; and it is especially pointed out that to Ruge belongs the credit of having been the first to introduce the youth of Halle to its metaphysical depths. Later, Ruge challenges any one to mention a single point in which he departs from Hegel's views; and he volunteers to read a *privatissimum* on Hegel's *Logic* for Leo. Other contributors call Hegel the centre round which the present turns (pp. 348, 770), so that the strictures of Feuerbach on Hegel, to the effect that he did not sufficiently recognise the importance of Fichte (p. 46), passed all the more unheeded, since Feuerbach himself, in his criticism of empiricism, explains that in principle he is at one with Hegel (p. 582). If it is considered besides, that although in the course of the year 1848, Strauss (*On Justinus Kerner*, p. 6) and Vischer (*Strauss and the Württembergers*, p. 449) had supplied most attractive essays, both were kept from taking up theological questions, in accordance with the principle of the *Jahrbücher*; that the editors explain that they do not share the view according to which the existence of the Absolute in Christ is impossible (p. 1101), that they reject Carove's deism and humanism (p. 1435), congratulate themselves on the respect shown to what is positive in contrast to rationalism (p. 611), take religion under their protection, and defend it against Heine and Feuerbach's *Leibnitz*, as well as the Church against the attacks of Rothe (pp. 1073, 1154), call Göschel a man of great ability, say that philosophy and dogma differ only as regards form (pp. 1884, 1888), describe the moderate deists and the Jews as heretics in reference to the free spirit of the age (pp. 1177, 1187); then, if we regard the Centre of the Hegelian school as the standpoint occupied at that time by the *Jahrbücher* in the form in which the Centre was represented by Vatke and Conradi, these two are perhaps placed too far in the direction of the Left. As regards politics, the *Jahrbücher* showed a decidedly Prussian colouring, as came out, for instance, in the review of Görres' *Athanasius* (pp. 481, 729), without however raising the suspicion of intentional exaggeration which obtruded itself in other places owing to the large type

in which the complements paid to the Prussian Government and administration were printed. Parallels between Prussia and France always resulted in favour of the former, and it seemed indisputable that the monarchical system was the best.

2. That the *Jahrbücher* had made a change of front, to which Feuerbach's previously mentioned essay on positive philosophy already pointed (p. 2305),—an essay, be it said, into which the editors inserted a *captatio benevolentiae* for the Hegelian school which is not Feuerbach's,—became much more evident in the issue of the year 1839. This appears already in the Preface, which casts off the fetters of an exclusive school from the *Jahrbücher*, and assures its readers that it is able to survive the withdrawal of less pietistically inclined men (*i.e.* Göschel, among others). It was further seen in two notices by Ruge of Bretschneider's *Baron Sandau* and Strauss' *Permanent and Transient* (1839, pp. 77, 94), in which a warning was given against despising rationalism, a habit which, it was said, was common amongst profound speculative fools. Göschel is attacked by Echtermeyer in the sphere of æsthetics (p. 153), and by Ruge in that of the history of religion. The admittance of Strauss' masterly essay on Schleiermacher and Daub (p. 97) shows that the theological sphere was no longer closed for him. The essay on Pietism and Jesuitism (p. 241) pronounces every philosophy which justifies dogma, to be pious philosophy with a purpose, and treats the dialectic method ironically, by applying it to the irrational. It is true that religion is still extolled, but only in the form of Protestantism, in contrast to old lumber. Wherein this consists, is a point left indefinite. The fact that Feuerbach's *Philosophy and Christianity* was prevented from appearing in the *Jahrbücher* solely by the action of the press censor, shows what position it already had taken up in regard to religion. When, accordingly, Hinrichs, in a criticism upon Michelet (p. 465), declared himself opposed to the views of the latter, the editors, by slight insertions, made him say things about the Right Wing which he had never thought of saying. The opposite view to that of the Right Wing constantly gained more ground in the *Jahrbücher*. We soon find it said that dogmatics ought simply to be the history of dogmas; that nobody can believe and know, for the one is incompatible with the other (p. 496). In the notice of the evangelical histories by Neander and Weisse, Georgii de-

scribes the standpoint of religion as dualism, and as therefore incompatible with philosophy, which asserts the existence only of what is here and now. Ruge, who had just expressed himself with a good deal of diplomacy regarding Strauss' worship of genius, now finds fault only with its aristocratism, which is disproved, for instance, by the indiscriminate out-pouring of the spirit at the Leipsic Reformation festival (pp. 985, 1329). The very full essay on the Schiller festival in Stuttgart (p. 1097), commends the fact that here we have the celebration of the true revelation of God, that which is given in genius. Rosenkranz, *i.e.*, the Centre, comes in for his turn, after the *Jahrbücher* had broken with the Right. Bayerhof reads him a lecture (p. 1391), because he is coquetting with orthodoxy, and believes in immortality. Feuerbach finally gives a criticism of the Hegelian system (p. 1657) in which he rejects its principal points, *viz.* the way in which it begins with the absence of all presuppositions, the importance which is conceded to negation, the subordinate place given to nature. In the same way, in an essay on Goldschmidt's *European Pentarchy* (p. 1729), Hegel is reproached with having brought, by his old German romanticism, so many of his pupils into bondage. The last remark points to the alteration which this year had brought with it in reference to politics. On the occasion of the appearance of Förster's war-songs, and in connection with the Berlin volunteer festival (p. 433), the Prussian patriotism of the *Jahrbücher* was still at its height. Now, however, Ruge, under the mask of a Würtemberger (p. 2089), writes a description of the Prussian Government and the hitherto so much lauded bureaucracy, in which he turns the "State of intelligence" into ridicule; and Biedermann in Leipsic examines the Prussian State-principle, and finds that it is entirely steeped in Catholicism (p. 2277). The greatest sensation of this year is occasioned by the joint "Manifesto" of the editors on "Romanticism and Protestantism," in which the idea of Romanticism is so defined as to include all fixed adherence to the ideas which had been surmounted by means of Protestantism, to include therefore the standpoint of the fixed Idea. It was out of policy, Ruge subsequently says, that they had here confined themselves to the domain of philosophy and æsthetics; the main purpose from the beginning had been a political one. The fact that Hegel is here put in contrast with

Romanticism, the culminating point of which is to be found in Schelling, and this after Feuerbach had proved that he had simply completed the System of Identity, produces a singular impression.

3. During the year 1841, in which the *Jahrbücher* rapidly follows the new course it has entered upon, the essays which have a theological interest, or, speaking generally, any strictly scientific interest, as for example Vatke's review of Jul. Müller's frequently reprinted book on *Sin* (2 vols., Breslau), give place to the popular discussion of practical questions, Echtermeyer seldom wrote, and Ruge all the oftener. A joyful announcement that Feuerbach was engaged on a critique of impure reason, was followed by the fourth article of the Manifesto, in which the old Hegelians are reproached with idleness, induced, says the Manifesto, by the master. They contemplate the historical process of the world, instead of taking part in what is practical; and their romantic cue makes them unjust to what is useful, to Nicolai and the Enlightenment. An essay, *Europe in the Year 1840*, vindicates hegemony for France, and lays down the position that there is only *one* Atheism, namely doubt in reference to the spirit of history. Köppen sings the praises of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which, and not the Reformation, begins the modern period, and jeers at the Hegelians, for whom Hegel's *Logic* replaces the Veda, while Ruge affirms that Brahma's kingdom is at an end. In an essay on *Von Gagern and Hegel*, he blames the latter for having abandoned the Theory of Contract, for having taken corporate bodies under his protection, for closing his system with religion instead of with universal history and the modern State. He gives an enthusiastic welcome to Bruno Bauer's *National Church*, and extols the Prussian State, because it has annihilated the Church. In another essay, the Hegelians are ridiculed for the orthodoxy with which they stick to the *Encyclopedia*; and Hegel himself is ridiculed for his idealism, which prevents him from seeing that spirit embodies itself at the present time in steam and iron, and that money, without which there is no industry, is the true idealist. Another writer calls the Hegelian philosophy, scholasticism, court-philosophy, a patching-up. It may be imagined, accordingly, with what delight the announcement of Strauss's *Doctrine of Faith* was received by the *Jahrbücher*.

4. In the Preface to the fourth year's issue (1841) the banner of rationalism and liberalism is raised, and complaints are made about the state of things in Prussia. It is declared that there is need of a free university, which, however, must be situated outside of Prussia. The *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung* is censured for not having more energetically taken up the cause of the Magdeburg magistracy against the devil's preacher Kämpfe. This year's issue contains nothing from the pen of Strauss; but Vischer contributed an essay on the Tübingen dogmatic professors, in which he states the view that a time may come when there will be no Church, a state of things of which there seemed reason to be apprehensive, since the "National Church," and along with it the *Jahrbücher*, had proclaimed that there is no Church. Speaking generally, the moment was visibly approaching when Strauss was to appear as one who has lagged behind. Bruno Bauer's previously-mentioned treatise on the Christian State is the last note-worthy essay which the *Jahrbücher*, as the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, contained. From July 1841 onwards, it appeared as the DEUTSCHE JAHRBÜCHER; and Ruge justifies this emigration from Prussia to Germany in the Preface, which reproaches the Hegelians with their threefold orthodoxy, which was at once philosophical, theological, and political. All the shreds of dishonesty in which the *Jahrbücher* had draped itself are henceforth to be thrown aside, and it is to present itself free from Christianity, which had been shaken to its foundations by Strauss and exposed in all its emptiness by Feuerbach, but above all to declare war against political servitude, against the theories of feudalism and property. Nauwerk and Edgar Bauer,—a brother of Bruno—contributed essays, all of which concern the domain of politics. Ruge, in the essay, *Protestant Absolutism*, demands a State in which the king will be the first servant. In a more incidental way it is declared, that as Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* had rendered Strauss' *Doctrine of Faith* antiquated, so Bruno Bauer's *Synoptics* had done the same for his *Life of Jesus*. The sole merit of the Hegelian philosophy, as of every philosophy, is, that it has freed many from prejudices. If any one reaches the goal more quickly without it, so much the better.

5. In the last year's issue of the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* (1842), a demand is made apropos of a political work by Theodor Romer for a constitutional monarchy, but with a

single chamber. In April, Ruge makes it known that difficulties occasioned by the censorship of the press in Saxony necessitated writing essays in a diplomatic vein, and affirms that the philosophical parrhesia belongs to the future. In July, there once more appears a manifesto, which places the essence of Romanticism in the maintenance of what is Christian, and therefore in Jesuitism. Nauwerk sets up Radicalism as the true view, in opposition to ideas of reform. Ruge ridicules the Christian State, calls the War of Liberation a war of restoration, jeers at the Germans on account of their feeling of nationality, and at the Prussians for their compulsory military service, that pendant of a universal sacerdotalism. As Nauwerk had extolled the future as the epoch of democracy, so also Ruge says in the Preface to the issue of the year 1843,—with which the *Jahrbücher* comes to an end,—and in which liberalism is made to criticise itself, that the time is at hand in which the Church must make way for the school, and liberalism for democracy. After the *Jahrbücher* had been prohibited in Saxony, Ruge left Germany. In Paris he brought out some parts of the *Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher* (1844). In the following year his *Two Years in Paris* appeared (Leipsic, 1845), and the issue of his *Collected Works* began in 1846 (10 vols. Mannheim). After his return to Saxony, in the year 1846, he directed the reform movement, first in Leipsic, and then, after he had been for a long period member of the Frankfort Parliament, in Berlin. After the year 1850 he lived in England, and gave to the public a translation of Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* (Leipsic, 1860), as well as the beginning of his *Autobiography*; and in these, likewise, he showed his spiritual kinship with the men of the eighteenth century.

§ 341.

1. Just when the *Jahrbücher* had come to an end, Edgar Bauer, who up to this time had been known only by some essays which he wrote in it, began his political lucubrations, which landed him first in prison and then forced him to go to England as a refugee. He was not only the foe of constitutional monarchy, but of every form of State in which piety, *i.e.*, religion, is of any importance whatever. Since, however, there is no State in which this condition of things does not

exist, he demands that the State should cease. Man is no longer to be a political animal, *i.e.*, a mere citizen, but a free member of society, simply an individual, without king, without marriage, without private possessions, without nationality and national peculiarities—exempt, in short, from all moral bonds. Since he attempts to transport himself into this position, he asserts that it is unjust for one who, like himself, does not recognise the idea of majesty to be condemned as an insulter of majesty, and to be condemned in accordance with the Prussian common law, the authority of which he does not at all admit.

2. When, however, the worth, not only of religion and the Church, but also of the State and of every moral organism was thus denied, or, as it was now expressed, was subjected to criticism; and seeing that criticism, as applied both to religion and politics, has completed its work, criticism may appear to be at a loss for an object. However singular it may now seem that Bruno Bauer and his brother should have made the attempt to place themselves at the standpoint of *pure* criticism, *i.e.*, of criticism, not of this or that object, but of criticism *in abstracto*, still this step was actually necessary. It was in truth already taken when philosophy first constituted itself as a theory of self-consciousness, when, that is, the Science of Knowledge issued in Irony (*vid.* § 314, 3). Only in the present case the self-deification of the All-destroying Ego seems to be much more logical, *i.e.*, more abstract, than in the case of Schlegel. This standpoint was much more clearly developed in the *Literaturzeitung* edited by Bruno Bauer (Charlottenburg, 1844), than in Edgar Bauer's *Conflict of Criticism with Church and State*. In both, the doctrine is proclaimed that there is no truth in anything but man, and that therefore even the word atheism, because it contains a relation to the object denied, is not the correct designation for the views of the free man. For this very reason the free man must not assume that anything has absolute value. Everything is posited only in order that it may be denied; as soon as it is recognised it ceases to be true. Criticism does not bring us satisfaction; he who will have recognised truths, let him go to religion. So far Edgar. Bruno, again, at a time when a large circle of young literati, mostly Jewish, thronged round him as his admirers, and changed every word he uttered into a stereotyped phrase, which was again trumpeted abroad by the

Rheinischer Zeitung or other journals, as public opinion or the voice of the people, declares to these followers of his that the worst testimony against any work is the enthusiasm which it evokes in the masses, and that the watchword should be: Away with formulas. In formulas, it is further declared, particularly in those which speak of freedom, the spirit has its real enemy. He now goes on to describe in the *Literaturzeitung* how the Rhine Parliament has treated the Jewish question, how Ruge asks to have the prohibition issued against the publication of the *Jahrbücher* removed, how Biedermann's *Monatsschrift* conducts itself like a type of windy liberalism. Nauwerk with his phrases and points, Marheineke with his legitimism in science, which seeks to maintain the theories of the last dogmatic systems long since abandoned, Proudhon with his theory, the Würtembergers, because with them that still passed for truth which had been a truth in 1839, are all alike severely ridiculed, because they do not seem to see that truths very quickly alter. At the same time, no regard whatever is paid to the question, who first gave expression to a truth; for not only does Bauer speak slightly of the *Mannheimer Abendblatt*, with its radicalism and its shrieking for freedom of the press, but also of the Berlin correspondent of the *Rheinischer Zeitung*, who was none other than—Edgar Bauer himself two years earlier. He is taken as an example of radical criticism as it still exists, and is estimated by the standard of pure criticism, which is only objective and descriptive, and which desires and wishes nothing else than to know things in their character as vanity. This tendency so to regard things must naturally have appeared “wonderful” to those who subsisted in part on Bauer's formulas. They must have “shivered” at the sight of such a standpoint; or they must have felt themselves under the necessity of denouncing “the presumption of two egoists from whom the nation turns away in disgust.” Bruno Bauer answers his earlier admirers in the essay, *What is now the Subject of Criticism?* This essay carries the identification of criticism with the individual person further than ever, and Bauer now explains that criticism drops all presuppositions only when those cease to be held of value which are framed by the masses, those dregs left by the Revolution. This view is distinguished from that held by Feuerbach, who in his deification of the species really deifies the masses. This pure criticism, says one of the last essays,

is not like theological criticism (Strauss), or philosophical criticism (Feuerbach), or historical criticism (Ruge), nor, what amounts to the same thing, like the criticism of theology, philosophy, and history. It rather contemplates the process of destruction, and takes delight in it, if delight is not too passionate an expression for a calm consideration. Once arrived at this point, nothing remains for the pure critical self-consciousness but to seek for this process everywhere; and it must be regarded as almost a necessity that at this stage it is just the great destructive process of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution, which arrested attention. The *Memoirs towards a History of Modern Times since the French Revolution* (1843), written by the two brothers, is intended to be so objective, in contrast to the accounts of Thiers, Dahlmann and others, which are written from a party standpoint, that in it extracts are given only from the *Moniteur*, with the feeling of calm joy that every figure which appears on the scene is valuable only in that it is destroyed. It is this same calm joy which breathes through Bruno Bauer's *History of the Culture, Politics and Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century* (4 vols., 1843), through his *History of Germany during the French Revolution* (2 vols., 1846), through his *Complete History of the Party Struggles in Germany* (1847), through his *Civil Revolution in Germany* (1849), and finally, through the *Fall of the Frankfort Parliament* (1849). All these show how every phenomenon perishes of its own "inner pauperism"; and we feel, from the way the account is given, that every phenomenon which is welcomed with enthusiasm by the *gros*, is immediately recognised by the critic, who isolates himself more and more, as worthless; and its fall fills him with the proud consciousness: *Impavidum ferient ruinæ*.

3. There is nothing unfair in placing Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer side by side as deifiers of themselves, although the former does not go the length of pure criticism but develops in quite a different way. The self, namely, or the Ego which they put on the throne, is itself something twofold. It is sensuous, and it is intellectual; and just as the enlightenment of the eighteenth century,—which, carried out in the spirit of the nineteenth century, is revived in the Science of knowledge, and had now repeated itself once more in the reawakening of the latter in the post-Hegelian spirit,—appeared in the two forms of the French and German Enlightenment, so the same thing

manifests itself in the present case. The poverty-stricken Bruno Bauer had from his youth been accustomed to brood over his own inner consciousness; and the lessons which he gave in his boyhood, and the potato field which he himself cultivated in his manhood, became for him what his music-copying had been to Jean Jacques Rousseau. It will therefore not be regarded as an astonishing circumstance that such a man, who knows himself to be lord of all only when he *thinks*, and when he says "criticism" instead of "I," should remind us often of Nicolai, the Brandenburg Minos of the eighteenth century. Feuerbach, again, for whom the enjoyment of anything can alone be called the possession of it, and to whom the Bruckberg porcelain factory supplied what Helvetius got from his occupation as farmer-general, and Baron Holbach from his fortune, ranges himself alongside of those thinkers in deifying enjoyment and happiness. After Feuerbach, in his *Preliminary Theses* (1842), had proclaimed and denounced the Hegelian philosophy, even in its pantheistic form, as theology, he published in the following year his *Philosophy of the Future* (reprinted, *Werke*, p. 269 ff). In this work he pronounces the transformation of theology into anthropology, *i.e.*, his *Essence of Christianity*, to be itself still Christian, theological, and religious, because in it man is conceived of as a rational being, and therefore the sensuous and natural are regarded as elements which have to be overcome. This is the standpoint of irrationality. In contrast to this, the philosophy of the future will say: The body in its totality is my Ego. The sensuous alone is the real, and therefore reason does not decide what is truth. The most important object of the senses is man; and it can be said that the origin of ideas is to be sought for in man only in the sense that we pick up the truth in conversation, *i.e.* from these highest objects of sense. It is not reason, but man as corporeal, that is the measure of all things. He is distinguished from the brute by the universality of his senses, and from the blockhead by the fact that what is immediately obvious to the senses, namely the phenomenal, is not for him the true, but what is discovered by the cultured senses, by the eye of the philosopher. Since, however, man does not attain his true destiny, enjoyment and happiness, in isolation, the motto of the philosophy of the future, which at bottom is simply physiology, is, *Ego* and *Alter ego*, egoism and communism, the former for the head, the latter for the

heart. A brother, Friedrich Feuerbach, popularized these theories still further in the *Outlines of the Religion of the Future* (Zurich, 1843; 2nd Part, Nürnberg, 1844), a book which was largely read by communistic workmen. The difference between Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer noted above, was confirmed by a book written by the then editor of the *Rheinischer Zeitung*, who in his threefold character of Jew, Radical, and newspaper editor, felt himself injured by Bauer. In this book, *The Holy Family of the Bauers*, Marx grants to Strauss and Bruno Bauer that they have gone beyond Hegel, in that they set free what was true in his views from the metaphysical caricature we meet with in him. But while Strauss defines the Spinozistic idea of substance abstractly as nature in contrast to man, and Bauer, on the other hand, had only stuck to self-consciousness as understood by Fichte, and had at the same time entirely identified himself with it, Feuerbach had united both views in the thought of the real man, and had put humanism in the place of pantheism and atheism. That in the principles of this philosophy of the future there was really a contradiction, was too evident to have escaped the notice of Feuerbach, even if the writings of others had not called his attention to it. This contradiction lay in the fact that only the "cultured senses," only the eye of the "philosopher" could, according to Feuerbach, recognise the truth; and that with such a conception of reality the human *species* must necessarily be left out of account; and yet all the while it was regarded as playing an important rôle. Accordingly he himself very soon confesses that in the *Philosophy of the Future* he has not sufficiently shaken off the philosopher, nor sufficiently freed himself from the "rational being" which haunted him. This was first accomplished in *The Essence of Faith in Luther's Sense* (1844), in which Luther's doctrine is described as "a hymn to God and a libel on man"; but it is shown at the same time that in the latter God is conceived of in such a human fashion as necessarily to compel us to draw the conclusion, that every one finds his God in another man. *Homo homini Deus*.

4. Feuerbach seems to have been somewhat taken by surprise,—at least he never replied with such moderation and even humility as on that occasion,—when the work of MAX STIRNER: *The Only One and His Property* (Leipsic, 1844), appeared. (The pseudonymous author, Dr. Schmidt, died a

few years since in Berlin.) This book seeks to show how religious Bauer and Feuerbach still are, even in their latest works. The "self-consciousness" of the one and the "Man" of the other are for them just such highest beings, as "society" is for the communists. From their superstitious standpoint they forget the main thing, the individual. It is not Feuerbach's "Man," which is just such another spectre as the God of the orthodox, but this one Ego that is what is true. Therefore, long live the Egoist! Whoever respects anything, unless his respect has been bought, has a soft place in his head. To set up ideals, but also to set up any kind of community, is to be religious. The communists, therefore, are "common" men. The egoist is the only man. While Max Stirner boasted of the absolute rights of the solitary individual man, an attack was made from a wholly different side by a man who had been thought to be a personal friend of Feuerbach, and to be in entire agreement with his views. GEORG FRIEDRICH DAUMER (born on the 5th of March, 1800, while at school, under the influence of Hegel, and while at the university under that of Schelling, professor for a time at the Nürnberg Gymnasium, then living there as a private teacher and prolific author, died on the 14th of Dec., 1875, in Würzburg), whose *Primitive History of the Spirit of Man* (Berlin, 1827), closely connected with Schelling's theory of freedom, did not do so much to make him celebrated as his connection with Kaspar Hauser, and his anti-Christian books,—which sought to prove that in Christianity we have the highest point reached by that phase of thought which is inimical to nature and man, and the grossest manifestation of which is presented by the worship of Moloch,—published in opposition to the views of Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, *The Anthropologism and Criticism of the Present* (1844), in which he makes a violent attack upon them, because they deify Man, "the most horrible of horrors," at the expense of the only real absolute, Nature; and because by this anti-naturalistic tendency of theirs they have taken up the same standpoint as that of the Pietism. When, moreover we find in this book that Daumer, who was quite furious with the Pietists for seeing in the cholera an "extraordinary judgment on the godless age," declares that it is an "exceptional" act of revenge on the part of Nature, because Pietism was getting the upper hand, we need scarcely be astonished to find that this enemy of Christians went over to

Catholicism in the year 1859, and published Hymns to the Virgin Mary full of religious enthusiasm. It is not a matter of much moment whether it was Stirner's or Daumer's book which induced Feuerbach to go further. His *Essence of Religion* (Leipsic, 1845) proved that this had taken place. Starting from the idea that Religion is grounded on the feeling of dependence, *i.e.*, of wishing and not being able to accomplish one's wish, he arrives at the conclusion to which he had already given expression in the *Essence of Christianity*, that men's wishes are their gods. The natural man contents himself with wishing only what nature can supply him with, and therefore natural forces suffice for his Divinity. In the same way, the political man is satisfied with the State or with the Emperor; and in the same way philosophical thought sufficed for the Greeks. When man has gone the length of putting himself above all else, and of having unlimited wishes, there appears in the place of those powers an Almighty power which grants everything, *i.e.*, a power which is as fantastic as the wishes which create it. The thought which is here expressed *implicite*, namely, that the more supernatural a religion is, the more absurd it is, was stated more strongly in the lectures which Feuerbach delivered in the year 1848 in Heidelberg, to a very mixed audience, it would seem. These appeared in the eighth volume of his works as *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*. He expressly declares that he puts Nature above Man, that he is an adherent of the religion of Nature; *i.e.*, that he recognises the dependence of all things on the laws of Nature; further, that he is a decided follower of egoism, since he regards as highest of all that which is demanded by the impulse of self-preservation, and by what is of advantage to the individual. As something really new in these lectures, may be mentioned the incidental political utterance that the republic is the goal of history, as well as the statement in the Preface, that he took no share in the Revolution of March, because it originated in belief in theories. He, as a complete unbeliever, could take part only in a revolution which would really be the grave of monarchy and hierarchy, because it knew its time. In what Feuerbach subsequently wrote, there are some propositions upon which he has laid stress with a certain satisfaction, such as: Man is what he eats. The true *vinculum animæ et corporis* is eating and drinking, because it "holds body and soul together," etc. These later writings may all the more

readily be omitted from a sketch of the history of philosophy, inasmuch as Feuerbach himself has openly declared that the peculiarity of the philosophy they contain is, that it is no philosophy.

5. Even if these lectures had contained more that was new, they would not have found such a wide circle of readers as Feuerbach's earlier writings. The reason of this is, that not only had the events of the year 1848 weakened the interest in reading, but because already, in the year 1846, it had been shown in a work that even yet he had not gone far enough. The anonymous work, *The Realm of Understanding and the Individual* (Leipsic, O. Wigand, 1846), had, owing to the name of the publisher, been attributed, when it came out, to some one intimate with Bauer's circle. There seemed, later, to be a strong probability that the author was Dr. Karl Schmidt, a clergyman in Cöthen, who subsequently came into notice through some valuable educational works which he published, and who wrote the book in order to show to what comfortless nonsense this style of thought led. Whoever the author was, the book remains a notable one, because, by means of a skilful mosaic-work in which the separate stones are the very words of the authors themselves, he sums up the result of the movements of the last three *lustra*. After having in the introduction characterized Paganism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and having included in the last-mentioned a sketch of the movement of modern philosophy down to Hegel, with whom thought was all in all, the question is raised whether thought is not after all nothing. This question is answered by Criticism; and in the *First Part* it, *i.e.* the Realm of Understanding, is considered in its different departments and phases. According to it, the criticism of religion,—as we find it in the ideas of Bruno Bauer in their earlier form, and also in the works of Strauss,—was still orthodox; and it was by means of Bauer's *National Church* that the transition was first made to moral criticism in the form in which it is represented by the two Feuerbachs, who, on their part, made way for the criticism of the infinite self-consciousness which Bauer employs in the *Synoptics*, the *Jewish question*, etc., and with which theological criticism reached its goal. Edgar Bauer represents the criticism of the State, and finally, pure criticism is represented by the *Literaturzeitung*, edited by the two brothers. Now, however, the war which was entered upon against criticism,

or, against the Realm of Understanding, *i.e.*, against thought, begins to show itself. Quotations from the work of Marx and from Feuerbach's *Philosophy of the Future*, make it appear that Max Stirner is the one who really represents the culminating point of the tendency begun by Hegel. In him the self-consciousness of the egoist has the highest place, and to this self-consciousness all abstractions have to yield. What now, if the egoist, described by a *nomen appellativum*, were, just for this reason, an abstraction himself! In the *Second Part*, the *individuum* is opposed to the egoist, and this *individuum* thus constitutes the opposite of any realm of understanding. But in order to be able to do this,—inasmuch as all sciences aim at recognising law, reason, idea, thoughts in short, in reality,—inasmuch further as culture, virtue, morality, all these follies, grant authority to what is universal, and are therefore based on faith, the *individuum* must annihilate all science, and thus become so entirely a pure self, that it is not able to describe itself by any word whatever, but only to point to itself with the finger. Not hating like the egoist, not loving like the communist, the *individuum* does not think and does not will; it stares and laughs, and the only answer it knows to the question, Who and what are you? is, I am myself alone.

§ 342.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

I. Whether or not the author of the *Realm of Understanding* might have joined in the mocking laughter of his *individuum*, there appeared to be good reason for it. For a glance back at the movements after Hegel's death seems to show that in the first Lustrum his metaphysical restoration, in the second his rehabilitation of dogma, and in the third his maintenance of the idea of moral organisms, had been proved by anti-Hegelians, Hegelians, and ultra-Hegelians to be worthless, and therefore his whole system and all his efforts had proved to be nothing but a brilliant meteor without any substance whatever. That where the carcase was, the eagles should have gathered together, was natural. Thus, during the process of dissolution which has been described, but especially after it seemed to be completed, lengthy works appeared, and are still appearing, which demonstrate the absolute

worthlessness of the Hegelian system, and describe it as a just Nemesis for its overweening pride, that at the present day people no longer concern themselves about it. Perhaps both statements would have found readier credence if so many works of this sort had not appeared. At present, many obstinate-minded persons have concluded from the fact that the Hegelian system was once more being slain, that it was still living, and from the fact that a thick book again appeared, which dealt with it alone, that people are, after all, still talking about it.

2. One of the first who subjected the Hegelian system in all its parts to a very stringent criticism was HERMANN ULRICI (born on the 23rd March, 1806, now Professor in Halle [died in Halle on the 11th Jan., 1884.—Ed.]) who, while his first writings had belonged to the domain of philology and æsthetics (*Characteristics of Antique Historiography* (Berlin, 1833), *History of Greek Poetry* (*Ibid.*, 1835), *On Shakespeare's Dramatic Art* (Halle, 1839, 2nd ed. 1847)), gave to the public in his work, *On the Principle and Method of the Hegelian Philosophy* (Halle, 1841), a strictly philosophical book. This work, which originated in academic lectures, gives first a short outline of the system, then passes on to its fundamental principles and method, further criticizes in succession the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Logic*, the *Philosophy of Nature*, and, especially, the *Philosophy of the State*, in connection with which particularly, Hegel's opinion respecting the necessity of evil is discussed. It then passes on to Absolute Spirit, and examines Hegel's *Æsthetics*, his *Philosophy of Religion*, and finally, his conception of philosophy. The very severe, often bitter, criticism, concludes with the remark, that the mere fact that the Hegelian philosophy is pantheism ought not to have led to its rejection, if Hegel had only proved that pantheism was in accordance with reason. Raised as a structure without foundation, it falls to the ground all the more readily, that apart from the false start, "every further advance is gained only by means of pure assertions, open insinuations, and arbitrary abstractions, accompanied by perversions and contradictions of all sorts." It is not easy to understand how a few sentences further on it can be said that "Hegel has the immortal merit, not only of having applied the great legacy of his predecessors, namely, pure thought, as the true fundamental principle of philosophy.

in the most penetrating way, but of having also made the attempt to carry this out in a strictly methodical form throughout the domain of knowledge"—"that therefore it is not Hegel's principle (the substantial part of his philosophy) which is defective, but the way in which he carries it out (the deduction), *i.e.*, the form or method which he adopts as his principle; but that, on the other hand, it is just since Hegel and owing to Hegel, that every attempt at speculation apart from form has become simply impossible." In the work which follows this, *The Fundamental Principle of Philosophy* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1845-46), the first or critical part, which distributes the history and criticism of the principles of modern philosophy under the headings: Realism, Idealism, Dogmatism, Criticism, Dialecticism, is likewise occupied with Hegel, when Ulrici comes to discuss the formal completion of Dialecticism, —which was developed by Fichte in an idealistic way, by Herbart in a realistic way, and by Schelling in an ideal-realistic way, —and to treat of its reversion to idealism. Ulrici in this connection appeals to his earlier works, which gave an immanent criticism of Hegel's theory, starting from Hegel's own principle. He is all the more convinced of the objective validity of the criticism that similar criticisms with similar results, by J. H. Fichte, Fischer, Trendelenburg, and others had remained unrefuted. In order, however, not to carry owls to Athens, he here means to discuss only the principle itself, and to show that the so-called absolute standpoint maintained by Hegel is one-sided, groundless and untenable. What is most worthy of notice in this criticism is, that Ulrici distinguishes in Hegel two wholly different conceptions which he had of his system. According to the original plan, the *phenomenology* which Hegel designates as the first part of his system, was to have been followed by the Logic or speculative philosophy as a second and last part, which would then have embraced everything. This was still the state of matters when Hegel wrote the *Logic*, in which, just for this reason, he treats of the doctrine of Nature and Spirit. An alteration first took place in the *Encyclopedia* which belongs to the year 1817; and the two real sciences appear alongside of and outside of the *Logic*. The charges which Ulrici brings against the Hegelian system are, that in principle it is purely subjective, since the objective validity of the categories is never proved, that in its development it is formalism, because the Absolute is here nothing but

method, and that in its results it is not so much Pantheism, but rather a deification of man.

3. The review of Hegel by K. Ph. Fischer (*vid. supra*, § 332, 5) mentioned in this work of Ulrici, bears the title *Speculative Characteristics and Criticism of The Hegelian System*, etc. (Erlangen, 1845), and must here be referred to all the more that it was very much praised in other quarters as well. It was called by Wirth for instance, "a crown of thorns for the Hegelian philosophy but in itself the blossom of a positive harmonizing dialectic." The intention of this work is to show that the Hegelian philosophy is "the science of the absolute negativity of the Idea or of the world spirit which destroys while it creates and in destroying is creative, and which Hegel by a process of apotheosis exalts to the position of the Absolute Spirit." Owing to the praiseworthy intention expressed by the author of giving an immanent criticism, it might have been expected that in this he would have followed the example of Ulrici, and gone through the system in the regular order which Hegel himself observed in constructing it. A singular impression is accordingly produced when we find that the criticism begins with that part of his philosophy with which Hegel concludes his system, the History of Philosophy; and because, forsooth, "this is admirably adapted for enabling the reader to understand, to begin with, how Hegel conceives of the present and actual as the only reality and of the Absolute Spirit as a world-spirit which annihilates all individuals." (This is what he calls leaving the reader unprejudiced.) If in reading Ulrici's critique one has often the feeling that Hegel is being treated like a school-boy, Fischer offends one by everywhere scenting out some insidious design. The fact that Hegel lingers so long over China is not to be explained by his bad habit of going into detail at the beginning of the session and then having to hurry later on, but by his preference for despotism, and so on. Furthermore it is rather astonishing, after each single chapter has been described as false in its conclusions, sophistical in its development, to hear him speak of lofty conception, able and brilliant execution, profound grasp of ideas, strength of intuition, etc. The way in which he throws himself into what he writes, which gives a peculiar warmth to the development of his own thoughts, and which may be said to constitute Fischer's strength, is a great hindrance when he comes to give an objective reproduction of

the thoughts of others. This book accordingly, although it has been the most highly praised, is really the weakest which Fischer has written. He becomes unfair because he never gets out of himself, and never enters without reserve into the circle of thoughts in which the other moves. After examining the *History of Philosophy* and the *Phenomenology*, to both of which he makes the objection that in them all forms of consciousness and speculation are sacrificed to the subjective aim of self-glorification, he goes on to criticize the *Logic*. Because Hegel had said this last coincides with Metaphysic, Fischer considers that he is justified in allotting the parts which he—and not Hegel—distinguishes in Metaphysic to the three parts of the Hegelian Logic, and next, after he—and not Hegel—has laid down the doctrine that the theory of Being is meant to be only dialectic cosmology or physics, he thinks he has a right to blame Hegel because categories are here introduced which are not solely physical. In the same way after he—and no one else—has defined the second part of the Hegelian Logic, the doctrine of Being, to be ontology, he finds fault with Hegel because ontology happens to come after cosmology. In the same way the doctrine of the Notion is put alongside of rational theology, and then fault is found with Hegel for identifying human and divine thought. (This want of objectivity comes out in quite a special way when to certain terms employed by Hegel he attaches wholly different meanings from those attached to them by Hegel himself, and then proceeds to open a campaign against him. Even if Hegel makes a mistake in distinguishing identity from sameness or unity without difference, the critic has no right so to understand his words as if he had made no distinction between these expressions. But this is just what he does when he says the Logic ought certainly to have begun with identity. Fischer further asserts that evil is absolute negativity. Hegel, who by absolute negativity understands negativity which is done with and abolished, represents it as the essence of Spirit. It is no immanent criticism when Fischer gets arguments against Hegel from the terminology of the critic, a terminology which besides cannot, like that of Hegel, adduce in its defence the right which belongs to the original inventor and the right of etymology.) Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* receives the most gentle treatment of all, because in it Hegel approaches most nearly to the views of Schelling. But here too it is plain that

certain settled convictions which Fischer holds lead him to make Hegel say what he has never said. Thus he is quite sure that Hegel entirely transformed the Philosophy of Nature into logic. Because of this he does not think it amiss, where Hegel has said that Nature is the Idea in the form of externality to make him say that nature is the *logical* Idea in the form of externality. He allows himself the same falsification in the criticism of the Hegelian *Philosophy of Spirit* where it is similarly said that, according to Hegel, Spirit is the *logical* Idea in the form of actual being, as if it were not the case that according to Hegel the Idea is logical only where it is *not* in the form of actual being. In no part of his criticism so much as in this, does Fischer show his incapacity for freeing himself even for a moment from opinions which he has once for all formed. The thing which he wished by his arrangement to make his reader "understand to begin with," and which Ruge had demanded from the Hegelian system but had failed to find in it, namely, that the world-spirit which realizes itself in history should take the highest place in it, is for Fischer a matter of certainty. He overlooks the fact that Hegel takes up the history of the world in the doctrine of finite spirit. The fact that in Hegel's doctrine of the State there is no longer any mention of religion and the Church, should never have brought a critic,—who, because Hegel takes up the State *after* the family, had said with a certain justice that in his case the family is absorbed by the State,—the length of saying that Hegel's State absorbs religion and the Church; and yet this is the judgment which Fischer passes. In connection with the doctrine of Absolute Spirit, where he declares further that his views are in essential agreement with those expressed in the *Æsthetic*, it never seems to occur to him that with Hegel God and Absolute Spirit are by no means convertible terms; and he is quite astonished when, in the *Philosophy of Religion*, he comes upon what are not only hints but express declarations by Hegel to the effect that Religion occupies a higher place than life in the State. Since, however, the highest expression of religion ought just to consist in life in moral communities, *i.e.*, in the State, by thus putting religion above the State the possibility of this is destroyed. (As if life in the State based on religious motives would not be a wholly different thing from simple *justitia civilis*.) The result arrived at of course is, that Strauss had a perfectly correct conception of the Hegelian theory; and

that just for this reason the author's earlier work against Strauss was also a thorough refutation of the Hegelian system.

4. It is not necessary to mention the titles of all the works which have set themselves the same task as the two just characterized. The number of these increased to such an extent that not only did the larger public get accustomed to conclude from the tombstones that death and burial had taken place; but even amongst those who had previously called themselves Hegelians the aversion to calling themselves by this name grew upon them more and more, and assertions were openly made that the Hegelian school, and even the doctrine which had been promulgated in it, no longer existed. Years ago the author of these *Outlines*, just because he does not share this view, could compare his position with that of the last of the Mohegans; and he was naturally delighted when, some time after, quite independently of this, a Frenchman assigned him this very position.

SECOND DIVISION.

Attempts at a Reconstruction of Philosophy.

§ 343.

1. The necessity of the dissolution process just described is already evident from its continuity and progressiveness. Any one who wished to find the necessity of the process in the fact that the form taken by the times whose spirit is breathed by the Hegelian philosophy, the Restoration, namely, was severely shaken in the year 1830 and was broken up in the year 1848, might possibly meet with some who do not admit the truth of this latter statement. There are stubborn-minded people who see even in the revolutionary and reactionary movements misdirected expressions of the impulse towards restoration which correspond to what takes place in the living organism which, while still possessing the power of organization, but being momentarily incapable of producing healthy formations, produces fungous growths. Such people would certainly not be taught anything different by the movements in the domain of philosophy. This is true of all those, in short, who, however great the differences between

them, look steadily in the direction of a philosophy of restoration, taking the word in the sense in which it was used above (§ 331), where it was applied to designate the Hegelian system. The aim of the second or positive section is to show how this is true in the case of the most important of the philosophical works known to the author of these *Outlines* which have appeared since Hegel's death and which had not for their conscious principal aim to take part in the battle for or against his system. We now pass on to this section with the request that if this or the other work is passed over, it will not be considered that we intend to reject it. The excuse for so passing over any work is to be found rather in the fact that, for the present writer at least, any adequate study of all these works was impossible, and he did not wish to do at the close of these *Outlines* what he had never done anywhere in them, namely to repeat the judgments of others. To this he would add a second request, that the charge of omission may not be brought against him until the reader has convinced himself,—as the index will easily enable him to do,—that the author whose name cannot be found, or the work which it was expected would be mentioned, is not to be found in some other place in this book. Only where it seemed unavoidable, was any author treated of in detail in more than one place. In most instances any one who took part in the dissolution process of the Hegelian school *and* also in the reconstruction of philosophy, is only mentioned in connection with the former, as in the case of Beneke above (§ 334), or only here. Cases will however be met with where this was not feasible, and even cases in which it was necessary, by means of an asterisk in the index, to call special attention to certain places in this book as being the principal places.

2. The belief that in the *Outlines* before us the systems treated of before Hegel were rightly described as preliminary steps to his system, because he did not reject what they taught and attained nearer to what they strove after, gives us the right in all references to these, as to truth which has been already discovered, of seeing a proof of the fact that the tendency of the time points to a Philosophy of Restoration. Where, on the other hand, systems appear which promise something quite new, whether their originality has a real ground or rests on self-deception, the proof that their spirit is one of restoration in the three points frequently mentioned

will give the right of enrolling them in this set. (This right might appear more doubtful in cases in which the restoration tendency shows itself in separate points only. But we shall claim it in those cases too.) A third case, and one which would occupy an intermediate position between those attempts at repristination and these other attempts at giving a new form to philosophy, would occur if one or several of the systems hitherto considered were to be taken as a starting-point and further developed. Even in this case the statement given expression to above would be made good, if in these attempts it was possible to show the existence of that tendency to restoration. To the three groups just mentioned there falls to be added a fourth, which comprises those works in which we have not so much parts of knowledge united together into an organic whole, but rather in which the intention is to describe how such attempts at connection have been made and in how far they have succeeded. The sketch which now follows is divided into these four groups. The temptation is strong to draw a parallel between them and the phenomena in the domains of politics and religion, and to compare the first with the romantic longing of many a reactionary, the second with the Titanic impulse of many a revolutionary, the third with those well-meaning people who develop further what already exists, and finally the fourth with those who deny to our time the capacity of organizing anything, and advise it to preserve the *status quo* and to try to understand how it originated. Any one who to this comparison might prefer a comparison with the earlier phenomena in the domain of philosophy would have to direct his attention to periods of transition. If he were to go to the dogmatism, scepticism, and syncretism at the close of the ancient world (s. § 95-104), or to John of Salisbury and Amalrich (s. § 175), or to the Renaissance, Mysticism, and World-wisdom (s. § 230-256) or even if he should go to the sensualistic and rationalistic Enlightenment (s. § 285-293), he might meet with many startling resemblances. We begin with the modern Renaissance.

A.—RETURNS TO EARLIER SYSTEMS.

§ 344.

1. The line of development represented by the five names Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, owing to the fact

that the one who comes later declares himself, at first at all events, to be in complete agreement with the one who precedes him and whom he takes as his master, appears too much of a continuity to make it possible for any one who was alarmed by the mocking laughter in which the Hegelian philosophy seemed to end, to seek refuge with any of those four predecessors of Hegel. The case is different with regard to those voices which may be said to come between those five brilliant stars in so far as they had given warning against the transition from the one to the other, and had shown how the necessity for this could have been avoided. Little attention was paid to them when the call to be logical and to go further echoed so loudly; but now that it has been shown to what this going further has led, they are to appear as warning Eckards and are to be listened to. It is thus we can explain the following which the old man or even the dead man gets, who in the full vigour of his powers had stood quite alone.

2. If we consider, not the period which saw the renewal of these systems, but that in which they originally sprang up, then Fries will call for mention as the most important of the *Semi-Kantians* (§ 305). Little attention was paid to him when he first gave warning against the prejudice in favour of transcendentalism which begins only with Kant, but which is already raising its head in the speculations of Reinhold, and which after him goes on doing this more and more. The limits within which his activity as a teacher was confined, and the disdainful way besides in which Hegel openly spoke of him and Herbart privately at least, had caused Fries to be forgotten outside of Jena. It was only in the circle of the rationalistic theologians that he was held in high esteem, owing to the fact that De Wette closely agreed with him in many points. Then almost simultaneously two of his pupils who, particularly in the matter of religion, present a contrast to each other, came before the public in order to extol the philosophy of their master as the true one. E. S. MIRBT, who died early, proved that he was a man who thought for himself by his works: *What is it to Speculate? and What is Philosophy?* (Jena, 1839); and particularly by his *Kant and his Successors* (Jena, 1841), and by his *Last Words of J. F. Fries to the Studious* (Jena, 1843), he showed that he was a grateful pupil. Beside him,—and, as has been remarked, in a certain sense in contrast to him,—stands E. F. APELT (born 1812, died 1859).

who, after he had shown himself to be an accomplished writer by some polemical monographs: *Ernst Reinhold and the Kantian Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1840), *Anti-Orion, for the Behoof and Good of Herr von Schaden* (1843) published his principal work, *Epochs of the History of Humanity* (Jena, 1845). This was much better received than his *Theory of Induction* (Leipsic, 1854) and his *Metaphysic* (Leipsic, 1857). On the other hand, his works, *Kepler's Astronomical View of the World* (Leipsic, 1849), and the *Reformation of Astronomy* (Jena, 1852), are said to be held in high esteem by astronomers. His *Philosophy of Religion* appeared after his death (Leipsic, 1860). The school received an important accession when MATTHIAS JAKOB SCHLEIDEN (born 5th April, 1804; for a long time Professor in Jena, then in Dresden, and afterwards in Dorpat, now lives privately in Dresden [died in 1881.—Ed.]), who was already celebrated as a botanist, and who was known to be an opponent of the philosophy of nature (compare *The Relation of Schelling and Hegel to Science*, Leipsic, 1844), took part with Apelt, Schlömilch, and Schmidt as editor of *The Transactions of the School of Fries* (Jena, 1847–1849), and then in a monograph of his own recommended Fries to the Scientists as *their* philosopher.

3. Just as the philosophy of Fries had sought to give fixity to criticism by transforming it into anthropology, so, somewhat later on, theories of the universe had appeared which have been described above as offshoots of the *Science of Knowledge* (§ 314). The period of recognition arrives for these too. Fichte's doctrine, in its altered form, was again recalled to people's memories, owing to the fact that his son published his *Posthumous Works* (Bonn, 1834, 3 Parts). He spoke of it at first as if it were the true philosophy, and afterwards as if it were meant to be at least the beginning of this. Fr. Schlegel's later theories,—the excitement caused by which was of such a temporary character as is wont to be the case with a mixed audience,—became the common possession of the learned world, owing first to the publication of his lectures by Windischmann, 1837, and next of his collected works (14 vols., 1846). It is not the repeated editions alone which prove that they were read, particularly in the Catholic world. The recognition too of the worth of Schleiermacher's philosophical theories first took place at this time. Those who attended his lectures, who were not purely theologians, went over for the most part from

him to Hegel, to whom he brought more auditors than he himself anticipated. It was first seen after his death, when his lectures were published, that they contained principles which appear to many to give a promise of protection from the bankruptcy which overtook the absolute philosophy in its culminating point. It is specially the negative assertion that the Absolute is not an object of Knowledge, as well as the positive assertion attached to this, that we can only attempt to reach the Absolute by a kind of heartfelt longing, which, together, are making more friends for this system now that the author is dead than when he was alive.

4. If in connection with Schleiermacher we reflect on the method of his speculations and on the contrasts which intersect each other, it can hardly be called a leap if we pass from him to the two men who were designated above (§ 319, 5, 6) as those who improved the System of Identity. For one of these, Johann Jakob Wagner, who had been misunderstood and was almost forgotten, a palingenesis had already begun. Kölle and Adam, by cheap reprints of his earlier works, by editing his posthumous *Minor Works* (3 vols., Ulm, 1839, ff.), and by *Memoirs* (1849), took care that such an important thinker should not be forgotten who has found in Ditmar, Papius, Heidenreich, Kretzschmann, appreciative pupils. Troxler, it appears, had not been long enough dead to allow of his being stamped as yet as the philosopher of the future. Still, certain voices were already raised which pronounced him to be the greatest, or at least one of the greatest. This was done by Werber in his *Theory of Human Intelligence* (Karls., 1841), and by the younger Fichte too, as is shown above. The psychological turn which philosophy appears to be taking amongst us, is a further reason for believing that Troxler's time will come more evidently than it has done as yet.

5. The efforts of Herbart and Schopenhauer were referred to in § 321 as a critical reaction against the Theory of Knowledge and the System of Identity; and at the same time the reason was assigned why, at the time when both men appeared, they could find no support. It has been already stated above (§ 333, 4) that things have altered in this respect so far as Herbart is concerned, and in the same place the chief representatives of the Herbartian School were mentioned. The entire literature connected with the labours of this school down to the year 1849 is to be found

in the work by Allihn: *The Fundamental Evil of Scientific and Moral Culture*, etc., Halle, 1849; and there has been no pause in its production since then. Scarcely any follower of Herbart will deny that it aims at the restoration of a metaphysical foundation and of a rigid method, and likewise at the restoration of anti-revolutionary politics, in which the idea of a living community is firmly maintained. It is otherwise, to be sure, with its positive relation to dogma, although one can understand how adherents of a system which excludes every form of theology might take up a friendly attitude to theologies of the most varied sorts. Like Herbart, Schopenhauer too had the experience of being taken notice of only when he was an old man, and of not having people see in him, as Herbart had done, merely a representative of the "fashionable" philosophy, or as others asserted, an ordinary Kantian. The statement, that this recognition was extorted in the first instance by an English review article, may be all the more readily disputed by the author of these *Outlines*, since what he published on Schopenhauer had been written before the appearance of that article. The same thing that happened to Herbart in connection with his weakest book, the *Encyclopædia*, happened to Schopenhauer, who attracted more readers by his *Parerga*, than by his Dissertation and his principal work. One of the first in Germany to declare wholly for Schopenhauer was JULIUS FRAUENSTÄDT. In the year 1835 he came before the public with a work entitled *The Freedom of Man* (Berlin, 1838). In this work, which Gabler accompanied with a preface, and in which attention was directed to that great dilemma, the solution of which is the task of philosophy according to § 269, 2, Frauenstädt passed for a Hegelian. The same thing happened when he took part in discussing the Christological question of the day in his work, *The Incarnation of God* (Berlin, 1839), which was written with special reference to Strauss, Schaller, and Göschel. His work, *On the True Relation of Reason to Revelation*, 1848, was read more after he had in periodicals and elsewhere proclaimed himself to be the apostle of the "great Unknown" whom he had discovered. He did this in his *Letters on the Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Leipsic, 1854). In his *Æsthetic Questions* (Dessau, 1853) too he shows himself to be a decided adherent of Schopenhauer. So long as the latter was alive, Frauenstädt scarcely appeared in any

other character than that of commentator, especially after it had been seen how unmercifully Schopenhauer condemned even the slightest modification of his theories. After Schopenhauer's death, one can see from Frauenstädt's writings, and indeed from the titles of some of them—as for instance those cited above in § 321, 9, and the *Schopenhauer-Lexicon* in two volumes—that their author thinks only of occupying the standpoint of Schopenhauer. The same thing is seen in the many critiques which appeared in journals. The proposal to remove the cause of offence, which Schopenhauer's doctrines had given, by leaving the pessimism out of them, might certainly be called naïve. (It was doubly naïve, because such an alteration would have deprived the contingent of followers of the *blasé* young men in the military and civil professions, who, because they had lost all enjoyment of the pleasures of youth, were delighted to hear that there is nothing more melancholy than the wish to live.) How entirely the basis of the philosophy of Schopenhauer is abandoned by this modification, which was followed afterwards by several others, particularly in the *New Letters on the Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Leipsic, 1866), is completely demonstrated by E. von Hartmann in his *Neo-Kantianism*, etc. (Berlin, 1877). In this work, the diametrical opposite of Frauenstädt is correctly found in JULIUS BAHNSEN, who in his *Contributions to Characterology* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1867), and in his work, *On the Philosophy of History* (Berlin, 1872) takes Schopenhauer's assertion, that this is the worst possible of worlds, so seriously as positively to revel in its wretchedness. On the other hand, Bahnsen's individualism is a point in which he does not approach so nearly to the views of the man whom both he and Frauenstädt recognise to be their master, as is clearly done by Frauenstädt in his monism. His attention has been likewise rightly called to the fact that his position, with regard to the subjective idealism of Kant, is a wholly different one from that of Schopenhauer. If any one doubt whether, after what has been here said of Frauenstädt and Bahnsen, they should have been treated of in this place instead of in the third section, amongst those who improved on earlier systems, the reply is, that they themselves aim only to show how the true philosophy has been already discovered by Schopenhauer, and that therefore it is not necessary to lay new foundations, but at most to add a finishing touch here and there. DORGUTH

in Magdeburg afterwards approached very near to the theories of Schopenhauer from the standpoint of sensualism. This was done still more by KOSACK, who applied his doctrines to geometry, and by O. LINDNER, who used them in a similar way in connection with Æsthetics. Through Frauenstädt and Lindner the *Berliner Vossische Zeitung* was employed to spread abroad a knowledge of Schopenhauer's merits.

6. Oken and Baader were mentioned in § 325 as the men who had best arranged and prepared for solution the last equation of the most modern philosophy which had to be solved. For the latter, who hitherto has had an experience similar to that of Troxler, a period in which his merits will receive more just recognition seems to be approaching. We are justified in expressing such a hope by the fact that foreigners are beginning to appropriate his ideas, and that therefore, according to the old German way, they are certain soon to rise in value. This statement has reference less to such a phenomenon as Jaquemin's *Polarité Universelle* (Paris, 1867), which may be called almost a paraphrase of Oken's philosophy, than to the conquests which Darwinism has made and is daily making amongst us. The very thing which is most deserving of recognition in this theory has been so plainly pointed to by the German philosophy of nature which is at present so much despised, that we are not astonished that the man amongst the German scientists of whom one is accustomed to think first when Darwin is in question should have been the most zealous in trying to get at all events a monument erected to Oken. Compared with him Baader has been more fortunate, for not only have many learned from him, but they have openly confessed it. None of his pupils has devoted himself with such zeal to the task of representing Baader as the philosopher of the present and future as FRANZ HOFFMANN, professor of philosophy in Würzburg. [Hoffmann died in Würzburg, Oct. 22nd, 1881.—Ed.] His treatises on the dialectic of Plato, on Plotinus, on Anaxagoras, as well as his academic addresses on Schiller, Fichte, and others, prove that he is not blind to the merits of others. In the year 1835 he issued the *Speculative Development of the Eternal Self-Generation of God*, which is constructed out of propositions from Baader's works, and is recommended by the master in a prefatory note. This was followed by *On Catholic Theology and Philosophy* (Aschaffenburg, 1836), a

defence of Baader against the malicious calumnies in the *Athanasia*. Closely connected with this is his *Vestibule to the Speculative Theology of Franz von Baader* (Aschaffenh., 1836). The *Outlines of Social Philosophy by Franz Baader* (Würzburg, 1837; 2nd ed., 1865) consists of maxims by Baader himself, very skilfully put together. On the other hand, the valuable introductions with which he has accompanied the separate divisions of Baader's works are entirely the work of Hoffmann. These also appeared in a collected form under the title: *Eight Dissertations on Baader's Doctrines* (Leipsic, 1857). In another work, *Franz von Baader as the Founder of the Philosophy of the Future* (Leipsic, 1856), Hoffmann collects sixteen criticisms which had appeared on Baader's works in journals. He also wrote supplements to the *Dissertations* in various journals. These as well as many valuable criticisms are contained for the most part in the *Philosophical Works* (4 vols., 1868, '69, '72, '77). It is to be hoped that they will soon be followed by others, as the time hitherto taken up with the editing of Baader's works is now again at his command. Although, as his *Outlines of Logic* shows, Hoffmann does not shun working at philosophical studies, still, inclination leads him specially to historical work, for which he is fitted, too, by reading so wide that it may almost be called fabulous. It would be a great loss to science if the works on theosophy and philosophy were not forthcoming, which, as is evident from the preface to his philosophical works, have already taken a crystallized form in his mind in the progress of the work which chiefly occupies him, the exposition of Baader's system. Next to Hoffmann, J. ANT. B. LUTTERBECK, formerly professor of theology and now professor of philology in Giessen [died Dec. 30th, 1883.—Ed.], calls for mention. As early as his work, *On the Necessity of a Regeneration of Philology* (Mainz, 1847), he points to Baader as the principal representative of a Christian philosophy, and gives a complete list of his works. To what lofty historical views his philosophical studies have brought him is shown by his admirable book cited above (§ 108). His work, *On Baader's Philosophical Standpoint*, 1854, as well as the works cited in § 325, 8, are wholly devoted to the recommendation and spreading of Baader's doctrines. He has besides, as joint editor of Baader's works, and particularly by the preparation of a complete index, done himself great credit in

connection with these. J. HAMBERGER, professor in Munich [Hamberger died in Munich on Aug. 5th, 1885.—Ed.], known specially for his thorough knowledge of the Mystics, and particularly of J. Böhme, issued, in addition to the *Cardinal Points* cited above (§ 325), the work *Physica Sacra* (Stuttg., 1869). It is well worth reading, and contains what is quite as much an explanation of the thoughts of others, and particularly of Baader, as a development of his own, on the eternal and heavenly corporeality. He also took part in the editing of Baader's works. Of his independent works, we may mention *God and His Revelation in Nature and History* (Munich, 1839), and *Christianity and Modern Culture* (Erlangen, 1863-67). The former constitutes a sort of commentary to his *Handbook of the Christian Religion for Gymnasiums*; and the second consists of smaller essays written at various times, and which have already partly appeared in print. The essays on Schelling and Baader stand prominently out, to the writing of which one who had been a personal pupil of both men had a very special call. Like Hamberger, the noble Erlangen professor, EMIL AUGUST VON SCHADEN, who died early, took part in the editing of Baader's works. His mind, always in an intellectual ferment, after having first drawn nourishment from Schelling's later works, was latterly more and more attracted towards Baader. The works: *On the Natural Principles of Language* (Nürnberg, 1838); *A System of Positive Logic* (Erlangen, 1841); *Lectures on Academic Life and Study* (Märburg, 1845); *On the Contrast of the Theistic and Pantheistic Standpoints* (Erlangen, 1848), as well as the introduction to Baader's diaries, which he edited, give evidence of a thoroughly earnest Christian spirit, which enables us to understand how the *philosophus Christianus*, as he calls Baader, necessarily attracted him. ERNST VON LASAULX was still less a pupil of Baader's, in the strict sense of the word, than Von Schaden, although many, owing to his family connection with Baader, have supposed that he was; and it is indeed possible to trace the influence of his father-in-law in some of his religious and philosophical treatises. This influence consists specially in the references made by him to the earlier theosophists, and particularly to Meister Eckhart. Lasaulx, by the studies which he made preparatory to an edition of Eckhart's works, rendered Pfeiffer's work easier (*vid.* § 230, 1). FABRI, too, the zealous opponent of

materialism, owes a great deal to Baader. The great and still daily increasing influence, however, which Baader's doctrines are gaining through his school enables us to assert that the current of restoration in philosophical literature has not ceased to flow.

7. This assertion is of course still more warranted, owing to the fact that the two systems which have been described above (§ 326), as the concluding ones, have still adherents and are still gaining adherents. We mention first, accordingly, the pantheism of Krause. The slight notice which his system attracted was in great part deserved by the unfortunate purism which led Krause to substitute German expressions for all foreign words, and these besides were chosen without a particle of taste or feeling for language. It was therefore a kind of irony of destiny that his works were more favourably received in Germany after the thoughts contained in them had been developed in other languages, and had become known apart from their "pure" German dress. HEINRICH AHRENS (born 1808, at first *Privatdocent* in Göttingen, then professor in Brussels, afterwards in Grätz, died in 1876 when professor in Leipsic), made foreigners, especially those belonging to the Romance countries, acquainted with Krause's original doctrines. He did this by lectures in French, out of which grew his *Cours de Philosophie* (2 vols., Paris, 1836-38), but most specially by his *Cours de Droit Naturel*, which has been translated into many languages, and which he published in an improved form as *Natural Law, or The Philosophy of Law* (Vienna, 1852; 6th ed. Vienna, 1870). After his return to the Fatherland he issued *The Organic Theory of the State upon the Basis of Philosophy and Anthropology* (vol. i., Vienna, 1850), which brought about a more extended recognition of the fruitfulness of Krause's doctrines, particularly in the practical sphere. Similar views were developed by K. D. A. RÖDER in Heidelberg, who was gained over not by Krause directly, but by Ahrens (compare *Outlines of Natural Law and of the Philosophy of Law*, 1846; 2nd ed. 1864). HERMANN BARON VON LEONHARDI devoted himself with the greatest zeal to the spread of Krause's views. (He died in 1875 when professor at Prague.) He had published anonymously *Hints towards a Criticism of Hegel* (Munich, 1832); but after the death of Krause he was the soul of the undertaking which aimed to spread in the cheapest possible printed

form Krause's posthumous works. He devoted himself by preference to the study of nature, in connection with which Schimper gave him some fruitful hints. He did not however lose sight of the ethical question, and his *Lectures for Wider Circles* show the zeal with which he devoted himself to his life-work. H. S. LINDEMANN (for a long time *Docent* in Heidelberg, then professor in Solothurn, finally in Munich, where he died in 1855) received a decided impulse from Krause, although he deviated more from him. His *Critical Account of the Life and Theory of Knowledge of K. Chr. Fr. Krause* (Munich, 1839); his *Theory of Man, or Anthropology* (Zürich, 1844); his *Logic* (Solothurn, 1844); his *Sketch of Anthropology* (Erlangen, 1848), as well as separate essays in magazines, excited attention. VICTOR VON STRAUSS, in Bückeburg, by his edition of Krause's *Theory of Music*; H. SCHRÖDER, in Munich, by his edition of his mathematical works, LEUTBECHER, in Erlangen, by his edition of the *Æsthetics*, proved themselves admirers, at all events, of Krause. Those who steal from him without mentioning his name testify to his importance in the present day, more perhaps than the numbers of his adherents. In foreign countries, especially in the Romance lands, Krause is held by many to be the greatest German philosopher.

8. It must be held to be a still stronger proof that the philosophy of restoration is not wholly antiquated, when we see that the system which had, above all others, been so described, namely, the Hegelian system, has, since the death of its founder, not only retained its adherents, but gained new ones. Passing over the works which have been already mentioned as those of the older Hegelians (§ 329, 10), as well as those which have been discussed in connection with the process of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, we may here mention, not in chronological order, but in the order demanded by the arrangement of the system, those works which show that the number of those who sought to develop further the separate philosophical sciences in the direction which had been first taken by Hegel is not small. For brevity's sake they may be called HEGELIANS. This description can be all the more readily employed by the author of the present book, as the word is held by him to be a title of honour rather than a term of reproach; and in employing it he is far from wishing to deny originality to any one who lays store by this

quality. As regards, first of all, the fundamental science, it is to be noted that K. TH. BAYRHOFFER, who was well known afterwards for his political activity, began his career as an author with his *Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics* (Marburg, 1835). ROSENKRANZ developed single chapters of the *Logic* in his *Critical Elucidations of the Hegelian System* (Königsberg, 1840), with which was connected later the *Modifications of Logic* (in the fourth volume of his *Studies*, Berlin, 1839; afterwards, Leipsic, 1846 ff). K. WERDER's *Logic*, which was announced as a commentary and supplement to Hegel's *Logic* (Berlin, 1841), stopped short at the doctrine of quality; i.e. it only gave the ninth part of the *Logic*. Simultaneously with Werder, I issued my *Outlines of Logic and Metaphysics* (Halle, 1841: 4th ed., 1864), in which there were divergences from Hegel's views that I did not consider important enough to be called emendations. The first edition at least of the *Outlines* by KUNO FISCHER must be regarded, along with mine, as belonging to the Hegelian school. In its extended form (*System of Logic and Metaphysics, or the Theory of Knowledge*, Heidelberg, 1865), it claims a different place (*vid.* § 346, 12).

9. For the development of the Philosophy of Nature, in which, as was said above (§ 329, 4), so much remained to be accomplished, there was least of all done. Bayrhofer's work: *On Experience and Theory in the Natural Sciences* (Leipsic, 1838), makes demands for these sciences which his own *Contributions to the Philosophy of Nature* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1838), as well as his essays in the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, do not fulfil. Röschlaub's example ought to have made him cautious of applying the ideas of the philosophy of nature to therapeutics. Later, Schaller began to occupy himself with the philosophy of nature; but the reading public got from him only historical works on this subject (*History of the Philosophy of Nature from Bacon of Verulam to our own Day*, 1st vol., Leipsic, 1841; 2nd vol., Halle, 1846; not continued beyond the second volume), or else critical works. Among the latter may be counted his work: *Body and Soul, Elucidations of Implicit Faith and Science* (Weimar, 1855), written with special reference to Karl Vogt and Rudolph Wagner. In addition, the most was accomplished in the direction in which logic and the philosophy of nature come into contact. CONST. FRANTZ'S *Philosophy of Mathematics* (Leipsic, 1842) takes up,

not only mathematical, but also physical questions, and seeks to fill up the gaps in the Hegelian theory from its own principles. The author, as is well known, afterwards devoted himself entirely to the work of a publicist, and as such, in spite of all the enmity produced by his decided views, he takes an honourable place in the judgment of all unprejudiced minds. It is not however only in what he writes about that the Frantz in his later character differs from the Frantz of former days. The foundation of his views is also altered, for it is no longer to the Hegelian doctrine, but to the later doctrines of Schelling that he now appeals. The works of C. LUDW. MENZZER : *The Theory of Air-pressure* (Halberstadt, 1845), and *The Philosophy of Nature*, the first volume (Halberstadt, 1847) containing the theory of gravity, which originated partly through the influence of the writings of Frantz, are not of much importance. HERMANN SCHWARZ'S *Attempt to Construct a Philosophy of Mathematics* (Halle, 1847), seeks to prove that from Hegel's own premises many of the theories of Euler, Lagrange, and others, with which Hegel found fault, can be triumphantly justified. An extremely able book, in which the impulse given by the Hegelian doctrines is admitted, is that of ERNST KAPP, entitled : *Philosophical or General Comparative Geography* (2 vols., Brunswick, 1845-46). Its author had already made a reputation for himself by his educational works ; but afterwards, owing to unfortunate political complications, he was lost to Europe and to science. To what a great extent the Hegelian philosophy of nature inspired with respect even those who did not subscribe to it is evident from C. A. WERTHER'S : *The Forces of Inorganic Nature in their Unity and Development* (Dessau, 1852), in which at all events the honour is granted to it of having taken the last step which must necessarily precede a true philosophy of nature. Closely connected with the work just mentioned are : *Force of Life, Soul and Spirit* (Halle, 1860); and, *Man as a Spiritual Individual* (Nordhausen, 1867), which really constitute a single work. In this, it is shown that in the immanent progress of development the physical and mechanical forces are a means of transition to the organic ; while these last are represented in the three stages of the vegetative, the animal, and the pneumatic. GEORG BLASSMANN'S *Prolegomena to the Speculative Sciences of Nature* (Leipsic, 1855), too, is in no sense the work of a Hegelian,

and yet he takes his starting-point from Hegel. His main thought, in fact, that a revision of the category of quantity will give the philosophy of nature a positive relation to empiricism, could only have originated in a study of the Hegelian *Logic*; though, on the other hand, it helps us to understand why Oken could be placed above all other philosophers of nature.

10. As regards the Philosophy of Spirit, and, in the first place, Psychology, JOH. ULRICH WIRTH'S *Theory of Somnambulism* (1836) was entirely appropriated by the Hegelian school as its property, and was considered by opponents of the School as belonging to it, without any protest to the contrary on the part of the author. Rosenkranz called his *Psychology, or the Science of Subjective Spirit* (first ed., Königsberg, 1837), simply a commentary on what was contained in the few paragraphs in Hegel's *Encyclopædia*. My own *Outlines of Psychology* (Leipsic, 1840; 5th ed., 1873) takes up exactly the same position with regard to Hegel's teaching on this subject that my *Outlines of Logic* does to his *Logic*. The work which appeared a few years before, *viz. Body and Soul* (Halle, 1837; 2nd ed., 1849), is an amplification of what was contained in the introductory paragraphs of the *Outlines*. (The *Psychological Letters* [Leipsic, 1851; fifth ed., 1875] have had too high an estimate placed upon them, and therefore also too much is expected of them when they are viewed as if intended to give a scientific exposition of the subject. They are meant to be nothing more than an entertaining book which does not teach science, but only communicates the results of science. It is for this reason that even the later editions are only reprints of the first.) MICHELET'S *Anthropology and Psychology* (Berlin, 1840) vindicates for itself the right of taking up a much freer position as regards Hegel than had been done in the *Outlines* by Rosenkranz and myself, and it diverges also much more widely from his views. It was therefore, to say the least, frivolous on EXNER'S part, when, in his *Psychology of the Hegelian School* (2 Parts, Leipsic, 1842-44), he treated things which had been said by one of the three exactly as if they were assertions made by the two others, and when he even quoted them as such. Somewhat later than those just mentioned, SCHALLER came forward as an author in the department of psychology. *Phrenology in its Main Outlines* (Leipsic, 1851) has to do with only a single chapter of the doctrine of the

soul. On the other hand, in the year 1860, the first volume of his *Psychology* (Weimar, 1860) appeared, in which he treats of the psychical life of man. The second, which was to have taken up conscious spirit, has not appeared. The delightful and instructive writings of the celebrated alienist P. JESSEN stand in a very free relation to Hegel's doctrines. He shows, particularly in his little sketch, *The Psychical Life* (1832), but also in his larger work, *Attempt to Lay a Scientific Foundation for Psychology* (Berlin, 1855), how much attention he had bestowed upon them. This must be said to be still more the case with C. PHIL. MÖLLER'S *Anthropological Contribution to the Experience of Psychical Disease*, etc. (Mainz, 1837). How very entire DAUB'S agreement with Hegel was, is proved by his posthumous *Lectures on Philosophical Anthropology* (Berlin, 1838).—Ethics and Politics, which Hegel took up after psychology, are, in addition to the names mentioned above (§ 329, 10), represented by the name of K. M. BESSER, who wrote his *System of Natural Law* shortly before Hegel's death (Halle, 1830). Somewhat later there appeared several works by G. F. GÄRTNER: *De summo juris naturalis problemate* (Bonn, 1838), and *Philosophy of Life* (First Part, "Theory of Law and of the State," Bonn, 1839), which occupy essentially the standpoint of Hegel. My *Philosophical Lectures on the State* (Halle, 1851) occupy entirely the same standpoint. It makes an agreeable impression to meet, as late as the year 1857, with the tribute of recognition which CONSTANTIN RÖSSLER, in his *System of the Theory of the State* (Leipsic, 1857), pays to the master Hegel, who is disowned by so many who live upon him. This impression is all the more agreeable, as we have not in this instance to do with a slavish imitator, but with a man who discerns very clearly his relation to Hegel. The first part of G. L. MICHELET'S *Natural Law or Philosophy of the State* (Berlin, 1866), which, together with the introduction, treats of the law respecting the individual, was followed in the very same year by the second part. Although the history of Natural Law, with which the work opens, arrives at the conclusion that the Hegelian philosophy alone avoids the one-sidedness of previous systems, and gives their due place to the three great principles, liberty, equality, fraternity, the treatment of the subject is very different from what we find in Hegel's *Philosophy of the State*. To begin with, the three books into

which the work is divided do not in the least correspond to the Hegelian division into law, morality, and ethics; for the First Book, which is entitled *Law respecting the Individual*, takes up in its three sections law proper (property, contract, primitive law); morality (in very close agreement with the system of morality mentioned above [§ 329, 10], as the doctrine of virtue, the doctrine of duty, and the doctrine of conscience); and family law (marriage, paternal authority, kinship). The Second Book treats of *Public Law* in three sections. The first section enters into the question of public welfare (political economy, administration of justice, municipal science as the law of association); the second, into that of civic society (the district, the community, the circuit); the third into that of the science of the State (State law, national law, international law). The *General History of Law* makes up the substance of the Third Book; and the three sections of which it is composed take up the law of antiquity (oriental, Greek, Roman), the law of Christian Europe (pre-mediæval, mediæval, and present-day law), and finally American law (in the forms of civic, ecclesiastical, and State law). The work closes with hints that Australia will some day outstrip America. The writer has been unfairly charged with straining after popularity with the masses; any one who wants to secure this will not speak of capital punishment as Michelet does.—If, finally, we pass from the doctrines of subjective and objective spirit to that of absolute spirit, and come first of all to *Æsthetics*, we may place beside those mentioned in § 329, A. RUGE, with his *Platonic Æsthetics* (Halle, 1832) and his *New Introduction to Æsthetics* (Halle, 1836); but above all FRIEDRICH THEODOR VISCHER (born in 1807 at Ludwigsburg; first *Docent* in Tübingen, then professor in Zürich, from whence he was recalled to Tübingen [Vischer died in Gmunden Sept. 14th, 1887.—Ed.]), with his smaller work, *On the Sublime and the Humorous* (Stuttg., 1837), and his large work, *Æsthetics, or the Science of the Beautiful* (3 vols., Reutlingen, 1846–51). The *Critical Excursions* (Stuttg., 1844. ff.), which appeared later, added certain supplements to these, and partly supplied some rectifications. Even those who do not admit that it is only Pantheism which enables us to comprehend the beautiful, and upon whom the constant thrusts at Theism may produce a jarring impression, will gratefully acknowledge the wealth of information and the stimulus afforded by this

brilliant and able book. The *First Part* contains the metaphysic of the Beautiful, the essence of which is held to consist in appearance, meaning that an individual example is adequate to represent the Idea, and the beautiful is therefore defined as the Idea in the form of limited manifestation. In the analysis of what is contained in this we get the three moments of Idea, picture, and the unity of both; and these are discussed in detail when the simply beautiful comes to be considered. This is followed, in the second section, by the Beautiful as seen in the antagonism of its moments, the different relations of which supply us with the mutually contrasted forms of the beautiful, the sublime, and the humorous. As the objective and subjective sublime unite to form the tragic, so the objective and subjective comic unite to form humour. The return of the beautiful into itself, in which the opposition of the sublime, in which the picture was negated, and of the humorous, in which the Idea was negated, is overcome, prepares the way for the transition to the *Second Part*. This part has received the title, "The Beautiful in its one-sided Existence," because in the first section the objective existence of the beautiful is treated of (the beautiful in Nature, with inclusion of the humanly beautiful, as seen in individuals, as well as of the nationally beautiful, and of the historically beautiful in general) and in the second section its subjective existence (in the form of fancy, both as seen in the individual and in entire periods). The *Third Part* is the most exhaustive; it discusses the joint subjective and objective reality of the beautiful, or Art. This part is divided into two sections, comprising two volumes, and art in general is first considered, and then the separate arts. The constructive arts are specified as being art in an objective form, and music as art in a subjective form. (This part was elaborated by Vischer's friend and colleague, Köstlin.) In the case of all the arts, he first treats of their essence, then of their branches, and, finally, of their history. It is only in connection with that form of art which is both subjective and objective, namely, poetry, that history is introduced in distinguishing between the various kinds. Theatrical art is treated as an appendix to dramatic art. The complete index enables us once more to glance over the wealth of subjects discussed in this justly celebrated book.—A single chapter in æsthetics is treated in a brilliant and interesting way by Rosenkranz, *Æsthetics of*

the Ugly (Königsberg, 1853). Exactly like Vischer, Rosenkranz, when he comes to treat of the sublime and the humorous, recognises it as one of Weisse's merits that he directed attention to this idea. He however differs from both as regards the place to be assigned to it. The blunder with which he charges his predecessors is to be accounted for by the fact that they conceive wrongly of the place of the beautiful, the sublime, and the humorous. It is not the two last which ought to constitute a contrast, but rather the sublime and the agreeable; these make up the two sides of the beautiful, which stands above them and embraces them. The ugly, as the negatively beautiful, stands in contrast to all three; while the common is the negation of the sublime, and the offensive of the agreeable. A wholly different place is assigned to the humorous, which, by taking up the ugly into itself as a moment, and surmounting it, shows us how the beautiful can triumphantly make the ugly pleasing. The ugly, as being the negative contrast to the beautiful, must of course get predicates which are the opposite of those which are applied to the beautiful; and accordingly Rosenkranz discusses first its formlessness, then its incorrectness and want of symmetry, and finally its malformation, on account of which it is caricature. In each of these sections, the most varied modifications which these ideas undergo are considered; and it is shown how these modifications arise, partly out of differences gradually formed, and partly from the fact that it is now the sublime, and now the agreeably beautiful, which is more negated by the ugly. While here it is never lost sight of that the ugly constitutes the presupposition of the humorous, Rosenkranz shows, from the blunders of the works of art which he criticises, how nearly the humorous often approaches to distortion. In an epilogue, the course of the investigation is briefly recapitulated, so that the reader has once more the enjoyment of going along the pleasant road.—THEODOR WILHELM DANZEL (born Jan. 14th, 1818; died May 9th, 1850) started originally from Hegel; but afterwards, owing to his own reflections and to the influence of Weisse, he abandoned Hegel's views, and often very bitterly opposed his teachings on æsthetics. His works: *On Goethe's Spinozism* (Hamburg, 1841), *On the Æsthetics of the Hegelian Philosophy* (Hamburg, 1844), were supplemented by the essay in Fichte's journal: *On the Present Condition of the Philosophy of Art*. The later works,

Godsched and his Time (Leipsic, 1848; 2nd ed., 1855), which was unfortunately not completed by himself, and *Lessing* (Leipsic, 1849), are entirely devoted to the history of literature and culture. In the year 1855, O. Jahn published Danzel's *Collected Essays*: The works of the Hegelian school which have to do with the philosophy of religion have been partly mentioned in the above-named sections, and partly introduced in the account of the dissolution of the School.—As regards, finally, a comprehensive survey of the whole system, and as regards also a knowledge of its process of development, as regards, that is to say, Encyclopædia and the History of Philosophy—which, according to Hegel, are integrating parts of his system—I can only refer, in connection with the former, to Bayrhofer's *Idea of Philosophy* (Marb., 1838), and to the short encyclopædic survey in my *Lectures on Academic Life and Study* (Leipsic, 1858). The history of philosophy, on the other hand, was cultivated with great zeal in the School. For the most part, to be sure, only single portions of it were taken up; so that for a long time the lectures left behind by the master represented the only attempt which had been made to represent the entire history of philosophy according to his principles. First, in the year 1838, appeared the first volume of G. O. Marbach's *Hand-book of the History of Philosophy* (first vol., Leipsic, 1838; 2nd vol., 1841; 3rd vol. is wanting). In the year 1848 this was followed by Alb. Schweigler's sketch, which has been very often reprinted: *Outlines of the History of Philosophy* (Stuttg., Frankf., 1848), and with which the present *Outlines* are connected. As was remarked, however, separate parts of the history of philosophy were treated of at quite an early period in the Hegelian school. Thus we have mediæval philosophy by Mussmann (*vid.* § 118), and that of the Greeks by Ed. Zeller (now professor in Heidelberg [at present professor in Berlin.—Ed.]), *vid.* § 16, 4. The author of this last-mentioned work, at least when he began his book, was rightly counted as a member of the Hegelian school, to which he at present, according to his own express declaration, no longer belongs. Then, finally, we have the posthumous sketch by A. Schweigler, *History of Greek Philosophy* (Tübingen, 1859; 2nd ed., 1869). Feuerbach and I began almost simultaneously to work at modern philosophy. Feuerbach afterwards abandoned his design. Kuno Fischer, who in the year

1854 issued the first volume of his widely read book, had concluded it for the time with Kant. In his fifth volume, however, he gives an account of Fichte and his predecessors, and in the first half of the sixth volume the life of Schelling. Mine extends to Hegel's death. In § 259 will be found the full titles of all three. With regard, finally, to the post-Kantian philosophy, C. L. Michelet's *History of the Last Systems of Philosophy in Germany from Kant to Hegel* (2 vols., Berlin, 1837-38) must be mentioned in preference to all others. It has been already referred to above, when the separation of the two sides of the School was under discussion.

B.—ATTEMPTS AT INNOVATION.

§ 345.

1. In the present account, it might be said both of the adherents of the pre-Hegelian systems and of the Hegelians, that they either moved towards the stream of the philosophy of restoration or swam with it. The case is altered when systems appear with the declaration that entirely new paths are to be struck out, and that something is to be presented which has been hitherto entirely unheard of. If the whole history of philosophy has offered no single example of a philosopher who knew nothing at all of his predecessors, and who had not built upon them either while agreeing with them or combating them, it is doubly improbable that in our day, when people as a rule read more readily than they think, this should happen. Accordingly, the few also who came forward after Hegel's death with systems which were intended to be as original at all events as the epoch-making systems of Descartes or Kant in their time, were either writers who wished to mystify the world, or who mystified themselves, or, finally, who had so little acquaintance with philosophy, that they offered as new wisdom doctrines which had long ago been refuted. We may mention some instances of all these three cases.

2. Among those who sought to mystify the world, we may count one, who was at all events, in the highest degree, a notable man, FRIEDRICH ROHMER (12 Feb., 1814, to 11 Jan., 1856), of whose life Bluntschli, who allowed himself to be led for a long time by this political and religious Messiah, has given us a sketch. His anonymous work, written in German

and Latin, which only occupies a few pages, and is entirely Spinozistic in tone: *Speculationis initium et finis* (Munich, 1835), was followed by the writings edited by his brother, in which, however, Friedrich is always extolled as the real author of the ideas set forth: *The Mission of Germany in the Present and Future* (Zürich, 1841), and *The Theory of Political Parties* (Zürich, 1841). In both works the physiological view of the State is laid down as the basis, and it was this indeed which first called the attention of Bluntschli to a man who for a long time played a rôle in Zürich which is doubly astounding when we consider that the Swiss are generally thought to be good men of business. After his return to Germany, Rohmer lived in Munich, writing political *brochures* against absolutism, ultramontanism, and bureaucracy, and at one time even coquetting with the fourth estate. Even after his death, which was quickly followed by that of his brother, mystification did not cease. The works which appeared in close succession: *Criticism of the Idea of God in the Present Theories of the World* (Nördlingen, 1856), *God and His Creation* (Idem, 1857), *The Natural Way of Man to God* (Idem, 1858), are either by F. Rohmer or his brother, as was surmised on the appearance of the first of these by some uninitiated but attentive readers of his earlier works. If we discount the boasting of the new "Messiah," the first works, with their physiological view of the State and their conservative position in politics, are in such entire accord with Oken and Schelling, while the posthumous works, on the other hand, with their attempt to mediate between Pantheism and Atheism (moderated = Deism), are in such entire accord with Hegel and the Hegelians, that we are without doubt justified in ascribing them to the influence of the tendency towards restoration.

3. We meet with some men who are entirely free from the intention to deceive, though less free from self-deception, and who announce to the world that philosophy, in order to teach truth, must strike out wholly different paths from those which have been taken by Kant. MICHAEL PETÖCZ, in his *View of the World; an Attempt to Solve the Highest Problem of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1838), holds that God, the highest intelligence, reveals the immeasurable wealth of His ideas in souls, which are the only real existences. Of these, the living change those which are not living into their vesture, and by

becoming one with this vesture produce spirits who manifest themselves, each in his own world. Petöcz ought to have remembered better than he did that Boscovich and Leibnitz were his forerunners. HEINRICH VOGEL (*The Philosophy of the Life of Nature as Contrasted with the Speculative Philosophies and Philosophies of Nature which have hitherto Prevalled*, Braunsch., 1845) does not show himself quite so ungrateful to Locke, whom he recognises as the greatest of all philosophers. He too, however, more than he really ought, allows the point of contact between his theory and the earlier empiricism, as well as the earlier philosophy of nature, to fall into the background. This theory rests entirely on immediate and mediate perception, and in it the reciprocal action of subject and object constitutes the metaphysical basis. Chronologically, the works of WEBER and REIFF, which appeared at the same time, fall between the two just mentioned. Weber did not survive the publication of his *Absolute Idealism* (Rinteln, 1840), as he died during the revision of the last sheets. His friend and sole apostle, Hinkel, simultaneously with the appearance of the work of the deceased, announced to the world in his *Speculative Analysis of the Notion of Spirit* (Rinteln, 1840), news of the greatest scientific feat that has ever been accomplished. It consists in the attempt to escape the pantheism of the Hegelian Left by emphasising individuality. Single expressions seem as if they were echoes of Herbart, with whom the author pretends that he became acquainted only after his own work had been completed. If JAC. FRIEDR. REIFF (now professor in Tübingen) [Reiff died July 5th, 1879. —Ed.], in his *Beginning of Philosophy* (Stuttg., 1840), and in the *System of the Determinations of the Will* (Tübingen, 1842), which is closely connected with it, had not come forward with too lofty pretensions, both these works, as well as the treatise, *On some Points of Philosophy* (1843), would have met with a much more friendly reception than they did. His rancour against pantheism, the compliments which, as contrasted with this, were paid to the German Enlightenment, and as a consequence of both the necessary approach to the position of Fichte, did not by any means appear to the readers of his works to be anything so new as they did to their author. Reiff was not very highly thought of outside the circle of those who attended his lectures. For a long time it looked as if Dr. K. CHR. PLANCK (*Privatdocent* in Tübingen) would

take up the position of a follower of Reiff. Already in his *Ages of the World*, the first part of which develops the system of pure realism (Tübingen, 1850), and the second the realm of idealism (*idem.*, 1857), he treats Reiff as the last preliminary step. He thus goes beyond him, so that in consequence Noack, who with a rare versatility leaps from system to system, was able for a time to extol Planck as the man who had completed the philosophy of Reiff. RÖSE too, whose *Method of the Knowledge of the Absolute* (Basel, 1841) seems to have had a stimulating effect on EM. SCHÄRER (*Contributions to the Knowledge of the Essence of Philosophy*, Zürich, 1846), attempted to establish a peculiar standpoint, which he essentially modifies in his *Art of Speculation* (Zürich, 1847), but particularly in the following works: *The Ideas of the Divine Things of our Time*, *The System of Individualistic Philosophy*, and the *History of Humanity*. Finally may be mentioned the attempts at reformation made by J. RICHER in his *Nature and Spirit* (1st, 2nd, and 3rd parts, Leipsic, 1851), which, in spite of the fact that they were very highly approved of in a certain theological quarter, did not meet with general recognition, because the theories which were proved to be tenable in the extended work were far from being so much those of one who was self-taught as they promised to be.

4. Simultaneously with the publication of Feuerbach's *Philosophy of the Future*, and partly owing to the stimulus given by it, there appeared the flood of MATERIALISTIC WORKS which have been since followed by hundreds more, partly written by men whose names had a high reputation in other departments. Only complete ignorance of what already existed in the domain of philosophy could have led to their being looked upon as something new and never heard of before. Cabanis had already said all that people were now offered to read, even to the cynical comparison of thoughts to the excreta of the kidneys. Besides, amongst the really original French materialists of the eighteenth century, one does not meet with such absurdities as are to be found in the writings of the most highly lauded of these dabblers in matter; as, for instance, that crime takes place according to a law of nature, like the falling of a stone, and that therefore it is revolting when a House of Representatives retains capital punishment for murder. (As if, in truth, this resolution were not equally

a manifestation of the law of gravitation, and were therefore not at all revolting.) If it were really true that the philosophy of nature taught men to speak of things of which they understood nothing, then it has nowhere found such zealous adepts as among the exact scientists. Any one in the present day who knows how to handle the microscope well, believes that without going any further, he has a right to decide as to the nature of cause and condition, force and matter, law and truth. The circumstance that the circle of the readers of these books is very large and is daily increasing, that magazines which are calculated to suit the horizon of schoolmasters and peasants are constantly bringing more adherents to materialism, is for many a proof that it is the philosophy of the present or of the future. If this were decisive, then materialism would have already found its match; for the holy Gambrinus can count a still larger number of enthusiastic adherents, and adherents who are more zealous. Up till now, we have no instance in which the raising of the price of a book of Moleschott's or Büchner's has produced revolutions in large towns.—The estimate expressed in these words, which were written in the year 1866, has since been proved unwarranted by the facts; for not only does the mob applaud the "force and matter" philosophy, but men have become converts to it whose philosophical importance is notorious, and is even recognised in these *Outlines*. This is the case with D. FR. STRAUSS. In his *Legacy to the German People* [*Ibid.*] he declares that he has "abandoned the harmless pleasure in artistic figures to which he had surrendered himself in his *Ulrich von Hutten* (Leips., 1858, 2 vols.) and in his *Voltaire* (Leips., 1870), and in other works on culture and history, and is returning to his peculiar mission, unsparing destructive criticism." In *The Old and New Faith*, which went through four editions in the year of its appearance (1872), and the eighth stereotyped edition of which is now before us, Strauss does not object if this "confession of all who stand on the ground of the modern theory of the universe" is called materialistic. If it is considered, besides, that Strauss himself had arrived at this change in his views through the study of Voltaire and the latest writings of Feuerbach, then we have a new proof that the apologies for Lamettrie which have become the fashion are written out of the hearts of the cultured people of the day, just because their thoughts are

entirely of the Holbach-Büchner order. If this really held good in the case of Strauss, he could not have said that the difference between materialism and spiritualism is a vanishingly small one, when we compare it with what exists between them and their common foe, dualism. If we remember, moreover, how the *Système de la Nature* had defined its relation to Berkeley, then it is clear that Strauss, in spite of the change of his views in the direction of materialism, has not abandoned his Pantheistic standpoint, which reminds us of Spinoza, and which brings him into harmony with the spirit of the eighteenth century, at most in a negative sense, namely, in making attacks on religion, etc. To this we have to add, that the materialism which Strauss has adopted, even if it had not fallen upon a soil fertilized by the philosophical ideas of the nineteenth century, must necessarily have borne fruits other than those of the Büchner sort, because it is entirely different from the materialism of Diderot and Holbach. Darwinism, to which Strauss professes himself a convert, in its theory of descent, essentially rests upon ideas which would necessarily have appeared fantastic to the men of the eighteenth century. Malthus again, who, as Darwin himself admits, brought him to adopt the view of the "struggle for existence," has even been reproached by those holding materialistic views with being monkish, a word which for the French materialists was confessedly the strongest term of abuse. Finally, however much Darwin's followers, and he himself afterwards, may have extolled his theory as the best protection against all teleology, his "natural selection" would have been called a child of physico-theology by every materialist of the French school. With regard to the contents of Strauss' work, we find that it is divided into four sections, of which the *first* gives an unconditional negative to the question, Are we still Christians? since all the doctrines contained in the Apostles' Creed, which he takes up singly, no longer find any credence amongst the cultured of our time. The question raised in the *second* section, Have we still a religion? is not answered so unconditionally in the negative, since the consciousness of our dependence on the All and on its inviolable laws may perhaps be called religion. The *third* section, which takes up the question, How are we to understand the world? is the most interesting, because it supplies the positive complement for the previous negations,

and works out the theory of the universe which Strauss asserts is that of all cultured persons. He begins with the cosmogony of Kant and Laplace, discusses the solar system, the formation of the earth, the origin of living things on the earth, *generatio æquivoca*, and spends the most time over Darwinism, which, with all its gaps, has made one of the most important steps in the direction of truth. The conclusion is taken up with a refutation of every kind of teleology. Strauss himself is least satisfied with the *fourth* section, which asks, How are we to order our lives? This section contains the outlines of an ethic which does not amount to a glorifying of force, as is the tendency in Darwinism. The first traces of moral qualities are investigated; the different moral principles are criticised; the right of the sensuous elements to have a place in marriage and the State is maintained; the various forms of the State are considered; and, finally, the questions of the day in reference to the condition of workmen, capital punishment, the relation between Church and State, are discussed. As the result of this investigation, he declares that, in the case of the cultured, elevation by means of the enjoyment of art takes the place of edification by means of worship. The two appendices, which treat of our greatest poets, Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, and of our greatest musicians, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, accordingly connect themselves quite naturally with this section.

5. It is not only the fact that the materialism of the previous century impressed a Strauss which should insure its getting a respectful consideration, but because it was this materialism which in the last decade brought back many to the study of philosophy, and *in specie* to the study of the doctrines of our greatest philosopher, Kant. We are not thinking here of those who, as Tobias says of himself in his book, *Limits of Philosophy* (Berlin, 1875), which is very well worth reading, were formerly materialists, and were won over from materialism by Kant, for in this case the merit due to materialism is too entirely negative. We are thinking rather of the many instances, which are still on the increase, in which scientists of the first rank boast of their agreement with Kant. It must be looked upon as in itself perfectly natural that those who, like Goethe, are not satisfied with registering phenomena and "simplifying them," but who seek what lies behind these, which is for them the most essential thing,—and every one

who goes further than being a mere *describer* of nature, and becomes an *investigator*, is in this category—should feel themselves attracted to the philosopher according to whom correct thinking must distinguish the essence from the appearance. That this agreement, however, does not make a man a Kantian, has been conclusively proved by Tobias in the work mentioned above. He does this, first by showing how the Kant who wrote the *General Natural History of the Heavens* stood as yet entirely outside of the Critical philosophy; and then again, by showing that the “limited matter” in Zöllner’s justly praised book on comets, that Helmholtz’s connexion of his views with the speculations of Riemann on space, and even that what Du Bois Raymond wrote, both in the preface to his great work, and also in his lecture on the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature, are, in spite of frequent agreement in expression, irreconcilable with Kant’s transcendental idealism. In fact, these men might have quoted the Frenchman Comte as their philosophical authority rather than Kant, or even Comte’s English imitator, J. Stuart Mill. Although the former has few such open admirers in Germany as the late K. Twesten was, or as the geologist Von Cotta still is, yet among the philosophically cultured scientists there are many whose views approximate to his. The fact, that in Germany the words “philosophy” and “science” are coming to be employed as diametrically opposite terms, is one of the many proofs of this. But even if such were not the case, even if all those of whom the men just mentioned may be taken as the representatives were really to be considered as adherents of Kant’s transcendental idealism, the latter would not have to thank Holbach nor Lamettrie for such brilliant conquests. For precisely like the materialism of Strauss, the materialism of these men is saturated with philosophical theorems which present a contrast to the materialism of the eighteenth century. They are saturated partly with ideas which go beyond the entire eighteenth century point of view,—and this is true of all those who, like Strauss, have come under the influence of Darwinism,—and partly with ideas which themselves, to be sure, belong to the eighteenth century, but which ran exactly counter to its materialism. Such a theorem is the law of the conservation of energy, which was originally laid down by Leibnitz and confirmed experimentally by Mayer and Joule, and which remains true to its anti-materialistic origin, inas-

much as it is not consistent with a materialism *à la* Büchner, as Lange has shown (*vid. infra*).

6. As forming a complementary correlate, we may put over against these speculative scientists those who, originally occupying a philosophical standpoint, were not contented with this, and are seeking in the empirical sciences something to supplement it, if not something which will be an entire equivalent for it. How universally diffused the feeling of the need of this step is, is proved by the many lectures or *brochures* on the present vocation of philosophy, the majority of which come to the conclusion that speculation, which has become bankrupt, can help itself only by getting a loan from the empirical sciences. But, as was said, some went still farther. The empirical sciences, they say, are not to supplement but to displace speculation; and this is just the very thing that was admitted by the father of modern speculation, namely, by Kant. This startling discovery was announced, particularly in his later works, by LUDWIG NOACK (professor, and afterwards librarian, in Giessen [died June 15th, 1885.—Ed.]). His first works: *Hegel's Idea of Religion* (Darmst., 1845), *Mythology and Revelation*, etc. (2 parts, Darmst., 1845), caused him to be classed as belonging to the left wing of the Hegelian school; moreover the *Jahrbücher für Speculative Philosophie* (Darmst., 1846–48), edited by him, were the organ of the Berlin Philosophical Society, which consisted of Hegelians. His *Speculative Science of Religion* (Darmst., 1847) occupies pretty much the same standpoint. On the other hand, this is essentially modified in the *Jahrbücher der freien deutschen Academie* (Frankf., 1849), and in the *Mystery of Christianity* (Leips., 1850). In the *Concise Survey of the History of Philosophy* (Weimar, 1853), he appears as an adherent of the doctrine of Reiff and Planck. He became editor of *Psyche*, an anthropological journal, in 1855, and devoted himself to giving critical accounts of the philosophers of modern times. The work, *Schelling and the Philosophy of Romanticism* (Berlin, 1859), betrays its tendency in its title. The work which appeared later, *Joh. Gottl. Fichte Judged according to His Life*, etc. (Leips., 1862), was, like many others, occasioned by Fichte's jubilee. Before it was published, there had already appeared *Kant's Resurrection from his Grave*, etc. (Leips., 1861), and *Kant with or without a Romantic Cue* (1862), the titles of which raise the suspicion that he was trying

to make a sensation. In these works, Noack seeks to prove that Kant's whole aim is to represent empiricism as the only scientific standpoint, and that he is not in earnest in laying down the theory of the transcendental, even when this consists only of postulates.

7. A man who nevertheless afterwards admits that no one is so much the philosopher of empirical science as Kant, rightly expresses himself as opposed to this undervaluing of Kant by Noack. This is FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE. Born on Sept. 28th, 1828, in Wald, near Solingen, he became, soon after having completed his studies, a teacher in the *gymnasium* at Cöln, next *privatdocent* in Bonn, and afterwards in Zürich. He was then invited to Marburg as professor of philosophy, where he died on Nov. 21st, 1875. By some works on social science and political economy (*J. Stuart Mill's Views on the Social Question*, etc., Duisburg, 1866, and *The Labour Question*, 3rd ed., Winterthur, 1875), he had already gained the reputation of being, with all his admiration for J. Stuart Mill and Marx, an independent thinker, when his *History of Materialism* (Iserlohn, 1866; second improved edition [1873] in two volumes) appeared. These two volumes were soon followed by a third, but he did not live to see it issued. The work is divided into two books, the *first* of which treats of materialism previous to Kant. It is in four sections; antiquity; period of transition; the seventeenth century; lastly, the eighteenth century. Of these sections, the first and the fourth are the most important, because they contain the greatest number of critical observations. In the *first* it is shown why materialism is as old as philosophy; *i.e.* why the first philosophical attempts necessarily led to the materialism which culminates in Democritus. In his philosophy we find the main principles of modern science,—and not of the science of nature only,—*viz.* the conservation of matter and force, and the nullity of all teleology, plainly expressed. Sensualism, the truth of which was first established in ancient times by Protagoras, must be viewed as the complementary opposite of materialism. For sensation, which remains an insoluble problem for materialism, is taken by sensualism as the starting point, which, just because of this, has so often—as in the case of Protagoras himself—resulted in subjective relativity. The Socratic and Platonic philosophy takes up a position of antagonism to both at once; for by attributing the highest

importance to forms, it constitutes a reaction, not only against materialism, but against all science. But it has not been for all that merely an evil. For man has his attention turned, not simply to the knowledge which is formed out of the senses and the understanding, but also to the poetry which springs from the feelings, and therefore to religion and metaphysics. True, it is a delusion, kept alive by the expression religious "truths," that such poetry in any way enriches knowledge; but it does more than this. It elevates, it supplies an ideal aspiration, and therefore an enthusiasm, without which nothing great is accomplished, in science as well as in other things. In this we have the explanation of the fact, that the epoch-making discoveries were hardly ever made by materialists, but always by men who had received stimulus from æsthetics or religion. This may be shown to be true even in the case of Lucretius, to whose poem, which is directed against the horrors, not only of the Roman religion, but of religion in general, Lange devotes an entire chapter. The *second* section of the first book discusses the relation of the three monotheistic religions to materialism, and shows how the authority of Aristotle made the rise of a healthy empiricism impossible; it became possible only when the scholastic ideas had been undermined by Copernicus, Bruno, Bacon, and Descartes. In the *third* section, Gassendi and Hobbes are treated of with special fulness, as the renovators of materialism. It discusses also their influence in the seventeenth century, owing to which a materialism, mixed up with religious ideas, spread in England, while, on the other hand, in the fatherland of Descartes, the purely mechanical materialism of a Lamettrie and a Von Holbach sprang up. These two forms of materialism are discussed in the *fourth* and last section of the first book. It is here that Lange's peculiar attitude towards materialism comes at length clearly into view. He extols it, because it shows and spreads abroad the purely scientific antipathy to miracles, and to teleological connection. He finds fault with it, because it does not recognise the fact, that, besides the need man feels of having scientific knowledge, he has also to strive towards what is higher, towards what is ideal, and to embody this by means of fancy. In short, materialism fails to see that it lies in the organization of the human spirit to construct certain fictions for itself, without which it would simply fail to reach what is highest. The affinity between

this thought and Kant's idea, that the world of understanding is but an island, and not the whole world, is evident; only it is intelligible that with Lange's æsthetic nature it is particularly in Schiller's lines of thought and expressions that his criticism moves. The "form" of the poet and his "beautiful shapes" are exalted by no thinker of recent times so much as by Lange. It will readily be understood that the *second book*, which treats of the history of materialism since Kant, is especially interesting, and for this reason, if for no other, that in it the theories of the author himself come more prominently into view. In the second edition, this book constitutes the second volume, and is no longer divided into three, but into four sections. In the preface to this volume Lange speaks of J. Stuart Mill's posthumous work on religion in a highly appreciative way. As regards the contents of this book, the order of subjects in the separate sections is as follows: In the first, Kant's position in reference to materialism is explained, and in connection with this, Lange considers the entire significance of this greatest of German philosophers. The truth of his main thought is admitted; namely, that every act of cognition is a product of what lies outside of us and of what is within us, and that therefore the essential reality of things remains unknowable. The author censures Kant for wishing to discover and deduce *a priori* what exists itself *a priori* in us. It is further proved with much acuteness that there are other things besides time and space, etc., which thus exist *a priori* in us, and in fact, that with increasing development various things come to have this character. Lange next takes up the materialists after Kant. Besides Feuerbach, he discusses the views of Moleschott and Büchner. Their merits are fully acknowledged, although his final verdict endorses what is hinted at above *sub* 4; namely, that works of this sort do not deserve to be taken any notice of in an account of the history of philosophy. Attention is repeatedly directed to the fact, that after Kant the earlier "nâive" materialism is no longer possible. The latter, too, is more and more making room for a standpoint which may be called relativism, in the form in which it is taken up amongst others by Radenhausen, the author of *Isis* (4 vols., Hamburg, 1863). Well worth noting is what Lange says when he comes to speak of Czolbe, who in a way of his own, which is in a certain measure the opposite of that taken by Kant, goes

beyond materialism. In the *second* section, modern science is discussed much more fully than modern philosophy. In the second edition, this section is enlarged into two, whose wealth of matter may be judged from the headings of the chapters: "Materialism and Exact Investigation," "Force and Matter," "Scientific Cosmogony," "Darwinism and Teleology," "The Position of Man relative to the Animal World," "Brain and Soul," "Scientific Psychology," "The Physiology of the Organs of Sense," and "The World as Presentation." The reproach of dilettantism brought by Liebig against materialism is extended to the majority of the German scientists, in the way of denying to them the possession of the philosophical—*i.e.* the critical—and historical, sense. Mathematics saved the French, and practical logic the English, from the intellectual freaks of the Germans. In science, idealism takes a place, by way of complement, beside materialism, which has its justification within its own limits. The latter is the conservative element, the former the innovating or divining element. In connection with the discussion of the most important cosmical and anthropological questions of the present day, the merit of having excluded the miraculous and arbitrary from nature, and of having destroyed the fear of gods and demons, is repeatedly adjudged to belong to materialism. Its positive assertion, however, that matter is the sole reality, cannot be maintained as true in presence of the results of modern science, whose two most brilliant conquests refute it. The law of the conservation of energy gives the highest place precisely to that which the materialist denies; and the physiology of the senses, which has made such strides since the time of J. Müller, leads to the conclusion that the world of sense, including our body, is a presentation, a joint product, of our organization, and that therefore its real nature is unknown to us. On this point the greatest living physiologist of Germany, Helmholtz, agrees with the greatest German philosopher, Kant. What was formerly the third, but is now the fourth section, which treats of ethical materialism and religion, is, in spite of its brevity, one of the most important. In the second edition it was enriched by some very interesting investigations. Among these may be counted, together with others, the remarks on Strauss' last work, as well as the observations on the peculiar materialism of Ueberweg. Starting from modern political economy, which is based on the dogma of egoism, Lange

proceeds to show that, instead of seeking to find out (relatively) "what form political science would take, supposing men to follow only their egotistical interests," it falls into the error of asserting (absolutely) "since men are egotistical, therefore," etc. This position is consequently a false one, because, along with the ideas which are accompanied by pleasure and pain, the complex result of which we call the Ego, and upon which egoism is based, we find ideas which we call the external world. By means of these we are induced to go outside of ourselves, and they constitute the first foundation for sympathy, and the like. The work then goes on to criticise the abuse which is occasioned in moral statistics by the employment of averages, and finally a statement is made of a more connected kind than is given in any previous part of the book, regarding the standpoint of the author. He so far agrees with Kant, that knowledge is entirely limited to the sphere of sense, but he is of opinion that we can speak of truth only in the sphere of experience. If, accordingly, he further maintains, likewise with Kant, the irrefragable validity of the ideas of the Beautiful and the Good, this is owing to the fact that, according to him, our organization, perhaps for reasons which can be explained in a purely physiological way, is so constructed, that it does not only seek to recognise the true, but aspires after what is worthy. Ideas have thus only this practical character, and therefore Kant arrives at God, freedom, and immortality only by making the mistake of confusing what is and what ought to be, or, Notion and Idea, a confusion which he himself so severely censured others for making. Art and religion, and also metaphysics, have to do with Ideas. It is a mistake, therefore, when they make any assertion about reality, or when they interfere with investigation. We can understand how, on account of the irrefragable certainty of Ideas, the word truth should have been employed in connection with them, and how people should accordingly speak, for instance, of religious truths. Nevertheless, it is a misfortune; for it has helped to make men constantly forget, that every Idea which is formed theoretically, and is thus given expression to as a fact, has at most a constructive or symbolic value. The fact that faith stands on quite other ground than investigation makes it quite as unassailable as a symphony of Beethoven, which cannot be refuted, or as the Sistine Madonna, against which no proof can be brought. That the æsthetic, religious,

and metaphysical aspiration after the absolute, which is never reached in knowledge, has had an effect in stimulating and advancing knowledge, cannot be disputed. Still, the practice of turning what are determinations of value into explanatory reasons cannot be too severely censured. One can more readily forgive the religious man for hating science and the philosopher for mocking at religion, than when the two domains are confounded, when existence is constructed *a priori*, and when dogma is defended on scientific grounds. The best way is to keep the two separate: the poetry, which, as was said, stimulates even scientific investigation; and the scientific investigation, which is limited solely to phenomena, *i.e.* to our ideas of existence, and therefore only to a representation of existence. Accordingly the most distinguished investigators are so much occupied with their subject, that they have no time for negative dogmatics, unlike so many modern materialists.—There are not many books from which so much information and stimulus can be drawn as from this of Lange, which has just been characterized in this scanty synopsis. A peculiar attraction is exercised upon those who think quite differently from him by the fact that, however decidedly his inclination leads him to take up one side, he still, even if it is with evident reluctance, recognises the points in which his opponents have right on their side, and this in spite of the outcry of partisans. Just on this account, it cannot be said that we are demanding what is beyond Lange's powers, much less beyond human powers, if we express the wish that, when he mentioned the blunders made by a speculative philosopher in physics, or those to be found in the lecture on the soul delivered in Carlsruhe by the Leipsic chemist Erdmann, he had maintained the same dignified tone in which he exposes the absurdities of Büchner. (This sentence is repeated exactly as it was printed in 1870, simply in order to add that the new edition of Lange's work has made the wish here expressed unnecessary, because it has been fulfilled.) How much Lange's importance has been recognised is evident, not only from the fact that his successor in office has edited a posthumous work of his, but also because Vaihinger, in his interesting work, *Von Hartmann, Dühring, and Lange* (Iserlohn, 1876), proceeds exactly as if he were a pupil of his.

8. If Lange's idealistic Naturalism is connected in a posi-

tive way with Kant, then the way in which HEINRICH CZOLBE, who died 19th February, 1873, founds his realistic naturalism and sensualism, may also be said to connect him with Kant, though certainly in a negative manner. Although he very early decided to study medicine, philosophical and theological studies have occupied much of his attention. It was Hölderlin's *Hyperion* which, as he acknowledges, first placed the germ of naturalism in his mind. This was next nourished by the study of Strauss, Feuerbach, and Bruno Bauer, and for a short time assumed an entirely materialistic form. The careful study of Lotze's writings (*vid.* § 347), contributed towards enabling him to see that materialism was untenable. He could not, however, rest content with what he calls Lotze's theological turn. On the contrary, he regarded it as a necessary consequence that, just as Lotze conducts a polemic against a special vital force, he should take up a polemical attitude towards the supernatural in general, towards an immortal soul and a God. Whether or not he still occupied the materialistic standpoint in his inaugural dissertation on the principles of physiology (1844), I do not know, as I am not acquainted with it. It is certain that in the writings which followed, the *New Account of Sensualism* (Leips., 1855), and the work which was occasioned by Lotze's criticism, *Origin of Self-consciousness*, but particularly in the much more mature work : *The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge in opposition to Kant and Hegel* (Jena and Leips., 1865), he decidedly left it behind. Not that he became untrue to the principle of naturalism, the abandonment of all that is supernatural, but he asserts that it is impossible to deduce the phenomena of life from pure matter, as the materialists attempt to do. Without renouncing the application of the mechanical principle, and particularly without renouncing the fundamental principle of naturalism just mentioned, it is none the less necessary to make assumptions other than those made by the materialists. Czolbe, moreover, differs from most naturalistic thinkers in so far as he does not maintain that the advances made in science compel us to give a naturalistic explanation of all existence. On the contrary, all facts are complex, and leave us a free choice between the assumption of the supernatural or the rejection of it. If this reminds us of Kant's *non liquet* in his critique of theoretical philosophy, then Czolbe goes still further with Kant along the same road.

It is the ethical interest which forces us to come to a decision, and in the name of morality he demands that we declare for the side of the alternative which science presents to us. In diametrical opposition to Kant, however, he demands that since the highest happiness is secured by contentment with the natural world, we should give up the discontented striving to get beyond it, which, as being analogous to the theological sin against the Holy Ghost, may be called the sin against the order of the world. The foundation of religion, that is, the assertion of the existence of the supernatural, is immoral. It is a moral duty, a matter of honour, to exclude everything which can lead to the assumption of a supernatural second world. If we follow this command, and in explaining existence, never go beyond the sphere of the mechanical, *i.e.* of rigid causal connection; and if we also consider that,—as is most simply shown by the parallelogram of forces,—cause is never a single thing, but is always the coming together of many causes, and that therefore the effect is always a combined resultant; then we are brought by this to something stable, which is not an effect, but is eternal. This is extension, in the two forms of continuous space which pervades everything and is pervaded by everything, and of the many discrete and mutually impenetrable atoms. These, which are only actually indivisible, have different forms of crystallization; and, by means of their arbitrary movement, attraction and repulsion, the changes in the inorganic world take place. Like the atoms themselves, many more of their combinations date from all eternity, as will be granted by the materialism that has inherited its fancies about cosmogony from the Mosaic account, which have only led to wild dreams of a glowing ball of gas, etc. The earth is eternal and was eternal. (In his first work, Czolbe had sought to replace the æther by very much attenuated air; in the second, he asserts the existence of the æther.) Quite as eternal however as space and atoms, are, secondly, the forms, kinds, species, such as we meet with in the organic world, which are constructed on a regular plan, and which cannot be deduced simply from the attraction of atoms. Czolbe very energetically defends the constancy of the genera; and the eternal existence of the human race is united with the idea of progress in such a way as to show that the capacity for development possessed by the race had a beginning in time, since,

previous to the impulse which was given by individual men of genius, the human race developed quite as little as the animal species. Here, where, together with the existence of matter, Czolbe maintains the existence of the forms which manifest design, he gives full expression to his views on the relation of causal connection and the relation of design, and justifies himself for having called his work a naturalistic teleological application of the principle of Mechanics. In contrast to the ideas developed in the earlier writings, emphasis is laid in the later works on the thought that neither from matter nor from the eternal forms is it possible to explain the fact of the so-called psychical phenomena, *i.e.*, the sensations and feelings from which all others spring. They, too, must be regarded as something original and eternal. As in the case of the equilibrium of large masses, the entrance of a small preponderance liberates an enormous expansive force, so a cerebral process can liberate sensations and feelings which exist in a latent state and in a condition of equilibrium from all eternity. This eternal power of sensation and feeling in such latent conditions is called by Czolbe world-soul; and he accordingly lays this down as a third principle: Since in the case of individual sensation the power of having sensations possessed by the world-soul is set free,—becomes living, *i.e.*, conscious,—we may explain without having recourse to ingenious theories how the eye commands such a range of space, etc. The deduction from sense-perceptions of the further psychical processes, particularly of conception, judgment, reasoning, which was very fully given in the earlier work, in the first section, headed Psychology—the other two sections being entitled, Philosophy of Nature, and Politics—is recapitulated, so far as the most essential points are concerned, in the later work. It is decidedly improved in this recapitulation. In the earlier work, the author often makes the matter such an easy one that we are almost reminded of Condillac's deductions. In the later work, the main difficulties are by no means so lightly passed over, although Czolbe himself admits that his account is of a dilettante character. The most essential difference is, that while consciousness was, in the year 1855, held to be explained when the existence of a rotatory movement in the brain had been admitted—so that some one at the time proposed the question whether a revolving mill-stone was also conscious—now the

world-soul, *i.e.*, those latent sensations and feelings which penetrate the whole of space, is made the foundation of consciousness. In short, by adding the third principle to matter and the equally eternal forms, the deduction gets a much less forced appearance. After Czolbe has drawn attention to the contrast between his views and those of Kant and Hegel, *i.e.*, to his agreement with both, and to the points in which he differs from them, he lays emphasis in some concluding remarks on the scientific, moral, and æsthetic value of his naturalism. He here explains that it is only an accident if naturalistic thinkers adopt revolutionary or democratic views. The fact that division of labour allows every occupation to be carried on in the best possible way, has brought him to the conviction that it is best to let the monarch rule. Quite as little has his naturalism made him blind to the fact that humanity is infinitely indebted to religion, and particularly to the Christian religion; and his atheism does not hinder him from showing respect to all ecclesiastical arrangements. It is true that the attack of Strauss from the idealistic standpoint, and still more that of Renan with his realistic turn of mind, have shown that the days of the Christian religion are numbered, and that the moment is approaching when, just as the individual must bury his parents and stand on his own feet, but in a state of isolation, farewell will be said to fancy's creation of a Father in heaven. "A chilling thought certainly for most; but for the man who has grasped it in all its deep meaning with both the understanding and the heart, it is far less sad than the separation from actual parents." As the ten years which elapsed between the *New Description* and the *Limits* do not give evidence of any pause in the development of Czolbe's mind, his unrelenting advance is proved by his posthumous work, *Outlines of an Extensional Theory of Knowledge* (1875), which has been edited by Dr. Johnson. A treatise which he himself published on mathematics as the ideal for all knowledge, constitutes the kind of bridge by which this latter work is reached. In this treatise, space, of which time is regarded by him as a fourth dimension, is made to support all sensuous qualities to begin with, and next all sensations, the concentration of which in one point gives conscious individual sensation. An interesting comparison of the three phases of Czolbe's naturalism is given by Vaihinger in the twelfth volume of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* (Leips., 1876).

C.—FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

§ 346.

I. Those who took an earlier system as the starting-point of their progressive activity were much more numerous than those who went back to the past because it had accomplished all that was necessary, or than those who turned away from it because it had accomplished nothing. Perhaps of all three the work done by those first mentioned was the most worthy of recognition, and yet it met with the least recognition. For if the older schools still found some adherents, and if most of the newer schools found one adherent at least, as Weber did in Hinkel, and Rohmer in his brother, and so on, none of those about to be characterized succeeded in getting even a single real pupil. In order to get a better general idea of the subject, we shall here separate those who started from one single system, from those who started from a study of many systems. It must be at once admitted, however, that this separation can scarcely be maintained with exactness; and particularly in the case of some who have been here placed in the first group, a doubt may arise as to whether they do not belong far more to the second. Since both groups are introduced here without any reference to their relative merits, an occasional misplacement will do no harm. We begin, accordingly, with those whose starting-point was only, or was at least principally, *one* system which they then go beyond. At the same time, the chronology of the original systems, and not that of the derivative ones, will determine the order to be followed. To be sure, the consequence of this is, that the most recent phenomena will be discussed first, and afterwards those which appeared much earlier. In the last decade in particular, and for the most part after the last edition of these *Outlines* was issued, there appeared the works of the men whom we may call, with Von Hartmann, the NEO-KANTIANs, and who if their views were to be described in detail, would have to be dealt with in this place. The conditional particle just employed announces that an account of these phenomena is just the very thing which will not be attempted here. One reason, among many others, for not giving such an account, is, that it is not within my power to expand this Appendix into a third volume. Such a volume would however have been necessary, if the

whole or even the majority of the men were to be characterized, each of whom brings forward a theory so peculiar to himself that it cannot be discussed together with any other ; and it would be necessary to show, moreover, in the case of each one, that we were justified in placing him among the Neo-Kantians, because with one the "Neo" does not seem to be suitable, and with another the "Kantian." Both terms will be most readily admitted as applicable in the case of one who, twenty years after Weisse had demanded that we ought to place ourselves at the point of view of Kant, went much further, and began the series of those through whom Kant again became the fashionable philosopher. This was OTTO LIEBMANN, at present professor in Strasburg. His maiden work, *Kant and the Epigones* (Stuttg., 1865), gives a description of the four tendencies which are all rooted in Kant's teaching—the idealistic represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the realistic represented by Herbart, the empirical represented by Fries, and the transcendental represented by Schopenhauer. He closes his account of each with the exclamation : "We must return to Kant." It is also pointed out in this work, that Kant's assumption of a thing-in-itself beyond space and time is an absurdity, and is the real cause of these four errors. In his second book, *On the Individual Proof for the Freedom of the Will* (Stuttg., 1866), he similarly approaches Kant in many points ; but he asserts that he is not satisfied with the way in which Kant reconciles freedom and necessity. Finally, Liebmann, both in his work *On Objective Vision*, published in 1869, and in his latest work, *On the Analysis of Reality* (Strasburg, 1876), describes his standpoint as that of the criticism whose foundation was laid by Kant, the Newton of speculation—a name to which he is entitled, since he formulated the laws of the intellectual world, just as his teacher and pattern formulated those of the physical world. With express reference to his first work, however, he points out here also, that the theory of the thing-in-itself is the weak point from which Hegelian pantheism and Schopenhauer's pansatanism have been developed. Much more uncertainty than exists in Liebmann's case may perhaps attend the question, whether some who are called Neo-Kantians ought not rather to be counted among those who have been considered in the two last sections. This affects those whose position, in reference to each other and to

himself, Liebmann himself defines. What our opinion is with regard to Lange is shown in the place where we have treated of him. But how is it with Hermann Cohen, who, on account of his *Kant's Theory of Experience* (Berlin, 1871), has been made out by many to be simply a Kant philologist? or, with J. Bona Meyer, who, on account of his brochure, *Kant's Views on Psychology*, as well as his fuller work, *Kant's Psychology*, (Berlin, 1870), has been taken by one for a Kantian with a colouring of the doctrines of Fries, and by another considered to stand wholly outside the Kantian point of view? Are Stadler (*Kant's Teleology*, Berlin, 1874) and Arnoldt (*Kant's Idea of the Highest Good*, Königsb., 1874; and *Kant's Transcendental Ideality of Time and Space*, in the *Altpreuss. Monatsschrift*), really such orthodox Kantians as they have been said to be? How far do the expounders of Kant's theory of knowledge abide by his principles, and how far do they deviate from them; as for instance, Hölder (*An Account of Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 1874), Paulsen (*Attempt at a History of the Development of Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, Leips., 1875), J. H. Witte (*Contributions towards the Understanding of Kant*, Berlin, 1874; *Introductory Studies to the Knowledge of Existence of which we have no Experience*, Bonn, 1876; *On the Theory of Knowledge and Ethics*, Berlin, 1877); or how with expounders of other single points in his theories, as Laas (*Kant's Analogies of Experience*, Berlin, 1867), who, with his psycho-genetic deduction, stands somewhere between Aug. Comte and J. Stuart Mill; and so with many others? Any one who wished to describe the phenomenon of Neo-Kantianism in such a way as to give a clear conception of what each of its representatives accomplished, or at least sought to accomplish, would have to answer these and such-like questions. Just for this reason, and because a mere string of names and titles of books in place of such an account is of no value, this Outline must leave such an exposition to those who are not hindered by external considerations from using their pens freely.

2. Reinhold's son, CHRIST. ERNST GOTTLIEB JENS REINHOLD (born in 1793 at Jena; died when professor there, on the 17th of September, 1856), likewise connected his views with those of Kant, and still more with those of his father, while at the same time going beyond both. He had already made himself known by his *Theory of Knowledge and Thought*

(1825), and by his *Logic, or General Theory of the Forms of Thought* (1827), and still more by his works on the history of philosophy, before developing his doctrines more fully in his *Theory of The Human Faculty of Knowledge and Metaphysics* (2 vols., 1832–34), in his *Manual of Philosophical and Propædæutic Psychology, together with Outlines of Formal Logic* (1835, 2nd ed., 1839), and finally in his *Outlines of the Sciences of Practical Philosophy* (1837). His views avoid all extremes, and are of a moderate character; but they were taken little notice of outside of Jena. Reinhold himself describes the task which he set before him, as an attempt to go beyond the pantheism which Hegel raised to the summit of its perfection, and thus too to go beyond all the one-sided views which had established themselves in the period before and after Kant. This end, which coincides with genuine ideal-realism, is to be reached by founding his system on a thoroughly-worked-out theory of knowledge. Reinhold here accordingly takes as his starting-point, the becoming conscious of self, and in particular, indeed, the becoming conscious of self as active, *i.e.*, as will. In the exercise of the active force which brings about movements, and by means of it, we first get the idea of extension and duration; our sense of effort gives us the conception of cause, and directly indeed of active cause; and by means of the conception of the effect which is to be produced, it gives us the conception of final cause. If we transfer this conception to the world as a whole, there then arises from it the conception of the primary existence which conditions all things and works with an aim in all things, and which is to be conceived of as an omniscient ruling power, possessed of thought and will.

3. Just as Ernst Reinhold finds the starting-point for his speculations between Kant and his own father, KARL FORTLAGE finds it between Kant and Fichte. He was born on the 12th of Jan., 1806, at Osnabrück, was for a long time *privat-docent* in Heidelberg, and afterwards in Berlin, and is now actively engaged as professor of philosophy at Jena. [Fortlage died Nov. 8, 1881, in Jena.—Ed.] He is one of the most many-sided, and at the same time one of the most thoroughly cultured, philosophers of the present time. According to a statement he makes in his youthful work: *The Gaps in the Hegelian System* (Heidelberg, 1832), he allowed himself to be captivated for a short time by the views of Hegel. He however soon went back to those whose thoughts, as it appeared to

him, Hegel had only improved upon,—and that too in a one-sided way,—namely, to Kant and Fichte. His *Meditations on Plato's Symposium* (Heidelb., 1835); the *Lectures on the History of Poetry* (Tübing., 1839); the *Account and Criticism of the Proofs for the Existence of God* (Heidelb., 1840); *The Musical Systems of the Greeks* (Leips., 1847), present him to us as busied with questions connected with Æsthetics and the philosophy of religion, and show that he was thoroughly versed in these subjects. He then turns his attention to the history of philosophy; *The Genetic History of Philosophy since Kant* (Leips., 1852) contains, besides, what is the best key to Fortlage's peculiar standpoint. After the hints which he had given in this work regarding the most pressing tasks of philosophy, it was not surprising that his next work, which is the fullest he has given to the world, was the *System of Psychology as an Empirical Science* (2 vols., 1855). With this are closely connected the very charming *Eight Psychological Lectures* (Jena, 1869), which are written in a popular style. To these there were added in the same year *Six Philosophical Lectures*, and in the year 1874, *Four Psychological Lectures*. The two first reached a second edition in 1872. Besides this, he is an industrious contributor to the *Viertheiljahrsschrift*, to Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, to the Heidelberg and Berlin *Jahrbücher*, to journals of light literature, all of which contain highly valuable treatises from his pen. With the exception of the epoch-making Kant, upon whose shoulders we all stand, Fortlage rates no philosopher so high as Fichte. Since he takes the absolute autonomy for his starting-point, which Kant reaches by analytic and psychological methods, and from which everything is deduced synthetically, beginning at the top and going downwards, he irrevocably transforms philosophy into pantheism. This pantheism, however, is of a transcendental sort; for the Absolute, the identity which rises superior to the contrast of subject and object, does not enter into this contrast, *i.e.*, into the world of appearance or phenomena, and is not immanent in it. The damage done to the Science of Knowledge by Schelling and Hegel, simply consists in their having conceived of pantheism as immanent, since they both put the phenomenal world,—represented in the case of the one by nature, and in that of the other by history,—in the place of the Absolute. Fichte, on the other hand, transfers the standpoint of the spectator entirely from the one

Kantian world to the other, from the world of sense to the moral world, in which the many phenomenal Egos,—Egos of appearance, or individuals,—vanish in presence of the absolute Ego, which, in all individuals alike, addresses itself as Ego, *i.e.*, autonomously. This transcendental pantheism is radical or absolute idealism, and is quite openly expressed in the original *Science of Knowledge*; while in Fichte's later writings it is not in the least altered, but only concealed under the cover of a certain timidity. (For this reason, Fortlage describes as realistic every standpoint which approaches that of immanence, and therefore, too, that of Schopenhauer, because he thinks of the phenomenal ego as absolute.) According to the *Science of Knowledge*, the Godhead is the absolute Ego itself, which therefore can never appear to the relative finite Ego as a Thou, but only as an extension of itself, a freeing of itself from certain limits. Accordingly, we must not speak, as Baader does, as if the relation between God and the Ego was one in which the one stands *above* the other, as the world of truth and the world of appearance, but as if the relation were one in which the one may stand *in place of* the other. The mythology of Theism is surmounted by means of the Science of Knowledge; but so too is Materialism. Both, as the fate of the Hegelian School has shown, crop up as soon as the attempt is made to maintain the immanence of autonomy in place of its transcendence, by doing which we relapse from idealism to realism. That a return to the pure and absolute idealism of the *Science of Knowledge* is necessary, seems to be felt by some of those who combat Hegel's immanent pantheism. There is need of something else, however, and to this the views of those men have pointed who were stimulated by Fichte, but who went their own way, and who may be called Semi-Kantians. To the *a priori* deductions of the *Science of Knowledge* must be added the counter proof, or the mathematical proof, in a psychology which proceeds according to empirical methods. A beginning was made in this direction by Herbart, whose psychology is essentially an attempt to elevate the Science of Knowledge to the rank of an exact science. Even if there is much to object to in Herbart's standpoint,—above all, that he has foisted plurality into the absolute existence, and further, that his practical philosophy is very weak,—still there should be no mistake about his great merit in having opened up wholly

new outlooks for psychology. This merit still belongs to him, even although he has fallen back from the standpoint of the *Science of Knowledge* to that of realism, and just because he stops short at the idea of immanence. Finite existence consists in fact, according to the *Science of Knowledge*, of two factors or potencies, which in their transcendental condition constitute a state of repose or stable equilibrium, but in their immanent condition appear in a state of unrest or unstable equilibrium. These are, the rational factor, or the Ego, and the irrational factor, or the Non-ego. The former is capable of being posited absolutely, while the latter cannot be so posited; and accordingly, in the state of unrest which marks immanence, it is only partly posited, that is in the form of appearance, just as the Ego is only partly annulled, *i.e.*, it also takes the form of appearance. Thus immanence or appearance consists of two semi-existences which, taken together, are not indeed equivalent to pure existence, but can introduce something analogous to it, or something which is a false substitute for it. Since existence in itself is quite the same whether it is divided into two semi-existences or returns into the truth of its absolute calm and perfection, the absolute existence ought not to be brought so close to the phenomenal as to make it possible to think that it may be grasped in any one point of the phenomenal; nor, on the other hand, ought it to be so far hidden away behind the phenomenal, that the factors of the phenomenal come to be out of connection with it. Herbart commits the first blunder, for in his theories we are constantly coming across, complete subjects, absolutes, resting points of speculation. (Fries falls into the opposite mistake, for he renounces all knowledge of anything absolute.) Like Herbart, Schopenhauer and Beneke have also, to be sure, fallen back to Realism; but they have opened out new paths for psychology, the former by laying stress on impulse, that is volition, the latter by emphasizing the mechanism connected with the formation of ideas. The only way of rendering a great service to the Science of Knowledge is to reconstruct according to psychological methods the results which have been synthetically arrived at; and indeed the fact that Kant discovered its premises in a psychological way already points in this direction. If the Ego in its broken state would learn, by pursuing the method of psychological analysis, to rediscover in itself the traces and traits of the

absolute Ego, then the revivifying principle would once more be laid hold of, and by this means philosophy would be able to awake from its dream-like absorption in nature and history, and become alive to what is the truly human reality, a perfected psychology.—In the historical work from which all the foregoing propositions are taken, Fortlage had given expression to the wish which he hoped would be fulfilled; and in his *System of Psychology* he himself seeks to contribute to the fulfilment of it. It may astonish many, that Fortlage, who was so enthusiastic about the *Science of Knowledge*, should have chosen from among the three men whom he had mentioned as the prophets of a new psychology, the very one as guide who had seen in Fichte the real destroyer of philosophy. (*Vid.* § 234, 2.) And yet this approach to Beneke is intelligible. Not only was Schopenhauer's theory of volition found to be compatible with Fichte's doctrine, that impulse rules the phenomenal world, but also Beneke's teaching, according to which the original faculties exist first in the form of effort. If, in order to complete presentation, we now take, not the satisfying of the sense of effort, as Beneke does, but, like Fortlage, take the limitation or resistance as the second factor, then with very slight modifications the "new psychology" may be turned to account in the service of the *Science of Knowledge*. Moreover, Beneke's psychology commended itself to an apostle of the *Science of Knowledge* who placed the natural and rational impulses in one and the same series, while certainly regarding them as different potencies, by the fact that according to it the corporeal is only the spiritual depotentiated. (Since Fortlage applies the name materialism to this way of surmounting dualism—a way with which he agrees—this confirms what was pointed out above, when Beneke's spiritualism was under discussion.) To one, however, who was acquainted with the natural sciences, and who saw how the law of the conservation and transposition of forces in motion was daily opening up new perspectives, this thought must have appeared of much higher importance than Beneke himself had imagined. When, as Fortlage's colleague Snell, in his able exposition of materialism, had done with the process of sensation, impulse was placed in a similar relation to the electric current in the nerves, as that in which heat stands to suddenly arrested movement, such propositions of Fichte's as, presentation is

arrested impulse, and others, also received an entirely new significance. To these material peculiarities of Beneke's psychology was then added the formal one, that it, more than any other psychology, really followed wholly the example of the natural sciences. Fortlage, in short, hails Beneke as the real creator of a true empirical psychology; and he has also raised, in his lectures, a splendid monument of his veneration for his character. This does not mean that he became his follower, but that he learned from him to give simply an analysis of the perceptions given in consciousness, and to let all questions about the metaphysical essence of the soul alone, not because they are unanswerable but because they are premature. Similarly, he also learned to combat the delusion, which prevents the specific character of inner experience being recognised, that psychology becomes a science only when it is made a chapter of physiology. In particular, he succeeds in doing this by taking up the physiological question in the second part, after he is done with the psychological question. Fortlage himself states that the two points with which the psychological investigation is mainly occupied are *impulse*, which analysis finally reaches as being primary and as what lies at the foundation of everything, and *reason* or reflective activity, which determines the ascription of actions to us and our moral personality. What the *Science of Knowledge* lays stress upon as an unavoidable conclusion, namely, that in the mechanism of the impulses we are to see nothing but reason which has not yet risen to self-consciousness, is here to be empirically reached by its being shown how, by means of continuous arrest and transformation (the process of becoming latent), there arise from the original impulse the states of attention, questioning, doubt, etc., up to reflection and knowledge. Of the nine chapters into which the whole investigation is divided, four belong to the first volume. They treat of consciousness (pp. 53-118), of the general qualities of the matter of presentation (pp. 119-238), of the special qualities of the matter of presentation (pp. 239-384), of the relation of consciousness to the matter of presentation (pp. 385-491). The second volume treats of the vegetative impulses (pp. 33-112), of the impulses in the nervous system (pp. 113-218), of psychical activities in the narrower sense (pp. 219-293), of sense-knowledge (pp. 294-389), of will (pp. 390-489). Both parts are preceded by introductions, of

which that to the first calls for special attention, because it contains highly instructive explanations of the psychological and physical conceptions of force, and suggests that in the imponderables we have the intermediate link between physical force and impulse. Besides the difficulty of the subject, the peculiar terminology employed by Fortlage makes the reading of his works difficult. It resembles to a certain degree that employed by Herbart and Beneke, but for the most part it is new. The strictness with which he makes distinctions renders necessary the use of a large number of new expressions, and there are not many readers who will readily remember them. The arrangement of the separate chapters, too, is not such as always to make it easy to take a general view of the whole subject; but any one who in spite of this studies the book, will find that he has learned something from it. Any one who wishes to get a glimpse of the author's standpoint in an easier way, should read the *Eight Lectures*; and, in particular, he will find the last, on materialism and idealism, of great service in this respect. Here, also, as well as in the larger work, Fortlage's anti-monadological tendency is constantly coming into view either in the emphasis he lays upon the unity of spirit, or in the frank assertion of his belief in pantheism, or in the way in which he takes the doctrine of the world-soul under his protection.—While Fortlage places a high value indeed upon the *Science of Knowledge* looked at from the side of its bearings on life (and in particular where he considers its relation to socialism), he extols it in a very special way as the pantheistic theory of the universe, which cannot take the place of religion simply because the method inseparable from it is accessible only to a few. Another thinker, again, lays stress almost exclusively on its ethical importance, which he considers renders Fichte the greatest of all philosophers. KARL BAYER, when he studied under Hegel in Berlin, occupied quite a peculiar position in the circle of his fellow-students, owing to the fact that, having attended Schelling's lectures at Erlangen, he did not treat him as one long since buried. After having won an honourable position in the very varied spheres in which he had shown his activity, he came before the reading public with his work: *To Fichte's Memory* (Leips., 1836), which was speedily followed by *The Idea of Freedom and the Conception of Thought* (Erlangen, 1837). The recognition he received

from L. Feuerbach in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* was deserved, even if it was too much in the style of a panegyric. *Considerations on the Moral Spirit*, etc. (Erlangen, 1839), and the magazine entitled *The Moral World* (Erlangen, 1840), which unfortunately was very soon given up, were published soon after the works mentioned above. In all of these there is evidence of a mind refined by the study of the ancients and tempered by the experience of life, which seeks to restore the forgotten conception of virtue, and to remind a public which was no longer accustomed to think of them, of the postulates of freedom and unselfish love. In seeking to carry out this aim, as will readily be understood, he often follows the same lines as Fichte. As in the case of the latter, so too in that of Bayer, we feel infallibly certain in everything that he writes, that words and life correspond. WILHELM BUSSE reminds us of Fichte in a wholly different sense, or, if you will, in an opposite sense. In his work: *J. G. Fichte and his Relations to the Present State of the German People* (1st vol., Halle, 1849), he attempts to prove from the fact that in Fichte philosophy led to the glorifying of nationality, while philosophy is meant to be a knowledge which goes beyond the limits of a distinct nationality, that philosophy has destroyed itself and has come to an end.

4. Since in these *Outlines* the view has been repeatedly maintained, that Fichte's later doctrines are quite different from the original *Science of Knowledge*, we must decide in the case of every one who confessedly connects his speculations with those of Fichte, whether his starting-point has been the earlier or the later *Science of Knowledge*. To those who thus connect their views with those of Fichte, and who are of opinion that there is no difference whatever between Fichte's earlier and later doctrines, such a decision may seem quite arbitrary; and they may perhaps pronounce it caprice, that Fortlage and the YOUNGER FICHTE (*vid.* § 232, 4) should be here separated from each other, the former as the continuator of the original *Science of Knowledge*, the latter as that of the later. This separation is warranted by the fact that Fortlage regards Fichte's later doctrines as a veiling of the original one, while Fichte junior regards them as an unveiling of it. The works by means of which I. H. Fichte took a share in the dissolution of the Hegelian School have already been mentioned. To them, apart from magazine articles, may be added,

Speculative Theology, which forms the third part of his system (Heidelb., 1846). This was followed, after a long pause, by the *System of Ethics*, 2 vols. (Leips., 1850-53); and after this, Fichte devoted himself entirely to subjects in the domain of psychology. As the basis of psychology, first appeared the *Anthropology* (Leips., 1856), which has already reached a third edition. The main propositions contained in it are repeated as introductory propositions in the *Psychology* (First Part, Leips., 1864, Second Part, *idem*). Before the appearance of this work, Fichte published: *On the Question of the Soul, a Philosophical Confession*, and after its appearance, *The Continued Existence of the Soul, and Man's Place in the World* (Leips., 1867). Soon after, there appeared the *Miscellaneous Writings*, 2 vols. (Leips., 1869), which consisted partly of what had already appeared in print, and partly of unpublished matter. The preface to the first volume of the last-mentioned work, and the first paper, which contains an account of Fichte's philosophical self-culture, are specially welcome, because they supplement the more incidental explanations with regard to his standpoint given in § 332, 4. Fichte expressly defines as the starting-point of his philosophical culture the "standpoint of the *Science of Knowledge* in its later form," which "still had too firm a hold on him" when he wrote his *Knowledge as Knowledge of Self*. At that time, it is true, he was already firmly convinced that philosophy must be based on a theory of knowledge, and that it must be theology. Later, however, it became clear to him, particularly owing to a deeper study of Kant, that only a basis of anthropology and psychology makes such a system possible as he aims at constructing, viz., an ethical theism which is panentheism. He himself designates the *Psychology* as the work in which the truth of this standpoint has been established in a perfectly decided way; but he says that the *Anthropology* belongs to the *Psychology* and forms the introduction to it. That the very book which contains what is essentially the key to Fichte's doctrines, and constitutes the basis for the other branches of philosophy, should have appeared last, has had unfortunate results, so far as Fichte is concerned. For, owing to the fact that, in connection with these psychological investigations, attention is constantly being directed to the ethical and religious doctrines which have their basis in psychology, the complaint has frequently been expressed, that he repeats him-

self a great deal. That Fichte, in the course of an active life extending over more than forty years, has not kept to the views which he developed in his first works—which he himself will admit—is to his credit. But it is difficult for him, as it is for everybody else, to admit to himself and to the world that what he has once laid before the public is wrong. Hence the trouble he takes to bring his earlier assertions into harmony with what he discovered at a later period. The consequence is, that the earlier views often get a wholly different meaning, and the reader is at a loss to know whether he has ever understood Fichte. For the historian, scarcely anything remains, in characterizing the principal works, but to follow the chronology. Before the publication of the *Speculative Theology* as the third part of the ontology, fragments of it had appeared in smaller essays, which Fichte either refers to or essentially incorporates in the complete work. The introduction is attached to the theory of knowledge and ontology, and at once states definitely Fichte's relation to his predecessors, particularly to Schelling and Hegel. Their Absolute,—the identity of the subjective and objective,—is really only world-reason. We must pass beyond this to its ground, through which it is explained and ceases to be blind reason. What is last with Hegel, is simply the relative Absolute. It must be taken as a problem, and by getting a basis for it the true Absolute must be discovered; and this is the personal God, and not simply the world-subject. The investigation is divided into three parts, the *first* of which (§ 14–64) develops the Idea of God from the conception of the world, ontologically, from the world as the sum of finite existences, cosmologically, from the world as a system of specific differences, teleologically from the world as a graduated series of means and ends. The *second* part (§ 65–155) treats of the being of God in and for itself, and the comprehensibility of God, the idea of absolute personality and the divine attributes are discussed in three sections. The *third* part treats of the being of God in relation to the “other” in Him. This is done in three sections, which take up the creation, preservation, and perfecting of the finite world. The theory of the universe of monads must be regarded as, at least, one of the principal points, since Fichte himself agrees that it is to be considered as such. In opposition to Hegel, who allows the finite to be taken up into the infinite, and thus reaches pantheism, Fichte

maintains that, as nothing really comes into being nor passes away, the finite too, since it is not only phenomenal but real, is eternal. Thus the manifestation of the finite, which certainly loses its independent existence, must bring us to recognise in it the really eternal existence of the finite which is not found simply in the Absolute, but in the eternal primitive ways in which the Absolute realizes itself. When, further, these primitive ways in which the Absolute realizes itself are comprised in God as the *real* infinitude, or as nature, from which God creates the world, and over which he is Lord, not as one who comes into being but as eternally existing, and as one who is a personal God, Fichte is conscious of having points of contact with Böhme and Baader. (This now leads him to adopt Baader's distinction between true and false time, true and false space. It is, however, a question whether his views do not thus come into contradiction with what he, in agreement with Weisse, had taught at an earlier period. The inclusion in his system of the world-æther adopted by the physicists, seems to be attended with still more unfortunate results. Fichte, in an odd way, brings forward this æther as the recognised agent, too, in the origin of musical tones.) When, finally, the perfection of the world is placed in the love which takes an active form in the God-man, Fichte expressly points out that it is here simply the conceivability of the God-man which is alleged, and that he is not expressing any opinion whatever on a question which it is the province of the philosophy of history to decide upon. A retrospect of the results of the *Speculative Theology*, lays claim to the honour of having given a metaphysic which solves the problem of the world from the highest standpoint. The *first volume* of the *System of Ethics*, with which Fichte appeared before the public four years after the publication of his *Speculative Theology*, is made up of a critical and historical survey of ethical theories since the middle of the eighteenth century. Of the Germans, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Krause, Schleiermacher, Herbart and Schopenhauer, are fully treated of. So, too, are the theological tendency shown in the theory of the State, and the historical theory of law, as represented amongst others by Schlegel, Baader, Steffens, Savigny, Puchta and Stahl. In the second book, the theories of the English and French schools are discussed. He treats of the Anglo-Scottish moral systems from Hobbes to Wollaston, from Locke to Ferguson,

from Reid to Mackintosh and Hamilton, and finally Jeremy Bentham, following for the most part the accounts of others. He then goes on to the French, and takes up the sensualistic school, spiritualism and the eclectic school, the political authors since Montesquieu, and finally socialism and communism. His standard of judgment as respects the contents is as follows : Does the system start by maintaining that the idea of eternal personality—of genius—is warranted by reason, and does it hold fast to the three ethical ideas which follow from this, those namely of law, of the community as the complement of individual life, and of the immanence of God ? Formally considered, it is : Do the conceptions of duty, virtue, and property have justice done to them in the system ? Judging by this standard, Fichte thinks that, among the Germans, a high place ought to be assigned to the ethical theories of Krause and Schleiermacher, and a very low one to that of Hegel. The English moral systems are treated with great respect, as is usual in German books. Fichte asserts that, among the French, he agrees most closely with P. Leroux. Proudhon's merit is declared to consist in his having correctly shown, by his scepticism, how the one-sided views which have hitherto been prevalent destroy themselves (treat themselves with irony). In the *second* or descriptive part, Fichte's own theories are discussed, and it is indeed in the *general* part, after ethics has been defined in the introduction as the theory of the original will of man, that we first get an explanation of the system of ethical ideas and human freedom. In the first of these, the three ideas above referred to are brought prominently forward ; but in treating of the life in common which rounds off human life, a distinction is made between the two ideas of benevolence and perfection. The idea of freedom is followed out through the different stages of volition up to the point where it appears in the form of character which is in conformity with the highest good. In the *special* part, the doctrines of virtue and duty are discussed, and much more fully than either of these, the doctrine of property. It is shown how the realization of the idea of Law takes place in the relations which are based on private law ; how that of the life in common which completes human life is seen in family law, the law of the community, state law, and the law of nations ; how that of the indwelling of God takes place in the Church, which exercises its highest function in the mission

which it has of realizing the idea of humanity.—Since both in Fichte's earlier works, and particularly in his *Ethics* also, genius and the justification of genius play an important rôle, one cannot but feel pleased when he at last explains this idea more precisely than he has done before. This he does in the *Anthropology* and in the *Psychology* which is connected with it, and does it so carefully that we may pronounce genius to be the really fundamental conception and kernel of Fichte's psychological investigations. Since the inner personality is to be thought of as taking a bodily form, while fancy again is the essentially formative power of the soul, the fact that in Fichte's psychology fancy plays the most important rôle does not conflict with what has been stated above. The destiny of man is, that in his outer body he should manifest his inner body, which becomes visible in gesture and physiognomy and cannot be lost, so that the body of the future will consist entirely of gestures. (Since æther is to be the means by which this inner body is to be formed, Fichte has certainly a right to protest against the statement that he does not allow the soul to receive an ætherial body till after death. He cannot say, however, that he has never taught the doctrine of a body composed of æther.) The idea of inner body as the temporal and spatial form of the soul's individuality gives Fichte the chance of expressing his views regarding his relation to Fortlage, and upon the appearances of spirits, and upon what Schopenhauer had said about these. Here particularly, more than anywhere else, Fichte manifests a desire to agree with everybody, even though criticism should suffer somewhat by this proceeding. A great deal of what is said regarding ecstatic states, exercising influence from a distance, and the like, could scarcely withstand criticism. As *Ethics* leads in the end to the renunciation of self-will, whereby we come into accordance with God's will, in the same way *Psychology* brings us to the point at which anthroposophy becomes theosophy. Not only is the artistic creative fancy aware that it is an inspiration, but psychology too, when perfectly developed, shows us how not only volition and knowledge, but also the feeling of self, leads us to the thought that there lives in and through us something which is more than human; which when renunciation takes place is penetrated by a feeling of the certainty of the eternal self, and in which the love of the personal God which we experience is for us the guarantee of this

personality. Since the foregoing abstract of Fichte's works was made, two other closely connected works have appeared, which make it much easier for us to get an insight into his theory of the universe. These are: *The Theistic View of the World and its Justification* (Leips., 1873); and *Questions and Reflections regarding the approaching Development of German Speculation* (Leips., 1876). (The latter was an epistle to Zeller occasioned by his work referred to in § 287.) To arrive at a decision as between mechanism and teleology, and therefore, too, as between atheism and theism, is regarded as the problem of the present. By the choice of the latter, however, truth is not yet reached; for the naturalistic theism of Schelling, as well as the speculative theism of Weisse, deviate from the truth, because they overlook the peculiar character of our speculations, which make man their centre. From Kant, who was the first to maintain this in its entirety, we must learn that the startingpoint of our speculations is to be found in what is given in experience, and therefore in the world, from which we, by reasoning deductively, reach the First Cause. It will therefore depend on our conception of the world, whether we stop with the idea of the unity of the world, or with that of a world-soul, or that of a transcendental original subject, as ethical theism does. Besides Kant, Leibnitz must be named as the second main pillar upon which the philosophy of the present rests. He must be so regarded, not only because by his individualism he opposes the pantheism of Spinoza, just as Herbart has opposed in recent years the Hegelian pantheism, and not only, further, because by means of teleology he has put mechanism back into its proper limits, and because his idea of harmony points to an intelligent cause of mechanism, but because his doctrine of monads supplies a point of connection for one of the most important doctrines of psychology. According to this doctrine, the human spirit not only contains in its consciousness certain elements which are prior to experience, but is itself a being of an *a priori* nature existing prior to experience, from which by its own act it raises itself to the condition of a conscious subjectivity. Hegel did not sufficiently appreciate these two greatest philosophers of Germany, and therefore he belongs to that Spinozistic period which has now expired. Of the more recent philosophers, a higher place is given to Franz v. Baader than Fichte had hitherto assigned to him.

5. The same intermediate position that was assigned to Fichte's doctrine in its altered form was also assigned to the views of Schleiermacher. Long before the attempt was made to create a school for the deceased master by publishing an edition of his works,—a thing that Schleiermacher had never any desire to do while he was alive,—two men had been stimulated by him, whom we can scarcely be accused of robbing of their originality, if we say that they took the theories of Schleiermacher as their starting-point. The one, HEINRICH RITTER (born Nov. 21st, 1791, in Zerbst; for a long time a professor in Berlin; after 1833, in Kiel; next, for a series of years, in Göttingen, where he died on Feb. 3rd, 1862), had been attracted especially by Schleiermacher's way of treating the history of philosophy. He shows, however, that he had many points of contact with his teacher and friend, by his non-historical works as well, among which may be mentioned, *On the Relation of Philosophy to Life in General* (Berlin, 1835); *On the Knowledge of God in the World* (Hamb., 1836); *On Evil* (Kiel, 1839); and also by his *System of Logic and Metaphysics* (Götting., 1856), and by the *Philosophy of Nature* (Götting., 1864). The other, J. PT. ROMANG, who was first a teacher of philosophy and afterwards a clergyman in Switzerland, wrote: *On Moral Matters, presupposing Determinism to be True* (Bern, 1833), and *On the Freedom of the Will and Determinism* (*Idem*, 1835), in a way which reminded every one of Schleiermacher's doctrine of election. His *System of Natural Theology* (Zürich, 1841), and *The Newest Pantheism* (Bern, 1848), involved him in a dispute with the Ultra-Hegelians.

6. Those who appropriated the ideas of the System of Identity, not in order that they might abide by them, but in order to further work out their consequences, are too numerous to allow of their all being mentioned in a brief sketch, even if one were acquainted with them all. Only types of certain groups of phenomena can be introduced here. After having studied in a thoroughly systematic manner first the theories of Kant and then those of Reinhold and Jacobi, DAVID THEODOR AUGUST SUABEDISSEN (born April 14th, 1773, for a long time teacher of philosophy in Hanau, then tutor to the last Elector of Hesse, from 1822 until his death, May 14th, 1835, professor of philosophy in Marburg) took up late in life the study of Spinoza and the System of Identity, while at

the same time always continuing to occupy himself with the subjective theories of Jacobi and others. His activity as an author was at first shown especially in connection with education. He first applied himself to writing upon philosophy in his great work, *A Study of Man* (3 vols., Cassel, 1815-18), which was followed by the *Introduction to Philosophy* (Marburg, 1827), *Outlines of the Theory of Man* (Marb., 1829), and finally by *Outlines of the Philosophical theory of Religion* (1831). His *Outlines of Metaphysics* was not published till after his death (1836), and makes us regret that so many of his things have not been printed. While with Suabedissen it may be easily shown that his strong pedagogical interest displayed itself in his studies of Spinoza and Schelling, it lay in the nature of the case that we should see something entirely different, where enthusiastic love of Nature and Art is the characteristic of a man's life and has determined his choice of a vocation. KARL GUSTAV CARUS (born Jan. 3rd, 1789, at Leipsic, where he was for a long time *privat-docent* in medicine, came to Dresden in 1815, became royal physician in ordinary in 1827, and died while holding this office, on the 28th of July, 1869), was twelve years younger than Suabedissen. It was in the first instance owing to his splendid æsthetic and artistic culture, and next owing to the circumstance that comparative anatomy, which he naturalized in Germany, had been previously declared by Schelling to be a desideratum, that he was inclined to adopt the teachings of the latter, and has developed them into that pantheistic poetical conception of the world which makes his writings so attractive. It will be understood how one who was a thoughtful observer of form and a devotee of morphology has received less recognition, at a time when contempt for these is held to be the distinguishing feature of an exact investigator, than he would have received at a time when Meckel was excused even for propounding his theory of transitions. We mention, of course, only those works of Carus which have a philosophical interest: *Lectures on Psychology* (Leips., 1831); *Twelve Letters on Life upon the Earth* (Stuttg., 1841); *Outlines of a New Craniology on a Scientific Basis* (Stuttgart, 1841. With an atlas, 1843); *Psyche: A Contribution to the History of the Development of the Soul* (Pforzheim, 1846); *System of Physiology* (2 vols., 2nd ed., Leips., 1847-49), *Physis: A Contribution to the History of Bodily Life* (Stuttg., 1851), *Symbolism of the*

Human Form (Leips., 1853); *Organum of the Knowledge of Nature and Spirit* (1856); *Nature and Idea* (Vienna, 1861); *Comparative Psychology* (Vienna, 1860); *Recollections and Memoirs* (4 vols., Leips., 1865). The ideas of Schelling took a wholly different form, again, from what they had done in the case of the educationist and tutor of princes, or in that of the scientist who was an artist and the friend of a king, when they laid hold of a man who was living in an isolated position, and who by individual taste and vocation had his attention directed to a study of the religious consciousness, and who was absorbed in it. According to his own confession, it was the beautiful intellectual spring-time awakened by Schelling, which spread its warmth over the youth of the Finlander KARL SEDERHOLM, and won him over to the cause of German culture. He was a clergyman, first in Finland and afterwards in Moscow, and lived for a long time in an entirely solitary position. He published a series of writings the main results of which are presented in the *Eternal Facts, Outlines of a Union of Christianity and Philosophy* (2nd ed., Leips., 1859). The second and third parts of this work appeared under a different title, as *The Spiritual Cosmos: A World Theory of Reconciliation* (Leips., 1859). His rage at Hegel often borders on hate; and he considers Hegel's identity of opposites as the cardinal error of the most recent forms which philosophy has taken, while he applies the primal law of contraries universally; and in accordance with this he first deduces from the eternal one or the Absolute, the contrast of God and the world. As the contrast of Father and Son shows itself in the former, so within the latter we have that of Spirit, which is God, and of Nature, which is not God. He rejects the doctrine of the Trinity held by the Church; and he is in general very indifferent about the triplicity after which modern philosophers make such wild chase.

7. In §§ 321 and 322 the systems were characterized which abandoned the Theory of Knowledge and the System of Identity while partly combating them and partly combining them. Of the former class Herbart's system was there mentioned first. Whether it is because his doctrines form such a strict unity, or whether it is for other reasons, no attempt has as yet been made to further develop them systematically. Even Drobisch, who is indisputably the most important member of the school, has only modified them so far as is wont to happen when

objections are taken up which have been made from a wholly different standpoint. Herbart's ideas were really altered and made productive only when they came into contact with other elements, which furthered them particularly by rousing opposition. THEODOR WAITZ was one of the few who, even when his views had diverged to a large extent from those of Herbart, yet recognised in him the greatest philosopher of modern times; and he was accordingly, even to the last, considered by the school as one of its members. He was born at Gotha in 1821, and made himself known to the philosophical public by his splendid edition of Aristotle's *Organon* (Marb., 1844). After having entered upon a professorship of philosophy at Marburg, he appeared as a writer in the department of thought to which he has since confined his activity as an author, namely that of anthropological psychology. The *Foundation of Psychology* (Hamb., 1846), and the *Manual of Psychology as Natural Science* (Braunsch., 1849), which mutually supplement each other, are the writings which are of the most importance in determining his philosophical standpoint; for his fullest work, *The Anthropology of Uncivilized Peoples* (Leips., 1st vol., 1859, 5th vol. 1st Part, 1865), which was interrupted by his death in 1864, contains, in addition to an enormous amount of material, critical remarks upon others with a negative result, rather than positive statements regarding the disputed questions in anthropology. Although Waitz repeatedly declares that he rests his views upon Herbart's principles, that Herbart's theory is the only one which is compatible with the results of science, and so on; and although, when he speaks of idealism, we might think we were listening to the scolding of Exner, Allihn, or some other follower of Herbart, still the place which he ascribes to psychology is not one which can be reconciled with Herbart's principles. In the present sad condition of philosophical studies, he thinks it ought to be made the foundation of philosophy. That is to say, Waitz simply allows that Beneke was justified in saying what he did against Herbart. Waitz wishes to have psychology designated as science, because it too adopts the fundamental assumption of all science, that everything stands in a relation of rigid causal connection; and because it, just like the other sciences, by an analysis of what is given in experience, reaches an hypothesis from which it further synthetically deduces phenomena. It certainly differs from all other sciences in so far as its stand-

point is constituted, not by the most complicated, but just by the simplest of all processes, sense impressions, from which it goes on to hypothesis, and from that again to the combinations of those simplest processes. The fundamental hypothesis is that of a simple soul not existing in space, which by way of reciprocity reacts against what is external to it, namely the nerves, and thus comes to exist in different states. This hypothesis is logically possible and does for us what neither materialism nor modern idealism is able to do. Of the four sections into which the Manual is divided, the first treats of the essence of the soul and of the universal laws which govern the formation of presentations; the second, of what has to do with the senses; the third, of the heart, *i.e.* of feelings and desires; and the fourth, of intelligence. The conclusion is devoted to the consideration of character. The appendix to the first section is interesting in relation to Waitz's position; as in it he gives expression to his views on Herbart's psychology and examines the applicability of mathematics to psychology.—In the first edition of these *Outlines* it was said of Schopenhauer,—who was described in the section above referred to as the antagonist of Herbart, and as an antagonist who was working towards the realization of a similar aim,—that he had not been long enough dead for continuators of his system to make themselves known. Matters have altered, however, since the time when this was written. E. von Hartmann has made the attempt,—which was speedily rewarded with celebrity,—to represent Schopenhauer's standpoint as one which, on his own principles, stood in need of being supplemented; and he has himself sought to supply this supplement. The more exact account of Von Hartmann is not given here but further on (§ 347, 5), because he repeatedly refers to his agreement with the views expressed in Schelling's positive philosophy; and an account would first have to be given of this, before a judgment could be passed upon what Hartmann has accomplished. On the other hand, since he so expressly declares that the way by which he reached results similar to those reached by Schelling was wholly different from that followed by the latter, this must justify us, even in his eyes, for not treating of him in this section, as one who started from Schelling, but for taking him up in the one following.—With Herbart and Schopenhauer, as the opponents of the System of Identity and the Theory of Knowledge, were connected in our account those who occupied

an intermediate position between these two standpoints. Amongst these, Von Berger occupied a prominent position. As an author, but still more as an academic lecturer, he has exercised a lasting influence upon many; but this influence was of such a kind that they did not stop short at the point he had reached. Owing to the position he took up respecting Hegel, we can easily understand how many of his pupils afterwards became Hegelians. The man in whose works the impulse given by Von Berger may be most distinctly recognised was influenced by other philosophical systems at the same time, and must therefore be treated of later (§ 347, 8). Solger was for a time extolled by the Hegelian School as representing the stage of thought immediately preceding that of Hegel, and Hotho clearly owes some of the things in his views on æsthetics to his devoted and thorough study of Solger. In reference, finally, to Steffens it was already remarked before, that BRANISS cannot be called his pupil in the sense in which we are accustomed to use that word. He was, however, at any rate strongly influenced by him in various ways; and his agreement with Steffens' views regarding the absolute act, in contrast to Hegel's absolute thought, is so close that we cannot avoid supposing that the one first conceived of it, and that the other appropriated it. Which of the two suggested the thought to the other is a point that remains undecided. The *Metaphysic* of Braniss, characterized above, was followed by *The History of Philosophy since Kant* (First Part, Breslau, 1842). Unfortunately, this first part, which gives a survey of the development of philosophy in ancient and mediæval times, was all that was published. Besides the extremely able statement of his views on the separate phases of the history of philosophy,—and his characterization of Epicureanism and Stoicism forms a specially fine part,—we here meet with extremely thoughtful discussions on the immanence and transcendence of God, which prove how carefully Braniss followed the pantheistic movements in the Hegelian School, and how independently he had at the same time developed his own views. *The Scientific Problem of the Present*, etc. (Breslau, 1848), is a hodegetic lecture which was delivered in Breslau. The thought which is followed out in it is, that the Idea of history is essentially the principle which lies at the basis of the culture of our time, and that for this very reason the philosophy of history is the result of the development of modern speculation. He shows, moreover,

what form will be taken by a theory of the universe based on the philosophy of history, for which, in his view, Kant's moral ideal, Fichte's immanent ego, Schelling's absolute identity, and Hegel's absolute contradiction have all equally and to a large extent paved the way. This theory rests on the principle that the absolute is recognised as self-action, and thus as subject and ego, and therefore as a real God. In this way we reach a state, not of dependence upon religion such as we see in the case of the scholastics, but one in which we recognise religion as a friendly helpmate. This method of taking history as the basis of speculation is superior to that of previous systems which make nature the foundation, and which, just because of this, lead us no further than to the conception of God as existing before the world, and not to the conception of Him as existing in a real way outside of the world, which, however, does not at all do away with the immanence of God in the world.

8. Among the systems which sought to escape both pantheism and its opposite, by setting up a concrete monotheism, a special place was given to Schelling's theory of freedom in § 323. It deserves this, for the further reason, that the number of those upon whose development it exercised a demonstrable influence, is much greater than in the case of the other theories. Along with Stahl, who afterwards struck out a wholly different path, the first philosophical work of JACOB SENGLER (born in 1799, professor in Freiburg, [died in Freiburg, Nov. 5th, 1878.—Ed.]) was mentioned in § 323, 3, as the one which attracted attention to Schelling's *Munich Lectures*. This was done in the first volume. The second contains a very full discussion of Baader's theosophy, which Sengler, at a still later time, places in a similar relation to Jacob Böhme, as that in which Molitor stands to the Cabala. Sengler shows himself much more independent in his work, *The Idea of God* (2 vols. Heidelb., 1845, 47), than in the two introductions; and, as will be easily understood, this is manifest in the second part, which takes up in two divisions, the ideas of God and the world, or speculative theology and cosmology, still more than in the first part, which is historical and critical. The first part, in short, by means of a criticism of polytheism, pantheism, and abstract monotheism, clears the ground for concrete monotheism, the requirements of which are, however, not met by Schelling, even in his doctrines in their altered form. The doctrine of the Trinity, as being the

distinction drawn between the essence of God and his nature, can alone supply us with the data for a monotheism of this sort; and so, too, it alone can render possible the construction of a correct theory of the world, in its undeveloped state, its realization and reality, its preservation, redemption, and perfection. After a long pause in Sengler's literary activity, the first part of his *Theory of Knowledge* appeared in the year 1858. K. PHIL. FISCHER was mentioned in § 332, 5, as having likewise been strongly influenced by Schelling's *Munich Lectures*. The influence of these lectures, as well as that of the other heroes of philosophy mentioned in the same place, is recognisable in Fischer's *Idea of the Godhead* (1839), and still, also, in his most celebrated book, *Outlines of the System of Philosophy* (3 parts in 4 volumes, Erlangen; afterwards Erlangen and Frankfurt, 1845-55). In a critical introduction, it is shown how the conception of philosophy has risen through idealism to absolutism. The philosophical system is then divided into three sciences; into the science of objective and subjective logic, which deals with the methods of thought and being, and their conformability to law, and thus contains ontology and dialectic; and into the sciences of the concrete objects of reason, which constitute the philosophy of the real, in which Fischer's earlier *Metaphysics* is also included. This philosophy of the real is in its turn again divided into the philosophy of nature, as the science of the Idea of life, and into the philosophy of spirit. The latter is further separated into the sciences of the Ideas of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. Logic and the philosophy of nature are treated most briefly: the first volume is devoted to them. The second volume is occupied with anthropology, or the theory of the subjective spirit; the third, with speculative ethics, or science of the subjective spirit; the fourth, with speculative theology, or the philosophy of religion. The leading idea in the philosophy of nature, is that of life; in anthropology, it is that of the soul or subjectivity; in ethics, it is that of morality or personality; and in the philosophy of religion, that of God. Naturally of less scientific importance than this work, which is the fruit of years of labour, is Fischer's well-meant book, *On the Falsehood of Sensualism and Materialism* (Erl., 1853), to which the work directed against me, and written in a very violent tone, *On the Impossibility of making Naturalism a Complementary Part of*

Science (Erlangen, 1854), forms a supplement. (I thought myself entitled to reply very sharply to this book in my *Memorandum* [Halle, 1854].) According to his own declaration, LEOPOLD SCHMID (born June 9th, 1808, at Zürich, died while professor of philosophy in the University of Giessen, 1869) wishes to have his efforts classed with those of Sengler and Fischer. His *Spirit of Catholicism, or First Principles of Irenics* (4 Books, Giessen, 1848, '50), justly attracted a great deal of attention; and his election as Bishop, and the fact that this election was not confirmed, made the author of the work still more famous. The brochure, *A few Words to the Thoughtful in Germany*, 1845, which he published *apropos* of the German-Catholic movement, had given a warning against neglecting the rights of the individual, in the attempt to justify the religious and national interests of man. Later, he expressed the hope that a German Synod might be of service in once more uniting the three sides of religious life, namely, order, freedom, and union in God, which occupy a foremost place in Catholicism, Protestantism, and Dissent, respectively. Finally, in the *Irenics*, he seeks to show that concrete Catholicism, which is equally removed from absolutism and anarchy, is neither intended to be separated from Evangelicism nor blended with it, but that the German spirit demands something in which both are reconciled. Owing to the fact that Baader spoke of him in such a friendly way, some regarded him as a pupil of Baader's. After he had given up lecturing on theology, and confined himself entirely to philosophy, he sought to prove in his work, *Outlines of an Introduction to Philosophy* (Giessen, 1860), that after one period of philosophy had passed away with Schelling and Hegel, a new one was beginning, which demanded a philosophy of action, or a system of energy. A beginning in this direction had been made by Sengler, Fischer, and specially by Fortlage. As these three directed their critical efforts against different philosophers, Fischer against Hegel, Sengler against Baader, Fortlage against Herbart, so, too, each one sought out a department of philosophy and a favourite philosopher: Sengler, the metaphysical parts and Schelling; Fischer, the theory of knowledge and Leibnitz; Fortlage, practical questions and Fichte. By far the greatest part of the work is occupied by the second, or critical book, which contains a full abstract of the works of the three men referred to. The

first book is the most important, if we wish to get an idea of Schmid's own views. It gives a dialectic and systematic sketch of Introduction to Philosophy, in which Schmid first develops the principle of philosophy in such a way as to discuss its relation to itself; and then describes its organization, so that he divides the branches of philosophy into the sciences of philosophical preparation, philosophical development, and philosophical culture. Introduction, logic, and psychology belong to the first; the theory of knowledge, metaphysic, and practical philosophy to the second; æsthetics, philosophy of history, and the history of philosophy to the third. Finally, in the third part of this first book, the spirit of philosophy is considered, according to its process, tendency, and results. The points of view from which he regards his subject are arranged mostly in triads, and stated with great ability, features which distinguish all that Schmid writes, and make also, in this work, the progress through the deep thoughts it contains easy and pleasant. *The Law of Personality* (Giessen, 1862) followed this work, and is in many points closely connected with it. Schmid here crowds together almost too many thoughts into a very small space, so that one often gets the impression that one is reading very witty but disconnected utterances. After having first pointed out that the course taken by all modern science points in the direction of conceiving of the existence of all forms of being—partly relative, and partly absolute—as self-determination, he shows how this, in spiritual natures, takes the form of self-absorption, self-resignation, self-recollection, self-completion. The last-mentioned is reached in concrete total freedom, which, however, is not absolute freedom, but is attained only through intercourse with absolute freedom. The original harmony of the moral law with natural law, by means of which, personality passes through the different stages of the physical, juridical, moral, and perfect person, is therefore the law of personality. Substantiality, individuality, subjectivity, personality, present themselves as the phases through which the spirit of humanity passes, and may be equally recognised in the development of art and science.

Cf. B. Schröter and F. Schwarz: *Leopold Schmid's Leben und Denken*. (Leips., 1871.)

9. Schelling's doctrine of freedom received its most interesting modification from himself in his positive philosophy, as

it is commonly called, although this name is inaccurate for the same reason which made the name philosophy of nature an inaccurate description of the System of Identity. Modification is perhaps too strong a word to describe the further development of the hints given as early as 1809; for in agreement with Sengler and with what I myself had said in my little work, *On Schelling's Negative Philosophy* (Halle, 1851), I consider the standpoint which is taken up by Schelling in his posthumous works to be the same as that upon which the investigations on the subject of freedom were based. What is really a new addition, is the fact that Schelling tells us about the impulse which Hegel's system had given him. It was already remarked above (§ 326, 3), that just on account of this, the last writings of Schelling could not be discussed until we reached this point. Hegel, by transforming the System of Identity into logic, really completed it. He showed, in fact, that the System of Identity was simply logic and nothing more, *i.e.*, that it constructs *a priori* only the conception of all existence,—the What of existence,—and does not at all trouble itself as to whether there is anything real; just in the same way as is done in geometry, which would be quite correct, even were there no real triangles at all. The fault one is compelled to find with Hegel is, that with his philosophy it is a case both of too much and too little. He over-estimates the value of the logic which he has established, when he imagines that from it, dealing as it does with what is rational, with what cannot *not* be thought, he can advance in a logical way to the real, from the *quid sit* to the *quod sit*. On the other hand, he under-estimates his logic when he adds to it a rational physiology and pneumatology, as if rational philosophy did not already contain everything, though of course only *γενικῶς* in a generic way. The truth is, that the system of philosophy is divided into two parts, of which the one treats of all that must necessarily be thought, which cannot *not* be and cannot be otherwise, and advances from the *primum cogitabile* onwards to the *summum cogitabile*. With it, as the first philosophy, the second is connected, and in such a way that while the former has God for its goal, and therefore looks at everything apart from God in a purely rational way, and according to pure logical necessity,—in the manner of Fichte, whose atheism accordingly has a certain merit,—the second, on the other hand, has God as its principle, and for this reason coin-

cides with philosophical religion or the philosophy of religion. They stand in contrast to each other, both as regards their aim and their method, which, in the case of the first, is that of rational deduction, and in that of the second, an exposition more of the narrative kind, admitting the empirical principle. They are accordingly described by Schelling as negative and positive philosophy; and in connection with this he might have appealed to the fact that mathematicians are accustomed so to designate the two limbs of a curve. (The truth is, that this two-limbed form taken by the system is unavoidable, since in the doctrine of freedom the monopolar line took the place of the original bipolar magnet [*vid.* § 323, 4], and when, besides, we take into consideration Fichte's demand that the system must return to where it began. And Krause and Hegel have proved this in their systems.) The negative philosophy begins then with the theory of principles or potencies, with logic and metaphysics proper. In this theory the subject-object with which the System of Identity started as a ready-made presupposition, and the contents of which were merely indicated by the investigations into freedom, when the desire or hunger for existence, etc., was under discussion, is now in the posthumous lectures on negative philosophy developed in detail according to its most essential moments. Kant himself, and particularly his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, was held in very high esteem by Schelling at this time (*vid. supra*, § 296, 4). Starting from him and from his assertion that the substance of all that is possible, *i.e.*, of all *a priori* existence, is to be thought of as individual, Schelling seeks first to show why existence must be thought of as substance, and further, what the subject of these separate forms of existence is. In connection with this, he first distinguishes three moments: The bare possibility of being, or the pure subject of being, which, if instead of being we use as formerly the letter A, would be $-A$, then the diametrical opposite of this, something which is only predicate and object ($+ A$), and finally, $\pm A$, or subject-object, which has power within itself, and has the highest claim to be considered as existence. All three, however, point beyond themselves to something which supports them, after which, as it was formerly expressed, they hunger, and compared with which they are simply potencies; while this basis, seeing that it is not simply a potency, may be designated as A° . Before arriving

at this, which is the conclusion of the negative philosophy, the relations of the potencies which are necessities of thought, have to be taken up in order. There thus result : first, the principal stages which were formerly described as A^1 , A^2 , and A^3 , within which again are the subordinate stages of nature, so that the entire unaltered philosophy of nature is included within the negative philosophy, and finds itself on the road to God. Exactly the same thing holds good of psychology, about which Schelling, in his lectures on negative philosophy, expresses his views more fully than at any previous time. Since he still holds to the thought which was formerly given expression to, that there is nothing real but the will, the task of psychology is to start from the primal will as it manifests itself as the final result of the (human) soul which forms nature, to take up in order the Promethean act by which it conceived of itself as an independent Ego, and the various stages of knowledge until we reach the active understanding (which was quite correctly conceived of by Aristotle) and the practical reason, but always in such a way as to leave theological points of view entirely out of account. Practical philosophy, too, belongs to the negative philosophy, and within it the State in particular requires to be considered. The State does not limit man, but makes him free ; and even in its highest form as monarchy, it is not end, but means ; it is not the goal, but the presupposition of progress. Finally, still higher than in the State the ego raises itself in art and in contemplative piety, or mysticism (which is still to be distinguished from religion), as well as in contemplative science, or rational philosophy, which reaches its highest aim in that vision or intuition of God, to which Aristotle attained in his *νοήσεως νόησις*, and which is just the A^0 we have been seeking. This is conceived of in its independent existence, and as a principle, in the following way : The Ego, which, when it arose, became the beginning of a world which excluded God, thus declares itself not to be a principle, and subordinates itself to the God who was shut out, or separated from the world. The negative philosophy has thus led to God in a purely rational way, and simply by means of thought. For this very reason, however, we have discovered only the notion of God. God's existence, which can never be grasped by thought, because it has to do merely with the theoretical fact, has been thus entirely left out of account. Whether

the *summum cogitabile* which it has reached, really exists, does not concern the negative, but the positive philosophy, and the example of the ontological argument as well as that of the Hegelian system, has proved that the attempt to reach existence in a rational or negative way from the notion of existence, must end in failure. Much rather the *positive philosophy* constitutes the diametrical opposite of the negative. It accordingly begins with the opposite of all possibility or potency, namely, with what is preceded by no notion, by nothing that is thinkable, and therefore with what must be, with the notionless, the unthinkable. Spinoza's blind substance corresponds to this conception; and Spinozism, whose influence over men's minds rests upon this, is therefore the beginning of positive philosophy. But it is nothing more than the beginning; for it has to reduce the pantheism in it to a latent state, and to overcome it. It accomplishes this by showing,—in contrast to the ontological argument, which attempts to show how from what is divine we reach existence,—how what exists reaches what is divine. It shows how God makes himself Lord over that form of being which is to be thought of as before Him, and thus negates His blind being, just as innocence is negated in regeneration. This process, by which God becomes God, and which, therefore, may be called the theogonic process, reveals how to being which must be, there presents itself the possibility of being an "other," and how thus an ability to be is set over against it in the second potency; and this ability to be, because it is *and* can, may be called being which ought to be. The God who includes all three potencies is not yet a God in three persons, but is the All-One who embraces the manifold. God escapes the painful position in which Aristotle leaves his merely self-thinking *νοῦς*; for God, like every noble nature, desires to be known by placing the potencies of which he is the unity, in a state of contrast or tension. This is a reversal of unity, which may be called the *unum versum* (universe), in which, accordingly, tension of potencies (separation of forces it was previously called) must necessarily show itself. In the final stage of this, namely, human consciousness, God has His seat and throne, because in it, as in the existing God, the unity of potencies would be once more reached. Along with this process of coming into existence, however, there has also arisen a real hypostasis out of that state in which man had only been a

possibility, namely, out of the Wisdom which God manifested to men who were yet to exist. This hypostasis is the Son, who, so long as man preserves the unity of the potencies, shares with the Father the lordship of the world. The fact that man has still an incomplete history, proves that this unity was not preserved, but that man again put into a state of tension the potencies which were at rest in his consciousness, and thus assisted the separation (Satan), which ought to have remained simply potency, to attain to reality. In consciousness we have the same process repeated as that by which the universe came into existence; and from this we can explain the parallelism between the mythological process and the stages which we see in the potencies of nature. In the mythological process, consciousness appears as successively in subjection to the potencies, which had been potencies not only of the world-process, but also of the theogonic process. The philosophy of mythology accordingly shows that in the mythological process, through which consciousness passes, we are not to see what is simply an empty lie. This process begins with the ending of substantial monotheism, which humanity in its original state did not so much possess as it experienced. This ending of monotheism coincides with the separation of the one humanity into nations, each of which is dominated only by a single moment of the all-one God. In the most perfect mythology, namely, the Greek, the mythological process becomes itself object, and accordingly in the dynasties of the gods which supplant each other, Uranos, Kronos, Zeus, the stages of the pre-Grecian mythology repeat themselves. In the Mysteries, in fact, in which the mystery of all mythology is made plain, the coming of a higher principle is announced, so that Eleusis is not only called Advent, but is Advent; and the doctrine of the Mysteries constitutes the transition from the philosophy of mythology, as the first part, to the philosophy of revelation, as the second part; in short, to positive philosophy. As the former had to explain polytheism, the latter has to explain the monotheism which accordingly appeared in opposition to polytheism as dogma; for monotheism, in asserting that there is only one true God, presupposes that many have been honoured as such. Schelling does not mean here to make any attempt to comprehend the dogmas of the Church, those products of a wretched philosophy, but is concerned with the historical Christ as presented in

the original revelation. In connection with this, no point is of such importance as the *Kenosis* mentioned in the classical passage, Phil. ii. 7. The fall of man so far involves the Son, who governs the world together with the Father and is therefore not independent, that in consequence of it the Father withdraws from the world and lives in it only with reluctance, and the Son conducts the government of the world with an independence which resembles God's (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*). What is most essential in His work is, that He does not use this as a happy find (*ἀρπαγμόν*) and keep firm hold of the government of the world (temptation), but divests Himself of the rank which He held as being in place of God, and conducts the world to God, and in so doing attains to an equality with God which He has won for Himself. In consequence of this, the Father ceases to be in the world against His will; and the Holy Spirit too, which had hitherto been latent, and had spoken only in presentiments, has now come to be actively present. The germ which Christ placed in the world is developing itself in the Church, which has its Petrine-Catholic and Pauline-Protestant period behind it, and its Johannean period before it. As these last words wounded the Catholic consciousness even of the free-thinking Franz von Baader, one is all the more astonished to find that it was precisely among Catholics that Schelling's positive philosophy met with more approval than it did among those belonging to his own creed. Among the former, HUBERT BECKERS calls for mention. He attended Schelling's lectures in Munich, graduated there in 1831, was next made professor in Dillingen, and has held a similar position in Munich since 1847. The fact that the preface by Schelling mentioned in § 332, 3, was written for a translation by Beckers, proved what confidence the master placed in one who was at that time quite a young man; and it drew attention to him. He fell out completely with the Hegelian school when, in the criticism mentioned above (§ 336, 2), he treated Hegel as a garbling plagiarist who had stolen his ideas from Schelling's System of Identity. The extracts from older writings on the life after death, which appeared under the title, *Communications*, etc., in two parts (Augsb., 1835-36), as well as a collective criticism of writings on immortality in the *Jahrbücher für Theol. und Chr. Philos.*, show how deeply Beckers was interested in the question which was being so much agitated at that time. With the exception of a *Pro-*

gramme, which was published in Dillingen, treating of the principal stages of the history of psychology, and of his Munich *Inaugural Address* (Munich, 1847), which is occupied with a discussion of the position and the task of philosophy in the present day, Beckers' printed works have almost exclusive reference directly to the last phase of Schelling's speculations. This is the case with his *Memorial Address on Schelling* (1855), and the treatise, *On Schelling's Negative and Positive Philosophy* (1855), and with the works, *On Schelling and his Relation to the Present* (1857); the *Historical and Critical Commentary* on Schelling's treatise on the *Sources of Eternal Truths* (1858); and that entitled, *On the Significance of Schelling's Metaphysic* (1861), which may be considered his most important book. In these works, Beckers seeks,—by arranging together a number of propositions from Schelling, to which he adds explanatory remarks,—to bring forward a proof that Schelling's services to philosophy may be reduced to the four following points: the definite separation of negative from positive philosophy; the reconciliation of the opposition between reason and experience; the development of the theory of principles or potencies; and the carrying out of rational philosophy to its extreme limits. He naturally dwells longest on the theory of the principles of all being, the potencies. And here it should be acknowledged, that by a comparison between the development of the thought in the lectures on mythology, which were written earlier, and that in the negative philosophy as edited in its final form, the comprehension of this difficult part is rendered easier. After some festival-addresses, issued in the years 1861 and 1862, there appeared in 1864 and 1865 the two treatises, *On the True and Abiding Import of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature*, and *Schelling's Doctrine of Immortality*, which, like those previously mentioned, first appeared in the writings issued by the Munich Academy, but which were afterwards also published separately. In the first of these treatises, which was occasioned by the attacks made on the *Philosophy of Nature* by Mohl of Tübingen, he points out the beneficial influence which Schelling's *Philosophy of Nature* in its older form has already had. He then seeks to prove that the supplementing of the negative philosophy by the positive has a decisive influence upon the philosophy of nature as well, since it leads us to further distinguish a negative and a positive moment in

this also. The investigations into *a priori* empiricism and an empirical a priorism, which had been already made in the treatise on metaphysics, get a prominent place in this work also. The second treatise is especially occupied with Schelling's dialogue, *Clara*, but at the same time brings under review the parts of Schelling's lectures which Beckers had published with his permission, and finally appends some remarks taken from the Stuttgart lectures relative to the purely rational and the positive philosophy. It is here shown how, according to Schelling, the contradiction which lies in man's nature, owing to the fact that he is body, soul, and spirit, is solved in such a way that the one-sided forms of the predominating corporeal and spiritual existence, by passing through three states which follow each other in succession, are equalized in the perfect state of salvation. Of these states, the second, of which we are accustomed to think first when immortality is in question, is treated almost exclusively and in greatest detail. The starting-point is constituted by the state of what ought not to be, a state which is actually present, and which requires that death be the transition to a second life. This second life, relatively to the first, is on the one hand privation, and on the other progress. In the description of it, sleep and second sight are especially taken into consideration as present anticipations of it which we already possess.—As the distinction between negative and positive philosophy was first formulated by Schelling when he taught in Bavaria, it was natural that when a Bavarian professor brought out a system of positive philosophy, every one should expect to find in him an adherent of Schelling's new doctrines. MARTIN DEUTINGER (born in 1815, died in 1865 at Pfäfers, after having been military chaplain in Munich, *Docent* in Freysing, professor in Munich, and then in Dillingen, where he was forbidden to lecture in 1852) is considered by many up to the present day to have stood in this relation to Schelling's doctrines. It is not easy to define his peculiar position. The prefaces and quotations which, in the case of other authors, help us to form a judgment regarding them, are nowhere to be met with in the first six volumes of his *Outlines of a Positive Philosophy* (Regensb., 1843–1849). In the preface to the seventh volume (1852–53), however, he gives expression, though in quite a general way, to his views on the treatment of the history of philosophy. He stops short with

the decline of ancient philosophy, so that he gives no expression of opinion with regard to his immediate predecessors. The reader must accordingly go to the reminiscences which the author attaches to the work, in order to get an idea of the relation in which he stands to previous philosophical effort. The divisions which ordinarily help one to get a general view of a work, render it more difficult in this case. There are so many of them that the table of contents,—which consists simply of the headings of the principal sections and their subdivisions, — takes up seven entire printed sheets, and what with the A, I, a, i, α, aa, αα, etc., one is at last afraid of not being able to get any general idea of the book at all. If these difficulties are overcome, it will be found that Deutinger's positive philosophy can be compared with Schelling's only to the extent that Deutinger received his first impulse from the System of Identity. He writes, however, entirely in a religious interest, and gives everything a religious turn. The ideas of subject, object, and subject-object, determine the rhythm of his deductions, and he fully explains why, in the sphere of nature, the triads make way for Oken's tetrads. After philosophy has first been shown to be the knowledge of knowledge, or the central knowledge, the *Propædæutic* (vol. i.) is discussed, which, according to the moments above referred to, consists of introduction, encyclopædia, and the doctrine of method. In the second of these three sections, the encyclopædia, it is shown how, corresponding to the triplicity which exists in the object, there are three objects of knowledge; nature, God, and man who is related to both. Of these, the last is the object which lies nearest, and alone falls within the range of speculative scientific knowledge, while the two others lie partly outside of it, God being above it, and nature beneath it. Anthropology thus constitutes the central point and foundation of philosophy. It is itself, however, divided into the theory of thought, the theory of art, and moral philosophy, because man is thought, capability, and action. He further distinguishes in each of these, three parts, so that logic, dialectics, and metaphysics; architecture, constructive art, and music and poetry; and, lastly, the subjective basis of moral philosophy, its historical manifestations and its system, require consideration. The working out of all these parts comes first, while the *Doctrine of the Soul* (vol. ii.) supplies the general anthropological basis in the form of somatology,

pneumatology, and psychology. Next, the *Doctrine of Thought* (vol. iii.), the *Doctrine of Art* (vols. iv. v.), and *Moral Philosophy* (vol. vi.), are treated of in detail. The *History of Greek and Roman Philosophy* is added to these in the form of a supplement. Owing to the central position assigned to anthropology, we can understand how Deutinger lays down the statement, "I can think," as an absolutely fixed and certain starting-point, and why he always comes back to the basis of personality and freedom as the principle of all knowledge. The religious turn, again, which he gives to all his investigations leads him not only to conclude the doctrine of the soul with the return of the soul into its First-Cause, and metaphysics with the infinite love, which is the Three in One, but also to show how the doctrine of art (which points to a religious epos, that unites philosophy and poetry), and how moral philosophy, lead to the result that the highest perfection consists in the reception of the spirit of sanctification by means of free love.—If Deutinger leaves us in doubt as to how we are to regard his relation to Schelling's positive philosophy, WILHELM ROSENKRANTZ (died Sept. 27th, 1874, when assessor in the Bavarian ministry of justice) expresses himself very decidedly as to his. He published the first volume of his *Science of Knowledge* in the year 1865, and in 1868 for the second time, with the addition of a second supplementary volume. He acknowledges not only in the preface that he is walking in the footsteps of the *last* great teacher of philosophy in Germany, but in the course of the discussion he frequently declares that he goes beyond Schelling's positive philosophy. This is however not the only difference between the writings of the two men. While Deutinger is too sparing of quotations, Rosenkrantz overwhelms us with them. It often looks as if these *specimina eruditionis* were intended to show how thoroughly a jurist can master philosophical literature. It would have been often better if he had given us less of them, for many of the discussions,—as, for instance, those on Plato's Theory of Ideas and Theory of Number, and others, although, taken by themselves, they are extremely valuable,—conceal the line of thought pursued, much more than they cast light upon it. Since, in the passages quoted, the heroes of scholasticism are very often drawn upon, some have been led to class Rosenkrantz among the Neo-Scholastics. How far he is from belonging to them, is shown by the judgments he

expresses on *Liberatore*, and on other works. The work in its present form contains only the analytic of knowledge, or the theory of human knowledge in general, which is discussed in three principal parts, the first of which takes up the elements of knowledge (§§ 17-80); the second, the origin of knowledge (§§ 81-154); the third, the final ground of knowledge (§§ 155-174). The synthetic of knowledge, or the theory of the special objects of human knowledge, is meant to follow the analytic. This contains the peculiar knowledge sought by philosophy, while the other is only directed towards investigating the principle, *i.e.*, towards finding out *what* the principle is, which is placed before us by the Synthetic *as* the principle. (Since at the close of the Analytic the Divine will is proved to be this principle, it is not going out of the way to call attention to the fact, that the Analytic of Knowledge states a problem which is analogous to that of Schelling's negative philosophy.) Instead of analytic, he often uses the expression theory of speculation, and instead of synthetic, doctrine of construction. Starting from the thought that in every act of knowledge we are to distinguish between subject, object and the existence of the object in the subject (presentation), Rosenkrantz takes up in order the three elements of knowledge, and, in connection with these, distinguishes the presentations which belong to immediate knowledge from those of mediate knowledge. The former are (external and internal) perceptions, the latter reproductive pictures, conceptions, and ideas. He carries on the development of his own views and a criticism of the views of others at the same time, and with few exceptions—as, for instance, those of Günther and Schopenhauer—the judgments passed are mild in tone. The discussions on internal perception (§ 39 ff.) are more important than the full physiological and psychological discussions on the origin of external perceptions, since internal perception shows itself to be self-limitation, and forces us to distinguish three forms of activity (+activity, -activity, \pm activity), by the co-operation of which self-consciousness arises out of the free self-determination which constitutes the nature of reason. In the accounts which are given of mediate knowledge, the Ideas (§ 50 ff.) are treated with special fulness, as being the most important. By the Ideas are meant the presentations for which no corresponding object can be found in the external perception, and in connection with which we yet find ourselves bound by a certain

necessity to assume the existence of a ground which is independent of our thought (as in the case of the Ideas of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good), or, of an object which completely corresponds to them (God, world, soul). We now come to the decisive point in the proof, namely, that we are forced to suppose the existence of a triplicity of objective elements or principles, in short, causes of being, which go parallel to the elements of knowledge already referred to, and above which stands as a unity the unconditioned existence, in which they are powers, and accordingly can be described as $+P, -P, \pm P$. The last of these causes (not the fourth) is, as Rosenkrantz seeks to show, alone to be thought of as absolute Spirit, which carries the whole world of ideas in itself. Accordingly the three material ideas, the theological, cosmological, and psychological, are deduced and so united with the three formal ideas, that the Truth (and why not also Beauty and Goodness?) of all Ideas, and thus the proofs for the existence of God, etc., come to be discussed. If we pass from the first principal part, from which the foregoing propositions have been taken, to the second, the origin of knowledge, we find that by far the most important part of it is made up of what is said about reason, as the source of the pure notions of the understanding. Along with a criticism of previous theories of the categories, the author gives his own theory. The forms of pure thought in itself are, in the world of thought, cause and effect, substance and accident, and in its intercourse with the external world, space and time. To these there must be added as forms of pure cognition in its relations to the movements of the objective elements, in cognition, ground and consequence; in action, means and end. With these principal and simple categories are connected subsidiary categories, and categories which have been compounded of others. Naturally only the first two, and in no sense the last three, are valid for thought over against which there does not stand any impenetrable externality, *i.e.*, they alone are valid for absolute thought. In connection with the third principal part, special attention may be drawn to the retrospect given of the entire course of the argument, and to the assertion that since up to this point only the *what* of the highest principle has been under discussion, its *that*, however, or its existence (like any other existence) cannot be reached by thought, the transition to the synthetic part is to be made by means of a postulate, which

has then to be realized. At the same time, this grand result has been definitely reached, that nothing else can be a principle except the complete penetration [of existence] by power and will, which we call Divine will, and which reason represents as the only possible principle. Barely three months before his death Rosenkrantz wrote the prefaces to the two volumes of his *Theory of Principles* (Munich, 1875), which is connected with the work just characterized as being the Synthetic promised. In the first part, the principles of theology, and in the second, the principles of science are discussed. The *former* are preceded by an introduction on the theory of principles in general, as well as by an examination of the relation between the philosophical theory of God and positive theology. As a consequence of the results at which he here arrives, when he comes to treat of the principles of theology, constant reference is made to the most important theologians of the Middle Ages and of modern times; and among the latter, he often refers to Protestant theologians. (As a specimen of the strictly systematic arrangement of the topics, which mostly takes the form of a dichotomy, we may cite the fact that when it is desired to indicate exactly in what place the Divine predestination is discussed, we must say: Under II, 3, B, b, β , BB, cc, $\beta\beta$, BBB, bbb, $\gamma\gamma\gamma$, 2.) It is shown that the three powers discovered in the Analytic (+ P, - P, and \pm P) enable us to form an intelligible idea both of the distinctions within God which are taught by the dogma of the Trinity, and also of the distinctive relations of God to what is created, *i.e.* of the attributes of God. The development of the principles of science in the *second* volume leads to a similar result. This begins with a discussion of the relation between empirical and philosophical science, according to which the principal notions which are taken for granted by the former must be deduced from the latter by starting from a higher principle. The Analytic had proved the existence of this principle in the creative thought of the Divine Spirit, and had distinguished within it the activities which are frequently referred to: the determinable +activity, the determining - activity, and the \pm activity which unites both. Since the unconditioned Power separates these three activities and moves beyond the unconditioned existence, they become creative powers, while their reunion outside of God produces new being. The philosophy of nature has to represent the co-

operation of the creative powers in seeking to reach their aim, which is the restoration of their unity outside of God, and in this way to construe the process of nature, at least in its principal moments. The first product of the conjunction of these powers is *material substance*, or matter, in which + P gives extension, — P limitation, while \pm P unites both. (It accordingly showed a correct sense of proportion, when Schelling added to the two Kantian forces a third.) The different relation in which they stand to each other (which is in part determined quantitatively), gives us the distinction between different kinds of matter, as this shows itself at first in the permanent, the flowing, and the fleeting. The consideration of matter is followed by that of *force*, by which is to be understood the cause of an alteration in matter. This cause never consists of *one* force, but of the co-operation of *several* forces, and, moreover, of the three fundamental forces, of which the two first were long since recognised as the force of expansion and the force of contraction, while the third, which unites both, was meanwhile neglected. Since the production of the three Ps is limited in space, they become forces by which time and movement are made possible. It is the office of the philosophy of nature to construe the co-operation of the forces in time, both in one and the same body, and also in different bodies. It does the former in the theories of elasticity, heat, and light, the latter where it treats of magnetism, electricity, and chemical processes. To matter and force there remains to be added, as a third subject of the philosophy of nature, *life*, which manifests itself as a whole in the movements and reciprocal action of the celestial bodies, and in separate forms in organic nature, in plants, in animals, and in man. Throughout, the results of the empirical investigation of nature are first described, next the attempts it makes to explain things are criticised, and finally, to this there is added construction. Hints in the direction of a theory of spirit close the few sentences which treat of man. They confirm what must have been surmised after the remarks in the *Analytic* on the theological, cosmological, and psychological Idea, namely, that Rosenkrantz had intended to conclude his system with the philosophy of spirit. But this has not been published. Even among the writings which he left behind him in MS., and of which Dr. Laurenz Müllner has given an account in the warm eulogium he pronounced upon him (*W. Rosenkrantz' Philoso-*

phie, Vienna, 1877, reprinted from the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*), there is no trace of this title. On the other hand, we have a work entitled *Nature and History according to the Fundamental Principles of Absolute Idealism*, and a *Philosophy of Love*, from which Müllner has given some extracts. It is to be regretted that the promise which was given at the time, that the whole would be published, could not be fulfilled.

10. In the work by WEISSE, of which it was said above (§ 332, 4) that it put an end to the agreement between him and the younger Fichte, he himself asserted that he received his first impulse from Hegel, and even that he had been a decided adherent of Hegel's doctrines. It is evident, however, from the work referred to that the study of Schelling's later writings, so far as these had appeared when he wrote the *Problem of the Present*, if it did not entirely bring him to the view, at least confirmed him in it, that Hegel's merit consisted in his having developed the system of the categories, or of what cannot *not* be thought, by means of which we get, without further trouble, an insight into the course followed by the history of philosophy. He at the same time finds fault with him for having changed this negative basis of his system into the entire system, which, owing to this, does not get beyond rationalism. Granted that it is one of the merits of his system, that free personality does not appear within his categories, still the fact that for him there exists nothing higher than the complex of the categories makes it impossible for him to solve what is essentially the problem of the present time, namely, the question as to the personality of God. Schelling, by his universality, has already reached a higher standpoint. On the other hand, that of the younger Fichte is its inferior. Rightly understood, the Hegelian system knows no other God but the absolute Idea, and ought to be called acosmism, since it denies all reality to things. This is one of its decided merits, just as it is a decided merit that it took up seriously what is closely connected with this, namely, eternity, when it is conceived of as something before or out of time. This does not, it is true, establish the existence of the divine personality, but it supplies the metaphysical basis for it, namely, necessary thought, negative and formal logic, *without* which the Free cannot be conceived of. Hegel certainly stopped short of the final consequence of his logic, at the

point to which his misapprehension of the notions of space and time (for which he was previously blamed) brought him. This final consequence would have been, that the negative absolute Idea would have risen to the positive Idea of the Godhead, and in this way the entire logic would have become, as it were, an ontological proof for the existence of God. But this Idea, too, is, to begin with, only that of the possible God, and contains the notion of freedom only as a metaphysical conception. In order to arrive at the really personal, existing God, philosophy must first pass through the successive real parts, which thus, as it were, supply the cosmological and teleological proofs for the existence of God. Only the view that what according to Hegel is the entire Godhead, is the *prius* of the Godhead, permits us to see the justification there is for Schelling's idea of the "ground," permits us to appreciate rightly the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and by separating the eternal spiritual creation from that of this temporal world which is conditioned by evil, absolutely to refute at once pantheism and dualism. Augustine, and still more Jacob Böhme, were, together with Hegel and Schelling, referred to with pleasure in this most interesting work in support of this view. We can see how much mysticism was interesting Weisse at this time, both from his essays on Jacob Böhme, in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, for the years 1845 and 1846, "who," he said, "is not a speculative philosopher, but a religious seer pointing the way to speculative philosophy," and also from his studies on Luther, the fruits of which are to be found in the theological dissertation *Martinus Lutherus*, etc. (Leips., 1845), and in a further elaboration of the same ideas in the work entitled, *Luther's Christology*, etc. (Leips., 1852). In these writings special emphasis is laid on Luther's opposition to Anselm's theory of satisfaction, and on the strong mystical bias of his mind, and just because of this, the revival of Luther's spirit is held to supply the only conditions under which a living union of the confessions can be accomplished. Some years before the publication of the latter work, there appeared anonymously a book entitled *On the Future of the Evangelical Church, Addresses to the Cultured in the German Nation* (2nd ed., Leips., 1849), which created a great and well-merited impression, but one that quickly passed away. In harmony with what he had said at the close of his *Evangelical History*, Weisse declares, in the *Addresses* also, that he is absolutely

opposed to the limitation of salvation and the possession of salvation to those who believe on the historical Christ. For this reason, also, when he asserts that he is entirely at one with the material principle of the Evangelical Church, he emphasizes the fact that, according to Luther, by the faith which alone justifies, is not to be understood an historical faith in any facts whatever, but the certainty of salvation; and on this account he too, following the example of Luther, goes, not to the past, but to the future. It is specially the more modern theology that sprang from the impulse given by Schleiermacher, which sees in the historical Christ, not the central point of the plan of salvation to which the Old Testament also points, but the beginning of the plan of salvation. This more modern theology has narrowed the Reformers' horizon of vision, instead of extending it; and this comes out particularly when we consider its view of infant baptism. Saving faith, in Luther's sense of the word, is the self-consciousness of personality regenerated in the light of faith; and the Church, or the Kingdom of heaven, is constantly coming into existence by means of this faith, *i.e.*, by the unreserved yielding of oneself up to God. But in order that this community of the saved may become a self-conscious one, and the invisible Church a visible one, it is necessary that the experiences of the human race which finally led to unity with God, a unity which was consciously felt by Christ alone, should be preserved for the individual, and should therefore take a fixed documentary form. As those experiences are historical, and are therefore conditioned by the laws of natural development, we cannot speak of a supernatural inspiration in connection with the record which has been given of them. Real miracles, to which prophecies and acts of healing do not belong, are to be absolutely rejected, and no person of culture maintains that they are possible. It is not, therefore, necessary to abandon the formal principle of the Evangelical Church when it is rightly understood; only the Word of God must not be confounded with the letter of Scripture. True scriptural faith, on the contrary, sets us free from the bondage of the letter into which we are brought by a rigid rule of faith. This rule of faith is the beginning of scientific doctrine, while the Scriptures form its presupposition. The Evangelical symbolical books, on the other hand, constitute the termination of genuine development of doctrine. For this reason, a visible Church

requires a formula of confession, but it requires no symbolical books. The Church in the days of its youth was capable of establishing such a formula, because it stood nearer to the immediate revelation; and our time is capable of doing it because it stands nearer to revelation as purified by criticism, than is the case with the period that intervenes. Weisse seeks to find the data for a new rule of faith constructed entirely from the teachings of Christ, in the three conceptions of the Heavenly Father, the Son of man, and the Kingdom of Heaven. All three are examined in detail, particularly the conception of the son of Adam or the seed of the woman, in which we have united together the self-consciousness of Jesus and the Idea of glorified Humanity, which as thus glorified judges the world. After this he lays down the confession of faith of the German Evangelical Church of the future. A comparison of this formula with the Apostles' Creed, which is very severely criticized, results in establishing the superiority of the former, as consisting in the fact that even those who revere only an ideal Christ, and pantheists, can subscribe to it, always supposing that they have become what they are from the needs of their religious nature. Its superiority is specially seen in the power it possesses of giving an impulse to the construction of a new dogmatic, which can be accomplished only by the help of philosophy. The Church, as a free community of the Kingdom of heaven, can tolerate a doctrine of faith, too, in the form of free science. Weisse gives the outlines of the future evangelical doctrine of faith, in which the doctrine of the Trinity, already developed in the *Fundamental Problem*, is stated in a popular way; and this, together with the double doctrine of creation, make up the first part of the Dogmatics. As this part corresponds to the Article referring to the Heavenly Father, the second part corresponds to that which refers to the Son of man. The impressing of the essential image of the Godhead on the earthly creation is here defined as constituting the real conception of the Incarnation. This incarnation can be understood only when, in addition to the basis in God which is a necessity of thought, we recognise the essential nature of God as resting on freedom; and further, when we regard the human race as fallen, since it is only on account of this that the impressing of the divine image referred to takes place in one individual and not all at once in the whole race. In the

third part, which corresponds to the third Article, special attention is bestowed on eschatological doctrines, which take exactly the same form as they did in Weisse's earlier writings. The regeneration of the Church by the Sacrament, the German Church and the German State of the present day, are the headings of the two last (11th and 12th) addresses. The subject of the first of these is the purifying of the sacrament of the altar, so as to reach a form more nearly related to its original one. In this form it would certainly be accessible only to a narrow circle, to the ecclesiastical or priestly order set apart by ordination, and comprising various offices, whose work would be the mission within the Church, ecclesiastical discipline, teaching, and the government of the Church, while all others kept to the present meagre form. The last address discusses the relation of Church and State. An opponent of the separation of Church and State, Weisse hopes that by the spread of such views as are here developed, an approach may be made to that state of things which we should strive to reach, in which the German federal State and the national Church would mutually support each other. He thinks that the best way to bring this about, is to leave the unions and other societies to do as they like. What was given only in outline in the *Addresses*, is presented in a full and complete manner in Weisse's *Philosophical Dogmatics in Connection with the Philosophy of Christianity* (3 vols. Leips., 1855-62). There is more than this, however, in it; for this most important of Weisse's works, whose extensive and intensive wealth of matter has unfortunately frightened away many readers, contains in addition the result of all the philosophical and theological studies which have occupied him, and the conclusion of them. The results of any of the investigations which were made before the public, are here recapitulated; while, on the other hand, Weisse expresses his views most fully on points about which up to this time he had said nothing. Thus, *e.g.*, the fifth section of the first part contains what is practically the whole philosophy of nature. We come upon supplements without number to what had been already said, but no essential divergences. For this reason, any more thorough examination of the contents of the book is not to be looked for here. It is enough to state, that with the *Introduction*, which took up the conception of religion, revelation, the development of systematic doctrine, and finally the philo-

sophical dogmatics of the Evangelical Church, Weisse connects theology, as forming the *First Part*. Under theology, after having given a philosophical preliminary discussion of the proofs for the existence of God, he examines the Biblical conception of God, the conception of the Divine Trinity—with the same leaning towards Augustine's proof of this doctrine that he had shown in the *Problem of the Present* and the *Lectures*—the Divine attributes (metaphysical, æsthetic, ethical), and finally matter, as the basis of the creation of the world. The *Second Part*—and volume—treats of cosmogony and anthropology, and includes, together with the general doctrine of creation, the question of the creation of the material world. Under the first of these, the Elohist records, the original creation, the system of the world, the creation of life, the rational creature, are discussed, and under the second, the original condition of man, the Fall, the archetype of man, the nature of evil, sin and law. The *Third Part* contains the soteriology. In the first section Weisse discusses the historical genesis of the New Testament idea of salvation; in the second, the ideal Son of man, and the historical Christ (incarnation, paganism, monotheism, the Christ of history); in the third, the community of the saved, or the Christian Church, and the means of grace; and in the fourth, the Last Things.

Cf. R. Seydel: *Verzeichniss sämtlicher gedruckter Schriften Ch. Hermann Weisse's* (in Fichte's *Zeitschr.* Bd. 55).

11. If in Weisse's case, the time during which he was in agreement with Hegel was so short, and the agreement itself so far from being an unqualified one that only very few ever called him an Hegelian, it is quite otherwise in both respects with regard to ROSENKRANZ. His previously mentioned works, his *Studies* (six parts in all, Berlin; afterwards Leipsic), which have been appearing since 1839; his supplement to Hegel's works, which is written with such reverence: *G. Fr. Hegel's Life* (Berlin, 1844); and his *Apology for Hegel* (Berlin, 1858), in reply to Haym, allowed, and still allow, of his being considered an Hegelian of the strictest type; and in any case his relation to the Hegelian School is such that he does not look on this as a term of reproach. Still, particularly since he has had occasion to look further into the inner movement of political life, and to come into

contact with the French, he has been brought to take up a position which seemed to forbid mention being made of his latest larger works in § 334, 8 and 10. Already in the *Modifications of Logic* (*Studies*, Part III.), which appeared in 1846, Rosenkranz pointed out that some alteration would have to be made in the Hegelian Logic. These alterations he himself at length made in his *System of Science*, which he calls a philosophical Encheiridion (Königsb., 1850). It is a complete encyclopædia of the philosophical sciences, and occupies what is essentially the Hegelian standpoint, so that, according to it, philosophy, as the speculative science of the Idea, is divided into the philosophy of reason, of nature, and of spirit, *i.e.* into dialectics, physics, and ethics. The contents of the three sciences are indicated, provisionally, as follows. The Idea as reason, lays down Being as thought in the universality of the ideal Notion; the Idea as nature, lays down thought as Being in the particularity of material reality; the Idea as spirit, lays down Being as what thinks, and thought as actual existence in the individuality of subjectivity which knows itself to be free. With regard to the *First Part*, the dialectic, which treats of reason, we find that Rosenkranz has published this in a more detailed form in a special treatise: *The Science of the Logical Idea* (2 vols., Königsberg, 1858 and 59), the ideas of which agree entirely with those already given expression to in the *Encheiridion*. Since Rosenkranz, like Hegel, conceives of the Idea as the unity of the Notion and of its reality, he requires that its moments be treated of before it is taken up, and thus the doctrine of the whole Idea is preceded by those of Being and the Notion. The dialectic is accordingly divided into metaphysic, logic, and ideology. In the first of these the categories are treated of, which Hegel had taken up in his doctrines of Being and Essence; but besides these the doctrine of the End is discussed, since, according to Rosenkranz, the conception of end springs from reciprocity; hence, he thinks, Aristotle showed perfectly sound judgment in treating of final causes along with efficient causes. If the Metaphysic of Rosenkranz thus contains more than the first two parts of Hegel's *Logic*, he, on the other hand, wishes to exclude from the doctrine of the Notion and from the entire Dialectic a great deal which Hegel includes. Thus he would exclude the discussion of mechanism and chemism, which have to do with relations in Nature, and which could

be applied within the sphere of spirit only by a metaphorical use of language. Logic should therefore only contain the doctrine of the Notion, of judgment, and of the syllogism. In the same way in the last part, the doctrine of Ideas, which corresponds to Hegel's concluding chapter in the third part, instead of discussing the Notions of life, knowledge, and will, which belong to the philosophy of nature and to psychology, he discusses principle, method, and system, and from this, as a starting-point, he would make the transition from the logical Idea to nature. The supercilious tone with which some members of the Philosophical Society in Berlin described the alterations in the *Logic* which had been adopted by Rosenkranz after the most serious consideration, as "relapses,"—together with a reasonable feeling of impatience at the absence of any sign of appreciation of his efforts within the Hegelian School,—led him to write the *Epilegomena to my Science of the Logical Idea* (Königsberg, 1862), in which he states quite precisely his divergences from Hegel's *Logic*. If we turn back to the *Encheiridion*, and particularly to the *Second Part*, the philosophy of nature, the improvements in point of terminology at once impress us agreeably. "Physics" is taken as the heading for the entire philosophy of nature, and instead of physics, "Dynamics" is used to describe the *Second Part*. Still more important is the way in which the substance of the book has been enriched. Rosenkranz himself justly places the highest value on this part of his work, for it is the only attempt to construct a philosophy of nature on Hegelian principles which we possess. In the "elucidations" at the end of the work he refers to those men to whom he is most indebted for any advance he has made. (It is in these elucidations that the literature which has been excluded from the text is for the most part to be found.) He does not wish to create a new philosophy of nature, but to remain true to the principles and method of Hegel, and to work out in accordance with these the empirical data of which Hegel had not taken any notice. As regards the *Third Part*, the philosophy of spirit, the views he propounds in psychology are entirely in agreement with those which he had previously published on this subject, and therefore, too, with those of Hegel. He differs from him all the more, however, in the practical philosophy. He here includes in the first part, which treats of the Good in general, only the matter which

Hegel put into the introductory discussions. The second, which treats of abstract morality (*Moralität*), remains the same as it is in Hegel, in its examination of duty, virtue, and conscience. In the third part, on the other hand, which, as in Hegel, is headed "Concrete Morality" (*Sittlichkeit*), his divergence from Hegel is very great. Rosenkranz divides this part into three sections, of which the first, headed "Individual Law," treats of abstract law; the second, headed "Particular Law," of the family, the civic community, and the State; the third, headed "Universal Law," and "History of the World," of the national state (of passive peoples, active peoples, and free individuality), of the theocratic state (of the Jews and Islam), and of the state of humanity. "Absolute Spirit," or theology, forms the conclusion of the philosophy of spirit. Under this heading, he discusses the Beautiful and art, the Sacred and religion, the True and science, and shows how the history of philosophy constitutes the conclusion of the system. How strong, in spite of many important divergences from the views of the master, Rosenkranz's reverential feeling of indebtedness to Hegel remained, is proved by two works, the second of which was composed a year and a half after the first, and completed under great difficulties occasioned by a serious eye complaint. The first, entitled, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, etc. (Berlin, 1868), is at the same time an account of the version of Hegel's philosophy of nature by the Italian philosopher A. Véra, who translated it from the *Encyclopædia*, and published it in three parts accompanied by a commentary (Paris, 1863-66.) The two last sections of this work call for special attention here. They contain some reflections in opposition to Hegel and Véra, and give expression to Rosenkranz's views on the systematic organization of the Sciences of nature. While constantly referring to the assertions of modern empiricists, he directs attention to the great importance which the place in which anything in the system is treated of has in reference to the Notion belonging to it; and he calls for certain alterations in the arrangement of the Sciences which are based on reasons which are for the most part taken from Hegel's own declarations on the Subject. These are in the main the alterations which Rosenkranz had proposed in his *System of Science*, only that here the terminology is often somewhat altered. According to his ideas, the science of nature ought

to represent nature to us as the Absolute in the externality of its existence, and to show how it is *first* of all unmediated matter, and how, owing to the fact that the various masses exist in a condition of separation, it possesses unity outside of itself in the form of gravity. This part he describes as formal, real, and absolute mechanics. In the *second* place, nature, as seen in dynamic opposition to its externality, is force, which renders possible the reciprocal action of bodies. (This is physics; and in the *System of Science*, dynamics. While in the other work the first section which treats of the specification of matter, of its cohesion and disintegration in sound, heat, and light, was entitled mechanical individualization, Rosenkranz here proposes to adopt the name synechology. The second section would treat of magnetic, electric, and chemical polarity, and the third section of the meteorological process.) *Thirdly*, nature is life, and as such is the subject of Organics. As was done in the *System of Science*, so here, too, the moments contained in the conception of life, namely, self-formation, self-conservation, and the feeling of self, are made the basis of the division, and in accordance with this a distinction is drawn between the geological, vegetable, and animal organisms. The arrangement departs from that of the *System* only in so far as life in *general*, as taken up in biology under the divisions of anatomy, physiology, and morphology, is treated of before the three *special* forms in which life appears. Further, in accordance with this arrangement, the *sum-total* of life is discussed in the third part of the Organics, in somatic anthropology, which Rosenkranz had previously placed outside of the circle of the sciences. One cannot but feel grateful to Rosenkranz, that he did not agree to the proposal of the publishers to remodel his *Life of Hegel* in view of the latter's jubilee, but wrote, instead, his delightful book: *Hegel as Germany's National Philosopher* (Leips., 1870). The same warmth with which in his *Apology* he rebutted the disparaging remarks made on Hegel's character as calumnies, is maintained in this book when he returns to Haym's "caricature." It does not prevent him, however, from searching with critical thoroughness into the past for the first germs of Hegel's theories, nor from reminding us of such writings, or even of such utterances of Hegel's, as seemed already to have been forgotten. There is, perhaps, no Hegelian who is so familiar with everything which Hegel

has written as the author of this jubilee work. Any one who, like the author of these *Outlines*, regards the opinion which any writer pronounces upon Hegel's *Phenomenology* as the criterion by which to judge whether he is capable or not of rightly appreciating Hegel, will, if he reads p. 85 ff. in Rosenkranz's book, best assure himself of the correctness of this criterion. Since here, too, the genesis of the Hegelian system is presented to us and described in its embryonic form, and since we are further shown what form it takes in the "difference" of the "*Phenomenology*," there could hardly fail to be repetitions of what had been said in the biography. Partly, however, owing to the more concise form, and partly to the consideration of disputed questions which did not emerge till after the year 1844, what had been previously written is constantly taking a new shape. In this work, Hegel's connection with Kant is emphasized to a much greater extent than in the *Life of Hegel*, and he is repeatedly described as one who really continued Kant. Rosenkranz does not here altogether succeed in avoiding the rock which also Stirling, whom he justly praises, did not escape in his otherwise so admirable work, *The Secret of Hegel*, in that Fichte and Schelling are put far too much into the background. This is seen, for instance, in the discussion on the dialectic method, which Hegel himself often traced back to Fichte. The examination of what Hegel understands by absolute spirit supplies him with an occasion for expressing his views on pantheism and theism. In referring to the position which Hegel occupies, not only in German literature but in the literature of the world, he again gives expression in his jubilee work, as he had previously done in the preface to his "*Véra*," to a noble feeling of anger roused by the fact that while with us every translation, even of entirely unimportant English works, is loudly trumpeted abroad, the circumstance of Hegel's being translated into French or English is taken absolutely no notice of, and is even industriously concealed. In this book, too, Rosenkranz does not attempt to conceal the points in which the master seems to him not to have fulfilled his own requirements. Although, since the last words were written, the most severe blows of domestic affliction, and amongst these, total blindness, have fallen upon Rosenkranz, he has not given up his communications to the reading public which have come to be so much appreciated by both sides.

His charming and instructive autobiography, *From Magdeburg to Königsberg* (Berlin, 1873), was followed by three volumes of *New Studies* (Leips., 1875-77) on the history of literature and culture. The latter had been previously published; but the short articles containing reflections on various subjects, with which he accompanies them, show not only what position he takes up in reference to what is said in them, but constantly afford us new proofs of the spiritual freshness of the man.

12. While Rosenkranz might complain that he has not here been placed amongst the Hegelians,—and if he had, he would have got the first place,—an expression of ERNST KUNO BERTHOLD FISCHER'S (born July 23, 1824; for many years professor of philosophy in Jena, and since 1872 in Heidelberg) seems to protest beforehand against his being placed too close to them. "It will be found," he says in the year 1865, in the preface to his *Logic*, "that I have gone my own way; and if this conducts me to a goal where I do not stand alone, but where I occupy in the main an already historically given standpoint, I regard this agreement, so far as it goes, as in no way expressing dependence, least of all that implied in belonging to a school." In spite of this, he must be content to have his present standpoint regarded as a modification of the Hegelian position. He was introduced to the Hegelian philosophy at a time when it had already broken up into two mutually opposing sides. Already in his doctor's dissertation (*De Parmenide Platonico*, 1845) he showed that he had the ability of identifying himself completely with a theory by the discovery of its salient points. His next work was on æsthetics: *Diotima, The Idea of the Beautiful* (Pforzheim, 1849), in which there are so many points of contact with the views expressed by Ruge and Vischer that it has been described as a further exposition of these. Fischer next exchanged the vocation of a tutor for an academic chair. The unusually successful activity begun in Heidelberg came to an end after the first half of the first volume of the work cited in § 259 had appeared, owing to the withdrawal of his lectureship in consequence of an intrigue. During this time, the first edition of his *Logic and Metaphysics*, etc. (Heidelb., 1852) had appeared. While filling the professor's chair in Jena, he produced, besides his larger historical works, some historical and æsthetic essays. (Of these, the monographs on Schiller, on Lessing's *Nathan*, on

Shakespeare's *Richard the Third*, on the lives of Spinoza and Kant, on Joh. Gottl. Fichte, on the two Kantian Schools in Jena, and on wit, may be cited.) Besides these, however, he issued his *System of Logic and Metaphysics, or the Theory of Knowledge*, in a completely altered form (Heidelb., 1865), the substance of which we intend to refer to here. The fact that there are empirical sciences and mathematics requires, like every other fact, an explanation; and this is supplied by philosophy, which is accordingly a theory of the science of knowledge. It thus takes up its standpoint within experience, and not beyond it. The part of philosophy which treats of the forms of cognition is logic, which, just on this account, is the doctrine of Notion. Since all the notions which are given presuppose certain original syntheses, original pure notions or necessities of thought, these, *i.e.* the categories, are the first rules of thought to be considered, without which even perceptions themselves are not possible. From the latter, again, we form new notions by means of abstraction. With this, the question as to the problem of logic, to which the first section of the *Propædæutic* is devoted, would be settled. Two other questions, also answered by the *Propædæutic*, connect themselves with the first, namely: In how far is this problem already solved? and, How is it to be solved? The former question is answered by the history of logic, the latter by the doctrine of method. As the Sophists, in ancient times, by denying the possibility of knowledge, made it into a problem the solution of which was begun by Socrates and completed by Aristotle, just so, in modern times, Hume, driven to it by the opposition between empiricism and rationalism, stated in his scepticism once more the problem: What is rational knowledge? It is in the solution of this problem that Kant's merit consists. Logic made no advance between the time of Aristotle and that of Kant. Fischer gives a very full account of the logic of Aristotle, and seeks to show that his followers were the first to turn his logic into purely formal logic, because, in treating of the forms of thought, they disregarded their value in relation to knowledge. In Aristotle himself everything stands in the closest relation to the principal question, or, if you like, the only question, namely: the correct determination of notions, *i.e.* definition and proof. Since these are syllogisms, syllogisms must be considered; and since among these the first figure is the only scientific one,

the reductions and therefore the conversion of judgments, the quantitatively and qualitatively different judgments, their component parts, etc., have all to be considered. In short, nothing in the *Organon* is useless, if we reflect on the distinction between apodeictic and dialectic. If we pass over what Fischer, following for the most part the suggestions of Prantl, has to say of the later modifications of logic, and consider how he expresses himself regarding Kant and the moderns, we find that he points out how the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is,—not negatively, as in the case of Hume, but positively,—removed in the doctrine of the categories, since here, on the one hand, notions make experience possible, and on the other hand, make nothing possible but simply experience. The further course of thought on this point, is as follows: These conditions of experience are either taken as facts, as by Fries, or as actions, as by Fichte, who discovers, besides, that contradiction compels us to go further—a thought with which, though only by way of opposition, Herbart and Hegel have connected their speculations. Fichte's one-sidedness, particularly in reference to the conception of nature, calls out the System of Identity, which, by identifying thought and being, becomes of decisive importance for logic. In opposition to Schelling's System of Identity with its "geniuses," which, moreover, by its very existence, refutes the view that all knowledge is intuitive perception by genius, Hegel sets up his "rational" system, in which, what with Schelling formed the starting-point, viz., reason as the unity of the subjective and objective, constitutes the conclusion. In contrast to these theories of identity views could have established themselves and have really established themselves, in which identity is either denied, as is done by Herbart, or differently conceived, as is done by Schopenhauer, and, in a peculiar way, which approaches in some points to Herbart's system, by Trendelenburg (*vid. infra*, § 347, 7, 8). Both are very fully treated of, especially the latter, "because he, almost more than any other in recent times, has the merit of having once more made the most important question of philosophy the order of the day, and of having attempted its solution in a way which was intended to avoid the deficiencies in the solution given by his predecessors." Of both it is further said, that if their theory had been correct, their systems could not have been set up,

a style of criticism of which Fischer seems to be fond, since he has employed it not only in reference to Schelling's System of Identity, but also in his large work when speaking of Spinoza and Leibnitz. With regard, finally, to Trendelenburg, Fischer partly attacks his positions and partly defends those who had been attacked by him. He shows that the movement which, according to Trendelenburg, is to mediate between thought and being, does not succeed in doing this, because there are two sorts of movements of which now one and now the other is spoken of; that, further, it is not the original category; and finally, that it does not suffice for the deduction of the categories. He attacks in a very energetic way Trendelenburg's (certainly very astonishing) assertion, that Kant never attempted to prove that time and space are *simply* subjective forms of perception. Trendelenburg replied to this in his *Kuno Fischer and his Kant* (Leipsic, 1869), and Fischer retorted in his *Anti-Trendelenburg* (Jena, 1870). Then, finally, he seeks to defend Hegel against Trendelenburg's criticism, that, inasmuch as the former only comes to his categories by starting from perception, or bases his reasoning upon it, they ought not to be called forms of *pure* thought. Trendelenburg here overlooks the difference between pure thought, which first makes the perceptions possible and produces them, and discursive thought, which is subsequent to perception and by which we become conscious of the categories; and hence his objection rests on a confusion between the principles of reality and those of knowledge. With this criticism he at once passes on to the last section of the Propædæutic, which deals with the method of logic. Since its task consists in reproducing the original, *i.e.*, natural and necessary, products of thought, the course it follows takes the form of a continuous series of problems of thought which present themselves of their own accord and are solved. The method in which these are presented does not take the form simply of a genetic development, but of a development which is something more than genetic, namely, philosophical, which includes the genetic, while dialectic construction excludes it. Fichte was the originator of this true method. In the development, cause and end, necessity and freedom, reality and Idea coincide. The philosophical development of the categories must be divided into three parts, which treat of Being, of ground or Essence, of end or Notion, because

to development there belongs first what is developed, secondly the ground from which it is developed, and finally the end which the development has in view. The second book, the *System of the Categories*, i.e., logic proper, is divided into these three sections. In the first section,—the doctrine of being (quality, quantity, measure),—the fact that Fischer presents contradiction as existing, not so much in the notion as thought of, as rather in the thinking of a notion, has to be specially pointed out as constituting the principal divergence in his account from that given both by Hegel and by Hegel's disciples. By means of this contradiction, what has to be thought, because it cannot be thought (in this way), becomes a problem, the solution of which supplies a new notion and a new problem. The energy with which he carries on a polemic against other ways of representing the movement of thought, shows that he places great importance on these alterations. After the question of the first part: What is being? has forced him by constantly raising new problems to come to the question: How are we to think of the unity of all existence, a unity which must be thought but which cannot be thought of as measure? there results the answer, that it is to be thought of as the basis of existence. This, again, raises the second and deeper cardinal question: What is the essence or the ground? The notion of the ground constitutes the subject of the second section. The three chapters into which it is divided are headed: "Essence as Relation," "The Phenomenal," "Reality." As statements quite peculiar to him, which do not occur in other manuals by members of the Hegelian School, we might cite particularly those in this section in which, attaching his theories to the doctrine of the relations of measure, he defines essence as the connection of things; and further, those statements which have reference to the relations of possibility, actuality, and positive and negative necessity. By means of the notion of self-realization, to which in the end all necessary relations point, the transition is made to the third section, to Notion and End. Here at length, and particularly in the first chapter which treats of the subject, Fischer takes up a most decidedly polemical attitude towards Hegel and his School. The careful study of Aristotle's *Organon* brought him to adopt the view that the Hegelian Logic is defective in the doctrine of judgments and syllogisms. He considers it defective just because Hegel sought

to bring it into harmony with formal logic, *i.e.*, with the logic which leaves out of account the value which the forms of thought possess for knowledge. Hence the departures from the rhythm of method, etc. (the blame of which is without further ado laid even upon those Hegelians who sought to avoid them). The right thing to do is always to keep in view the fact that judgment as determination of the notion has for its final aim simply correct definition, and therefore stands the higher the more it contributes to this. In accordance with this,—because the determination of the notion demands, first the specification of the genus, and then the more exact specification of the part of the predicate in which the subject is included,—a distinction is drawn between the judgment of simple subsumption, of specification or division, and the disjunctive judgment, or the judgment of complete subsumption. The transition is then made by means of the hypothetical judgment, *i.e.*, the judgment which is established only conditionally, to the judgment which has been established by proof, or the syllogism. Since this is only a mediated judgment, of course the sequence of judgments and syllogisms corresponds. But after the syllogism of subsumption has been treated of, he takes up its development in a separate section, so that really the numbers 3, 4, 5 in connection with the syllogism, correspond to the numbers 2, 3, 4 in connection with the judgment. (The polemic against other ways of representing the movement of thought which pervades the whole of this part, is based particularly on the view that the positive categorical judgment expresses simple subsumption, while the negative judgment, exactly like the divisive judgment, stands higher as judgment of specification, and is not to be regarded as the correlate of the former, as those do who figure with notions instead of considering their worth for knowledge. So, too, the disjunctive judgment stands on a different plane, and ought not to be put on a level either with divisive or categorical judgments, as Trendelenburg and Herbart do. Some Hegelians are much more harshly rebuked even than these two.) In the most complete syllogism definition attains its perfect form, and by means of its practical character points to realization, and thus enables the transition to be made to the following chapter, which treats of the object. The Hegelian school will scarcely lodge a protest against this, or against the last chapter, which treats

of the Idea or self-constituted end. The fact that Fischer speaks of self-constituted end as development, where it is the custom of Hegelians to speak of the absolute Idea, does not make any very important difference, since the absolute Idea is also for them simply the "end which realizes itself." It is to be hoped, however, that no one will be found in the Hegelian school who is not willing to subscribe to the statement with which Fischer concludes his preface: "There are two things in philosophy which we cannot neglect with impunity, the Aristotelian logic and the critical philosophy, I mean the philosophy of Kant." By the continuation of his *Schelling*, which it is reported he will soon give us, Fischer will prove anew to his readers as he has already done by his academic commemoration address *On Freedom*, and his *Lectures on Goethe's Faust*, that he can study and speculate on the Neckar as well as he did on the Saale.

13. Almost simultaneously with K. Fischer, GEORG WEISSENBORN (born in 1816; died June 4th, 1874, when professor at Marburg) came before the public. But while Fischer's personal respect for Feuerbach, and his friendship with Strauss were not without influence on his development, Weissenborn received the first impressions which had a determining influence on his mind from the Right Wing of the Hegelian school, and also, quite as much, from those admirers of Schleiermacher who were inclined to orthodoxy. After having published his lectures on Schleiermacher, which had been delivered in Halle, and which were referred to in § 315, his *Logic and Metaphysics* (Halle, 1850) appeared. In this work he expresses the opinion that of the two parties which he can distinguish in the Hegelian school, the conservative and destructive, the former has certainly the more comprehensive and more profound amount of truth, but that the latter, on the other hand, certainly has the authority of Hegel on its side. The views held by the latter could really be successfully refuted, if the Hegelian philosophy, and particularly the Hegelian logic, were by means of an immanent criticism pushed beyond itself. He accordingly makes an attempt in this direction. The difference between him and Hegel in the first part of the *Logic* is by no means so great as it is in the second, and particularly in the third part. Weissenborn here not only, like Rosenkranz, drops out of the *Logic* mechanism and chemism, but also the relation of ends, *i.e.*, everything that Hegel had

treated of under the head of objectivity, because it belongs to the philosophy of nature. He, moreover, separates the doctrine of the notion from that of judgment and syllogism, while the two last are taken up in the doctrine of the Idea of cognition. In connection with the Idea of action, character is discussed, and finally, absolute personality. As Weissenborn had already declared in this work that his efforts were specially directed towards the refutation of pantheism by setting up a theism on a scientific basis, his later work showed that he had remained faithful to this plan. It is entitled *Lectures on Pantheism and Theism* (Marburg, 1859). In the first part the main forms of pantheism are distinguished as the mechanical or materialistic pantheism of the French, the ontological pantheism of Spinoza, the pantheism of Schleiermacher, the dynamic and psychical pantheism of Stoicism, the ethical pantheism of Fichte, and the logical pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. He allows that the last-mentioned contains the truth of all the other forms, but he at the same time also asserts that it does not satisfy the religious needs of man's nature in all cardinal questions. He then passes on to theism, with whose different forms the second part is occupied. Jewish theism, deism, supernatural theism, the theism of Jacobi, and finally the theism of the identity of the nature of God and the world, are represented as the preliminary stages of Christian theism, each of which surpasses the other. This Christian theism is theism in its perfectly true form. By way of conclusion, he takes up the conflict between Christian theism and modern science, and points out that there is no such conflict, since Christian theism is not afraid of Science, particularly of the science of nature, any more than it is of Art.

14. MORITZ CARRIÈRE (born in 1817 ; professor first in Giesen and then in Munich) was a contemporary of Weissenborn's, and in many points has followed a path similar to that taken by him and by Kuno Fischer. His inaugural dissertation, *De Aristotele Platonis Amico* (Götting., 1837), betrayed the fact that he was an ardent admirer of Hegel. This was followed by some smaller works, among which may be mentioned that entitled *Of Spirit*, which is addressed to Franz Baader ; and also the *Studies for a History of the German Spirit* (1841). They give evidence of the workings of a youthful mind, which intercourse with Bettina hardly cooled. A wholly different impression is made by the work on the Reformation

period referred to in § 226, which was the result of a sympathetic and profound acquaintance particularly with the mystical notions of that time. The fact that some thought they could discover pantheistic touches in this work is easily explained by its subject. Besides, Carrière declared even at that time, that what he wished to do was to reach a position above pantheism and dualistic deism; and he subsequently indicated that his position was allied to that of Weisse, or to that of the younger Fichte; and besides these, he further referred to Ulrici and Wirth, whose views will be mentioned further on, as kindred spirits. We see proof of this in the anonymous work, *Religious Addresses and Meditations for the German People by a German Philosopher* (Leipsic, 1850). The religion, or rather the want of religion, of the present day, forms the starting-point of these Addresses, which are often interspersed with poetry. The extremes which are directly specified as requiring to be reconciled, are rationalism and supernaturalism, pantheism and atheism, although the representatives of the two last named, Hegel and Feuerbach, are treated with respect. The being of the triune God, God in nature, man, freedom, sin, regeneration, the Fall, and the dispersion of the various peoples, Christ in ancient times, or, the prophetic period of the nations, the life of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, Christ in the history of the world,—what is said under this head consists partly of the thoughts of an imprisoned republican which had been communicated to him,—Christianity and the Germans, dogmatics, scholasticism, mysticism, the Reformation, Christian art, the rational consciousness and philosophy, the Christian state, the perfection of life,—are the subjects which are discussed in these often somewhat too declamatory *Addresses*, given in the spirit of a poetical modernized Christianity. Already here he shows that he has a special preference for the discussion of Art. *The Nature and Forms of Poetry* (Leipsic, 1854) is entirely devoted to this subject. In this work Carrière endeavours to show that the comprehension of Art is possible only when we have a theory of the universe, which rises above pantheism and deism by means of the Idea of the living God, who has nature and history within Himself, and who reveals Himself in both. To the development of the Beautiful and of Art in general in accordance with their notions, of poetical works of art in particular, and of the epic, lyric, and dramatic methods of representation,

he adds by way of literary and historical elucidations a comparison of the national epics of various peoples, reflections on Goethe, the greatest lyrical poet, and an estimate of Schiller, our first dramatist. Carrière did not, however, confine his æsthetic studies to the domain of poetry. His *Æsthetic* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1859. Second revised edition, *id.*, 1873) gives an account of the Idea of the Beautiful, and of its realization in nature, spirit, and art; and the book is so arranged that in the *First Part* he discusses the Idea of the Beautiful, the Beautiful in nature and spirit, or the matter of Art; fancy and the artist, or the Beautiful in the subjectivity of the constructing spirit; finally, Art and works of art. In the *Second Part* he treats of the division of the arts into constructive art, music, and poetry; and each of these is further divided into three forms. As some of the men had done whom Carrière mentions in this work as his comrades in spirit and aim, he too declares that the intended bearing of his speculations was what was described at the beginning of this section as the destined work of the post-Hegelian philosophers. "We philosophers," he says, "do not wish to set up any school, but to lead men to engage in free investigation. The time of the school philosophy is past, but philosophy has not itself passed away; on the contrary, it is beginning to become a science of life." In opposition to Vischer, against whom, particularly in the first part of the book, Carrière conducts a pretty constant polemic, he emphasizes the fact, that from the pantheistic standpoint we are unable to understand not only the Beautiful in nature, but the Beautiful in general. Speaking generally, the real work of philosophy is to unite transcendence and immanence. To do this in the department of æsthetics, and,—just as the scientists delineate the picture of the Cosmos by means of the united efforts of many investigators,—to advance truth together with those who seek to do the same in the domain of ethics, psychology, etc., is the task which Carrière sets himself. Just because of this, many for whom a new theory of the universe and a new system mean the same thing, have come to regard him as an able and well-informed eclectic. He had already in his *Æsthetics* drawn attention to the fact that the history of Art stands in as much need of being treated philosophically as any other department of thought. This he himself attempts in *Art in connection with the Development of Culture and the Ideals of Humanity* (five volumes, the first

of which came out in a second edition, 1874, before the completion of the last. Leipsic, 1863, 66, 68). In the preface to this work he places himself on the side of those who do not see any logical necessity in history, and accordingly reject any purely rational construction; but at the same time he asserts that he objects to the purely empirical way of treating history, and calls for some attempt to understand it. In accordance with this, he begins with what is pre-historic, with the origin of language, of myths, and of writing. He then passes on to consider the various peoples in a state of nature, between whom and the civilized peoples stand the Chinese with their patriarchal principle. The civilized peoples at once present us with the great contrast of Semites and Aryans, of whom the former are in a special sense the representatives of the religious idea, while the latter, on the other hand, established the idea of the Cosmos in nature and history, and are accordingly the representatives of the State, of Art, and of Science. Both tendencies,—the subjective tendency of Semitic thought and the objective tendency of Aryan thought,—appear undivided in the first civilized people, the Egyptians. In connection with the Semites, ancient Babylon, Nineveh, and Assyria, New Babylon, Phœnicia, and Israel, are fully described, as regards their language, religion, and æsthetic development. Carrière then passes on to the Aryans; and in connection with these he takes up India and Iran, treating of the former very fully, and of the latter briefly. The second volume comprehends Greece and Rome, and “carries on this philosophy of history from the standpoint of æsthetics” through the various periods of Hellenic and Roman life. In treating of Greece, he begins with pre-Homeric times, and comes down to Alexandrian literature, making a thorough survey at once of history, religion, and the arts. In treating of Rome, he begins with the ancient Italians and Etruscans, and comes down to the fourth century after Christ; so that the volume concludes with the struggle between Neo-platonism and Christianity, specifically, with Proclus. The third volume treats of the Middle Ages, beginning with Christian antiquity; and the intention here is to bring out the æsthetic truth of the Biblical narrative. A survey of the struggle and victory of Christianity is then given, and it is further shown what forms poetry, Church-music, architecture, and painting have taken in accordance with Christian ideas. He concludes this section with a review

of the Byzantine period, while Islamism is taken up in the following section. Mohammed's life, and the Koran, the literature and architecture of the Arabians, the modification of both in Spain, and, as an episode, the poetry of the Jews, and finally, the new Persian poetry,—make up the contents of this part, which closes with Firdusi's epic, and with lyrical and gnomic poetry. The European Middle Ages are taken up after these two sections; and in the fourth volume Carrière discusses the Renaissance and the Reformation; while the fifth is occupied with "the age of the dawn of spirit," namely, with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the introduction to this last volume, the course of investigation pursued in the entire work is summed up as follows: "We have seen how humanity, in the beginnings of civilization, was under the dominion of nature, how it gave form to the divine element it perceived in the appearances of nature, and how it realized the natural ideal in Greece and Rome. Jesus and Mohammed next announced the doctrine of a spiritual God. New nations with a predominating power of feeling adopted this religion; and from the traditions handed down from the ancient world there sprung a new art, in which the ideal of feeling took form, and painting and music came to predominate, just as the architectonic arts had held sway in the East and the plastic arts in Greece. We have regarded the Middle Ages in this light, as well as the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Cartesius introduces us into an age of spirit. If this age were to dawn, and if its ideal were to be represented, science would now become the basis and condition for modern art, exactly in the same way as in former times the popular mythology, and afterwards revealed religion, first gave expression to the ideas which were afterwards illustrated by poets and sculptors. . . . A bold idealism will construct the world out of itself, or allow it to reflect what is within. . . . A period of predominating realism will complete the foregoing period. Ideal-realism is the goal which is thus set before us." Carrière's latest work, *The Moral Order of the World* (Leipsic, 1877), "supplies the scientific development of the ideas which underlie his works on Art, Religion, and History; it is the slowly ripened fruit of studies in these departments, a theory of life which has been won and verified in joy and sorrow." After a patriotic address, which was delivered in a popular assembly, on the 3rd of September, 1870, and which is put in by way of introduction, he goes on

to treat of the following subjects in twelve sections : (1) "The Mechanical Order of Nature and the Materialists;" (2) "Idealism." Experience, as well as the assumptions which are necessary to thought, prove the one-sidedness of both materialism, and idealism, and thus establish the correctness of real-idealism, the outlines of which are developed in the third section, while specimens of it are given, taken from Carrière's own works, but especially from the works of Fichte and Ulrici. There follows : (4) "On the Idea of Perfection, and of what Ought to be." In this section, as well as in the following one, "On Freedom and Law," amongst those with whom Carrière comes to find he can agree, Ulrici in particular is frequently quoted. The latter's ethical categories, as well as the distinction he draws between these and ethical ideas, are gratefully adopted by Carrière; and even where he combats Ulrici's positions, he entirely agrees with him as regards the final conclusions to which Ulrici comes. § 6, "The Good and the Evil," as also § 7, on "Statute Law and the State," unite with their ethics a history of ethics, and show, still more than the previous sections Carrière's tendency to represent himself as in agreement with the most entirely different views, though of course this agreement is qualified by slight alterations. This tendency has led many to call him an eclectic. In § 8, "The Upward Course of Life in Nature and History," he goes on to discuss Darwinism. Carrière modifies it in a twofold way, partly by an approach to Kölliker's idea of heterogeneous production, but especially by resolutely holding to the teleological point of view. He compares the origin of a human cell in the highest form of existence beneath the human,—which undoubtedly presents us with something which is of the nature of a leap,—with the appearance of the most famous heroes and men of genius, a phenomenon which is equally of the nature of a leap or bound. By thus arranging these subjects, Carrière is able to pass at once to the philosophy of history, the substance of which he briefly indicates by referring the reader directly to the work on Art which has just been characterized, in which the periods of nature, of feeling, and of spirit stand out as constituting the essential stages. In § 9, "The World-sorrow and its Conquest," he attempts to reconcile pessimism and optimism, and recognises the consolation which can be got from the hope of another life. Although its existence cannot be proved, either from experience or

necessity, it ought not on that account to be called a blessed delusion. § 10 treats of "Art," which represents what ought to exist in existence, and which therefore has the moral order of the world as the peculiar subject with which it deals. § 11 treats in the same way of "Religion." A survey of the various religions, amongst which a specially high place is given to Islamism, proves that the feeling of being dependent on the moral order of the world and of being lifted up into it, constitutes the real essence of religion, the putting of which in a dogmatic form, might well be regarded as a matter of indifference, if not even as dangerous. The last section is entitled, "God." In it he develops the theory of the World-Ego, to which we stand related just as our ideas are related to our Ego, and the theory of the primal force which eternally realizes itself in the original forms in which the Absolute manifests itself, and which are partly simply centres of force and partly souls. These are neither to be thought of in a pantheistic way as losing themselves in the many, nor in a deistic way as existing outside of them.

15. It is interesting to see how the Hegelian philosophy was modified when, particularly owing to the academic lectures of Werder and Michelet, thinking Poles come to be acquainted with it, who at the time were beginning to be influenced more or less by Panslavic ideas. Among these, AUGUST GRAF VON CIESZKOWSKI takes the first place. In accordance with the design of this Appendix, of course only such of his works as are written in German will be mentioned. We may therefore first refer to his *Prolegomena to Historiosophy* (Berlin, 1838), in which he finds fault with the Hegelian philosophy of history, on the one hand for departing from the method of division according to trichotomy, and on the other, for excluding from its consideration the future, which cannot certainly be known so far as its details are concerned, but can at least be known in its essential nature, as the solution of what was unsolved in the past. According to Cieszkowski, history is divided into the thetic period of antiquity, the antithetic period of the Christian-Germanic world, and finally, the synthetic period which is now beginning. These three are related to each other as mechanism, chemism, and organism, as law, morality, and the ethical state, as feeling, knowledge, and will. The knowledge that history presents these three moments not only successively but also

side by side, is the true historiosophy. The task of this historiosophy is to establish a table of categories of the history of the world; and in accordance with this, all logical categories are not only to be rediscovered by a process of analogy in the course of history, but are actually to be sought for there, as Montesquieu did with cause, and others with certain of the relations of number. The same method is to be employed, further, in reference to all physical categories (as, for instance, we find mechanism in China, light in Persia, etc.), and finally, in reference to all anthropological categories, such as age, etc. For this there is required a psychology of the various peoples; and hints towards a construction of this have been given by Condorcet and Kant. Thus, the history of the world is what stands above everything else, while above it again stands God, who presides over the judgment of the world, as Augustine and Bossuet rightly surmised. Cieszkowski believes that he is justified in making all these demands of Hegel as the logical outcome of his system. But he demands in addition to this, that we go beyond Hegel's system. Neither Schiller by glorifying Art, nor Hegel by his apotheosis of consciousness and science, has succeeded in laying the foundation of the peculiar teleology of history. What we have got to do, is to bring the will to the same position of prominence to which speculative reason was brought by Hegel, and thus to give the ruling place, not to pre-theoretical but to post-theoretical practice, so that the history of the world is constituted, not by instinctive but by conscious actions. The philosophy of practice must therefore also take the place of contemplative absolute idealism; the objective dialectic of life must do away with the contradictions of the time, and bring us to what is the highest practical result—to humanity as a family of nations. This work is in many points closely connected with that by the same author, entitled *God and Palingenesis* (Berlin, 1842), in which he recognises the merit of Michelet's book on the personality of God and immortality, and states that it consists particularly in the fact that these two questions were united together. He next seeks to correct the indefiniteness of the Hegelian expression "particular," which was noticed above (§ 335, 4), and then, by distinguishing between particularity or individuality, universality or subjectivity, and totality or personality, he ends by denying immortality to the two first, and by vindicating it for the last

as being its well-earned possession, on the ground that it is its own act. As here, the philosophy of action and life, with which the Slavic period of philosophy begins, carries us beyond the abstractions of the Germanic absolute idealism, so it does in reference to the doctrine of God, in which Michelet does not get beyond the idea of objective spirit. Indeed, in order to do this, he would have had to get above abstract speculation, which takes up simply a negative position in regard to ideas in a pictorial form, and would have had to place himself on the standpoint of active intuition, which is the organ of the philosophy of life and action. Along with Cieszkowski, we may mention STAN. FERD. TRENTOWSKI, who lived for a long time as an exile in Freiburg, where he gave lectures. In his *Basis of Universal Philosophy* (Carlsruhe, 1837), and his *Science of Nature* (1840), he seeks to go beyond Hegel to the extent of uniting the Cartesian principle *cogito, ergo sum* with the sensualistic principle *sentio, ergo res est*, as all true and thorough philosophers have done, even though it was only in the way of having solitary glimpses of the truth. He crowns his speculations with the *animadverto ergo Deus est*, which is the result of such a union. This concrete philosophy is to be divided into essential, formal, and essential-formal philosophy, and each of these is to be divided into three departments of thought. The first includes the philosophy of nature, of spirit, and of God, as He appears to us; the second comprises grammar, logic, and mathesis, together with æsthetics; and the third, the criticism of experience, reason, and perception. Trentowski's educational works, which are written in Polish, are highly prized by his countrymen.

§ 347.

1. Those who, as soon as they became acquainted with a system, imagined that they detected its one-sidedness, and accordingly sought at once to supplement it with what would remedy this defect, form a much more numerous company than the group of those who took as a starting-point one only of the systems which had been previously founded. This makes it still more difficult for one individual to give a general idea of their speculations. The idea of the necessity of supplementing systems was first advanced by those who sought to steer between the rocks of the System of Identity

and the Science of Knowledge, and above all by Hegel. It is therefore not a mere accident if, in the theories about to be mentioned here, one at least of the integral elements is always one of the systems of mediation which were taken up in § 322, or one of the final systems which were referred to in § 326, 3, and if they all more or less take account of Hegel. On the other hand, however, the Hegelian system, by representing itself as the final stage of all previous development, rendered the consideration of earlier theories so necessary that in the case of many of the philosophers mentioned in the foregoing sections, as, for instance, Carrière, one may often doubt whether they ought not rather to have been taken up in this section.

2. The great reputation which Hegel and Schleiermacher enjoyed as academic lecturers gave rise to a desire among many of those who attended the lectures of both, to unite the views they had heard stated by each. The result was, that most of those who made this attempt ultimately decided for the one or the other; and in this way Schleiermacher led more to become adherents of Hegelianism than he knew or wished, just as he had done in reference to orthodoxy. The matter took a different shape in the case of those who were already firmly persuaded of the truth of the Hegelian standpoint, or of some standpoint akin to this, before they had made a more thorough acquaintance with the views of Schleiermacher. This was the case with R. ROTHE, who was introduced to theology and the Hegelian philosophy by Daub, and who had already in the work characterized above (§ 339, 2) expressed his indebtedness to Schleiermacher. Rothe's principal work gives evidence, not of a syncretic but of an organic blending of ideas, the seeds of which had been planted by both men and had ripened under the influences of an atmosphere which contained many theosophic elements. Its chief importance lies, it is true, in the domain of theology, in which Rothe long occupied a first place as a writer on dogmatics and ethics, but it cannot be passed over here. It is entitled *Theological Ethics* (3 vols. Wittenberg, 1845-1848. The first volume reached a second edition in 1867, and the second in 1869). The division into the doctrine of property, the doctrine of virtue, and the doctrine of duties, connects it with Schleiermacher's *Ethics*; and so too the contrast which we find in the two first divisions between the abstract ideal, apart from sin and redemption, and concrete

reality, recalls the main divisions in Schleiermacher's *Doctrine of Faith*. From a philosophical point of view, the introduction is the most interesting part. In order to assign to ethics its place within speculative theology, he gives an outline of the latter, and in this outline we have the expression both of the bliss of faith as it has been felt in experience, and of a candour which shows that the writer is entirely untrammelled by the mere letter of Scripture. After having discussed the general conception of theological ethics, namely, its basis, method, and introduction, he passes on to the Doctrine of Property, and this occupies the first volume and two-thirds of the second. The second part, the Doctrine of Virtue, is treated most briefly of all. In this part he discusses the peculiar nature of the individual by which he is enabled to realize the highest good. The Doctrine of Duties, on the other hand, is very fully discussed, and takes up the whole of the third volume. It will be understood, he says, that the moral problem cannot be considered apart from the question of restraint : for the righteous there is no law. Duties to self and special duties make up the system of duties, just as the qualities of genius, wisdom, originality, and strength had constituted the chief virtues, and as the moral communities had been constituted by property. All these communities issue in the perfect kingdom of God, which transcends the contrast implied in State and Church.

3. Some years before Rothe published this book, JOHANN ULRICH WIRTH, parish clergyman in Winnenden, whose first work was referred to above (§ 334, 10) as belonging entirely to the Hegelian school, brought out his second work, *The System of Speculative Ethics* (2 vols. Heilbronn, 1841, 42), of which the same cannot be said, since the Schleiermacher element in it at least balances the Hegelian. Already in the introduction, in which the encyclopædic position of Ethics is referred to, he attacks Hegel on the ground that Ethics is made a part of the doctrine of objective spirit, and that accordingly art and religion, which equally give moral impulses, are not discussed in connection with it. In the *Pure Ethics*, which are treated of in the first book (and volume), he first discusses in ethical metaphysics the Good, in ethical anthropology, the Will, Freedom, and Conscience ; and finally, in ethical cosmology he takes up Duty, Virtue, and the Highest Good. He then passes on to *Concrete Ethics* (2nd vol.) ; and in this he first works out

the system of individual morality in its identical, different, and concrete forms, and in connection with the last-mentioned refers to Character, Friendship, and the Family. He then goes on to the system of objective morality, or to the philosophy of law, and this is treated very fully. Finally, a transition is made to the system of absolute morality, in which religious and intellectual morality and the morality of the beautiful are discussed. The fact that the last-mentioned is given the highest place, and that it finally includes the discussion of Society and Amusement, has led many who are accustomed to read but the beginning and the end of a book to repeat of one really thoroughly worked out, the statement, that it declares private theatricals to be the highest fruit of morality. As if Schleiermacher had not given an equally high place to pleasant social intercourse, and Rothe, in his first work, to popular festivals! To this should be added the fact that Wirth promises a history of philosophy by way of conclusion to his ethics, though it has not yet appeared. Wirth departs still further from Hegel, in his work, *The Speculative Idea of God* (Stuttg., 1845). Hegel is here expressly designated as the one who closed the period of the philosophy of the Notion—a period which has passed away and is about to be succeeded by that of a philosophy full of ideas. This new philosophy is to be a thoroughly philosophical religion—a religion which began as feeling and became knowledge. If this last proposition accords very well with the fact of a fusion of the doctrines of Schleiermacher and Hegel, it is apparent from the whole work that since the publication of his last book, Wirth had admitted a third doctrine into his mind, namely, Schelling's doctrine in its altered form, as it was then expounded by Frauenstädt and Paulus. He expressly assigns to this new doctrine of Schelling's a position subsequent and superior to Hegel's absolute philosophy; and he besides distinguishes in it three different forms. In his sketch of the history of philosophy, which takes up by far the largest part of the work, he describes Neo-Platonism as the culminating point of Greek philosophy; and so likewise he represents Schelling's new doctrine as the crowning point of German philosophy. Neither the one nor the other has however reached the real goal of philosophy. In order to get to this, it is necessary to take as a starting-point the inner contradiction between his infinitude and his individuality which man finds in himself, in the religious needs of his

nature, and from this, as from the principle which has to be laid down as a foundation, to rise to the principle in which the solution can alone be found, because it has and is this solution in itself. Thus God will be rightly conceived of only when the triplicity,—which is not demanded by philosophical necessity,—is abandoned, and when God is conceived of rather as a quadruplicity of substances ; as essence, life, central soul, and central spirit. Of these, the fourth is undoubtedly the substance of substances ; and we get a right conception of God when we recognise that He is not to be thought of apart from the eternal universe, and apart from an unknowing principle in Him, which is transfigured into knowledge and will. God is self-conscious only as He penetrates and sways the pure universe or the eternal cycle of the spheres. (Personality he regards as a clumsy expression.) From the separation which takes place in those principles or substances, and which is brought about by the will of God, there arises the contrast between the eternal and the temporal spheres. In the latter we have a manifestation of finite nature in existing, living, and animated creatures, above which the created spirit raises itself as the work of Spirit, as a relative Absolute, as an ego endowed with spontaneity, which has come into being by the primal spirit's act of distinction within itself, but which is at the same time a reflex of God. Every true doctrine of freedom must recognise both of these factors equally. God is the henadic subjectivity of all relative henads, not as a harmony which exercises compulsion, but as a harmony which supplies them with impulses. In man, who is the image of the divine quadruplicity, the primal spirit gathers together all other substances into a unity ; and man again realizes in morality the ideal content which he makes his own in the successive stages of philosophy, religion, and art. Morality is therefore a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, as was shown in the *System of Ethics*. Hegel, who was in error both as regards this and also as regards the correct sequence of those forms, cannot, on account of this, perceive that the life of spirit is a new creation, a re-creation of the universe out of the ideal. He accordingly knows nothing, either, of a wisdom which creates life, but only of a wisdom which is like the owl of twilight. The aim which God sets before Himself, namely, to be Spirit in a kingdom of spirits, the members of which live freely in the primal spirit, is attained

by the passing of the created spirit, in the course of its development, through the four stages of the existing, vital, psychical, and pure spirit. These four periods, or revelations of the four substances in God appear also simultaneously in races, temperaments, etc., because the individual too is on his part a microcosm. We must contemplate God not only, as hitherto, in the eternal universe, and further in the temporal universe, but also in His eternal-temporal universe. Only as He is the spiritual unity of these three worlds, is God the Absolute, or God absolutely, *i.e.*, the infinite spiritual organism, which we not only call world, but world-all. The existence of the universe, as being at once temporal and eternal, is to be thought of, so far as the individual is concerned, as follows: In the telluric world, by the negation of his natural basis as his aim, man reaches what he originally in the eternal world eternally is, which becomes intelligible when we get a correct insight into the conception of cause and end. So far as the universe, looked at as a whole, is concerned, we have to think that when the spirit on one planet still occupies the stage of mere existence, it has on another meanwhile reached the vital stage, and so on. By means of this great law of the unity of the co-existence and succession of all things in the Absolute, the original aim of creation is attained, namely, that God should be the universal spirit in a system of relatively infinite henads. The thorough understanding of this is not to be regarded as a quietist wisdom, such as all German philosophy has hitherto been, but as a union of modern thought with the ancient original wisdom; and it brings the worship of God into harmony with the worship of industry, humanity, science, and the Beautiful. This is the purely ideal-realism; for the eternal world is what is simply ideal, the temporal world is what is simply real, while the world as temporal and eternal is both. In the year 1851, Wirth started a journal under the title *Philosophical Studies*. He soon, however, gave this up in order to work on the journal conducted by Fichte and Ulrici, to which he had always been an industrious contributor, and of which he afterwards became joint editor. Among his essays in the latter, those on Immortality (1847) deserve special mention, while of the essays in the *Studies*, we may call attention to that on Reform in Philosophy in reference to Dialectic, in which he states that the doctrine of knowledge in itself and its method, or the theory of scientific knowledge,

i.e., dialectic, is the subject with which philosophy above all other sciences has to do. He moreover shows how what is to be done before all else is to add to inductive knowledge, or knowledge which constructs conceptions, and to deductive knowledge, or knowledge which is based on deduction from ideas, a productive knowledge or knowledge which realizes ideals. Neither empiricism, which does not get beyond the first kind of knowledge, nor Hegelianism, which does not get beyond the second, fulfils this requirement. What we have therefore got to do, is to unite the realism of the empiricists with the idealism of Hegel. Not only does Wirth himself consider that in his theory this problem has been solved, but H. Schwarz, among others, is of the same opinion.

4. While Rothe and Wirth confined their attempts to blend the ideas of Schleiermacher and Hegel more to the departments of speculative theology and ethics, LEOPOLD GEORGE (born at Berlin in 1811; for a long time *Privatdocent* there; died on the 24th of May, 1873, when Professor of Philosophy in Greifswald) tried to accomplish this in the fundamental principles of philosophy. He was an enthusiastic pupil of both great masters; but as a brilliant lecturer, and in his power of presenting his ideas in a scientifically arranged form, he approximated more to Schleiermacher, for whom he had personally a very great respect. He first made himself known by a work on Old Testament festivals, and by his extremely brilliant and able essay *On Myth and Legend* (Berlin, 1837), and gathered round him a circle of devoted hearers. He next published *The Principles and Method of Philosophy with special reference to Hegel and Schleiermacher* (Berlin, 1842), with which his *System of Metaphysics* (Berlin, 1844) is closely connected, for in the first of these works, after having fully discussed the principles and method of philosophy, he presents a short synopsis of the system of philosophy, and this is further developed in the *System of Metaphysics*. After writing these works, which for a long time did not meet with the recognition they deserved, George appeared as an author in the department of psychology. In *The Five Senses*, etc. (Berlin, 1846), he seeks to make the theory of sense-impressions the basis of psychology, and at the same time to simplify it by reducing all impressions on the organs of sense to slower and more rapid movements. In this way he thinks that the so-called metastasis of sense-impressions, among other things, can be

explained, since the fifth sense, which is affected by the slowest and most rapid movements, as for instance, by impact and heat, and therefore comprises them all, acts instead of the rest. Delightful as this little work is, like everything which comes from George's pen, it cannot compete either in originality or importance with the two works the contents of which are treated together in the following sketch. The equally great importance of both masters, and at the same time the diametrical contrast between their theories, which he is never tired of presenting to us in what are always new and highly striking antitheses, lead him to seek after the common ground which could have formed the basis of such a contrast. George finds it in the fact that both have made an abstraction, namely being, into a *principle*. Whatever be the other contrasts between their views, since for the one, being is the most universal subject, and for the other the most universal predicate, and so forth, they both very easily incur the attacks of scepticism, which philosophy is able to escape only when it really drops all presuppositions and starts with what scepticism itself never doubts, namely, nothing. A philosophy which starts from nothing, is a real thinking-after a God who creates out of nothing, a thinking-after which is quite as free and creative as the act which it reproduces. The further advance from nothing takes place by means of the speculative *method*. Respecting this, George says that Hegel and Schleiermacher surmounted the opposition implied in the analytic and synthetic, inductive and deductive processes, and that they follow what is called, according to Schleiermacher's terminology, the process of combination, but that their methods themselves constituted the contrast which Schleiermacher declared to exist within the combining process, and which he defined as that of the heuristic and architectonic processes. It is this last-mentioned idea which exclusively constitutes Schleiermacher's claim to be received as an authority, while Hegel is to be regarded as a master in philosophy, because he sought out the complementary conceptions which were wanting. The arbitrariness which may be brought as an objection both against the way in which Hegel passes to the "opposite" and against Schleiermacher's fourfold division, and which is concealed in the case of both only when the one is thinking architectonically as well as heuristically, and when the other is thinking heuristically as well as architectonically, disappears,

when it is united with Consciousness, which was the leading point of view of both their methods. If we maintain with Hegel, that opposites demand mediation, while holding at the same time that the opposition does not simply appear to exist, then we must end by separating the two opposites thus set against each other, by means of their indifference, which on its part again cannot be thought of without an opposite. That is to say, we will apply Schleiermacher's plan of mutually intersecting lines, and, instead of one pair of opposites, have in all cases two, in which each term, though in a different way, is put in opposition to three others. Suppose we think of two such oppositions as a and b , c and d , so arranged in reference to each other that each term constitutes the fourth part of a larger square; and if we then add to a and b , which are thus placed in opposition, the square t , which is the mediation they demand, and to c and d again add u ; and if we further reflect that a and c , of which the one stands beneath the other, also demand a mediation (v), and that in the same way b and d , of which the one stands beneath the other, also require a mediation (w), and that finally t and u as well as v and w , point to a mediation which is valid for both (z), namely, the principal square which is still wanting, we arrive at a plan which does not take the form of triads, but of enneads. This plan has this advantage over those of Hegel and Schleiermacher, that in this way we arrive at a really final mediation which is wanting in both of the other two. For this reason we can say of them that they have a method but no *system*, for we attain a system only when method has a beginning and a definite end. It is not a mere accident that, connected with this defect, there is the fact that both philosophers have no place in their system for the true Absolute, or God. Hegel makes Him disappear in one-sided immanence in the world, while Schleiermacher places Him in one-sided transcendence beyond knowledge, which thus becomes with him, just as with Hegel, a mere wisdom of this world. We thus get first a small system of categories, since the two opposites Nothing and Being unite in *Becoming*, appearance and disappearance in *Existence*, the two first members of the two opposites in *Beginning*, the two second in *Subsistence*, and finally, the four mediations, and therefore all those determinations of thought, unite in *Eternity*, which is the first predicate of God, while the world has applied to it the categories of Beginning and Subsistence, Becoming

and Existence, but not that of Eternity. If we call the whole ennead, Being, since in defect of another expression we take one and the same expression in a double sense, then by means of the same creative thought which had conducted us from Nothing to Being in the narrower sense, we arrive at the opposite of Being in the wider sense. This is *Quantity*, within which the two opposites of multiplicity and unity, whole and part, give the (horizontal) mediations of *Number* and *Amount*, and the (vertical) combinations of *Degree* and *Measure*. *Totality* constitutes the concluding member ; and the world is not totality, because in it degree and measure, number and amount are separated. The mediation of being and quantity gives *Quality*, and with this we have given the three enneads, manifoldness, simplicity, and transition ; and among these, something, being otherwise, and determinateness. Finally, difference, identity, and mediation supply us, in the last determination of thought, with the means whereby we can escape pantheism and deism, since we think of the identity and difference of God and the world, of the transition from it to Him, and yet of the determinateness of both, and conceive of God as a ruler who determines Himself, etc. The system of quality is moreover of special importance in reference to method. Methods which adopt the category of difference *only*, or that of transition *only*, are necessarily one-sided. The opposition of being and quantity demanded, in addition to the mediation in quality, according to the methodological plan, a second opposition (between *c* and *d*), which intersected the former. This gives us the two systems of *Essence* and *Appearance*, of qualitative being and qualitative quantity, which naturally take the form of enneads analogous to those three : position, negation and relation, attraction, repulsion and indifference, inherence, accident, and substance made up the first ; the external, the internal and manifestation, content, form and existence, thing, quality and reality, constitute the second. It is in accordance with the rhythm of the method, that they should themselves again be mediated in a new ennead, namely, the system of *Reality*, which is separated into possibility, necessity and reciprocity, causality, contingency and actuality, ground, condition and independence. In the same way, the systems of being and essence unite to form that of *Subjectivity*, in which we have spontaneity, receptivity and activity, action, passivity and state, force, resistance and power

On the other hand the systems of quantity and appearance unite to form that of *Objectivity*, in which we have actual existence, connection and relativity, universal, particular, and individual, infinite, finite, and absolute. *Spirit* forms the final member, which in the same way constitutes an enneadic system, only that in this case we come upon enneads in nines. This is easily understood, since here all that has been so far developed, is united together. In accordance with this, all the first members, the members, *a*, according to the ground plan, nothing, multiplicity, manifoldness, etc., are united together in the superadded ideals; all the second members, *b*, *i.e.*, being, unity, simplicity, etc., are united together in the reals which are attached to them; all the third members, *c*, becoming, number, transition, etc., are united together in the Notion; all the fourth, *d*, origin, whole, something, etc., in abstraction; all the fifth, *e*, passing-away, part, being otherwise, etc., in concretion; all the sixth, *f*, existence, amount, determinateness, etc., in the Idea; all the seventh, *g*, beginning, degree, difference, etc., in transcendence; all the eighth, *h*, subsistence, measure, identity, etc., in immanence; lastly, all the ninth, or final categories, *i*, eternity, totality, mediation, etc., are united together in the *Divine Spirit*; and when we have reached this, we have got the highest metaphysical expression for God. Notion and Idea, immanence and transcendence, do not here any longer constitute opposites. Since Spirit is the sum and substance of all these categories, everything which proceeds from spirit is subject to them. Accordingly, therefore, thought is; and psychology in the part in which it treats of thought, will have to show why thought is bound down by these definite rules. Kant was thus able to deduce certain categories from reflection and apply them to judgments, those, namely, of being, quantity, and reality, to which thought in the act of judgment is united. Hegel adopted a higher standpoint, but his deficient method made it impossible for him rightly to conceive particularly of the final categories. Ten years after the appearance of his *Metaphysics*, George published his *Manual of Psychology* (Berlin, 1854). It was dedicated to the memory of Schleiermacher, whose lectures on psychology George edited eight years afterwards from a notebook of his own. In the introduction (pp. 1-35), he discusses the conceptions of organic, living, and animated existence; and the result he arrives at is, that we can speak of life, and

therefore of soul, only in the case of the animal which in a certain measure unites in itself the vegetable and crystalline forms, and by means of its nervous system brings them to that central inwardness which we call self, and which, by means of reciprocal action between it and the external world, becomes what we call soul. But since this reciprocal action is rendered possible in the first instance by the intervention of the sense nerve-fibres, the *First Part* (pp. 36-221), takes up the *sensuous* soul, *i.e.*, the soul in so far as it is conditioned by sense perceptions. As was done in the work on the senses, so here too, the vibratory movement which is conveyed to the sensory nerves is taken as the element common to all sense impressions; the fifth sense, touch, is separated from the rest, while it is shown that these four, by means of the mutually intersecting opposites, far and near, permanence and change, form a system. Since sense-perception gives consciousness, not only of the stimulus given by the external world, but also of the reaction of the sensible subject, we must distinguish in it two functions; perception of the changes in the external world, *i.e.*, perception in the narrower sense, and perception of its own reaction, *i.e.*, the fact of being affected, or pleasure and pain. In both, in accordance again with the mutually intersecting opposites, we have to distinguish four moments, in the case of the former, wakefulness, attention, appropriation, sensation; in the case of the latter, joy, hope, excitation, satisfaction, and their opposites. These moments are made to form a parallel with the four senses, and it is shown how they are prevalent in morbid phenomena. Thus we find attention in somnambulism, sensation in dreams, and so on. The same arrangement into four is repeated in temperaments, and further, as expressing the moments of individuality, instinct and genius. These parallels frequently remind us of Steffens; and in those passages in which animals are referred to, they remind us of Oken. We are reminded of the latter also by the fact that George by no means makes such a distinction between man and the other animals, as is generally done. Since in treating of sense-impressions, and since,—in particular in those passages in which it is shown that a very great deal which is considered to be due to a bodily process is due to a psychical one,—it was not possible to avoid making reference to conscious processes, George repeatedly impresses upon us the fact that these are anticipations. By means of sense-percep-

tions alone the subject is by no means able to distinguish the external world from itself, for the sensory nerves conduct to it only a successive series of sensations, which, because they have not yet been arranged in space, remain in a state of chaos. This constitutes the distinction between the sensuous and the *conscious* soul, which is treated of in the *Second Part* (pp. 222-399). The fact that the spot where a sensory nerve is excited makes no difference so far as sensation is concerned, proves that the organ of sensation does not suffice for the localization of the sensation. But then, it is also impossible to deduce consciousness from perceptions, for consciousness presupposes that we place ourselves here and the objects yonder, that, in fact, we distinguish ourselves from them. It is just sensation which brings them near, *i.e.*, makes the distinction disappear. The motor nerve fibres constitute the organ which makes this distinction, and they accordingly are for all forms of consciousness, and therefore for thought, exactly what the sensory nerve fibres are for perception. That the development of the separate moments of consciousness should give us nine such moments, will be understood from what was said above in reference to method. The immediate certainty that our will produces movements allows us to put a boundary line between that something in which the movement proceeds without meeting any resistance, and that something in which it meets with resistance. It is in this way that we first determine the existence of *self-consciousness* and *objective consciousness*. By means of the union of the two, that is by *Reflection*, it comes about that much which self-consciousness considered at first as belonging to itself, is referred to the external world. Thus the resistance which our limbs offer to our will brings us by degrees to distinguish our body from our self as something external. The ego which has reflected, is thus something quite different from that of the little child. With the opposition of subjective and objective consciousness which is reconciled in reflection, is connected that of the combining *Understanding*, and of the distinguishing *Imagination* which gives fixity to the individual thing, both of which are united in *Memory*. By means of the last the moment of time is introduced into the system of localized points, which is what has been reached so far; and since the continuity of consciousness arrests the flow of perceptions, memory does not reproduce traces of sensations as is gene-

rally thought, but combinations, the occasion for which has been supplied by the sensations. The reciprocal action of reflection and memory gives occasion for the rise of two new forms of consciousness. Reflections retained by memory become *Presentations*, while the memory supplies matter for new reflections, and in this way produces *Perceptions*. In the former, self-consciousness and understanding co-operate, and in the latter, objective consciousness and imagination. All the moments of consciousness hitherto treated of, are so closely connected together and make up by their reciprocal relations such a complete unity, that it is essential to conceive of them too in a definite notion. This notion is *Thought*, by which is to be understood consciousness as a result, or as completed consciousness, which just on this account—seeing that the first beginnings of consciousness spring from what are as yet unconscious movements—is master of the movements of its own body, and through them of all the rest. Connected with the points here brought forward, there are often given, by way of excursions, very interesting and more extended explanations, among which the following may be specially mentioned. In connection with objective consciousness we have a thorough examination of the union of sensation with movement, by means of which sensation becomes touch. (The ear, too, touches when it listens.) In connection with presentation, after-images and complementary colours are explained, not physiologically, but psychologically; and also language is taken up and discussed. Art is considered in connection with perception, and the difference between man, the animals, and idiots, who are also thinking beings, is taken up in connection with thought. Diseased consciousness is treated of in an appendix. The *Third Part* (pp. 400–588) treats of *Reason*, or the knowing soul, which, as such, has perception and thought as its equally essential preliminary conditions. In this part the enneadic rhythm comes more prominently forward than it did in the second, since each of the nine sections is put in the form of nine parts. Had George himself—as will be done here—placed his *Logic* before the public simultaneously with the three first sections of this Part, his latest work, *Logic as the Theory of Knowledge* (Berlin, 1868), would not have had to face many of the objections which have now been made to it. Even one who had read George's *Psychology* when it first appeared might,—

when, fourteen years later, he found in the introduction to the *Logic* the statement made as self-evident, that conscious thought has the motor nerves for its organ,—no longer remember what reason George assigned for this, nor, that the objection, that then animals too must think, does not alarm him. Besides, George, in the same introduction, gave such as read introductions only,—and these are confessedly numerous,—occasion for supposing that he had modified his earlier standpoint, which he is very far from doing. When, for instance, he states that the tendency in thought which was begun by Fichte came to an end with Hegel, and, on the other hand, says of the different course of thought, that “Schleiermacher pointed it out, and Trendelenburg followed it up,” we certainly cannot but suppose that he no longer wishes, as formerly, to reconcile Hegel and Schleiermacher, but Hegel and Schleiermacher as followed up by Trendelenburg. This, George is far enough from doing. He denies that space and time, or the categories, can be deduced from movement; he denies that movement in being is the same thing as that in thought to which Trendelenburg gives this name; he denies, in short, the very principles upon which Trendelenburg’s theories are based (cf. § 347, 7). What reason is there then for the admission above referred to, which only helps to conceal the meaning of what George himself asserts, namely, that he stands exactly where he stood twenty-six years ago? That there is no difference particularly between the standpoint of the *Psychology* and that of the *Logic*, will at once be seen if we compare the table of contents in both books. Not only do the three principal headings in the *Logic*, I. Faith (pp. 48–219), II. Cognition (pp. 220–481), III. Knowledge (pp. 482–662), cover the subjects taken up in the three first sections of the doctrine of reason, but in each of these the nine headings are exactly the same; for the fact that in the *Logic* we have Experiment in the place occupied in the *Psychology* by Trial, can scarcely be called an alteration. Thought becomes knowledge only by union with sense perception. The succession of sensations which was furnished by perception, is by means of thought changed into the correlation of objects; and to these, as forming their basis, are attached the sensations of blue, sweet, etc., as qualities. Every theory of knowledge, therefore, is one-sided, which reduces it simply to perception, or simply to thought. The first step of knowledge is (1.) *Faith*, the sur-

render to what is perceived, joined to the certainty that thought corresponds to the object. Beginning with *Opinion*, by which we take the single object for itself, it goes on, in *Confidence* in this, to maintain the unity and sameness of the object in all its changes, and unites both in the *Certainty*, which has for its object the development of the *Object*, and therefore something which is a universal, and the reality of which is denied only by Atomism. While in these three moments faith is directed only to what is actual, it develops by means of *Conjecture*, which has to do with ground or reason, and by means of *Probability*, which has to do with the conditioning circumstances, into *Conviction*, which is possessed by the law of phenomena. In spite of the satisfaction which conviction secures, there is connected with it, by means of mutual play of certainty and conviction, a desire to get to the connection of laws. The *Presentiment* of the existence of this connection, supplemented by critical *Doubt*, leads to *Truth*. Were opinion and conjecture repeated in the first of these, and confidence and probability in the second in a higher potency, then in truth all the moments of faith would be united, and truth and faith mutually bound to each other; for truth is the certainty and conviction of the correspondence of our thought with being. For this reason, the highest object of faith, namely God, is the highest unity of being and thought, and is therefore the highest truth. As truth is a matter of faith, so clearness is a matter of knowledge. Before the *Logic* passes on to this, the different forms of untruth, error, delusion, superstition, unbelief, are treated of, just as was done in the *Psychology*. The doctrine of (II.) *Cognition* emphasizes first the opposition between it and faith,—since here thought is the primary thing and perception is secondary,—and then passes on to the idea of the *Subject*, and further to that of *Predicate*. The starting-point for the formation of both is constituted by the fact that the ego knows itself to be the subject of changes. In addition to this, the Law of Identity gives the standard for the construction of the subject, while the Law of Contradiction gives the standard for the attribution of predicates. Both are thus criteria of clearness though not of truth. At the same time, we must not regard clearness as form that is indifferent to the matter contained in it—the way that formal logic regards it. Just on this account, those two principles preside over the formation of *Judgment*, which in its

complete form recognises the predicates as the reciprocal determinations of the subject, and is thus at once analytic and synthetic. According as the process of the formation of the judgment seeks out for the subjects the predicates which correspond to them, or the reverse, is it *Induction* or *Deduction*. As regards the former, George very strongly opposes the view that the inductive process is applicable only in the empirical sphere, that it consists of abstraction, and leads to unreal abstractions. In mathematics, we pass by means of induction from the square, rectangle, etc., to the parallelogram in general, which really exists in the rhomboid, as it is always the case that the primitive germ shows the universal in the form of reality. The process of deduction is in accordance with the plan of division, which, if it is to be scientific, must be based on the positive opposition of correlative members, and supplies a systematic arrangement which unites together those given by Hegel and Schleiermacher. After the ordinary division of judgments has been criticised from the point reached, and after the *princ. exclus. tertii* has been referred to the deductive process, just as previously the *princ. rat. suff.* had been referred to the inductive process, George goes on to discuss the *Notion*. The *Notion*, or *Definition*, is the product of the inductive and deductive processes, and thus underlies also the laws of thought just mentioned, only that since in it, as the product of judgment, subject and predicate become one, the two previously mentioned processes get their due place. The transition from judgment to notion brings us to *Principle*, and by going from notion to judgment we come to *Method*. In the former, the essential thing is the reciprocity of the known presentation in the subject, and of the induction which makes the comparison, in the latter it is the deduction of the proper predicates. In a criticism of the various methods,—in which Trendelenburg's merit is found to consist in his syllogistic, Schleiermacher's in his heuristic and architectonic, and Hegel's in his dialectic method,—he compares with them all his own speculative method, which consists of nine members. The result of method, and therefore of the whole of knowledge, is *System*. Since in this, each conception has its place, the maximum of clearness is reached; and it thus becomes possible to arrive at an agreement with every one. Faith and cognition, truth and clearness, are the equally necessary factors of (III.) *Knowledge*. They are co-ordinate, because both

unite in themselves the elements of perception and thought. Discovery or *Invention*, and *Observation*, in which the first moments of faith and cognition are reconciled, give by being joined together, *Experience* (\sim Certainty, Judgment.) *Hypothesis* and *Analogy* are the factors which unite to form *Experiment* (\sim Conviction, Notion), which is by no means to be limited to the domain of the natural sciences, but which plays a very important rôle in mathematics, the science of education, teaching, philosophy, etc. Experience and experiment are, in all the sciences, the pillars upon which their progress rests. It is realized by means of *Theory*, which anticipates principles, and by means of critical methodical *Practice*, and finally leads to *Philosophic*, or speculative *Knowledge*. This kind of knowledge, and hence philosophy, does not stand in contrast to other kinds of knowledge (and sciences), but, since it rests on the latter, it stands above them. Speculative knowledge adopts what in all these has already been reduced to principles and has become knowledge. George's *Logic* concludes with an encyclopædic survey of the various sciences, and of their relation to the parts of philosophical system. We here leave the *Logic* in order to refer to what is discussed in the *Manual of Psychology* after faith, cognition, and knowledge have been treated of. As the rhythm of the method requires, the principal forms of the practical spirit are treated of in six sections. They are also discussed in accordance with the arrangement into nines, only that in this case the separate moments are not taken up in detail, but are merely enumerated. In (iv.) *Inclination*, he distinguishes between interest, abandonment, liking, respect, esteem, warmth of feeling, deference, fondness, love. In the case of (v.) *Desire*, he distinguishes between the feeling of need, seeking, longing, striving, exertion, wish, craving, aspiration, appetite. Under (vi.) *Will*, he discusses choice, reflection, zeal, discretion, assiduity, earnestness, resolve, plan, determination, and at the same time he examines the forms taken by will when it is perverted, such as mania, passion, etc. (vii.) *Personality* is the heading under which he puts frankness, sympathy, feeling, trustworthiness, firmness, heart, courage, fidelity, character. (viii.) *Action* comprises assimilation, formation, instruction, production, organization, practice, enjoyment, authority, happiness. The fact that he discusses (ix.), *the Divine Reason*, in a work which is meant to have the soul for its subject, seems even to George himself to

stand in need of an apology. He finds an excuse for so doing in the fact that God is immanent also in the world; and he shows how all the predicates which were attached to the soul belong to God in an eminent degree. After discussing the subject of communion with God, he concludes with the remark, "that personality can count on having a true continued existence, only in so far as it is reconciled to the eternal God."

5. Schleiermacher, however, was not the only antagonist of Hegel's who began to be regarded as a philosopher of equal rank with him. HEINRICH MORITZ CHALYBÄUS must be mentioned as one of the first to make this claim for Herbart. Born on July 3rd, 1796, he had, when a teacher at the School of the Cross, in Dresden, brought himself into notice by his *Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel* (Dresden, 1837), which has been frequently reprinted since. In 1839 he was called to a professorship in Kiel, where he remained, with a short interval, till his death, on Sept. 2nd, 1862. Of his other works composed in Kiel, the following may be mentioned: *Phenomenological Papers* (Kiel, 1841), *Modern Sophistry* (Kiel, 1843), *Outlines of a System of the Theory of Knowledge* (Kiel, 1846), *System of Speculative Ethics* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1850), *Philosophy and Christianity* (Kiel, 1853), *Fundamental Philosophy* (Kiel, 1861). As Chalybäus in his first work had contrasted with the idealistic one-sidedness represented by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the realism of Herbart as a one-sidedness which was the complement of the other, some saw in this the announcement of a system which was to reconcile these two one-sided theories. It is true that in the preface to the second edition he defends himself against being so understood; but when, in connection with this, he gives us to understand that it would have been more correct if he had been classed with Hillebrandt, instead of with Krause and Suabedissen, he practically grants the truth of the statements as to his syncretism. In the works which followed, he constantly gives occasion for these same statements. Thus, in the *Phenomenological Papers* and in the *Theory of Knowledge* he conceives of the contrast between Hegel and Herbart as consisting in the fact that the former represents in a one-sided way the ancient form of objectivity, and that the latter represents modern subjectivity in a similarly one-sided way; or, that with the former being is lost in becoming, while with the latter becoming is lost in being. In

saying this, he asserts what is connected with it, namely, that the one represents negative dialectic only, and the other formal logic only. He likewise specifies pantheism and atomism as the systems which represent the one-sided views held by both men; and at the same time he is constantly directing attention to the fact that, if the errors of atomism are avoided, monadism must necessarily meet with due recognition. It is on this account, that, in developing his arguments, he much more frequently combats the views of Hegel than those of Herbart. This appears especially in the discussions on the principles, method, and system of philosophy, in which Chalybäus, exactly as George had done simultaneously, finds fault with Hegel for not uniting principle and method so as to form a completed system. But further, since the essential principle of philosophy consists in this, that, as its name signifies, it is a striving after truth, and not simply after theoretical knowledge, Hegel is to be blamed for having deprived philosophy of its teleological or ethical colouring which points towards the ideal. With this error of Hegel's is connected also that "Epimethie" of philosophy, which has no intention of vivifying, but which seeks to comprehend, and to paint grey in grey. Herbart again deserves to be criticized, because he made a complete separation between practical and theoretical philosophy, a method of procedure which in the end leads both to blind action and unpractical knowledge. On the contrary, the time has come when philosophy should take Prometheus as its pattern; and this it does when ethical personality becomes the central point round which turns the effort to reach wisdom. But in order that this may be accomplished, it is necessary that the theory of knowledge,—that is, the fundamental science upon which all the sciences rest, seeing they adopt from it the lemmata that form their basis,—should develop not only logical and physical, but also ethical categories. It must be acknowledged that Chalybäus has given such a table of categories in his system of the theory of knowledge and that he has shown, in his system of ethics, how in accordance with this table a point of union has to be found between ethics and the fundamental science. In this way he enables the reader to form a general idea of those parts of his system which he has not fully worked out. Analogy supplies the data for thus constructing it. Of the three parts in which Chalybäus has treated the theory of knowledge, the first is entitled,

The Doctrine of Principles. Here already he indicates the view,—which is expressly stated both in the further course of the work and in other works, as for instance in the *Ethics*, in an essay in Fichte's *Zeitschrift* on the subjective and objective beginning of philosophy, and elsewhere,—that the formal and material principles of philosophy mutually condition each other. Since our thinking is a thinking-after the divine thought, a philosophy which is recognised to be a striving after truth must bring us to a God who wills, *i.e.* loves, the truth, and is therefore a self-conscious subject. Since philosophy starts with the intention of bringing out the truth by means of knowledge which is accompanied by thought, it is speculative and not merely theoretical science. Just for this reason, it stands in need of a mediating process, which conducts us to the end which has to be reached. Accordingly, the *Doctrine of Mediation* is added to the doctrine of principles as a second part, while *Teleology* follows as a third part. The most important discussion in the first part is that on method, in which Chalybäus opposes the systematic consciousness to the two extremes represented by Herbart's firm attachment to formal logic and Hegel's contempt for it, which leads to an endless process. This systematic consciousness includes formal logic as it does all inferior standpoints, and thus enables us to return upon them. The second and fullest part contains in its three sections, ontology, logic, and theory of knowledge, the fundamental categories of speculative physics, logic, and psychology. Besides this, the rhythm of the whole system is repeated within them. The principles of ontology, etc., are first laid down: they are here called "principles" just because they have been arrived at by deduction. The mediation of these is next discussed; then, finally, he takes up their perfected form and their highest end. The most important point in the ontology is, that existence is defined as eternal æthereal matter—an assumption which can lead to materialism only when it excludes every other assumption. This *materia prima* or *pura*, which cannot yet be called substance because there is nothing which it *substat*, does not only manifest itself in the phenomena of the unity of the world, as in gravitation, but is also the presupposition of the notion of spirit, and even of God. It may be called the soul-æther; it is the spatially and temporally infinite, since space, time, and number are its forms, which we think by abstraction from it. It is now to be shown how in

this concrete infinite there exists the possibility or *conditio sine quâ non* of all substantiality, causality, and reciprocity, as well as of corporeality, of life, and of soul, all of which thus belong to the ontological categories. As Being or Matter was the element of ontology, so Thought is the element of logic ; and it is bound by the law of identity, since it is impossible to think anything and at the same time not to think it. Thought takes an active form in the construction of conceptions, judgments, and syllogisms. Chalybäus here lays down the three following canons as being of the highest importance in the application of the categories : namely, that the lower can exist without the higher, that the higher cannot exist without the lower, and finally, that the higher never proceeds from the lower, although it may show itself by means of the lower ; so that everything is present at once in the highest in an immanent way. In the theory of cognition, which treats of the relation of being and thought, Chalybäus finds cause for blame in the fact that the modal categories, which are to be conceived of first here, have had given them what is partly an objective ontological form, and partly a subjective logical form. It has not been considered that knowledge is not only something distinct from being, but something distinct from thought. The principle of knowledge is consciousness, and its categories are modal ; but to these freedom in its various forms also belongs, and their highest function consists in verification and in the exercise of critical judgment. The third part of the theory of knowledge, teleology, is the foundation at once of æsthetics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. The Absolute forms the subject-matter of this part. Philosophy, which was something that willed truth, can posit as the Absolute only something which wills absolute truth, and therefore a self-conscious spirit. This willing of truth is love, in the positive sense, which does not only, like "negative love," wish to be recognised, but wishes to recognise in turn. When philosophy has reached this conception it really goes beyond pantheism and atomism, since it admits that God knows all being as His own. But it goes still further than this. Since God knows the world, as contained in eternal matter in the form of a possibility, to be non-existent, this knowledge becomes for Him the basis of creation. This does not mean that in creation He became conscious of Himself, or that He came to have consciousness only in the world. After creation, just as before it, He knows

Himself as the only God, but no longer as a God who is alone. It is not His eternal knowledge of the ideal end which undergoes alteration, but His knowledge of how this end is reached. Religion on man's part corresponds to revelation on God's part. In the latter, we must separate creation, preservation, government, and providence from each other as being essentially different, for apart from this distinction the miraculous, among other things, cannot be rightly understood. In religion, the stages of original piety, as well as those of the different forms of theology up to the highest, namely, what is credible for thought, are to be distinguished from each other; while at the same time we must avoid the extremes of degrading self-abnegation and overweening Pelagianism. Revelation and religion meet in worship, while worship appears as the way by which we reach the highest aim, the absolute ideal. The realization of this consists in the fact that the primal absolute is united with the world. This primal absolute has never ceased to be the active perfection of power, which determines itself to exercise will by means of the ideal, though it certainly did cease, owing to the act of creation, to be monotheos, pantheos, *i.e.* a solitary God, since everything which the Absolute was in itself is revealed in the world. This may be thus expressed. The eternal original nature of God as a Trinity is always coming more and more to be a Trinity immanent in the world, since the Trinity realizes itself by working out the divine economy of the plan of Salvation. The course it takes is as follows: The Ideas of Beauty, of the Right and the Good, unite to form the idea of Holiness; and by the authority which this exercises, the Spirit of God lives in the Church as a Holy Spirit. It is the mission also of science to bring us under the influence of this spirit, and science has not by any means the smallest share in this work. In the *Fundamental Philosophy*, which Chalybäus published shortly before his death, he attempts to present the substance of the theory of knowledge in a briefer and more popular form. Owing to this, it has lost somewhat in scientific precision. The only real divergence which calls for mention is, that in the doctrine of mediation the arrangement is altered, and the logic is put before the ontology. The detailed *System of Ethics* is also divided, like the theory of knowledge, into the doctrine of the principles of morality, the phenomenology of morality, and the system of ethics. It belongs to the

nature of the case, that of the three books in which these three parts are treated of, the third should be the fullest. In the *first* book, other views are criticized, and in connection with the theory of knowledge the ethical Idea is marked off from the æsthetic and religious Ideas. Finally, the Notion of human personality as immediate (eudæmonistic), legal, and absolute, is reached by deduction, and in this way Chalybäus gets a basis for the organic division of his system. But before this is actually given, he discusses, in the *second* book, the actual process of the realization of morality as this has been modified by the historical entrance into the world of evil, which philosophy represents simply as a possibility. The Christian way of viewing the history of humanity and its relation to the philosophies of history which have been attempted, form the conclusion. In the *third* book, in accordance with what has just been pointed out, the first part contains the eudæmonology, and immediate and natural morality, as it realizes itself in the physical and domestic virtues. The second part comprises the doctrine of law, the law as respects persons, as well as the law of the civic community and the State. The third part is devoted to the doctrine of religious morality, the principles of which are first laid down, and followed by the consideration of Christian Wisdom in the life of the community, and of the organization of the Christian community. The profound and searching discussions on questions of detail, and the constant references made in connection with these, above all to Schleiermacher, Hegel, Rothe, Wirth, and Jul. Müller, show that religious-ethical questions interested Chalybäus more than any others. Owing to the unshaken conviction that Herbart's real antagonist is to be found in Schopenhauer,—a conviction which led to their being treated of together in § 325 of these *Outlines*,—an attempt to refute and improve the theories of Hegel and Schopenhauer by surmounting their one-sided views can be regarded simply as the counterpart of what was attempted by Chalybäus, and must therefore be mentioned here. At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that it is only the opposition between their attempts which makes the one the counterpart of the other, and that by placing them together there is no intention of obliterating the contrast. CARL ROBERT EDUARD VON HARTMANN, who made this attempt, which was at any rate a noteworthy one, and thus fulfilled the prophecy made by the present writer as early as the year 1853 (*vid.*

Entw. d. deutsch. Spec. seit Kant, § 41, 3), was, according to the very delightful autobiography with which his *Collected Studies and Essays* (Berlin, 1876) are introduced, born in Berlin on February 13th, 1842. He was also educated there, at a time when the thoughts which had been put in motion by Hegel formed an important, perhaps the most important, element in the general intellectual ferment. Hegel's *Encyclopedia* and some French works of the eighteenth century were among the first philosophical works which he studied. Many regard it as a fact of decisive importance for his future career, that, after having completed his gymnasium course, the young officer attended the school of artillery and engineers from 1859 to 1862. For at this time, the admiration for Schopenhauer was already at its height among the scientifically cultured young military men in Berlin. He himself disputes this, declaring that there was no one,—among his companions, at least,—of whom it is true; and that he came upon Schopenhauer's works quite of himself, in the year 1863. Considerations of health led von Hartmann to quit the service in 1865, and he is now a *Privatdocent* in Berlin, having taken his Doctorate there in 1867. He sketched his theory of the universe in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (Berlin, 1869), which was already finished in the year 1867, and is therefore older than the earlier published controversial work, *On the Dialectic Method* (Berlin, 1868), and than the work which appeared later: *Schelling's Positive Philosophy*, etc. (Berlin, 1869). It is for von Hartmann an established truth, that pantheism,—better called monism,—is the only true theory of the universe; and he finds a confirmation of this in the fact that the two philosophical systems in which the development of thought up to this time had culminated,—namely, those of Hegel and Schopenhauer,—are at one as regards their pantheism. Their agreement extends no further than this, however, for otherwise, these two philosophers hold such opposite views, that they must be regarded as essentially antagonists who are bound to combat each other's theories. While, for instance, according to the one, it is the Idea only, *i.e.*, the logical element, which has reality, according to the other, it is only the alogical Will, without ideas and reason, which is real. In this, above all, says Hartmann, we can see the great merit of Schelling's philosophy, not that he set up a system, for that was never his concern, but that he gave fixity

to a standpoint which is superior to the one-sided views represented by the two former. In his positive philosophy, $+A$ is the pure possibility of being, *i.e.*, as he himself says, Will; and in the same way $-A$ is defined by him as pure object, *i.e.*, as something which is in no way a subject, as something which cannot *do* anything, but is only presentation or Idea. Had he not allowed himself to be misled by his coquetting with ecclesiastical orthodoxy into proving that the germ of persons already existed in his principles, he would have spared himself the trouble of making that fantastic A° , and would have stopped short with $\pm A$, as the unity of Will and Idea, or spirit. Still, it was he who, more than any other hitherto, first gave expression to the truth by the divining power of genius, as indeed usually happens in connection with the other sciences as well. It is this truth which has now to be established in a methodical way. In thus establishing it, we are not to think at all of a dialectical proof in Hegel's sense. His dialectic method is a tissue of errors, and its main blunder consists of the two false presuppositions of an Absolute, and of the reality of contradiction. (The unity of positive opposites is not contradiction.) The only scientific method of proof, on the contrary, is that which is followed in the natural sciences and in history. Starting from what is given in experience as that which is to be explained, we seek to get at the ground of explanation, which is to begin with the unknown. In this way, the philosophy of the Unconscious seeks to mediate between Hegel's pantheism of the Idea, or panlogism, and Schopenhauer's pantheism of the Will, and to transcend the one-sided optimism of the former and the pessimism of the latter. Although, in accordance with the task which he thus sets himself, von Hartmann arranges his discussions so that of the three parts into which these are divided, the two first contain only the methodically arranged facts which make the assumption of a universally active Unconscious necessary, while it is not till the third part that he passes on to the metaphysic of the Unconscious (c. pp. 320-678), still it is conducive to a correct apprehension of his system if we first bring forward some propositions from this last part, those, namely, which illustrate the connection between his system and materialism. Philosophy will never triumph over materialism until it resolves to take into account all the results of science, and to adopt for itself without limitation the legiti-

mate starting-point of materialism expressed in the incontrovertible proposition, that every conscious act is conditioned by a normal brain function, and that therefore consciousness apart from a brain is impossible. To this proposition we may very reasonably add the assumption of unconscious mental activity, which precedes the brain function, as it does all other material processes which are its products. It must therefore be admitted that Schopenhauer made the first step towards refuting materialism by adopting it as a part of his system. His theory of the Unconscious Will in nature is however one-sided, for while he reserved the will for speculation he surrendered the intellect to materialism. This separation of the two is the weak point in his teaching, for where the Will, which does not possess the power of thought, is the only reality, there can be no rational connection in things, and no final end can be laid down as the culminating point of this connection. In this point the Hegelian theory, according to which it is just thought, the Idea, or reason, which is the only reality, has an advantage over that of Schopenhauer. To be sure, it is not in a position to explain the alogical or irrational element in the world, an element to which Schelling rightly called attention, and which Hegel too foists in under the name of the Accidental. If we proceed methodically, *i.e.*, if we proceed from what is given in experience, the phenomena both in the sphere of the corporeal (A. pp. 39-153) and in that of the spiritual (B. pp. 157-315) force us to admit that instinct, *i.e.* unconscious Will, and in the same way unconscious intelligence,—which can be best described by the word clairvoyance,—everywhere govern phenomena. The functions of the spinal cord and the ganglia, voluntary and reflex movements, the *vis medicatrix naturæ* and organic formation, sexual love, character, æsthetic judgments, the origin of speech, thought, perception, and mystical intuition—all show by their conformity to an end, that reason, and by their activity, that Will is revealing itself in them. Both of these must be unconscious, for cerebral vibrations which are the indispensable conditions of consciousness, are first produced by them. In the same way they must be immaterial, for according to modern science, the only real element in so-called matter is composed of the countless attracting and repelling centres of force, that is, of Will. Finally, the concurrence of both in the production of phenomena compels us to think of

the Will, which has no power of thought, and of the Idea, which is devoid of force, not as two separate substances, but as attributes of one essence which may be called Absolute Spirit, if only we do not attach to this word the confused idea of a personal conscious Being, but which, on this account, would be better called the Unconscious. In respect of these principles of all existence, which, as such, may be called supra-existence, we can adopt a very great deal of what has been developed by Schelling in his theory of principles or potencies. And first, we can adopt the principle that the Will (the +A), apart from Idea, has nothing which it can will, but is entirely empty and without content, a point which has been overlooked by Schopenhauer, who perhaps borrowed from Schelling the thought that all being is will. Secondly, we can adopt the principle that the Idea, as such, is without the power of doing anything, that it only says what and how everything must be if it exists, while the actual fact of things existing is made possible only by the action of a Will. Hegel overlooked this, and he therefore torments himself in vain to find a way of passing from the logical to the real. Since Will and Idea unite, the former takes the latter up into itself, while the latter yields itself up to the former in order to become real; and thus they become the existences in which the logical manifests itself, being realized by means of the alogical. It is now that the rational first becomes real; and, since the logical in its final result is what is in conformity with an end, everything manifests an orderly arrangement which is in conformity with an end; and of this we can say that it is the best possible world. In virtue of this order, which is in conformity with an end, all reality manifests a rational sequence, an infinite wisdom, since the simplest elements, namely, the attracting and repelling centres of force which constitute the atoms of bodies and of æther, as being the first product of the Will when it has been filled up by the Idea, become the means whereby what is higher and more complicated comes to exist. It is owing to this conformity to an end that after the organic has once come out of the inorganic, Nature prefers the easier way of univocal production to the more tedious æquivocal production, and the latter therefore disappears. In the same way, she prefers to introduce improvements within the species by means of the "struggle for existence," and "natural selection," rather than to exert herself to reach a similar result by

a more difficult path. (The passing of one genus into a higher can take place at most in a lower and poorer stage of the earlier genus, but not in a stage which is richly differentiated, still less at its culminating point, as, for instance, in the case of the apes.) Since this sequence is in conformity with an end, is rational, in fact; and since reason or end exists only in the Idea, and not in the Will, the goal to which the gradual progress is always drawing nearer is of course the triumph of the logical over the alogical. Since consciousness is the condition of this triumph, the sequence in existing things is always seen to be a nearer approach to the point at which an organism has the conditions of consciousness within itself. These are given when a brain is so constructed that the impressions made on it from without produce vibrations in it which are changed into sensations; and then the Will, as it were, strikes against these movements which have not been produced by it but which are recurrent, and with a start awakes to consciousness. Consciousness may accordingly be called the emancipation of intellect, *i.e.* of Idea or reason, from the Will, and consists in self-manifestation, which, just because it has this character, is composed only of transitory manifestations. Whether there is any awakening to consciousness outside of this earth, we of course do not know. There is no very great likelihood, that among the infinitely numerous conceivable degrees of the cooling of the celestial bodies, our temperature, in which animal life is possible, should again occur. It is enough for us, that on this earth the conditions necessary for consciousness are given; and conscious beings and their conscious pleasure or happiness are to be regarded as the final end of the world, and the end which has to be realized. Consciousness does not only represent the means whereby we strive to reach this goal, but it makes attainable something else which is different and far higher—it becomes the means whereby the world is redeemed. However certain it is that the world, owing to the wisdom or order in accordance with an end which shows itself in it, is the best possible world, it by no means follows that it is a good world, or that it would not be better if no world existed. On the contrary, we may most confidently maintain the truth of this latter view. The highest end, namely, the preponderance of pleasure over pain, has been decidedly missed. Only one who is still prejudiced by the emotional judgment of instinct can deny the fact,

which becomes more evident the more intelligence increases, that the little pleasure which there is in the world is far outweighed by the pain which every individual even, and much more the sum-total of all beings, has to bear. (Let any one just compare the pleasure of the animal which eats with the suffering of the animal which is eaten by it.) The illusion in which the men of antiquity lived, and which made them imagine that happiness is to be found in this life, passed away in the Roman Empire and in its passion of suicidal despair. The other illusion, with which Christianity sought to comfort the world because of its misery, namely, that there is a conscious and therefore a bodily life beyond the present, is constantly disappearing more and more before the advance of modern Science. We are passing into a third stage, where we look for happiness in a present world which is at the same time a world beyond this, or in a world beyond this which is yet a present world, without having to fall back into the delusions which have been abandoned, or imagining that there ever can be any blessedness for the individual. The idea of development, which first occurred to Leibnitz and was most energetically thought out by Hegel, is just what enables us so to blend the instinct of egoism with the instinct of sympathy, that, as a reward for the sacrifice of the individual will, we enjoy the hope that we are helping on the future happiness of the whole. (As compared with this resignation in the service of coming humanity, the suicidal Buddhism of Schopenhauer is a relapse to the pre-Christian standpoint.) Since this resignation sacrifices individual gratification and individual bliss, we cannot of course speak any longer of piety here. The time is not far distant when a man of culture will simply be no longer able to enter into the enjoyment of devotion. He will be quite as little able to enjoy the highest of all kinds of elevated pleasure—that, namely, which consists in scientific and artistic creation. There is no more need of genius, since the task of the time is not so much to give depth to work as to diffuse it. The process of levelling to a condition of solid mediocrity has accordingly already begun, in consequence of which art will be for humanity what at the present day the Berlin farce is for the Berlin business man in the evening. This stage too, however, is one of illusion; for the more knowledge and comfort increase for the whole human race, there are all the more who experience what the

man who has become wiser or richer everywhere experiences, that the enjoyment of comfort, etc., is not worth the cares and trials; and besides this, humanity cannot, like the individual, console itself with the thought that it is tormenting itself for the sake of an heir. Accordingly, after it has passed through these three stages of illusion, it will at last see the folly of its efforts, renounce all attempts to get positive happiness, and aspire to reach that state in which there is absolute absence of pain, *i.e.* after Nothing, Nirwana. A comfortless and hopeless doctrine! True, but comfort and hope are to be got only out of devotional booklets; philosophy does not supply us with them, but only with truth! But in this case, there is a kind of consolation in the truth. Even though it is after ever so long a time, just because this feeling of comfortlessness will have become universal, humanity, or if not humanity, some animal species which has raised itself above humanity, will take the step which Schopenhauer advised the individual to take, and deliver the world from the misery of willing, *i.e.* from the misery of existence. The point at which all, or even the majority, will unite in making this resolve, will not be reached, if the individual by an act of cowardly egoism at present plunges himself into the Nirwana of willing no more. On the contrary, it is still necessary that there should be an affirmation of life, an energetic willing and working in order that the goal may be reached at which the human race, when it is pressing and crowding together, will, in virtue of the means of communication of every sort, be in a position to come to that agreement which is to save the world. Von Hartmann (p. 643) sums up the results of his discussions as follows: "The act of willing, in accordance with its nature, brings with it as a consequence a surplus of pain. The act of willing which posits the 'that' of the world, or the fact of the world's existence, thus condemns the world to misery, it matters not *how* it may be constituted. The deliverance from this misery of willing, which cannot be directly accomplished by the universal wisdom or logical element of the unconscious idea, because it itself is not free in relation to the will, is effected by the emancipation of the idea through consciousness, since it, in the process of individuation, breaks up the will in such a way that its tendencies, when thus separated, turn against each other. The logical element guides the world-process in the wisest way to the

goal of the highest possible development of consciousness ; and when consciousness has reached this it is in a position to hurl volition into nothingness, and with this the *process* and the *world* cease. It is owing to the logical element, therefore, that the world becomes a best possible world, a world, namely, which comes to find salvation, and not a world whose misery is perpetuated throughout an infinite time." It can certainly be regarded as at most very improbable that the will, which as unconscious is not at all shrewd, should not once more agree to the "sinister fact" or "original accident" of a real world. But then, it must be considered that, even if the chances for and against were quite equal, it would still be a gain, if, while at the present time in which this miserable world exists the certainty of this existence is = 1, it should in the state of annihilation fall to $\frac{1}{2}$. Since the foregoing synopsis of Hartmann's philosophy was written, this work has attracted so much attention that it has already reached a seventh edition. One feels very grateful that the advice and example of Schopenhauer have been followed, and that in the later editions, besides the additions and appendices, the text of the first edition has been kept. A very considerable number of works were written in refutation of this new system ; and since these were replied to either by Hartmann himself or by those he had gained over to his views, there is already a by no means small von Hartmann literature. On this, the preface to the seventh edition may be consulted, in which fifty-eight works on this system are mentioned as having appeared from 1870 to 1875. This has naturally given greater clearness and precision to Hartmann's views, since the attacks to which he or his supporters replied were made from entirely different sides. Thus, Baron du Prel (*The Healthy Human Understanding in the Presence of the Problems of Science*, Berlin, 1872) dealt with the materialistic objections of J. C. Fischer (*v. Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious*, Leips., 1872), in the same year in which Fischer's book appeared. A. Taubert (*i.e.* von Hartmann's wife), in the work, *Pessimism and its Opponents* (Berlin, 1873), replied to the detailed criticism by Haym in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*. In the same work, the objections of J. Bona Meyer, Weis, Knauer, and Hartsen were also examined, with the intention of pointing out to them that there was no contradiction in the addition to pessimism of an evolutionist optimism, which is

just what constitutes the difference between von Hartmann and Schopenhauer. Very nearly the same objections were dealt with by Mor. Venetianer in his *Schopenhauer as a Scholastic* (Berlin, 1873), and his *Universal Spirit* (Berlin, 1874). Von Hartmann himself was not idle; and he too united with defensive criticism, offensive, but always friendly, criticism. *The Thing-in-itself and its Characteristics* had already appeared in the year 1871. This is an explanation of his position in reference to transcendental idealism, which he held to be an absolute illusionism, and which he thought Kant himself, in fact, by laying down the doctrine of transcendent causality in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, had exchanged for a transcendental realism. To this last-mentioned doctrine von Hartmann declares that he also adheres. (It is for this reason that, in the second edition, this work gets the title, *The Critical Basis of Transcendental Realism*.) The principal point in this work is the proof given of the view that if the Kantian forms of thought are simply immanently valid, objective knowledge is impossible, while their transcendent validity, *i.e.*, the conformity between the thing and our thought, can be explained only by supposing that one and the same reason unconsciously created things, and comes to consciousness in our thought, so that *our* reason simply reflects the reason that creates. After this work, von Hartmann had *A Collection of Philosophical Treatises on the Philosophy of the Unconscious*, as well as the anonymous work, *The Unconscious from the Standpoint of Physiology and the Theory of Descent*, published in 1872 by C. Duncker, whose services in the way of rapidly circulating his works are recognised by von Hartmann with winning frankness and naïveté. In the anonymous work afterwards republished under his name, he attempts to bring the parts of the Philosophy of the Unconscious which had been written before he had made a very thorough study of the theory of descent, into harmony with the teachings of modern science, so far as this can be done without abandoning his principal doctrines, as, for instance, monism, dynamic atomism, etc. Closely connected with the result arrived at in this treatise, namely, that *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*,—this last attempt to preserve a teleological metaphysic,—may also prove to be the last attempt to preserve a purified faith in God, is what von Hartmann wrote on David Strauss' last work, and

closely connected with the entire contents of the treatise is what he has to say on Darwin, *i.e.* his *Self-Disintegration of Christianity* (Berlin, 1874), and his *Truth and Error in Darwinism* (Berlin, 1875). In the first of the two works, he calls Strauss superficial, because he seeks only to refute the orthodox, and not also the liberal, Protestants. He and they certainly occupy perfectly common ground, inasmuch as they both identify religion with Christianity, and then, because the latter is untenable, reject also the former. It is otherwise with von Hartmann. He admits that the ideal and metaphysical, without which a people would fall back into a state of brutal barbarity, can exist in the uncultured only as feeling; but then he holds that metaphysics in the form of feeling is religion. To take from a people their religion, is to brutalize them. The Christian religion, however, is antiquated, and what we have to see to is, that modern metaphysics, namely monism or pantheism, should be put in the place of Christianity as religion, and that it should supplant theism, just as pessimism should supplant the out-and-out irreligious optimism. A glance at the history of religion shows that an aim such as this is to be attained only by means of a synthesis of the Indian with the Judeo-Christian development of religion, in a form which would unite the characteristics of both these tendencies in religious thought while excluding their defects. This would make a monopantheism with a much more spiritual worship and a much less egoistic morality than are possessed by Christianity. The second of the books mentioned, that on Darwinism, shows that its author is an unqualified adherent of the theory of descent, but not therefore of Darwin's theory. Darwin, by over-estimating natural selection, which would explain at most differences due to adaptation but not morphological differences, and further by limiting the theory of descent to progressive transmutation, but especially, by the way in which, without more ado, he explains every ideal relationship genealogically, and finally, by his untenable analogies, has changed the theory of descent into a doctrine which, as the example of Strauss shows, may be interpreted in an entirely materialistic way, but also in a way entirely different from this. Von Hartmann, in attacking Darwin's progressive transmutation, appeals sometimes to K  lliker's heterogeneous generation, and sometimes to Baumg  rtner's metamorphosis of types, frequently also to Wigand, who however,

he thinks, undervalues the importance of Darwinism. The result he arrives at is, that all the three factors which constitute the theory of selection, namely, the struggle for existence, variability, and transmission, are only subordinate principles of explanation, just as Darwin's purely mechanical theory of the universe is after all only a subordinate moment in the true organic theory, which maintains the existence of teleology without rejecting mechanism, and which has been set forth in the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. The most recent publication of Hartmann's is that which was referred to above (§ 344, 5): *Neo-Kantism, Schopenhauerianism and Hegelianism* (Berlin, 1877). This is a revision of some things which had been previously published, and is closely connected with an essay on the course of the development of German philosophy from Kant to Schelling's system in its latest form, which is contained in the *Collected Studies and Essays*. Just as in the former work his relations to Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Schelling had been discussed, so in this essay he defines his position in reference to the tendencies of thought at the present day. Lange and Vaihinger, Frauenstädt and Bahnsen, Volkelt and Rehmke are carefully criticized in pairs under the headings supplied by the title of the book, particularly in reference to those points in which they differ from the philosophy of the Unconscious. The polemic is objective and dignified. Only one thing seems to have annoyed him so much that he cannot conceal his vexation from the reader, namely, that Vaihinger should contrast the philosophy of Dühring with the philosophy of the Unconscious as a diametrically opposite type, and should maintain that Lange goes beyond the one-sided views which are represented by these two philosophies. Since in the case of an antithesis of this sort the suspicion always arises that equal importance is being attributed to the two parts which form the contrast, and perhaps even to the authors of these, and this often to a much greater extent than was intended by the person who framed the antithesis, we can scarcely blame von Hartmann for being so annoyed. The almost nasty way in which Dühring refers to what has been done by others, and particularly to von Hartmann's work, would in itself make an author of refinement who even when he is controversial is always polite, feel that an injury was done him in being put in company with the former. Besides all this, there are contrasts of so peculiar a

sort that the antipathy could not but increase. Vaihinger has gone so carefully into these as thereby to prove that he has a right to place the two systems side by side—though hardly their authors. To the contrasts which have been brought forward by him, several more might still be added, and among these the following, that von Hartmann and Dühring divided the legacy of abusing professors and professional science, which was left by Schopenhauer, in such a way, that while the former takes quite a special pleasure in jeering at the science of professors, the latter, on the other hand, is never tired of giving a dressing to the professors of science. (Von Hartmann chose a more magnanimous opponent than Dühring, as the latter has experienced to his cost.) [Von Hartmann now lives in retirement near Berlin. His most important works since the appearance of the last edition of these *Outlines* are the following: *The Religious Consciousness of Humanity in the Stages of its Development*, *The Religion of Spirit*, which, the author tells us in the preface to the latter, “are related to one another as the historical and systematic parts of a philosophy of religion” (both 1882), and *German Æsthetics since Kant*; 1st, or Historical and Critical, Part, 1886; 2nd, or Systematic, Part, 1887 (Duncker, Berl.). An English version of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, in 3 vols., by Coupland, appeared in 1884.—Ed.] Like v. Hartmann, EUGEN DÜHRING, who is nine years older, was also born in Berlin. Like Hartmann, also, he was obliged, by a physical calamity (loss of sight) to give up his earlier vocation of a practising jurist, and devote himself exclusively to the study of science. He did not, however, confine himself to the work of an author, but qualified as a lecturer on philosophy and political economy in Berlin. He appeared as an author in both subjects at the same time. The prefaces to Carey’s *Revolution in the Doctrine of Political Economy and Social Science* (Munich, 1865), and to the *Natural Dialectic* (Berlin, 1865), were written in the same month. Connected with the first of these are, *Capital and Labour* (Berlin, 1865), and *The Critical Basis of the Doctrine of Political Economy* (Berlin, 1866), the latter of which occasioned a memoir written by order of Privy Councillor Wagener, which led to a quarrel between the two men that did not reflect credit on either. *Carey’s Detractors* (Breslau, 1867); *The Critical History of National Economy and Socialism*; and the *Course of National Economy*, which reached a second

edition in the years 1875-76, also belong to this division of his writings. On the other hand, connected with the *Natural Dialectic*, we have *The Value of Life* (2nd ed., Leipsic, 1877); the *Critical History of Philosophy* (2nd ed., 1873); and the *Course of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1875). None of Dühring's writings has made him so widely known as the work to which the prize was awarded by the Göttingen philosophical Faculty, *Critical History of the General Principles of Mechanics* (Berlin, 1873). It is true, also, that it proved fatal to him, for the additions in the second edition (1877) led to his being deprived of his lectureship. Since, according to Dühring, philosophy has to establish the principles not only of a theory of the universe but also those which apply to the conduct of life, and since the conduct of life is for him the more important of the two, he lays especial emphasis on disposition in the philosopher. In accordance with this, he has brought into special prominence in his *History of Philosophy* those philosophers who in his opinion gave by their character new impulses to their contemporaries and to posterity. Among these, he counts Schopenhauer, not on account of his doctrines, for they are treated critically, but because he finds Schopenhauer's character so worthy of admiration—an admiration in which he will hardly get many to join. With this harmonizes very well the fact, that in his own case what really incites him to engage in philosophical speculation is the feeling which impels one to search into the meaning of existence and to seek to transform his life; that is to say, his speculations are throughout of a passionate character. Passionately to attack everything which prevents us from understanding existence and leads us away from active work, becomes in his case a duty. Since understanding is the organ whereby we comprehend existence, while work has the sensuous present world for its theatre of action, the fierceness with which he falls upon everything which savours of mysticism, or which points to anything beyond the present, is easily explained. He directs his wrath above all against religion, in which the elements of popular disease are entrenched, and which, as the pernicious belief in ghosts, as the hallucination of a delirious fever, etc., is the worst enemy of the true philosophy, *i.e.* of the philosophy of reality. Materialism, therefore,—in the shape, for instance, in which the two greatest philosophers of the nineteenth century, A. Comte and L. Feuerbach teach it,—

is the true pedestal of the true philosophy, because it delivers us from the spectres of the immortal soul, and a God. Only the quack philosophers, those priests of the second grade, who occupy our university chairs, refuse to admit this merit of materialism. There certainly ought to be no mistake about the fact that the negations of materialism, taken along with their positive complementary truth, that only matter exists, supply only a small part, something like $\frac{1}{20}$ of true philosophy. This, together with the remaining $\frac{19}{20}$ of the true positive doctrine of practical life and science, makes up the entire philosophy of reality. The philosophy of reality is really formed into a whole in this way; and therefore the true philosophy allows the validity of materialism, but does not misrepresent it, as, for instance, Lange does, when he overseasons it with the mongrel philosophy of professor Kant. Morality in particular finds its surest foundation in materialism. It is only after our material interests have been satisfied that we are in a position to satisfy our higher interests. So far as the general arrangement of his system is concerned, Dühring seeks in the *Dialectic*, or higher logic,—which stands related to the ordinary logic as higher analysis does to arithmetic,—to explain the laws of thought, which are at the same time laws of reality. The most important propositions referring to the further development of his system are the following: The inviolable Law of Identity, according to which what is contradictory cannot be thought and cannot exist, does not exclude that antagonistic struggle without which there is no development. The prevailing conception of infinitude is false, and has arisen from confounding the subjective possibility of always going further with objective limitlessness. Further, the Law of Sufficient Reason is false, because in every case it is necessary to go back to something with which the question as to ground or cause comes to be meaningless. Finally, it is owing to a false preconceived idea, that law and what is universal come to be regarded as convertible conceptions; for even what is purely individual may be characterized by conformity to law. Constant use is made of these propositions when Dühring comes to give an outline of his philosophy of reality in the *Course of Philosophy*. Since here, in the separate sections, he indicates how many leaves are devoted to each, it is already evident that Dühring is in a hurry to get to what is for him the most important part of his subject,

the practical realization of his principles. After having in the Introduction (pp. 1-16) established the Notion of philosophy (*vid. supra*), he proceeds to show that the principles of knowledge and will are to be developed in the two principal parts of philosophy, and he then passes on to the development of the former. In the first and second sections (Fundamental forms of Being, pp. 16-55; and Principles of the Knowledge of Nature, pp. 56-127), that being which is the only being, and which is one in itself, is conceived of as limited. This is matter. Its elements are permanence and change; and while the first of these, the atoms with their inherent forces, require no beginning, the second does. This beginning of what takes place must be thought of as having occurred in time. What we have not as yet succeeded in doing may perhaps be accomplished some day by mechanics, when it has been further developed, namely, to explain how matter, which is similar to itself, came to be in a state of differentiation. By this, the transition from statics to dynamics would be made. To begin with, we must simply allow that the differentiation which has appeared, or, that what has actually taken place, is a fact. Within this, the antagonistic movements are the only means by which something increasingly higher is produced, until what is highest of all, namely, sensation and consciousness, are reached. (It is not quite clear how Dühring can regard the introduction of types or ideas after the fashion of those of Plato and Schopenhauer, as well as his attempts to justify teleology, as compatible with this purely mechanical position.) Life appeared at a definite point of time. It is not for this reason something accidental, for the Dialectic showed that conformity to law and eternity are not convertible terms. Dühring praises in Darwin's theory only what Lamarck had already taught before him. He rejects the additions, and above all the "monkish and Malthusian" theory of the struggle for existence which is a deification of brute force. The supposition that descent alone can explain likenesses he holds to be one-sided, on the ground that similar geological and other conditions must have produced similar effects. He would like, moreover, if, in general, the clear and intelligible conception of increasing combinations were substituted for the obscure conception of metamorphosis, so that the organic may represent only mechanical processes in a combined form. A special section, namely, the third, which

is entitled, *Elements of Consciousness* (pp. 128–191), is devoted to the highest of all vital manifestations. What has here to be done, is to find out the various processes of consciousness and their material conditions, specifically different from them, without foisting into these processes an imaginary subject which we are accustomed to call a soul. But at the same time we must never overlook the fact, as A. Comte has done, that the physiology of the organs is only a science which helps us to form a theory of consciousness; and this again, in its turn, has itself to take a position in which it can be of service, particularly to morality. Like all processes in the universe, sensation, which fills up a real gap in the universe, also originates owing to the antagonism of forces—is, in fact a sensation of resistance. This is true of every sensation; for touch, in connection with which this antagonism is most plainly seen, is typical of all the higher senses, the foundation of which is always the sense of touch. In the schematism of the senses, that of Nature is repeated, hence the natural and justifiable supposition that sensations correspond to objectivity. The impulses and passions are for action what the sensations are for knowledge. Since they presuppose sensation, and since the stimulus which produces sensation is present in space and time only, sufficient warning cannot be given against the assumption of mystical effects of the future, such as we meet with in the theory of instincts, presentiments, and the like. The impulse of preservation and the sexual impulse must be taken as representing the fundamental impulses. Along with the end which these impulses have as the end directly sought, there is at the same time the pleasure which accompanies them. (This, however, explains unavoidable pain as well.) But since those impulses have now a double end in view, namely, the preservation of the individual and the species, and also pleasure, there arises the possibility of mistakes. The blunders which are by no means unknown in nature, become in this case in those points of consciousness which by the action of Nature flash up in bodies that are endowed with nerves, false steps consciously made. The passions, too, have been condemned by a hypocritical morality, exactly as has been done with the impulses; and thus there has been no possibility of getting to know that they form the basis of ethical conceptions. Thus, for example, revenge forms the basis of penal justice, and envy that of

communism. This section closes with a discussion on understanding and reason ; and the distinction drawn between them is, that the former is the faculty of rational insight, while by the latter is to be understood the faculty of carrying out that insight into actions. The senses and sensations, accordingly, constitute the foundation of understanding, while impulses and passions supply the contents of reason. Hints in the direction of a correct estimate of language are scattered about. The fourth section, entitled Morality, Justice, and Nobler humanity (pp. 192–262), shows us what Dühring has to say in his special line as communistic moral philosopher. Since we can speak of what *ought* to be done only where one will is confronted with another, we have to consider the first meeting together of two wills. We have to observe besides, that in every man the brute nature more or less exists, *i.e.* rapacity and the lust of power, which represent what is left in us of the beast of prey ; and then we have to see what shows itself as a direct manifestation of nature, and what has originated owing to some mutual agreement. Natural “resentment” gets a very prominent place in connection with this, and, starting from it, Dühring passes on to law, and asserts that criminal law is the key to all the relations of law. Natural resentment, or the demand for retaliation, which, put shortly, is revenge, is the natural consequence of the violation of freedom, or injustice. It is an arrangement on the part of nature, the aim of which is self-preservation, and it forms the foundation of the most perfect criminal law. Since the community takes over the right of revenge, and forbids the individual to exercise it, it inflicts suffering on the person who has committed the injury ; and in order that an expiation may take place, it inflicts on him more suffering than he had inflicted. (The fact that Dühring carries on a constant polemic against capital punishment, presents an odd contrast to this view.) It is not only, however, criminal law which ought to be based on the principle of reciprocal relations, but the whole of civil law. To get this done, we should certainly require to have a thorough reform of law as it at present exists ; for in the law of marriage it countenances marriage by force, in which the woman has become a means of enjoyment for the man without will of her own ; and in the law of property it helps capital to take the advantage of labour. There is need of having a humanity of a higher stamp, particularly in regard to these two points.

Until this state is reached, those who are taken advantage of cannot help defending themselves in a way which conflicts with the existing so-called law. The fifth section (pp. 263–340) is entitled *Commonweal and History*, and pronounces Rousseau's labours to be the only ones which might have given a start to the construction of the free society. The only fault to be found with him is, that he too cheaply sacrificed the individual will to the majority. All exercise of lordship is excluded from the free society, which is therefore something wholly different from the State, which exists only by the exercise of violence—and particularly from the so-called legal State, which, notwithstanding all the objections which have been made against the police-State, is very like the latter. In accordance with his fundamental principle, that a rational atomic theory has truth on its side, not merely in science but in politics as well, Dühring firmly maintains the sovereignty of the individual, and calls for a society in which each one is bound by agreement with all the rest to perform mutual offices of help in the way of protection against injuries. Force is to be rejected even when it serves the cause of justice. The State, as it at present exists, is therefore to be thrown aside, for it is only the product of usurpation. In its place we must have a condition of things in which even military leaders will be elected, in which blind obedience will disappear, in which there are no judicial castes, in which small communities will take the place of large States; and all who compose these communities will have got beyond the childish notion that there is anything supernatural, and there will therefore be neither worship nor oaths, etc. He declares that Buckle and Comte have done for history what Rousseau did for society; but then they are only beginners. History is nothing but a continuation of the work of nature, and therefore it is not simply a moving in a circle, but a progress, in which the first era, that of religions, is concluded by the French Revolution. This, again, points in the direction of a new era, in which communistic socialism supplies the historical programme of the present day. The disappearance of the State founded on force, and, therefore, among other things, of paid labour, is being brought about everywhere by Cæsarism (in a bastard form by Ministerialism). We see this in the present day also. The importance of separate individuality, of nationality, centralization, and self-government

are fully discussed; and finally, the increase of the value of life is laid down as the fundamental function and the fundamental law of history. The sixth section (pp. 341-385) is devoted to the consideration of this subject; and in the course of the thorough-going attack which is made on Pessimism, a great deal of what had already been said in the *Worth of Life* is repeated. (It is only the pessimism of Lord Byron,—in whom Dühring sees the genius of the nineteenth century, exactly as he sees in Rousseau the genius of the eighteenth,—which, as a “pessimism of indignation,” finds an excuse in his eyes.) The seventh section (pp. 386-430) is entitled the Socialization of all Forms of Activity; and it gives such an ideal description of the appearance which would be presented by a socialistic commonwealth, in which the journalists would no longer have their incomes in their eye, but only the matters they had to deal with, as almost to suggest to one the state of things represented in Gessner's idylls, in which Tieck missed “some wolf.” The eighth section (pp. 431-525) is taken up with the consideration of science and philosophy in ancient and modern society, and prophesies that a time will come when both of these will be the common property of all, and in which there will be no longer special scholars and philosophers, who are simply priests of the second grade. To this coming time the present stands in strong contrast, as is shown in rather a drastic manner in a special chapter. In this chapter Dühring had already practically said all the things which, when he repeated them two years later, led to his being deprived of his lectureship. It is quite intelligible how the suggestions which are thrown out in connection with the description he gives of the present state of things, and particularly how those which refer to the general school in which, after national schools and universities have disappeared, all will receive, if not the same education, at any rate an education of the same value, should impress people as being very radical. It is only, however, he says, by following them, that a condition of science and philosophy will become possible, to which the present stands in the same relation as imprisonment does to free life. The conclusion of the work entitled, *The Study and Development of the Philosophy of Reality*, contains, in addition to the methodological instructions, an autobiography of the author of this philosophy, written between the lines.—To the principle which is followed in this work:

always to say only so much regarding a system as will make clear to the reader what the founder of the system really intended, and how he sought to attain his aim, there remains to be added a personal reason, which explains how the account of Dühring's theories has come to be so full. The author does not conceal the fact that, owing to the snappish and rude tone of the writing, owing to the constant repetitions, owing to the unfair assertions made by Dühring, that he was the first to say, or even the only one who did say, things which are to be found in a hundred books (as, for instance, that revenge is the foundation of penal justice, that besides our egoistic inclinations we have sympathetic inclinations—what only Anniceris, Comte, and Dühring have discovered!), the study of this system was a disagreeable task. His account will betray this in some places; but just for this reason he felt that he must avoid giving rise by brevity to the impression, that we have to do here with a phenomenon which could be put off with a passing notice.

6. In maintaining that the Hegelian system was a one-sided idealism, ULRICI was at one with Chalybäus, as was pointed out in § 342, 2; only, in the case of the former, the realistic elements with which he seeks to remedy this defect, do not, as in the case of the latter, remind us of Herbart, for whom Ulrici appears to have no special liking. In connection with one who is so conversant with English literature, we involuntarily also think, when he takes to philosophy, of theories which have sprung up on the other side of the Channel. One who has heard from Ulrici's own lips, that he did not become acquainted with Locke and the Scottish school till late in life, can certainly not speak of the impulses which the former, and particularly the latter, gave to his philosophical speculations, in such a way as to imply that it was a case of master and pupil. But even one who has this knowledge may doubt whether, if Jacobi had not naturalized the doctrines of the Scotch in Germany, and if Ulrici had not occupied himself with English books and cultivated the society of English people, the form and contents of his writings would have been the same as they are now. We can hardly think that we are any longer in Germany, when we hear him say, that when speculation and empiricism come into conflict, one of the two, and most probably the former, is in the wrong; or, for instance, again, when he says that even the

Pythagorean theorem would have fared badly, so far as certainty is concerned, if it had not been verified by measurement. The section just referred to takes up only the first or critical part of Ulrici's *Fundamental Principles of Philosophy*. The second part, which appeared in the following year, contains the speculative foundation of the system of philosophy, or the Doctrine of Knowledge. Since a great deal of what was here advanced has been repeated in a more concise form in the *System of Logic* (Leipsic, 1852), of which the *Compendium of Logic* (Leipsic, 1860) is a synopsis, the tables of contents belonging to all the three works may be here joined together. As the result of the critical part, Ulrici declares that the history of the more recent philosophy proves, that every system which has hitherto been set up, be it dogmatic or sceptical, realistic or idealistic, presupposes the fact of human thought. (This is the case particularly with the dialectic of Hegel, the absence of presupposition in which is a delusion, and the contents of which are made up of what is an impossibility.) The only fault that is to be found with this presupposition is, that those who made it had no proper understanding of what it involved, and of how it was to be justified. Philosophy, which, speaking generally, has for its task to find out facts and establish their laws, must above all explain the fact of thought and knowledge. We have first of all to see what is involved in that fact, and therefore, since thought has been presupposed, what has been presupposed along with it. The question as to what thought means, leads to the following propositions which formulate the fundamental determinations of thought. Thought is activity ; but activity is a simple conception which cannot be further defined, since *e.g.*, motion, which some would place above it as being a higher generic conception, is itself a kind of activity. Along with productivity, which accompanies this activity, as it does every other, we have as the specific mark of thought, the act of making distinctions, so that it can be defined as distinguishing activity, though certainly not as simply the act of making distinctions. To this there must be added as a third determination, the fact that thought, by distinguishing itself *in itself*, becomes consciousness and self-consciousness, in connection with which we may have the distinction, that the one kind of thought reaches this state immediately, while the other reaches it by means of the co-operation of others. In its

character as distinguishing activity, thought, fourthly, can only think in distinctions, *i.e.*, it can only have a thought while, and in so far as, it distinguishes it from another thought; so that pure thought, *i.e.*, thought without content, is no thought; but every real act of thought contains within it a manifoldness. Finally, in that fact is contained the certainty that thought is in a position to know what is thought of—at least when this is itself—to be what it really is. We have now further to justify these fundamental presuppositions of all philosophy, which, when taken together, may be called the fundamental fact upon which philosophy rests. Since they are *fundamental* presuppositions, this cannot be done by deducing them from others which lie deeper down. On the contrary, it can be proved that we are warranted in making them, and that we *must* make them, and therefore ought to make them, when it is shown that the assumption of their contraries leads to absurdities or impossibilities. Accordingly, the necessary in thought, *i.e.* the opposite of the arbitrary in thought, is the peculiar criterion of truth; and no distinction can be made between what must be thought, and being. The necessary in thought has a twofold character. It may be bound up with the nature of our thought. In that case it is *formal* or *logical*, and *Logic* is therefore the first part of the theory of knowledge. It has to do with the laws to which, since they are based on the nature of thought as the distinguishing activity, all thought, and therefore, too, what is arbitrary in thought or what is thought of in an arbitrary way, must be subject. From the conception of the distinguishing activity two, but only two, laws of thought are to be deduced. These are, the Law of Identity and Contradiction (because in the act of distinguishing there is neither pure difference nor pure identity), and secondly, the Law of Causality, which is based on the distinction made between activity and act. The more definite determination of the fact of distinction, or the manner *in* which the objects compared are distinguished from each other, whether it be as regards magnitude or qualities, etc., is based on certain conceptions, namely, the categories, which precede the act of distinguishing and are so far innate. The various theories which have been held regarding these are criticised, in order to show that they all appear as relatively true, if the categories are conceived of as simply the universal relations of difference and likeness which have to be

deduced from the nature of distinction ; for in that case it is plain, that besides their logical significance they must also possess metaphysical and psychological significance. The categories, according to Ulrici, are to be divided into original categories, such as, being, unity, difference, space, activity, time, etc., and categories which have been deduced. The latter, again, are divided into simple categories of essential character, categories of relation and substantiality, and categories of arrangement. Among the categories of arrangement, that of End is discussed first, notional subordination next, *i.e.*, conception, judgment, syllogism, and finally, the Idea. At the close of each section, however, the relation of the categories to the absolute is explained. In accordance with this, logic ends with the absolute Idea, or the absolute as Idea, *i.e.*, it ends with the thought, that while the Idea of the individual substance is represented by that very essential nature which explains its relation to the universal end, the absolute alone is an end in itself. Connected with the logical categories which have been enumerated, and particularly with the categories of arrangement, are the ethical categories, which, when united to the feeling of what ought to be, supply us with the foundation of ethics. The categories right, good, true, beautiful, are in like manner to be deduced from the distinguishing activity. The necessary in thought, however, in addition to the logical necessity which is contained in it, contains secondly a necessity which is based on the co-operation of factors which exist outside of thought. Not only can I not deny that $A=A$, and not only am I obliged to lay this down as true, but also I cannot deny and I must lay it down as true, that what is perceived exists. The assumption of idealism in its extreme form, that nothing whatever exists outside of thought, can, when we hold fast to the idea that thought is distinguishing activity, be easily controverted. As thinking, I can think of myself only by placing myself in contrast with what does not think, and therefore material being is a necessary assumption of thought. In the same way, I can think of myself as limited only in contrast to an "other" which limits me, and thus I am compelled to assume the existence of other spirits. Finally, the thought of my being as conditioned, involves the thought of an unconditioned, through which everything is conditioned, so that it becomes imperative to have the thoughts, world, spirit, God.

It is true that, to begin with, the content of these three thoughts is only negative, the not-thinking, the not-I, the not-conditioned. The positive complement comes to us, however, through the positive operation of these three, the existence of which we are compelled to assume by the law of causality which is a law of thought, although it is quite compatible with this that our thought may only correspond with what they are in themselves, but may not be absolutely equivalent to them. Just as the realistic view that our knowledge is conditioned by an influence which is exercised upon us, is a necessity of thought, so also is the idealistic view that our knowledge is spontaneous activity. If both realism and idealism can appeal to the necessary in thought, and are therefore standpoints which are philosophically tenable, this does not mean that philosophy ought to adopt a higher standpoint which is above both and which is not that of either; but rather, on the contrary, that the doctrine of the world, of spirit, and of God ought to be developed in a perfectly realistic way up to the point at which Realism sees itself under the necessity of proceeding in an idealistic way (of assuming laws hypothetically, and so on), and at the same time, in a perfectly idealistic way until a point is reached at which we must take refuge in experience, in the definitely qualitative, and the like. We find, however, that not only does Ulrici demand of philosophy what Fichte had found fault with in Kant's transcendental idealism (*vid.* § 312, 2), but that his doctrine of knowledge gives a summary first of an entirely realistic theory of the universe, and next of an entirely idealistic theory, in order to prove that if both do not confound conjectures with evident proofs, they must come to admit their mutual dependence on each other. What is here worked out in a sketch has been worked out with greater exactness in two works of Ulrici's which are closely connected with each other, and which have had a much wider circle of readers than his earlier books had. These are *God and Nature* (Leipsic, 1862, 3rd ed., 1876), and the first part of *God and Man*, which, under the special title *Body and Soul* (Leipsic, 1866, in two divisions in the 2nd ed., 1874), contains the outlines of a psychology of man; while the first-mentioned work contains the outlines of a philosophy of nature. (It is these writings in particular which remind us of English works with a similar tendency.) Both works, however, which set themselves the task of constructing an idealism on a

realistic basis, were preceded by *Faith and Knowledge; Speculation and Exact Science* (Leipsic, 1858), as a sort of programme. In this work, Ulrici seeks to make a contribution towards bringing about a reconciliation between the conflicting claims of religion, philosophy, and empirical science. In order to do this, he calls attention to the fact that a great deal not only in religion, but in philosophy and in all the sciences, does not deserve the name of knowledge, but only of faith, although you may call it scientific faith, because the unconditioned necessity, or the unthinkableness of what is different, is not capable of proof. In the further course of the argument, scientific faith is distinguished from purely subjective opinion, from personal conviction, and from religious faith, so as to bring out the fact that when the reasons for and against are of equal weight, the first gives its consent simply in accordance with its wishes; the second, because one side of the personality demands a decision; the third, because the whole, and particularly the ethical, personality makes this demand, while scientific faith rests on an objective preponderance of reasons. In reference to the contents of *God and Nature*, Ulrici himself remarks that the title ought properly to be, "Nature and God," since the results of modern science constitute the starting-point, while the aim which has to be reached is constituted by the proof of the truth, that God is the creative author of nature and the absolute presupposition of science itself. He develops this proof in such a way that in the separate chapters which deal with science, the scientific coryphæi themselves are introduced and made to speak; and then it is shown that their theories consist in great part of unproved hypotheses, which besides, may be employed quite as readily in the interests of a theistic theory as in those of an anti-religious one. Most of the chapters in the first and second sections, which take up scientific ontology and cosmology, accordingly close in rather a sceptical way. The third, shows that the fundamental assumptions of modern science, atoms and forces, presuppose the existence of some one as their author. The fourth, represents God as the necessary presupposition of science, since all our knowledge and therefore also our knowledge of nature, rests on our distinguishing activity, while this itself is a distinguishing after God, and is an act which presupposes the distinguishing, creative, original power of God. So, too, since freedom is a

condition of science, which comes to exist only by means of conscious action freely exercised, and since freedom again does not come into conflict with the almighty power of God, but on the contrary presupposes it, we reach the same result. Finally, however, it is pointed out, that science also rests on ethical categories (*i.e.*, of order), and by means of these refers us back to the Creator, owing to whom nature is made into the workshop of ethical ideas. The fifth section gives a speculative examination of the idea of God, and of His relation to nature and humanity, in which the idea of God and the conception of creation are described as conceptions which assist and limit our thought and cognition, which we have no exact knowledge of, but respecting which we have a scientific faith, just as in science we have faith respecting an atom, infinite divisibility, and so on. All that we can do, therefore, is to represent these conceptions to ourselves analogically, and so we pass from our own conditioned joint production to the unconditioned self-production, as that is conceived of in creation, which begins with the original thoughts of the world—that product of the absolute distinguishing activity of God. With this there is connected, secondly, the act in which God does not so much distinguish the world from Himself, as rather the manifoldness in the world. In the former act, the world is posited, in the other it is arranged; in the former it is laid down as possible, in the latter it is laid down as real. The two facts that the world is not eternal and yet that its creation is eternal, do not contradict each other. It is by carrying out the distinction between God and the world through the various logical and ethical categories, that the conception of God comes to have definiteness and clearness; while the world is in space, space is in God, etc.; God is absolute causality, He is absolute goodness, love, and so on. In the same way, the investigations which have hitherto been made regarding the world supply the data necessary for explaining the transitions from a lower form of existence to a higher, from the inorganic to the organic, and from this to the psychical and spiritual, without having recourse to the assumption of a creative activity on the part of God, but simply of the activity whereby He orders things. They also enable us to see that the aim of creation is that living fellowship with God which is attainable by man. The essence of religion, of the feeling at once of dependence and freedom, which is

called forth by the influence exercised by God on man, is the last point which is discussed, so that the "treatise ends at the point at which ethics, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history, begin their task." Ulrici closes his work, *God and Man*, with exactly the same words, because it is meant to lead to the same conclusion, by approaching the subject from a different side. As the philosophy of nature shows him especially in the rôle of an antagonist of anti-religious physics, so his psychology shows him to us as the opponent of materialism. He himself defines his task as an attempt to "prove on the basis of thoroughly ascertained facts that to the soul as distinguished from the body, and to spirit as distinguished from nature, it is not only fitting that there should belong, but that there actually does belong, not simply an independent existence but also the right of ruling." With this end in view he discusses in the *First*, or physiological *Part*, first the conceptions of matter and force, and in connection with these comes to the conclusion that modern science warrants the assumption, that every existing thing is a centre of forces held together by a uniting force which coincides with the resisting force. From this he passes on to the conception of organism, in order to explain which Liebig, among others, rightly assumes the existence of a special force which forms the primitive organism, namely, the cell, and from the cells constructs a formation which is an end in itself, and which maintains itself in existence until it has gone through the series of the stages of its development. The human body is then discussed; the difference between it and the animal is examined; the purely materialistic explanations of sensation, consciousness, etc., are shown to be untenable; and the admission of the most thoughtful physiologists, who, if it were at all possible, would gladly be materialists, is accepted, namely, that to the physiological processes there must be added an unknown something in order to explain the psychical processes. The nervous system and the soul form the subject of a new section, in which the view is developed, that the soul is to be conceived of as a fluid resembling ether, yet unlike ether in so far as it does not consist of atoms, but is a continuous fluid which spreads itself out from a centre, penetrates the whole body as composed of atoms, and co-operating instinctively with the vital force, if indeed it is not exactly the same as this, exercises the power

of producing morphological structures. Where, again, it rises to consciousness with the power of distinguishing, it manifests the peculiarly psychical effects. A detailed consideration of the organs of sense and their functions according to the most recent investigations by Weber, Volkmann, Fechner, Helmholtz and others, makes up the fifth and last section of the physiological part, in which, quite at the end, he discusses the feeling which is made up of all feelings, mood, impulse, and instinct. He then collects together once more all the special facts supplied by the results of physiological investigation which may be used as proofs of the operation of specific psychical forces and of the existence of the soul. In the *Second*, or psychological *Part*, he states that consciousness forms the starting and central point of psychology, and he discusses its origin. As in his earlier works, he places this origin in the distinguishing activity of the soul; but it is more strictly determined that it is an act of distinguishing self *within self*, from which consciousness results, since we cannot deny to the plant a power of distinguishing itself, and accordingly perhaps also the plant has sensation. He then passes on to the conscious soul, treats of it in its relation to its body and to other bodies, and in connection with this, answers the question as to how the soul comes to be conscious of its bodily form. He next discusses waking, sleeping, dreams, somnambulism, mental derangement, temperaments, age, the sexes, races, and nationalities, and ends the discussion by affirming that while the soul certainly stands in a thoroughly reciprocal relation to the body, it is not, though so related, the weaker part, but is on the contrary the predominating factor. The third section treats of the conscious soul in its relation to itself, and especially of its life as manifested in feelings, ideas, and impulses; while in connection with the impulses a distinction is drawn between pure sensuous impulses, impulses of feeling, and impulses of presentation. In the freedom of the will, and in the effort to have this freedom actively realized, we have a manifestation of the highest reach of impulse, which conditions, and is at the same time conditioned by, the highest form of psychical life as manifested in ideas, namely, understanding. In the fourth section, which has to do with the conscious soul in its relations to other souls, he treats of the social impulses and feelings which we owe to nature, of the ethical feelings, ideas, and aspirations, finally of

the education and culture of man, and particularly of the self-education of the will, because the essence of man's personality is conditioned and determined by his will. This essence of personality is discussed in the fifth and last section, which treats of the soul in its relation to God. The relation between ethical and religious feelings is here very fully discussed. These feelings, although they are not identical, are yet as closely connected together as are the metaphysical and ethical natures of God, and for this reason the one is the complement of the other, and they never can come to be in contradiction with each other. In harmony with what was said in *God and Nature*, certain views as to the origin of the idea of God are refuted also here, and it is asserted that the real foundation of this idea is to be found in the religious feelings implanted in us by God, and in which the feeling of dependence is united with the feeling of spiritual worth. The religious ideas originate in the distinction we make between the perception of God's existence which we owe to feeling, and what is contained in other perceptions. These ideas are various ; but the religious feeling is only one, though certainly at first so tender and weak that it can at a very early stage be further developed or dimmed and checked. Hence the differences which exist among children. With the Psychology Ulrici's *Outlines of Practical Philosophy* (Leips., 1873) is closely connected ; and he accordingly unites the two together under the common title, *God and Man*. The intention of the *Outlines* is to sum up the leading ideas of his theory of the universe. This work has not yet been completed, since of the three parts into which his practical philosophy is divided, he has only finished the first, Natural Law, and is still occupied with the Ethics and Æsthetics. The ample general introduction (pp. 1-208), in which he lays the groundwork of his views, stands, as will be readily understood, in close relation to all the three parts of the practical philosophy ; but it is not till towards the close that he comes to take up in a special way natural law. He first recalls the principal propositions contained in the earlier works ; and these constitute the presupposition necessary for the practical philosophy. From the Logic, he takes the propositions, that conscious thought consists in the power of distinguishing ; that all knowledge rests on certain fundamental facts, which, because we cannot doubt them, constitute the necessary

element in thought; and that knowledge, in the course of its further development, is bound by certain rules, which we call the laws of thought and the categories. From the Psychology, he takes the proposition that the will is distinguished from the theoretic faculty by the fact that it manifests effort, from the simple desires by its being capable of putting itself in opposition to the impulses, and by having the capacity of considering and resolving. With this is connected the fact that it distinguishes itself from the impulses, or has the consciousness of freedom. Herewith stands or falls the truth which forms the foundation of all ethics, namely, that we have the feeling that we *ought* to be or do this or that—a truth which rests on the fact that we cannot think of freedom apart from consciousness. No one is without this feeling, although in the case of many it never reaches the conscious stage. The feeling which is expressed by the word *ought*, points to the truth that man is determined by ethical considerations, and becomes intelligible only when man has an ethical aim set before him. This aim, which is ethical perfection, consists in the highest possible culture of the spiritual powers. Since, as psychology teaches us, these are the powers of cognition, will, and feeling, the ideas which correspond to them, namely, those of the true, the good, and the beautiful, are the fundamental ethical conceptions or categories which more definitely determine what constitutes the feeling that we ought to do this or that. All three are submitted to a very careful examination; and it is shown that an ethical character belongs in particular to the aspiration after truth which is the foundation of the two others, and this, because its origin is not to be found in sense, and because it seeks after law and order, and pursues an ideal. In the same way, it is shown with regard to the idea of the beautiful, that it has to do with man's power of representation, which is dependent on the will, and therefore has an ethical character. In the last section of the introduction, which treats of the relation of ethical ideas to one another, the result reached is, that none of the three should take precedence of the others, and that their united realization is the task of reason, by which, therefore, we are not to understand a special mental faculty, but the ethical, active exercise of all the faculties. Philosophy, as the science of reason, must of course be guided by all three ideas. Still, a difference manifests itself in its different parts.

Ethical presuppositions should not be mixed up with investigations into nature, history, etc., or in general into what is given in experience, so that they may not falsify the result. The law here is, that the investigation of truth should be conducted with an entire absence of all presuppositions. We can only base ethics on the results arrived at in a thoroughly independent way in the fundamental departments of knowledge, so that the evidence supplied by these constitutes the starting-point of ethics, namely, that truth is knowable only because its nature is ethical. When philosophy has gained a knowledge of this truth, it becomes what it essentially is, not only in its final part but all throughout, namely, practical philosophy, though, if we take it in connection with the two ideas of the good and the beautiful, it forms a part of practical philosophy as ethics in the narrower sense, and æsthetics. The remainder of the book (pp. 211-540) is occupied with the first part of ethics, namely, *Natural Law*. Since law embraces all those conditions under which subjectivity can maintain itself and develop further, and since this development is an ethical duty, the law of nature and ethics are related to each other as means and end. Ulrici accordingly demands that the one should be most strictly separated from the other; and not only does he attack Trendelenburg, who nowhere separates the one from the other, but the Hegelian view also,—according to which moral communities get a place neither in the doctrine of law nor in the sphere of morality, but in a third sphere,—finds in him an opponent. Marriage and the State are in his opinion simply legal institutions; and where, accordingly, those obligations which are not compulsory are discussed, we are put off with a reference to the doctrine of morals; or they are wholly passed over, as in the case of credit; or else, when he cannot avoid touching on them, as for instance, in the case of patriotism, they are quite briefly mentioned. It is precisely on account of the fact that the State is discussed here as a legal institution, that we can understand why the division of law into the law of property, the law of contract, and the law of persons, which was worked out in the first section, is repeated in the last; while, in the place of the forms of government which are usually referred to,—such as monarchy, etc., and which are put aside as “empty abstractions,”—he introduces, the state of property, the state of contract, the state of persons. We are constantly reminded of

the close connection between the separate discussions and their ethical basis in the feeling of duty and obligation, by the fact that he almost always establishes a right by reducing it to a duty. What I ought to do I may do, is the formula to which many of Ulrici's deductions in connection with law may ultimately be reduced. If it were not that quite towards the end of the work he says of the feeling of right, which is rooted in the ethical nature of man, that in the last resort it is rooted in God, as man's ethical nature is, and that God is really absolute law, the principal title, *God and Man*, might seem to have been quite lost sight of. He here promises, at least, to show in the doctrine of morality, that the same holds good also of natural law.

7. Although the existence of points of contact with more than two different systems can be proved in the case of some of those whose views have just been characterized, still their standpoint had pretty much taken a definite form before they appropriated anything from others, and therefore their doctrines could be described as children of a monogamic marriage. It is otherwise with a man who, even when quite young, felt the truth to which he gave expression in ripe manhood, namely, "that philosophy will never attain to a condition of permanence until it grows as the other sciences grow, and does not with every new comer propound the problem afresh and then drop it again, but takes it up historically and develops it further." In accordance with this idea, and before his views had settled down into a completed theory of the universe, he devoted himself to a thorough study of wholly different masters. ADOLF TRENDELENBURG, born in Eutin on the 30th of November, 1802 [died in Berlin, Jan. 24th, 1872, after a remarkably successful academic career of nearly forty years.—Ed.], had had, even from his school-days, and particularly owing to the influence of the Kantian König, his attention directed to those philosophical studies which form the basis of speculation, and was well versed in formal logic. He was led to make a more thorough study of philosophy by K. L. Reinhold, but particularly by Von Berger, whose influence may be recognised even to the last in his characteristically sensuous language, which borders on poetry. He threw himself at once into the study of the greatest philosopher of modern times, Kant, and of the greatest philosophers of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle. The more careful

his study of these philosophers had been, the more he felt himself compelled to recognise the value of their originality; and when he began to occupy himself with Hegel, the fact that the latter,—who assigned these philosophers their place in his terminology,—“proceeds unhistorically and turns them into Hegelians,” was not the least powerful of the reasons which roused him to oppose Hegel. When at a later period he became acquainted with Herbart, his views were already formed, so that he got more help from the opposition which Herbart's theories produced in his mind than from his agreement with him. On the other hand, the works of Karl Ferdinand Becker on the philosophy of language had a very important influence on his views. The value of Becker's labours became the more evident to him, the oftener he found that in the development of his own speculative thoughts his views coincided with those of Becker. He became known to the public as a man of philological and philosophical culture by his very thorough works in Latin on the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas and Doctrine of Numbers. In the year 1833, he obtained an extraordinary professorship in Berlin; and while holding this he published his justly valued edition of Aristotle's work on the soul (Berlin, 1833), which was accompanied by an admirable commentary. In the year 1837, he was elected ordinary professor, and gave as his inaugural address a Latin dissertation on the *Philebus* of Plato (Berlin, 1837). His first lectures had to do with the history of philosophy, and the next included logic within their range, and by degrees almost all other departments of philosophical study. His thorough knowledge of Aristotle, as well as his theoretical and practical acquaintance with dialectic and the needs of schools, enabled him to publish the *Elementa logices Aristoteleæ* (Berol., 1837). It is a collection of propositions taken from Aristotle, accompanied by a translation and commentary, and is meant to further the study of logic in schools. It was very well received, and has been frequently reprinted. He afterwards added to it explanatory notes for the use of teachers. His efficiency as an academic teacher was very great. In addition, he developed a truly remarkable activity as Secretary of the Academy. His standpoint, the basis of which is given in the *Logical Investigations* (Berlin, 1840, 2nd ed., Leips., 1862), has remained unaltered since the publication of that work, so that the second edition can be called only an en-

largement of the first. The additions consist for the most part of criticisms of works which had appeared or had become better known since the publication of the first edition. He devotes a great deal of attention to the later doctrines of Schelling and to Schopenhauer. Two controversial essays, which appeared first in the *Neue Jenaische Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, and afterwards under the title, *The Logical Question in Hegel's System* (Leips., 1843), are connected with the work just mentioned, and were occasioned by the attitude taken up by the Hegelian school to that work. Trendelenburg's *Historical Contributions to Philosophy*, appeared in the year 1846 (Berlin). While the second volume, which appeared in 1855, and the third, which appeared in 1867, contain almost nothing but reprints of some academic papers, we have in the first volume two new papers joined together under the title, *The History of the Doctrine of the Categories*. The first of these, on Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, works out in a more thorough way the thought which was first given expression to by Occam (*vid.* § 216, 5), and had been developed by Trendelenburg himself in his Latin dissertation, namely, that Aristotle had reached his categories under the influence of his grammatical sense (*cf. supra*, § 86, 6). The second, gives a history of the doctrine of the categories from the time of the Pythagoreans down to the date of the appearance of his own *Logical Investigations*. Many of the academic papers refer to Leibnitz, Frederick the Great, and other personalities who are of importance for Prussia, as was necessarily to have been expected in addresses delivered on the anniversary celebrations of the Academy. The critical remarks on Herbart deserve special mention, and above all the paper entitled, *On the Final Distinction between Systems*, and the other connected with it, *On the Fundamental Ideas of Spinoza and their Results*, which have been very widely read. We may mention, lastly, the *Natural Law on the Basis of Ethics* (Leips., 1860, 2nd ed., 1868), the first and only "advance into the sphere of reality," with which he had followed up his *Logical Investigations*. To the twenty chapters which this latter work originally contained, three are added in the second edition; the First, which treats of logic and metaphysic as the fundamental sciences, the Tenth, which, under the heading "End and Will," contains a detailed criticism of Schopenhauer, and the Twenty-third, which is entitled "Idealism and Realism."

The line of thought pursued in the work, as thus enlarged, is in substance as follows : (I.) All the sciences flow over on the one hand into metaphysics, when they come to a point at which the special grounds upon which they rest pass over into the universal ground, and at which their special object is marked off as distinguished from existence in general ; and on the other hand,—in virtue of the fact that each science follows a definite method which excludes mere opinion,—they flow over into logic, which investigates thought. That science which seeks to comprehend the essential nature of science, and aims at being the theory of science, must for this reason embrace both metaphysics and logic. It may be called Logic in the wider sense. It has to explain how knowledge is possible, and how that to which all science points, namely necessity, is possible, and wherein it consists. The fundamental science sought for, is supplied neither by formal logic (II.), which, as such, has been in existence only since the time of Kant, and has no right to call itself Aristotelian, and which does not really make good its pretension of abstracting from matter ; nor by Hegel's dialectic method (III.), in which "pure" thought is able to start only by the help of the perception it despises, and by foisting in concrete thoughts, particularly that of motion. The problem (IV.) of this fundamental science is to abolish in consciousness the opposition between thought and being, for it is in the reconciliation of the two terms of the opposition that knowledge consists. It has therefore to give an answer to the questions : How does thought get to being ? How does being enter into thought ? That which mediates between the two can only be something which is common to both ; and since it does bring about a mediation between them, it must be active. We have therefore to seek after the form of activity which is common to thought and being ; and it must be a form of activity which is not based on any other form, but which, as the foundation of all others, is known only through itself. This we find in motion (V.), of which, since repose itself is only the equilibrium of motions, all being consists, and which, since every act of perception is an act of construction, belongs essentially to thought. To external motion as connected with being, there corresponds the inner constructive motion in thought which we call perception, and which is indicated particularly when we use the words whither ? for

what reason? ground, consequence, end, etc., as describing what are simply relations of motion. It is impossible to give a definition of motion; and in all the definitions that have been attempted, it is already presupposed. The same holds good of space and time (vi.), out of which it is customary to construct motion, instead of recognising them to be products of motion, or sides of it which have been obtained by abstraction, and which, exactly like motion itself, are forms of being and thought. (At this point, he inserts a very full criticism of the theories of Kant and Herbart regarding time and space.) This original productive activity of spirit, which is the counterpart of external motion, enables us to posit objects *a priori* (vii.), and yet to be sure of not having their existence disproved by being, just as is done in the case of mathematical knowledge. But an *a priori* element is mixed up even with sense-perception, because this takes place only where the motion of what produces the influence is met by the motion of the thinking subject. It is certain that the consideration of sense-perception brings us to something which cannot be deduced from motion, namely matter, however welcome it might be, so far as the theory is concerned, if we could regard Kant's construction as satisfactory. Although it is known only through motion, and although we can therefore understand it only in so far as we reduce it to motion, still there is always left over an irreducible residuum; and we are thus compelled to adopt, in addition to motion, matter, as a second principle. On the other hand, the conception of motion completely suffices to define matter, and therefore mathematics, the fundamental conceptions attached to which are in this chapter deduced from motion, form an *a priori* science. (It is at this point, that Hegel is criticised with special fulness.) This does not, however, mean that it presents us with an act of thought which is divorced from perception, or the reverse. Speaking generally, no such separation exists, for discursive thought is the abbreviated expression of intuitive thought. The conception everywhere calls for the accompanying perception; and the highest form of knowledge is the *a priori* knowledge which finds its completion in experience. If the results which followed simply from the conception of motion supplied us with the fundamental conceptions of mathematics, such as point, line, number, etc., then by uniting with it the additional conception of matter, or material substance,

we arrive at the real categories (VIII.), which may also be called physical categories. By these, therefore, we are to understand those points of view necessary to thought,—under which *what* moves itself must be placed, because it is subordinate to thought,—or, as we may call them, the conceptions by means of which thought seeks to express the essence of things. First of all, we get from the creative act of motion, the relation of the producer and the produced, *i.e.*, causality, in which the effect follows from the efficient cause. While from this category we *can* deduce that of form as a subordinate category, and oppose it to matter which is given in experience, as *causa formalis* and *materialis*, there is a real necessity for making the transition to the category of thing or substance, a transition which is indicated by what is done in language, when the products of the producing activity—the verb—are turned into substantives. Substance is the permanent product of causality; and substance itself, when thought of as the starting-point of new motion, has quality. Along with it, we have the categories of quantity and measurableness, which result from the union of the fundamental mathematical conceptions with substance; and finally, in the same way, we get the combination of unity and multiplicity which is present in the relation of inherence. The relation of quantity and quality is treated differently in the second edition from what it is in the first; and the relation of the whole and the parts is much more fully treated. But of all these categories which are to be deduced from motion, we must always regard the first, the *causa efficiens*, as the main category. In the further course of the investigation it is accordingly always introduced in place of all the rest; exactly, in fact, as Kant is in the habit of allowing causality to make him forget the other eleven. Just as the transition from the mathematical conceptions to the physical, was made by the addition of a new principle, namely, matter, so the conception of End, which it is equally impossible to deduce from motion, opens the way for entering into a new sphere (IX.). It is true that the form of the expression, For what reason? Whither? signifies that it may be united with motion; but it is clear that it stands in diametrical opposition to the Whither of the efficient cause, since this makes the parts precede the whole; while in the realization of the end the relation is reversed, and what comes later is turned into what is earlier. The fact of the existence

of the end in connection with all the phenomena of life, is quite certain ; but it is as certain that end in nature, as representing a definite form taken by being through the agency of thought, is understood in a wholly different way from that in which we understand the efficient cause. We understand that nature works in conformity with an end, only because we are able to realize our ends in nature. The organic is a preliminary stage of the ethical, and becomes intelligible by means of the latter. By the addition of the conception of end, the real categories which have been considered, get quite another significance (xi.). They become organic categories, just as, by the addition of matter, the mathematical categories became physical. The efficient cause, as serving the end, becomes a means, and the substance, a machine or an organism, according as the end lies outside or within the cause. Matter in this case becomes organic matter, and form becomes articulate form, as we see it in beauty. In the same way, it is at this stage that the whole and the part, in the proper sense of the words, first come into prominence, and the part thus becomes a member of a system, etc. As for the end, we find that it constitutes the basis of moral conceptions ; so that those fundamental conceptions which were formed independently in the mathematical sphere, find their content in the physical sphere, acquire depth in the organic sphere, and get an elevated place in the ethical sphere. (Let any one compare figure, substance, organism, person.) Besides, this end which dominates the organic and ethical stages occupies a higher place than the efficient cause, while the mathematical and physical stages are under the power of the latter ; but it does not therefore come upon the efficient cause blindly, like a fate, but is the providence on whose account the cause exists.—We have now to pass to a conception which co-operates in a silent way with the already considered fundamental conceptions relating to the production of effects. This is the conception of negation (xii.). It has a real significance only as the repelling force of an affirmation, and therefore only as resting on something positive. Pure negation exists only in thought. Opposition is different from negation, since things that are opposed do not unconditionally exclude each other, like affirmation and negation, but may come together in something which is common to both. And again, contradiction is also something different, exists only between

thoughts, and can occur in connection with reality only where phenomena are related to an end or thought, which underlies them. (Think of anxiety, and the like.) It is unjustifiable, therefore, to turn the proposition of contradiction into a metaphysical principle. Its value consists in its being a dialectical direction to maintain everything in its individual definiteness, and therefore it is of use where a conflict arises (cf. *supra*, § 86, 5). By taking up the consideration of the modal categories (xiii.), the *Logical Investigations* pave the way for the transition to the solution of the second question which was referred to Logic in the introductory chapter, namely, How does knowledge come to have the character of necessity? The categories which express the relation of the thing to the thinking spirit—those of modality—are first of all; appearance, which corresponds to sense; and ground, which corresponds to understanding. A more thorough investigation into the nature of the ground leads to the distinction between the grounds of fact and the grounds of knowledge. The former are either efficient causes or ends; the latter are constructed either out of the effect or the cause. As the cause contains a multiplicity of conditions, so the ground contains a multiplicity of moments. If all the conditions are known, and thus the whole ground understood, we get necessity; when this occurs only partially, we get possibility. The former,—resting upon a community of thought and being, to which thought, which seeks to escape, must yield itself a prisoner.—coincides with the universal, or rather has the universal as its ground. This, again, can itself be partly the universal element which belongs to the actual fact, and partly the universal element which belongs to the ground; while in its manifestation, we have the identical or unalterable. The further question now arises as to the forms in which thought solves the problem, the possibility of which has so far been demonstrated (xiv.). These are the forms and combinations which must of course correspond to those of being. Judgment corresponds to activity, conception to substance; and accordingly, as language gives a substantive form to the manifestations of activity—in the infinitive—we get a stage of judgment which lies at the basis equally of the conception and the development of the judgment. The conception (xv.),—as the substantial form of what has spiritual content, or as substance conceived of as universal,—requires the accompanying general image, and

accordingly never appears without this image. The substantial element in it constitutes its content, while the universal element forms the sphere in which it works. The former is formulated in definition, and the latter in division. Genetic definitions and divisions, which are formed out of the essence of things, alone fulfil the requirements of science. Trendelenburg next takes up the forms of judgment (xvi.), in which the conception takes an active form; and which, in accordance with this, appears as judgment of the content, in which the subject is universalized, and judgment of the extent, in which it receives specification, or categorical and disjunctive judgments. The theories of Kant and Hegel are criticized in detail, and he then passes on to proof (xvii.), where he discusses the difference implied in the contrast between induction and syllogism, and that between the analytic and synthetic processes, and refers to the impossibility of separating the two latter. The treatment of the syllogism (xviii.) is prevailingly critical. Of the positive determinations, the most important is the following: That which in the sphere of the real is the ground, is in the logical sphere the middle term of the syllogism. Where, accordingly, the ground of the real and the ground of cognition correspond, knowledge is complete; and therefore the true deduction from the conception (xix.), is the genetic process or development. It is based on the fact, that the thing is known out of the grounds which produce it. If these consist only of the efficient cause, then it follows the cause alone; when, on the other hand, the end determines the efficient cause, then this end becomes the leading thought to the same degree that it conditions the origin. The indirect proof (xx.) constitutes the opposite of the genetic proof; and although it is of less value than the direct, still, if we take principles into account, it is the only possible one. The system of knowledge (xxi.), as knowledge of the whole, is really the extended judgment, and is the spiritual type of the world. Since the fundamental science has answered the two questions as to the possibility of knowledge, and the necessity of mathematical, physical, organic, and ethical knowledge, the system of knowledge takes such a form, that four parts of philosophy, as representing the universal science, or science of the Idea, which is different from the special sciences, are built up upon logic and metaphysics, which presuppose the particular sciences.

The third, which treats of the organic, will have to end with psychology. All of them together, however, have to do only with the finite. The Unconditioned (xxii.), to which everything points, and of which therefore the world supplies an indirect proof, would, even if the whole world were known, be no object of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the arguments for the being of God—which are fully gone over—have value and even truth, but have no demonstrative force. *Nesciendo Deus scitur.* The organic (and ethical) view of the world, still more than the mathematical and physical, brings us to recognise a whole which conditions everything, and in which the world and what is in it have their determination. By means of this knowledge, it turns the Notion of each thing, *i.e.*, the law of its formation, into its Idea, *i.e.*, its final determination. Accordingly, it is itself idealism (xxiii.), but not the kind of idealism which itself shuts up the passage to reality. This latter, however, is only a dream of the representative faculty; it possesses only a world of *eidola*, and is most fitly described as eidolism. A retrospect (xxiv.) presents us with a summary of the whole course of thought, in which emphasis is once more laid upon motion and end as being the forms of activity which are identical with thought and being, and in which the organic theory of the universe is extolled as that which makes possible a subordination of the real to the ideal, and a realization of the latter in the former.

8. Any one acquainted with the subject will have his attention at once arrested, in studying the *Logical Investigations*, by the elements which have been specified above. If we consider, besides, how Trendelenburg at the same time takes note of all the more important recent intellectual phenomena, and improves, accordingly, his own theories, whether by appropriating the new ideas or by rejecting them, then he more than any other must be described as an historical philosopher. The work of Bratuscheck, which is referred to further on, and which no one will suspect of seeking to minimize Trendelenburg's merits, shows that his main thoughts, at least, have been borrowed from Reinhold, von Berger, K. F. Becker, Plato, Aristotle, and others. But it is also evident, that the elements derived from ancient philosophy outweigh the modern elements. Not only is there proof of this in the fact that, while, as the critic of Hegel and Herbart, he carries his rigour the length of word-catching, he defends with

loving piety even what are manifest errors in Aristotle; and not only is it proved by the way in which he censures Schelling for having taken Aristotelianism simply as a spring-board,—the opposite of this is to take it as a foundation,—but we have his own express declaration that the organic theory of the universe, the basis of which was laid by Plato and Aristotle, is the only philosophy which has a future before it; and that speculation done by fits and starts and by every man for himself, has proved itself to have no permanence. All systems may at bottom be reduced to one of three stand-points: to that in which the efficient cause, blind force or blind matter, is put above everything, Democritism; or to that which, in contrast to this, the End occupies the highest place, Platonism; or, finally, to that which seeks to establish the indifference of that contrast, Spinozism. Trendelenburg expressly declares his adherence to the second of these stand-points. This Platonizing, or rather, this general running of thought into ancient moulds, with which is connected—and not by accident only—the noble and elevated language which distinguishes his works, comes out in a very special way in his *Natural Law*. The second edition, which appeared eight years after the first, is described as an amplified edition. It is, as a matter of fact, simply enlarged by additions, the most important of which are mentioned in the preface. Among the additions which are not especially referred to by himself, attention may be called to certain remarks directed against Schopenhauer. In connection with what was stated in the *Logical Investigations*, he shows that, since the ethical represents an advance on the organic, in treating it philosophically we must take into account not only its ethical necessity but also its physical and logical necessity. Since here in dealing with the ethical it is only Law which has to be considered, we have first of all to establish the Idea of law, *i.e.* its final determination, as this shows itself to be in harmony with the inner end or design. This is done in the *First Part*, in which, in addition to the ethical side of the Idea of law, the physical and logical sides are also treated of. The two latter have to do with the means whereby law takes an active form. Thus, for instance, in compulsion, law takes physical force or the efficient cause into its service; in a legal process it makes use of the logical syllogism, of induction, etc. The ethical side is accordingly the most essential, and

is taken up first by Trendelenburg. The most important point in connection with this is the very decided attitude of opposition which he takes up in reference to the separation made by Thomasius and Kant between the legal and the moral. Even the mediation between these, which Hegel found in the sphere of the ethical, does not content him. He makes no distinction between the ethical and the moral, and insists on a return once for all to the standpoint represented by the joint views of Plato and Aristotle, in which the two were not as yet separated. The chief aim of the work is in the direction of emphasizing the ethical elements in the various relations of law, so as to combat the false independence of juridical law, which not only distorts the theory of law, but also in life deprives it of its due value. What narrows ethics, as represented by Aristotle and Plato, is that they do not rise above the point of view of the ancient world, according to which there is nothing higher than the State and the citizen. The Christian view puts man and humanity above both of these, and, as it passes through the various ages, comes to regard man not only as a political but as an historical being. The principle of ethics, therefore, is human nature in itself, or, in the depth of its Idea and in the wealth of its historical development. Man is accordingly a member of the whole, a member of the ethical organisms, a connected whole in which the individual is strengthened, in which the whole separates into organic parts, and in which both are mutually complementary. The elevation of the individual to the state in which he is adequate to his Idea and realizes the inner end of his being, which is to raise himself from the sensuous to the spiritual, is the realization of the idea of the good, or of perfection, which, according as it manifests itself in disposition, in intellectual insight, or in representation, is the good, the true, or the beautiful. Since disposition takes us back to religion, to exclude the latter from ethics, as Hegel does, is all the more a mistake, that historically States rest on a religious basis. The realization of the ideal man in society and in each individual is accordingly the ethical principle; and all ethical systems which have hitherto been constructed, emphasize either the one or the other of these moments. In the moral whole, law is defined as the substance of those determinations of action by means of which it comes about, that the moral whole and

its organic parts are maintained and can take on new forms. With this determination of the conception of law there is connected in the second edition a detailed analysis of it, occasioned by the objections, in which he explains, among other things, why neither what is generally approved nor the possibility of using compulsion, was included in the definition. So, too, what had already been shown in the first edition, namely, that this definition appreciates the importance of the law of custom and makes intelligible an historical development of the ideas of law, is illustrated in the second edition by a series of examples taken from the history of law. After having defined the conception of law, he explains what is unlawful or wrong, and passes on to the physical side of law, *i.e.* both to those phenomena in which the physical is a limitation of law, and to those in which it is a means employed by law. He here discusses compulsion and punishment, *i.e.*, a diminution by law of personal existence with the express aim of counteracting a wrong committed. In reference to capital punishment, he declares himself to be opposed to those who allow to the murderer an unconditional right to his life, without however maintaining the necessity of precisely this form of punishment. The logical side of law, to which he next passes, shows itself both in its origin, where we have analogies of law and definitions, and in its application, where we have interpretation of laws, subsumption under these, weighing of evidence, etc., all of which show us pure logical activity engaged in the service of law. After having thus in the *First Part* investigated the principles of law, he proceeds in the *Second Part* to deduce from these principles the relations of law. Although Trendelenburg lays special stress on the fact that man in his individuality is never an accidental abstraction, and accordingly declares himself to be most decidedly opposed to the so-called rights of man, which are supposed to accrue to the individual apart from society, he yet considers it necessary, "in order to get a sure start and a clear general idea of the relations of law," instead of beginning with the family, which is the first source of the relations of law, to begin with the person as the basis of law. Thus, it is after he has taken up property and general intercourse, that he passes on to the law of the family, which, according as we deal with its beginnings, its definite existence, or its dissolution, takes the forms of marriage law, domestic law, or

the law of inheritance. In connection with the last-mentioned, he sees in the right of the heir to refuse the inheritance a refutation of the view that the property is left to the family in intestate succession; and he accordingly takes the disposal of the testator as a moment in addition to this, so that the bond of families and possessions here constitute the constructive principle of law. This is followed by the consideration of the State, which is treated of according to the relation in which it stands to property, according to the different orders in it, as government or authority, and finally according to its general constitution. Force is certainly the foundation of the State; but the end sought which first justifies force, is the determination of man, the development of man as a whole. Accordingly, in a way similar to that followed by Plato, only with still greater detail, the State is considered as the universal ideal man. It would be improper to treat of civic society before treating of the State; and if Aristotle treats of the community before the State, he follows only the beginnings of history; but this arrangement is not suitable for things as at present constituted. The opposite views of the State held by moderns, who look more to the individual, and by the ancients, who consider the whole more, are contrasted as national-economic and political, while the State of the statesman, or the royal State, is placed above both. For the expression, "the powers of the State," Trendelenburg substitutes, "the functions of the State," as it is only the State which has power; and he connects his views with those of Constantin Frantz by drawing a distinction between government, military power, legislation, and administration of law. The aim of all State organization is to exhibit, in the reciprocal relation of the parts to the whole, the firmest and most beneficial unity of feeling, intelligence, and power. There is, therefore, no best form of the State. The two pure forms of monarchy and democracy are carefully examined, and it is shown how in their case all the functions of the State must take different forms. The advantages of the monarchical constitution are summed up; the right of resistance to the government, as well as the origin of revolutions are discussed; and he then passes on to the last section, which is entitled, Nations and States. States too, like the individual, have to be mutually complementary, since each one thus strengthens itself; and in them humanity takes an organic form. Accordingly, the movement of international

law passes from the state of constant war at the commencement of things, to that of everlasting peace in future ages. Cosmopolitan discoveries, private rights in international relations, the right of asylum, war, ambassadorial law, and diplomacy, are discussed; and as the goal, it is pointed out, that while the State has been the realization of the universal man in the individual form of the nation, humanity, apart from this limitation, will be one great moral man, and there will be no more waging of war, unless against those powers which are unspiritual or are below the spiritual stage.

Cf. H. Bonitz: *Zur Erinnerung an F. A. Trendelenburg*. Berlin, 1872.—
E. Bratuscheck: *Adolf Trendelenburg*. Berlin, 1873.

9. However different, then, the elements might be which were found united in the men of whom this last section treats, and however great, accordingly, the differences were which were necessarily presented by the *Metaphysics* of George and the *Logical Investigations* of Trendelenburg, or by the *Ethics* of Rothe and Chalybäus respectively, still there was always this similarity between them, that the elements of their doctrines were originally speculation, and philosophy. A different state of things must naturally present itself when speculative doctrines are united, not with any such speculation or philosophy, but with a science, namely, the science of nature, whose watchword is: War against speculation. Nor do we see what was observable in the case of some of those just mentioned, who began in the later years of their lives, after their own philosophy had pretty much taken a complete form, to occupy themselves with the natural sciences, in order to borrow from them what supported their systems. On the contrary, we see here that the thorough, because professional, study of the natural sciences is not interrupted where the speculative impulse awakes, and we find that both equally largely contribute to the form taken by the system. There is something natural in passing from Trendelenburg to such men, because those philosophers to whom he owes most, were the ancient philosophers, *i.e.*, those in whose case philosophy had not yet separated itself from the other sciences; so that even from the genesis of his system we can explain how, in the development of his philosophical views, he so often lays claim to the results of other sciences, such as those of grammar, mathematics, etc. Two men, now, are to be mentioned here, one

of whom is about the same age as Trendelenburg, and the other about half a generation younger, who by a course of study which, just because it presents a contrast, necessarily led to many results having points of contact, and by active scientific intercourse with the same representatives partly of philosophy and partly of science, have come to stand in a relation to each other which makes it difficult even for an attentive observer to decide whether the repulsion or the attraction between them is the greater. These are the two natives of Lausitz, Fechner and Lotze, who present a contrast to each other also in this, that the former will perhaps regard it as an insult when a sketch of the history of philosophy treats of him, while the other would have had to be very forbearing if, when Fichte gave him a place among the physiologists as contrasted with the philosophers, he had taken it calmly. Fichte, however, did not fail later to make an *amende honorable*.

10. GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER was born on the 19th of April, 1801, in the neighbourhood of Muskau, and has been professor of physics in Leipsic since 1834. [Fechner died at Leipsic, Nov. 18th, 1887.—Ed.] He originally attempted to separate the two sides of his nature, that of the penetrating humorist and that of the keen observer, by actually publishing his wonderfully beautiful humorous things under the name of Dr. Mises, and his translations and repositories of physics and chemistry, on the other hand, under his own name. His proof of the theorem that space has more than three dimensions (in his *Four Paradoxes*) already showed the impossibility of making the separation; and this was shown still more by the *Book of the Life after Death*, mentioned above (§ 336, 3), which Dr. Mises had written. Accordingly, when, in the year 1861, Professor Fechner turned his attention to the series of works which develop in a gradual way his favourite theme, he gave the last-mentioned work a place among his serious writings; and when he brought out a second edition in 1866, he called himself Fechner on the title-page, just as, on the other hand, he wrote his *Book of the Moon* as Fechner, without disowning the Dr. Mises in it. A lingering trouble with his eyes, which condemned him to a life of total darkness, enabled him to direct his glance all the more to the inner life; and what he saw on his recovery, when he first came once more

into contact with nature in all her glory, became the germ of what he gave to the world in his *Nanna; On the Psychical Life of Plants* (Leipsic, 1848). But he had proved in the work, *On the Highest Good* (1846), published two years before, that it was not only nature which roused him to reflection. He published what was a further development of the thoughts presented in *Nanna*, in his *Zend-Avesta, or On the Things of Heaven and the World Beyond* (3 vols., Leipsic, 1851). Some years after, his work, *On the Physical and Philosophical Atomic Theory* (Leipsic, 1855) appeared, and in the year following the controversial work, *Professor Schleiden and the Moon* (Leipsic, 1856), which is remarkable as much for the thoroughness with which the investigation is conducted as for the humour in it. After a pause of several years, during which time some extremely interesting papers by him appeared in the transactions of the Leipsic *Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, he issued his *Elements of Psycho-Physics* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1860). In his work, *On the Question of the Soul* (Leipsic, 1861), Fechner himself directs attention to the very close connection in which the *Elements* and the *Atomic Theory* stand to the thoughts developed in *Nanna* and the *Zend-Avesta*. This work is altogether the best fitted for enabling us to take a general view of Fechner's theory of the universe in its entirety and completeness; while in the other works, particularly at the beginning, we easily get the impression that only Dr. Mises worked at the *Nanna*, and only Professor Fechner at the *Psycho-physics*. What Fechner in the *Zend-Avesta* describes as observation of nature in contrast with investigation into nature, is in the *Question of the Soul* described as the true philosophy of nature; and he opposes this quite as much to materialism as to the philosophy which has hitherto held sway. The former resembles the man who denies that the circle has a centre, because, cut the periphery into as small fragments as you choose, you never find it amongst them. The latter, again, resembles those who, before they have found the centre, wish to construct the periphery out of it. In place of this, he seeks for the centre which belongs to the periphery, for the invisible which belongs to the visible; he speculates from facts, *i.e.*, from what experience and calculation have established as certain; and he speculates from this, not beyond it. He first asserts that he makes no distinction between the words "soul" and "spirit," but

understands by both what manifests itself, and can therefore be characterized only by the phenomena of the self-manifestation; while frame or body is that which is grasped by means of the outward senses, and is characterized only by the relations of the external manifestation. He then takes his stand with Descartes on the truth that our own soul exists, as on the one incontrovertible fact. The conclusion drawn as to the existence of other human souls rests on analogy and supplies us with no real knowledge. It ought properly to be called faith. On the same grounds on which souls are attributed to other men, they are attributed also to animals by all with the exception of the Cartesians; and they must also be allowed to plants. It is conclusively shown that the reasons urged against this view are either reasonings in a circle or parallogisms. Fechner next more strictly formulates six positive reasons which were developed in *Nanna*, and arrives at the result that plants have undoubtedly no animal souls, because their souls consist only of sensation and impulse bound to the present, that the souls of animals have besides presentiment and after-feeling, together with memory and a power of representative association, while finally, the human soul possesses the higher consciousness of the past and the future. If the soul of the plant therefore occupies a lower position than the animal soul, still, looked at from another point of view, it constitutes a correlate to this, just as the woman does to the man; and to conceive of the life of the plant as an embryonic life, or life of sleep, is to do it injustice. The gradation rather is: bodies belonging to the inorganic kingdom, which are always and entirely asleep; bodies belonging to the organic kingdom, which are alternately asleep and awake (for the plant, too, opens its eyes when it blooms, only it always has new eyes), and in which plants show a permanent slumbering of the higher faculties, animals of the highest of all. God and his angels are eternally awake. Just as we are under the necessity of supposing that souls exist in a world beneath that of man and animals, we must, exactly in the same way, suppose that souls exist in a world above it. Such are, to begin with, those souls whose body is constituted by the world-body with all that is in it, and therefore by the earth and our bodies included. The earth-soul or earth-spirit looks through the eyes of all men. That spirit is a self-conscious thought of the

greater spirit which we call humanity, spirit of humanity, or whatever you like. Just as our thoughts enter into conflict within us and become reconciled, so too do we within that greater spirit. It may be questioned whether a greater spirit, again, dwells within the single planetary systems, but it is established beyond doubt that just as our soul dwells throughout our body, the world in the same way is dwelt in throughout by God, whom therefore, according as we conceive of Him, we name the All, or the spirit of the All. (Just as the *Nanna* had taken as its theme the soul which is lower than the animal soul, the *Zend-Avesta* takes for its subject the superhuman souls, in connection with which the angels are identified with the spirits of the stars.) We have thus now reached the point at which Fechner's fundamental idea of things can be brought forward. This can be done only at this stage, for he impresses upon every one that the plunge into the dark gulf of a fundamental idea of the essence of things, is best undertaken only after we have exhausted the wealth of the phenomena manifested by this essence; since a fundamental idea of things may certainly be inferred, though nothing can be inferred from a fundamental idea. If we hold firmly to the thought that there is only one fact which is in accordance with experience, namely, consciousness,—this solitary existence which knows how it is, and is exactly as it knows,—and if we pass from this to what we are forced to assume the existence of by the three principles of belief, then undoubtedly it becomes possible to adopt the view which is cherished by materialism and the philosophers of the day, that besides what we possess of things in our consciousness, in sensation, knowledge, etc., there exists not only outside of our consciousness but outside of every consciousness a dark unknowable thing-in-itself, or, it may be, many such dark things, which by their effect upon or reciprocity with the soul give rise to consciousness. To this view, which Fechner compares to the man who, after he had thoroughly studied a steam-engine in all its parts, still wished to see the space in which the horses which drove it were to be found, he opposes the other and true view, according to which there is nothing but phenomena, *i.e.*, what is found in consciousness. The reason why this matter of consciousness presents a connected whole which is free from the arbitrariness of combination, and which thrusts itself upon every individual consciousness,

is, that they are all embraced by a higher consciousness, which unites them together by means of what they have in common and by their reciprocal relations. In this consciousness, we find, in addition to what comes into the individual consciousness, something else which is an external world, not indeed to the higher consciousness, but certainly to the other individual consciousnesses. What comes neither into a lower nor a higher consciousness, does not exist. That this view is idealism, Fechner is well aware; and so he very often blames the modern idealistic systems for not being idealistic enough. By means of an idealism such as this which he works out, everything is not changed into a constantly shifting flux of dreams. Law is what represents the permanent element in phenomena, and what is essentially real in them. He who knows the laws of the combination and course of phenomena, knows all that the wisest man can know of the principles of existence. All questions relating to causality, with their Wherefore? must be answered by the statement: That is the law. Thus the law of phenomena is their real being; and in this sense, and because all the connected wholes of phenomena come into His consciousness which conditions them, we call God the Highest Being. Just as Fechner assumes to himself the name of an idealist, so also he assumes that of a dualist. Phenomena, according to him, are divided into two classes, of which the one is not reducible to the other. The one comprises everything which appears to itself, and therefore the phenomena of self, souls, and spirits. The other comprises what appears to others only, and therefore external phenomena, bodies, corporeal substances, etc. When materialism, which regards what we know of bodies as a secondary consequence of a thing-in-itself, namely matter, appeals to experience, it forgets that all we can prove in connection with what we call bodies, if we make experience the basis, is that there exists a collection of phenomena, which exists for different souls at the same time. The permanent matter which is got by abstraction from this combination of phenomena, is only an expression for a permanent possibility of the recurrence of external phenomena. We have no reason whatever for supposing that there exists more of the corporeal world than the combination of phenomena which is governed by laws, and which exists for more than one unity of consciousness at the same time. This does not at all prevent

us from likewise reducing to its primitive elements that combination which is governed by law, by going back analytically to the primitive elements of the body. If this is done, we finally reach the atom, which is thus as much the boundary conception when we go downward, as God, or the All, is when we go upwards. Fechner does not wish his atomism, —which is developed in his *Atomic Theory*,—to be confounded with monadology, with which, on the contrary, it engages in a life-and-death struggle. His atoms are just the simplest phenomena, and therefore what exists in consciousness, *i.e.*, in the consciousness of God, and thus of all; while, on the other hand, the monads of Herbart and Lotze are dark things-in-themselves. Physical reasons, to begin with, necessitate the assumption of atoms, since it is possible to construct the undulation theory upon which optics, the theory of heat, etc., are based, only on the hypothesis of discrete particles separated from each other by empty space. Then we have the fact, that the phenomena of isomerism, the actual refutation which has been given of Mariotte's law by means of the discovery of a limited atmosphere, etc., can be explained only by these particles. It is besides quite false to assert that the teleological way of looking at things is incompatible with the atomistic view. (Fechner produces himself as a proof to the contrary.) The imponderable ether which exists between the discrete parts of the ponderable matter, consists likewise therefore of discrete parts, and these atoms stand in relation to each other by means of forces, just as the celestial bodies do, *i.e.*, they obey the laws of equilibrium and motion. Combinations of atoms produce molecules, which may be again disintegrated, or which are destructible. The remoteness of the primitive atoms of whose possible dimension and form nothing is known, is to be thought of as relatively very great. No one has as yet succeeded in tracing back the repulsion and attraction of atoms to their primitive forms. Since matter itself is nothing but force, *i.e.* law, the atoms would be centres of force. After this physical exposition, Fechner passes on to philosophical explanations, *i.e.*, he goes on to show *how*, on the hypothesis of atoms, a philosophical view of nature, or a real *Metaphysic*, is possible. In other words, he explains how it is possible to grasp the most universal conceptions of what is given in experience and those conceptions which bound experience, by advancing further

and coming to conclusions on the basis of experience itself, until we reach the most universal and final principles of experience. We have now to think of the atoms, first as having only position but not extension, as real points which are found as the absolutely discontinuous in the absolutely continuous, namely, space and time, so that they present us with the three main conceptions of quantity, viz., nothing, unity, infinitude, or have for their schema, central point, radius, and periphery. By means of the absolute forms time and space, pure matter (the many atoms) gets relative forms. To suppose the existence of matter already formed, as, for instance, balls, in order from this to construct the world, is to build a house out of houses. From space, time, their motions, the relations between them, and the laws which govern them, all that can be constructed in the domain of nature, may be constructed. In addition to an explanation of his position in reference to the doctrines of Herbart, and a critical discussion in the appendix on space, time, and motion, which seems meant to refer to Trendelenburg, the book closes with an hypothesis in regard to the universal law of force in nature, in which the law of gravitation is described as but an imperfect manifestation of a more universal law. Since this law contains in itself a graduated sequence of laws, in which the result of the higher laws, instead of being regarded as a combination of the results of the lower, itself combines itself with the results of the lower laws, it becomes possible by means of it to explain the phenomena of elasticity, crystallization, units of measurement, simple chemical elements, aggregate conditions, and finally, the distinction between imponderables and ponderables, in such a way that in the former it is found to be atoms which enter into combination, and in the latter molecules. The final form of Fechner's views is not, however, represented by the dualism which, according to his own statement, is constituted by his doctrine of soul and body, and which enables him to jeer at the materialists who want to deduce consciousness from what is corporeal, which certainly they must find it easy to do, since, to start with, they have turned what were simply determinations of consciousness, such as sensations, etc., into things-in-themselves. Since, so far as experience goes, every soul has united with it a body, which has been formed in view of external manifestation,—or, to put it otherwise, since the possibility of a combination of

manifestations perceived by self is connected with the possibility of a combination of manifestations perceived by others, so that they form a solidarity and constitute one substance, *i.e.*, are mutually conditioned,—the law of this solidarity must also be sought after ; and this is the task of the *Psycho-Physics*, the elements of which are given in his two-volume work. Fechner says that his theory is materialistic, just because it recognises this fact of two things mutually conditioned ; and that indeed it is more than ordinarily materialistic, because it maintains not only that no human thought is possible without a brain, but also that no Divine thought is possible without a world and movements. It may, however, be equally called a system of identity, because, according to it, both manifestations point to one substance, *i.e.*, to a substance conditioned in accordance with law, while their inseparability is finally conditioned by the unity of the Divine consciousness. Fechner says that his view stands in a relation of complete antagonism to one view only, namely, monadology. Throughout the whole of the *Psycho-Physics* it is taken for granted that the bodily and psychical processes stand to each other in a functional relation. The psychical processes are indirectly conditioned by influences exercised upon the body, and immediately by such as are exercised within the body ; and these latter processes are the peculiarly psycho-physical processes. In the *External Psycho-Physics* the possibility of having a psycho-physical standard is discussed ; and then the law discovered by Weber,—that we have a like increase in sensation corresponding, not to a like, but certainly to a relatively like, increase of stimulus,—is taken as a starting-point, in order,—after the methods have been discussed according to which differences of sensation are measured,—to discover within what limits the law holds good. With a view to this, the experiments made by Weber with the organs of touch only, are extended to the sensations of light and sound ; and in particular, the point is more strictly defined at which we begin to notice a stimulus or a difference in stimulus, and this is called by Fechner the threshold. An attempt is further made to establish mathematically the value of the threshold in the various departments of sense. The following law is next laid down as a parallel one to Weber's law : When the susceptibility for two stimuli changes in a constant ratio, the sensation of their difference remains the same. This law is

compared to the experiments which have been made in connection with exercise and fatigue. Finally, those influences are treated of which come into operation when we have a mixture of stimuli, as for instance, of white with coloured light, etc. The *Internal Psycho-Physics*, which Fechner gives us in the second half of the second volume, treat of psycho-physical processes in the proper sense of the term,—which were passed over by the *External Psycho-Physics*, since the latter went from the physical stimulus directly to the psychical sensation—those processes, that is to say, which go on in the subject, or in the immediate substratum of what is physical. Here the most interesting point is the seat of the soul. First of all, in the wider sense, since the soul is the uniting bond of the whole body, the body itself is this seat. In the narrower sense, it is the organ with which are connected the manifestations of active conscious life; and Fechner does not wish this organ to be conceived of as a point, but as extended, so that in healthy conditions the soul spreads itself through brain, spinal cord, and nerves. It is then stated as in the highest degree probable, that Weber's law, the parallel law, and the law of the threshold will hold good in a much more unconditional way when we come to discuss the relation between psycho-physical excitation and sensation, than in connection with the relation between stimulus and psychical process. The fact of the threshold is in particular of the highest importance for the theory of unconscious ideas, sleep, attention, etc. A large number of experiences in connection with images in memory and imitations of images in memory, hallucinations, etc., are collected together; and he sums up, in some general observations, the main conclusions which can be drawn from them. The hypothesis of a special nerve-ether as the substratum of psycho-physical movements is considered by Fechner to be unnecessary. The imponderables certainly play a rôle in connection with these movements, but so too do the ponderable substances. Most interesting and instructive is the attempt, made by Fechner, in the work entitled *The Three Motives and Grounds of Belief* (Leips., 1863), to show how his standpoint satisfies the highest interests of the emotional side of man's nature, since "it takes the most important utterances of the Bible in a more literal sense than the literalist, and in a more rational sense than the rationalist, and finally elevates the grounds of unbelief into

grounds of belief." After faith has been defined in general as the holding for true what we cannot be certain of by experience, or by logical, *i.e.* mathematical, reasoning, the question is limited to faith in the narrower sense, *i.e.* to faith in the highest things, God, the other world, higher spiritual existences. The determining grounds of faith are divided into motives which force us to believe, and reasons which justify faith, while the union of the two is called principles of faith. Of these there are three sorts. In the first place we have historical principles, since we believe what has been believed before us and is believed round about us. When in the most different circumstances the highest endowed spiritually and the best morally, maintain the truth of a tradition, then we have a weighty reason for holding this to be true. Secondly, practical motives force us to believe; we believe what it is profitable for us to believe, or what tends to our welfare. At any rate, those who are always asserting that there is nothing which is so profitable to man as truth, ought not to object if a man goes on the supposition that what is of the highest service to him cannot be false. As these two motives mutually support each other, so also does the third, or theoretical motive, according to which we believe what we find, in experience and reason, determining grounds for believing. The section in which the theoretical principle is discussed, and which is the most important in the whole work, is closely connected with the proposition to which Fechner gave expression in his earlier works, namely, that we have, to begin with, a real knowledge only of our own individual self. Starting from this fact, we can go on to draw inferences, not by means of induction, for many facts are necessary if we employ this, but according to analogy. If these conclusions are kept within the limits laid down by science and analogy, and if they are supported by the historical and practical argument, then they are grounds of belief which are valid for reason. The fact that I know myself, or am spirit, permits me to conclude not only that there are other (neighbouring) souls, but that there is a spirit which embraces me and the other spirits—a spirit in which we live and move and have our being, just as our perceptions, recollections, and thoughts do in our own spirit. As in our case, when perceptions have become recollections, the reaction of the latter on the former proves that the change was in no sense de-

struction; so in death, which means that things become a recollection for God, man does not cease to live an active life and to know himself as being thus active. We are brought to a perfectly similar result as is supplied by this argument "from spirit," by the argument "from body," which is the analogical inference from the fact that our own body at once reflects and carries within it a spirit. Analogy does not point to the conclusion that God has a body such as we have, but certainly to the conclusion that He stands to the universe which has been posited by Him, in a relation similar to that in which our spirit stands to our body. While the argument from spirit teaches us to maintain as seriously meant sayings of Christ which people laud as being the most profound of His sayings and yet forget, this belief allows us to be more just to Paganism than most Christians can be. The further Psycho-physics, only the beginnings of which as yet exist, are developed, the more victorious this theory will prove itself. But even as it is, it can be shown that a psychology which assigns as the seat of the soul one definite point, must lead us to a God who is also only a point; while a more correct science of Psycho-physics teaches us to recognise truth in the doctrines alike of mystics and rationalists, of Christians and pagans. Throughout the whole work there runs, moreover, the complaint, that the doctrine which is demanded by analogy and recognised by Christianity, namely, of the existence of spirits which stand between God and man, has been narrowed down by modern Christians to the mediatorship of Christ alone, and by Catholics too, who, when they are men of culture, allow to angels and saints an existence only on canvas. The idea that an angel watches over us, bears us at death to heaven, is not only poetically beautiful, but is literally true. The spirit which animates the earth is an angel; and the body of which he is the soul is a (heavenly) body, which moves about in heaven.—The years which have passed away since these last words were written have, in spite of new difficulty with his eyes, occasioned no pause in Fechner's activity as an author. Besides, the fact that this activity has been directed to very varied departments of knowledge has served to bring always into clearer relief the unity and rigid connection of thought which characterize his theory of the universe. We may mention here, first, the work entitled, *Some Ideas on the History of the Creation and Development of Organisms* (Leips.,

1873), in which he clears away from the theory of descent a number of the one-sided elements and difficulties under which it labours, as held by Darwinians. One of the principal points here, is the distinction drawn between organic and inorganic matter, not from a chemical but a mechanical point of view, since Fechner holds, that in the former the particles of the molecules which act upon each other alter the order in which they are arranged, while in the latter they preserve it. In the formula for the relative position of these particles, therefore, the symbols are reversed in the former case, while in the latter they are not, *i.e.*, in the former, we have periodical and other developed movements, while in the latter we have only very small vibrations in relatively stable positions of equilibrium. The various phenomena that can occur, in which inorganic, or organic, or finally, organic and inorganic molecules come into near contact, are taken up in order; and all organisms are shown to belong to a mixed system which consists of both. To these definitions, given in Section i., there is to be added as a second cardinal point (iii.) the introduction of a law which has been discovered partly *a priori*, but partly through experience, and which Fechner is inclined to place beside the principle of the conservation of energy, under the name of "the principle of the tendency to stability." According to this law, there is in every system, when left to itself, or when existing under constant external conditions, a continuous progress from unstable to stable conditions, until a final condition is reached which, if it is not absolutely stable, is perfectly or approximately stable. Seeing that the conditions of stability are much more favourable in the case of the inorganic molecules and systems than in those of the organic, this principle (iv.), when applied to organic relations, renders it possible easily to explain the transitions from the organic to the inorganic, which are known to experience and undeniable, while the inorganic state can produce no organisms out of itself. Just for this reason, exactly like the *generatio æquivoca*, so too the modern theory of descent, according to which in primeval time the organic is supposed to have come out of the inorganic, ought to be exchanged for the more correct view (v.), that the inorganic masses were first separated from the masses existing in the originally organic condition of the earth; or, to put it otherwise, that the molecular organic and molecular inorganic sprang from the cosmorganic con-

dition of primitive matter by means of differentiation. (It is shown, besides, how this hypothesis is compatible with the cosmogony of Kant and Laplace, since it allows us to place the impulse to tangential divergence from the falling line in the molecules of the planets, etc.) In Section vi., Fechner turns to the consideration of what is the only really original theory of Darwin, namely, the struggle for existence; and he shows how this struggle has in the present no such importance as is possessed *e.g.* by the inter-dependence of the conditions of existence of organic creatures; and how, further, for this and for other reasons, that principle is to be applied only as a complement of others, particularly of the one just referred to, which is designated as the principle of relational differentiation, and the sway of which we everywhere recognise, whenever what is homogeneous splits up into correlates that are mutually complementary. Like this principle, so too that of decreasing variability (vii.) has been too much neglected by the modern theory of descent, although it would necessarily have led to this very theory. This is still more true of the principle of the tendency to stability. In Sections viii. and ix. the question is further developed as to what form the theory of the universe will take, and as to how we are to think of the origin of single organisms and particularly of man, when, all these principles are taken into consideration, and when, in accordance with them, we see in the animal and vegetable protoplasm, not matter in its original form, as many moderns do, but rather the residuum which,—after the uniform primitive creature, that is, the primitive organism, had differentiated itself,—remained over as something incapable of further differentiation. Section x., on “Some Geological Hypotheses and Palæontological Fancies,” then follows. In all three sections, it is shown that, in contra-distinction to the view that the higher creatures have sprung from the lower, we may hold as equally thinkable the view, that the lower creatures are, on the contrary, secondary products which have split off in the way of differentiation. In the two last sections the results of the investigation are brought into connection with the views Fechner had developed in his other works. Thus, in the eleventh section we have it stated, that the tendency to stability can be very easily thought of as the basis of a psychical tendency which, when it steps across the threshold of consciousness, proceeds in the

direction of a contemplated end, so that in this way the principle which has been established can be turned to account psycho-physically and teleologically. Finally (xii.), the proofs are brought forward under the form of theories of belief, which establish the fact that, just as molecular organic beings may be subjects of consciousness, so too may the cosmorganic One; and that scientific confidence in the principle of the tendency to stability quite naturally forms the basis of the religious confidence that God guides everything for the best. "If one is surprised, however, that the *Zend-Avesta* and the *Elements of Psycho-Physics* should have come from the same man, it is a surprise of the same sort as when we see how branch and root have come from the same seed and are found united to form the same plant."—After writing this work, Fechner directed his energies as an author to a department in which a reader of his works would have expected to find him, even had he not known that he had long laboured there in his professorial capacity,—the department, namely, of æsthetics. In the works, *On Experimental Æsthetics* (first volume, Leips., Hirzel), and *Elements of Æsthetics*, which appeared in two volumes (Leips., 1876), he does not try to deduce æsthetics "from above" by placing a metaphysic of the Beautiful at the top, but to build it up "from below" by considering the cases in which sensuous perception gives rise to pleasure directly, and not only after reflection. He then goes on to investigate the laws or principles according to which this takes place, and the object accordingly comes to be called *beautiful*. (Although the conception of the [truly] beautiful involves that of the morally valuable, still the main thing is so much the exciting of pleasure, that Fechner willingly calls his standpoint, eudæmonism.) Of the principles which have been discovered, the two first are closely connected with the Psycho-physics, since, according to the "principle of the threshold," the sensation must pass across the threshold of consciousness in order really to give pleasure, and must be near it in order to give pleasure easily; and according to the "principle of help or intensification," the combination of conditions of pleasure can produce pleasure of a higher value than is produced by the sum of separate conditions of pleasure. With these two quantitative principles are connected as qualitative principles, the three chief formal principles, of uniform connection of the manifold, of truth, and of clearness.

Finally, alongside of these five principles, Fechner places as a secondary principle,—though not on that account a less important one,—that of æsthetic association, according to which that gives us pleasure which reminds us of what is pleasant—a principle upon which hangs, if not the whole of æsthetics, as in the case of Lotze, then, at any rate, the half of it. None of the principles, accordingly, are so fully treated of as this. After the separate principles have been taken up, the rigid connection which marks the previous part of the investigations falls somewhat into the background. The headings of the separate sections, which follow, may serve to show this, and at the same time to prepare the reader of the book for the instances of instructive and stimulating thoughts which await him. x. Explanation of the impression made by a landscape by means of the principle of association. xi. The relation between poetry and painting from the point of view of the principle of association. xii. Impressions of physiognomy and instructive impressions. xiii. A defence of the direct factor in æsthetic impressions, as opposed to the associative factor. xiv. The various attempts to establish a fundamental form of beauty. Experimental æsthetics. Gilt edge and quadrat. xv. Relation between conformity to design and beauty. xvi. Commentary on some maxims of Schnaase in matters of architecture. xvii. Of ingenious and witty comparisons. xviii. Of Taste (second volume). xix. Art from the point of view of its conception. xx. Remarks on the analysis and criticism of works of art. xxi. On the conflict between those who hold to form in æsthetics and those who hold to matter, in relation to the plastic arts. xxii. On the question how far art may depart from nature. Idealistic and Realistic tendencies. xxiii. Beauty and characteristics. xxiv. On some of the main departures of art from nature. xxv. Preliminary considerations to the three following sections. xxvi. to xxviii. On style, Idealizing, Symbolizing. xxix. Commentary on a maxim of K. Rahl's. xxx. On the strife for superiority between art and nature. xxxi. Beauty and art from the point of view of fancy. xxxii. On the idea of sublimity. xxxiii. On the greatness of works of art. xxxiv. On the question of coloured sculpture and architecture. xxxv. A contribution to the æsthetic theory of colours. xxxvi. Preliminary remarks to a second series of æsthetic laws or principles. xxxvii. Principle of the contrast of conse-

quence and reconciliation. xxxviii. Principles of summing up (practice, etc.). xxxix. Principles of persistence and change of occupation. xl. Principle of the expression of pleasure and pain. xli. Principle of the secondary idea of pleasure and pain. xlii. Principle of the æsthetic mean. xliii. Principle of the economic application of means. xliv. Supplementary section on the relations of measure as governed by law applying to pictures in galleries. Supplement to Part I : On the colour impression of the vowels.—The last work of Fechner's which has appeared up to the present time, bears the title, *In the Cause of Psycho-Physics* (Leips., 1877). In it he first recalls those laws and formulæ which he has established, then collects all the objections which have been brought against them, and next reviews the reasons with which his opponents have supported their objections. The result he arrives at is, that they agree still less with each other than they do with him, and so he closes with these words : "The Tower of Babel was not finished, because the workers were not able to understand how they were to build it; my psycho-physical structure must remain standing, because the workers will not be able to come to an understanding as to how they should tear it down."—Whoever, after this description, might be inclined to think it strange that Fechner should have been introduced here, and not in § 345 among the innovators,—to whom certainly a man belongs, whose *ceterum* is quite express to the effect that it is necessary to break with all previous philosophy,—should in that case not think of Berkeley and Kant's doctrines about nature, nor of Schelling's animated stars, so much as of what Fechner himself says in the preface to the *Atomic Theory* . . . "how I, who have fallen away so far from Schelling, and simply here show this in a clear light, yet originally fell with my whole philosophy from his stem; how I plucked the best fruit from what was certainly a widely deflected branch of Hegel (Billroth?); how I got from Herbart's ashes,—though I miss and regret in them stem and fruit,—a coal to burn upon my hearth." Besides, how would it have been possible for one whose scientific intercourse consists of disputing, even when he came victorious out of the dispute, not to have borne some traces of the fact that he had placed himself so often at the standpoint of others?

11. To Fechner's panentheism (cf. § 327, 2), so full of

souls, the theory of the universe advanced by his younger countryman, RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE, presents a diametrical contrast, as he has himself quite rightly observed. Born on the 21st of May, 1817, in Bautzen, he came to the University in the year 1834, and studied medicine for four years; besides which he studied philosophy with such good effect, that he was able in the year 1839 to qualify as *Docent* in both faculties. In his medical studies he found in Volkmann, with whom he was personally very intimate, a true adviser; and he found the same in Weisse as regards his philosophical studies. When *Docent* in Leipsic, he published his *Metaphysics* (Leipsic, 1841). This was followed by the book which justly gained for him a great reputation, the *General Pathology and Therapeutics as Mechanical Sciences* (Leipsic, 1842), in consequence of which he became extraordinary professor in Leipsic. The article entitled "Life" in Wagner's *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*, belongs to this period. Since 1844, he has been ordinary professor in Göttingen. While the *Logic*, which was published while he was still in Leipsic, is connected rather with the *Metaphysics*, the *General Physiology of the Bodily Life* (Leipsic, 1851) and the *Medical Psychology, or Physiology of the Soul* (Leipsic, 1852), are to be regarded as continuations of the *Pathology*. A couple of æsthetic treatises by him had appeared previously: *On the Conception of Beauty* (1846), and *On the Conditions of Beauty in Art* (1848). His entire theory of the universe, however, is given in the *Microcosmus: Ideas for a History of Nature and a History of Humanity* (3 vols., Leipsic, 1856-64, 2nd ed., 1869; a third edition has also appeared); and during the time in which he was engaged on this, there also appeared the first portion of the *Controversial Writings* (Leipsic, 1857), which consisted of a reply to Fichte. It was perhaps the fact that Lotze in the third part of his *Metaphysics* described sensations as self-assertions of the soul when disturbed, which, in spite of the circumstance that in this book he carries on a constant polemic against Herbart, gave occasion to its author being classed with the Herbartian school. This perhaps also explains how he continued to be so classed even after he had published his criticism of Herbart's *Ontology* in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*. The result was, that in the work which he wrote in reply to Fichte, he distinctly forbade this, and stated, with as much frankness as correctness, his position in reference

to other standpoints. According to his own account here, it was a strong inclination to poetry and art which was what first brought him to study philosophy. He was thus besides led more in the direction of the great circle of ideas, which, owing to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, had been developed, speaking generally, rather into a characteristic mode of culture than into a finished system of doctrine. He mentions as the influence which told most decidedly of all upon him, that of Weisse, to whom he was indebted for having become so thoroughly acquainted with a certain circle of ideas, and for having become so strongly convinced of the truth of them, that he has never had any occasion outside of himself, and has never felt any inclination within himself, to give them up again. The study of medicine brought him to see the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of natural science, and it at the same time enabled him to see the completely untenable nature of Hegelian views. It is to this knowledge, to physics, in short, and not to the preponderating influences of the philosophy of Herbart, that he owes his realism, his theory of simple essences, and his perception of the truth that causality occurs only where there is a plurality of causes, etc. If any philosopher at all were to be named as having shown him the way to the position he occupies, then it would have to be Leibnitz with his world of monads, for he did far more for him in this respect than Herbart, for whom he has in fact an antipathy which he cannot overcome. We can hardly err, if, as among those convictions which at an early period became immovably fixed in Lotze's mind, or even as being their culminating point, we take the theory of the universe which Lotze in the same controversial work gives as his fundamental theory, and which is allied to that of the elder Fichte. According to it, the sufficient ground of what goes to make up all being and existence is to be found in the Idea of the Good; or, to put it otherwise, the world of moral values is at the same time the key to the world of forms. Only, he does not wish, with the elder Fichte, to restrict the Idea of the Good to the domain of action, but, on the contrary, according to him, the calm bliss which belongs to the Beautiful, the holiness which attaches to the passionless and inactive moods of the mind, are equally a part of that ideal world which ought to be, and to which the whole haste of action is related only as the means whereby it is to be realized. Just on this account this

theory of the universe is sometimes called the ideal, sometimes the ethical, and sometimes the æsthetic theory. In accordance with this fundamental theory, he is able in his *Metaphysics* to describe his standpoint as teleological idealism, and to say that metaphysics does not find its starting-point in itself, but rather in ethics. This work, which Lotze's later works have caused people to forget more than ought to have been the case, starts investigations into the truly existent, which are necessary, he says, because as culture takes different forms and goes on advancing, what at first passed with men as the truly existent loses its significance as such, and gives place to something else. The investigations are divided into three parts, the *first* of which comprises the doctrine of being, or ontology. After having discussed the conception of being, and then that of essence, he passes on to treat of the connection of things (through their relation to an end); and as the result of the investigation, he declares that that only is truly real which ought to be. The three main conceptions which are brought out here are, those of ground, cause, and end. To these he holds that the standpoints of Spinoza (Hegel), of Herbart, and of the philosophy of nature correspond, and that the defect of these standpoints consists in the one-sidedness with which those who severally occupy them take up only one of these conceptions and neglect or deny the other two. By far the most difficult part of Lotze's *Metaphysics* is the *second*, which treats of the phenomenal. Here, as he constantly does afterwards, Lotze warns us not to forget that appearance not only demands a substance which appears, but also something to which it appears; so that thus the forms of the phenomenal or the cosmological forms are nothing else than the means by which the ontological forms, and finally therefore whatever can be regarded as an end, can come to be perceptible. They are accordingly objective appearances, without which the connection of things or the teleological process cannot be made perceptible. Since these forms, which correspond to the three ontological fundamental conceptions, are partly pure, *i.e.* mathematical, partly reflected, *i.e.* empirical, and partly transcendental, a mathematical, an empirical, and a speculative philosophy of nature are conceivable. The general conception of time, from which time is got by abstraction, spatiality, and motion, are pure forms of perceptibility. Matter and force, in a physical sense, are

reflected forms. They are illusions, which are produced in certain configurations of the phenomenal; but they are besides abbreviations which the physicist has a right to use. Among the transcendental forms of perceptibility, mechanism, or the system of all mechanical processes, occupies a foremost place, as comprising all the rest. In this connection, it ought to be noticed that Lotze here makes no distinction between mechanism and chemism, but that by the first expression he understands all causal connection in accordance with law, so that to mechanism he opposes nothing but teleological connection. Already at this point he declares, in fact, that he is opposed to the separation of the mechanical and the organic, and insists that all organic processes should be explained mechanically, and that a physical physiology should be established. It would certainly be difficult to explain in this way the beginning or first disposition of things, for, respecting this, all knowledge comes to an end; but when once an organism has come into existence, then everything goes on within it mechanically, *i.e.* in accordance with physical law. The last question of cosmology, as to how that essence must necessarily be constituted which changes the objective externality and its influence into an inner definite form of existence, namely, sensation, paves the way for passing to the *third* part of the *Metaphysics*, which treats of the truth of cognition. First of all, the subjectivity of the categories is discussed, then the passing over of the object into the categories, and finally the deduction of the categories. The main point here is that Lotze is opposed to making the ordinary dualistic separation between real existence and the recognition of it in knowledge his starting-point; for if we begin with this, the result we naturally arrive at is, that the world is in reality quite different from what it is as known, and so we are thrown into doubt as to whether we are justified in subordinating the real to the categories which exist in us as a possibility of knowledge. On the contrary, the process of cognition is itself a part of actual existence, and it is only when the vibrations of ether are changed into colours by the seeing subject that we have the complete reality. Accordingly, the investigation into what our perceiving soul contributes to the excitations which move it, *i.e.* a critique of reason, does not require to precede metaphysics, but is a part of it. Since the so-called objects form only the one part of reality, they should be placed under

the categories ; just as, on the other hand, the same relation lies at the basis of our way of perceiving existence, as lies at the basis of existence itself. Just as the final ground from which we can explain why causes (*causæ* and *concausæ*, according to the older form of metaphysics) concur and produce an effect, is to be found in the end involved in the latter, so too the final ground from which we can explain the fact that the knowing subject meets the existence which is known, as, for instance, the seeing eye meets the vibrations of ether, is to be found in the highest end of all and in him who sets it before himself ; and the supreme problem of speculation would undoubtedly only then be solved when everything were represented as the realization of divine ends, or deduced from the Absolute. The modern idealism of Schelling and Hegel attempted this. That the attempt miscarried, is perhaps to be explained by the fact that it is an attempt beyond the reach of human power. It can certainly, however, be explained, when we remember that they despised mechanism to such an extent—and by mechanism is meant the immanent reign of law in the reciprocal relations of things, by means of which all existence is made possible—as at last to maintain the truth of what was physically impossible, because it appeared ideally desirable. The investigation of that connection between things which is governed by law belongs, according to Lotze's repeated assertion, to the subordinate side of philosophical inquiry. In fact, in the controversial work which he wrote in reply to Fichte, he even goes the length of saying that it is the opposite of philosophical inquiry, and in accordance with this, describes as non-philosophical those writings in which he had made it his aim to consider the phenomena of body and soul from a purely mechanical point of view, that is to say, in which he tries to find out how far the physical and chemical laws which are known to us go in the direction of explaining the phenomena of healthy and diseased life, without having recourse to a life-force which is different from them, or to a higher power which works in accordance with ends. He is unjust to these works ; for not only, as he rightly boasts, has he had a lasting influence on physiologists, but also psychologists have felt that they have made essential advance in their subject by their help. The works referred to are : the *Pathology*, the treatise on *Life and Life-Force*, the *Physiology*, and the *Medical Psychology*.

12. In the *General Pathology and Therapeutics*, which we take up first, Lotze seeks to carry out the theory that what takes place in the living body is distinguished from what goes on in inanimate physical existence, not by any fundamental difference in the nature and way of working of the acting forces, but by the arrangement of the points of attack which are offered to these forces, and upon which, as is the case everywhere in the world, the form of the final result depends. This is worked out in the *first* book, the general nosology, in such a way as to show that by life-force we are not to understand any force in particular, but rather, on the contrary, the intensity of the effect which results from the union of many partial forces under certain conditions. If it is intended that this effect should maintain itself, then any change is a disturbance of it. Disease is this disturbance, if, owing to it, the existence of the organism is endangered, the existence, that is, of a system of masses closely connected with each other, which offer such definite points of attack, that a previously arranged series of developments must follow from them. The *second* book contains the symptomatology, and discusses in detail the diseased sensations and motions, the deflections of circulation, the diseased conditions of the nerves and the soul, the deflections of nutritive secretion and assimilation, as well as of excretion. The *third* book, the general ætiology, treats of the liability of the body to illness, the influences of external physical conditions, and finally contagion. If by a sceptic we understand, as we ought to do, not one who is inclined to denial, but one who cares for thorough investigation, then the opinion which was expressed by many, and particularly by practical men, on the appearance of Lotze's *Pathology*, that the author was a sceptic, would have to be extended to all his writings. Just as he unsettles the idea of the doctors in reference to the old-fashioned notion of crisis, etc., so in exactly the same way he points out to the physiologists and psychologists how many links in their chains of reasoning are still wanting, and how many possibilities have not yet been excluded from their arguments, in order that he may bring them to confess that there is a great deal which has not yet been sufficiently considered. Perhaps the fact that dogma retires so much into the background in his investigations is the reason why a man with whom as regards intellectual grasp Weisse alone among German philosophers can be com-

pared, and who now therefore stands alone so far as this quality is concerned, with whom as regards acuteness in discernment George only can dispute the palm, and who is besides far superior to both as a brilliant writer and lecturer, has not founded a school, either among his readers, or among those who have attended his lectures. It is possible that he has too much of the academic spirit, and too little of the professor about him, for this. With the *Pathology* is connected the *General Physiology of Bodily Life*. When Lotze wrote this book, he had had experience of the fact that his *Pathology* and his treatise on *Life-force* had been employed by many, in order to make it appear as if science had reached the point at which it was prepared to explain all the phenomena of life as physical and chemical processes of a perfectly simple kind. One of the tasks which he sets himself in this work is to combat this arrogant delusion. In the *first* book, in which the fundamental conceptions and fundamental principles of general physiology are discussed, he first expresses his views in regard to the different ways of conceiving of nature. These are reduced to the ideal, dynamic, and mechanical theories; and in this connection he reaches the conclusion that true science admits that there is a justification for all three, provided that the first—to which the teleological way of looking at things belongs, in addition to the view according to which everything is deduced from the Absolute—does not stop short with the idea of the realization of the end apart from means, nor set up as an end what is not really realized by means of the active causes, and provided that the second does not entirely exclude the third. In the comparisons between the living and what is without life which follow this, Lotze declares against all the distinctions, hitherto held as valid, which it is usual to make between the two. Still, in the last section, which treats of the essence and conception of life, it is pointed out that we are justified in making a distinction between the living and what is without life. The organism is compared to a machine which has been constructed by art, and it is shown how one of the main differences is to be found in the fact, that in the case of our machines it is almost exclusively the mechanical laws of motion which are turned to account, but not, along with these, the chemical transformation of the separate parts of the machine. The *second* book treats of the mechanism of life, and the economy of living bodies. The

chemism of the change of elements is taken up first. In this connection, the teleological presupposition that the organism is intended by its nature to preserve itself is firmly maintained throughout; and it is proved that the method followed in the change of elements is that of uniform avoidance, by means of which the body, instead of directly defending itself, secures itself against any disturbing of its elements. Change of elements is, accordingly, organized decay, in which the body maintains itself just as the form of a vortex does. A full discussion of the chemical side of the change of elements in animals and plants follows; and in connection with this, attention is called particularly to the circumstance that here the walls of the retorts are not, as in our laboratories, made of glass, which is without feeling of what is going on, but consist of membranes. After the chemism of the change of elements has been considered, Lotze goes on to treat of the mechanism of this change; and in particular deals with molecular effects, the movement of sap in plants, the mechanics of the first and second ways, and also of assimilation and secretion; and then, thirdly, he speaks of the mechanics of the formation of structures. This is done, for the most part, in the sceptical spirit characterized above. In opposition to the loose comparisons made with crystallization, and to the measurements, which are often entirely without any principle, special emphasis is laid upon those points to which a morphology of the future must pay particular attention. The fourth chapter treats of the functions of living bodies, and takes up, first, the dynamics of their motions; next, their mechanism, and further treats of the functions of the nerves; and, finally, of their susceptibility to stimulus. Habit, in general, is discussed here; and, as had been already done in the *Pathology*, the distinction between habit and custom is done away with by reducing the latter to the former, by reducing the blunting, say, of a sense to the exercise of it. The fifth and last chapter of the second book treats of the combination of physiological processes, and discusses waste and repair of elements, the conservation of heat, the economy of forces, regulation by means of the central organs, and periods of life. This is followed in the *third* book by a discussion of the kingdom of living existences, and of how they are preserved. In the first chapter, which treats of the system of organic creatures, the general conception of natural kingdoms, the distinction between plants and animals,

the graduated series of living existences, and types of organization, are all discussed. Lotze's tendency to oppose hasty dogmatising comes out here in quite a special way. The distinction between plants and animals is one which, in his opinion, can hardly be maintained. The views expressed by Fechner in his *Nanna*, if not actually confirmed, are at any rate described as irrefutable. It is in connection with single classes at most that we can speak of a graduated series, and certainly among the living creatures of the earth, the highest place is to be allowed to man. To go further than this appears to Lotze to be simply inquisitiveness. In the same way, a warning is given against pushing the theory of types too far. You can no more conclude from the ossification of the covering of the arteries that it is a softened bone, than you can conclude from the perfect flower that the stamens are modified leaves. The second chapter, which is on the propagation of forms of life, treats of the increase, propagation, and conservation of species; the third, on the relation between organisms and the external world, is occupied with individual existence, the influence of cosmical forces, the interchange of elements which goes on between the organism and the external world, and also with the relation of the individual life to the collective life of Nature.—Both in the *Pathology* and *Physiology* Lotze had frequently drawn attention to the fact that the animal and human organisms were intended by their nature to receive impulses from a soul which was bound up with them. These hints, which have been neglected particularly by those who have employed Lotze's writings in the interest of materialism, are supplemented by the detailed treatment of the subject given in the *Medical Psychology*, which is intended to be a physiology of the spiritual life, as distinguished from the physiology of the bodily life. Like all Lotze's writings, this work is divided into three books, of which the *first* discusses the general fundamental conceptions of physiological psychology. The first chapter treats of the existence of the soul, with constant critical reference to materialism, on the one side, and to the different systems of identity, on the other. In reference to the former, it is shown that the assumption of the existence of an immaterial soul is by no means to be identified with that of the existence of life-force—the reasons against the possibility of which are here collected together and put in a more succinct form than anywhere else

in Lotze's writings,—but that the fact of the unity of consciousness makes the assumption necessary, as affording the only grounds upon which it can be explained. To the systems of identity Lotze objects, that to unite in one substance an ideal and a real attribute, is simply to mock the desire for real unity. Spiritualism is brought forward in opposition to both, as being the true standpoint, looked at from which, what is for materialism the most solid and certain of all things, *viz.* matter, disappears. It is not matter which is given us in experience, but all sorts of attributes, which we may comprehend under the name materiality. With reference to a large portion of these attributes, namely, the qualitative, the physicists themselves confess that they are relations to us; as regards the others, extension, impenetrability, etc., it may be shown that they can very reasonably be explained as relations of simple, unextended existences. If we at the same time hold fast to the thought that our own inner states, our feelings, etc., are absolutely certain and immediately evident to us, and that it will be difficult to satisfy an ideal interest if by far the largest portion of all existences is regarded as being nothing for itself, but as being there solely for others, then the only tenable view appears to be that which takes up the position that only spiritual monads exist. If from the inner states of these monads we could now deduce the relations which furnish us with the phenomena of impenetrability, etc., then psychology would be the foundation of philosophy, or rather it would be the whole of philosophy. But this is not the case; and so we must take as our starting-point, and in the form of an abbreviation for what has not yet been deduced from principles, material existence, on the one hand, and our psychical existence, on the other, and take these along with each other; or, we must begin with making a sharp separation between body and soul. For this reason we would have to consider first, the joint physical and psychical mechanism, and this forms the subject of the second chapter. The main point to be noticed here is the view that the exercise of an influence by the soul on the body, and *vice versâ*, ought not to be really any more incomprehensible than that of one wheel of a machine upon the other; and, to be sure, not less so, for *how* motion is communicated, and *how* the separate parts of the wheel cohere, we also do not know. All that is given us by experience here, as well as in the other case, is that a process

in the one is conditioned by a process in the other. Lotze is accordingly willing to describe his standpoint as Occasionalism; but he gives us to understand that the spiritualistic view characterized above can supply us with a more thoroughgoing explanation, and do this more easily, than any other. Souls or spirits, immaterial or ideal substances, could exert an influence on what is material quite as readily as imponderables do upon ponderable matter, even if the elements of what is material had an essentially different nature; and naturally this influence could be much more easily explained, according to the theory referred to. After emphasizing the fact that the soul requires bodily affections in order that it may translate them into sensations, and then further modify them by its own action, Lotze explains in detail that the soul needs for one part of its work only the conductors or nerve fibres, for other parts whole organs, and for parts of it, again, which are different, neither of these. Finally, he designates that part of the brain which has no fibres as the probable seat of the soul, since the existence of a common point for all nerve fibres cannot be demonstrated, nor is it likely, indeed, that the separate excitations of the soul are conveyed to it in a condition of entire isolation. (The question how the soul nevertheless comes to have perceptions of space is specially treated of afterwards.) The third chapter takes up the consideration of the essence and destinies of the soul, and Lotze here carries the sphere of animated existence further down than Fechner, since he holds that the elements of what is material have also feeling. On the other hand, he rejects the idea that the celestial bodies have souls, criticizes the theories of Herbart and Hegel, defines his own standpoint as the idealistic, according to which everything exists only because it has its necessary place as expressing a morally valuable Idea that constitutes its essential nature. He accordingly claims immortality, not for all souls, because they are substances in Herbart's sense, but only for those which realize in themselves a nature of such high value, that owing to it they cannot be lost to the whole. That phase of the course of Nature during which the germ of a physical organism originates, represents also the moment in which the substantial ground of the world produces the soul. Just as the bodily excitation reacts on the soul, and is the occasion of its having a sensation, so here the act of production, which takes its rise in psychical impulses, supplies a like occa-

sion for God, in whom everything takes place. In the *second* book, which treats of the elements and physiological mechanism of the life of the soul, Lotze opposes Herbart's attack on the older theory of the three psychical faculties, without on that account bestowing praise on this theory. He shows how, besides the capacity possessed by the soul for producing sensations in answer to stimuli, and also presentations, we must suppose that it possesses a capacity, which is not deducible from the other, of having feelings of pleasure and disinclination, and thirdly, the capacity of effort. The simple sensations, the feelings, the psychical motions and impulses are treated of, and, finally, he passes on to discuss spatial perceptions. Among so many points that are interesting, the most interesting in connection with this subject is, that Lotze shows how, while to start with it is only in an isolated condition that the impressions received are conducted to the brain, where at length they reach the fibreless parenchym of the brain within which the soul is found, it becomes possible for the soul by means of certain local signs which each impression has acquired in the course of its transit, to assign to their right place the objects which have caused the impression. He shows, too, how at the same time a great many advantages are thus attained, such as modification by distribution to other nerve fibres; and how it becomes possible to explain a large number of empirical facts, such as joint motions, etc. In the *third* book he discusses the life of the soul in its healthy and diseased conditions, and takes up, first, the states of consciousness; next, the conditions of the development of the life of the soul; and, finally, those things which disturb soul-life. Consciousness and unconsciousness, sleeping and waking, the course of ideas, self-consciousness, attention, moods and emotions, as well as their reaction on the processes of circulation, secretion, and nutrition, instincts and innate individual capacities, are, in addition to the pathological phenomena, the most outstanding subjects in this book.

13. The fact that Lotze also in this book lops off a number of investigations because they belong to a "philosophical" psychology, might almost have made any one who had an exalted idea of his importance as a philosopher, impatient with him for being so long in fulfilling the promise made at the end of the *Physiology*, that he would go into at least the "region which lies between æsthetics and physiology." He at last

redeemed his promise by presenting in his *Microcosmus* the "attempt to construct an anthropology, of which the aim is to investigate the whole significance of human existence by a joint consideration of individual life and of the history of the civilization of our race." In harmony with what had already been indicated in his earlier works, he here develops in detail the view that the opposition between the æsthetic-religious and the physical view of nature, rests on a misunderstanding, and vanishes when the physicist admits that the creation and origin of things form no part of his subject, but that he has to do simply with things as they stand in a reciprocal relation to each other as governed by law; and when the religious man on his part does not forget that it is not derogatory to the honour of the Creator, if He is related to created things as their Sustainer, *i.e.*, if He is related to them in such a way that He respects, or does not interfere with, the laws which govern their operation, and which He has given to them. That in the *First Volume*, the first book of which treats of the body, the second of the soul, and the third of life, a great deal of what was contained in the earlier works should be repeated, was to be expected. This repetition is seen in what is said as to the conflict between the various views of nature, as to mechanism in nature generally, and the mechanism of life in particular; next, in what is said regarding the structure of the animal body and its preservation, regarding the existence of the soul, its nature and its powers, the course of ideas, the forms of relative knowledge, the feelings, self-consciousness, and the will; and also in what relates to the connection between body and soul, the seat of the latter, the reciprocal action between both, the life of matter, and the beginning and end of the soul. But even one who has read these earlier works will not feel, when he takes up this book, that in any part it consists of pure repetition. In the *Second Volume*, the fourth book treats of man, the fifth of spirit, the sixth of the course of the world. The five chapters into which each of these three books is divided, develop a number of ideas in reference to subjects which are not to be met with at all in the earlier writings, or which are only very briefly indicated. A statement of the headings of these chapters will show the truth of this. Thus we have: Nature and the Ideas; Nature out of Chaos (in the chapter thus entitled, the question is started as to why it is that disorder

should necessarily come first); the Unity of Nature; Man and the Animals; the Diversity of the Human Species, *i.e.*, Races; Spirit and Soul; The Human Faculties of Sense; Language and Thought; Knowledge and Truth; Conscience and Morality; The Influences of External Nature; Human Nature; Manners and Customs; The Various Parts of the Outer Life; The Inner Life. No reader will be deceived if he expects to find here a very rich store of instruction. He must, however, make up his mind to find much which appeared to him indisputable truth described as uncertain, and in the same way much which he held to be demonstrably false represented as at least probable. It is this last-mentioned fact which has especially brought the materialists, who had got accustomed to count Lotze as one of themselves, to brand him as an "apostate." The *Third Volume* is also divided into fifteen chapters, each five of which make up one book. The seventh treats of history, the eighth of progress, and the ninth of the connection of things. In no part of the work is there so much to be found that is new as in this. Quite at the beginning,—where he discusses the creation of man, and in connection with this the constancy of natural development, and the acts of free interference with nature on the part of God,—Lotze holds up a mirror in which both the so-called believers with their childish fear, and those who, in their arrogance, take weak hypotheses for absolutely certain knowledge, may see themselves and learn something. A further point of the greatest interest is Lotze's nominalistic view, particularly if we compare it with the opposite view of Fechner. It comes into prominence where he speaks of the education and progress of humanity. Since humanity is an unreal abstraction, those expressions have a meaning only on the supposition that the single individuals continue to exist, and attain a consciousness of how they have helped on the coming generations. Freedom and necessity are discussed in connection with the forces which operate in history; and attention is directed to the hollowness of the conclusions which are drawn from statistical observations. The external conditions of development are taken up, and at the same time the question as to the unity of the origin of humanity is considered. All this is done with that same feeling for truth which Lotze has displayed from the first, and which prevents him from forming hasty judgments. The seventh book closes with a thoughtful

survey of the history of the world, which helps us to understand why Lotze speaks with such reverence of Herder, and to which he attaches a warning against writing any philosophy of history until the facts have been more thoroughly investigated, particularly those referring to Orientalism. The eighth book opens with a survey of the course which has been followed by Science. The conclusion he comes to is, that the errors of modern idealism,—namely, that thought and being are identical, and that the essence of things is thought,—have been inherited from the philosophers of antiquity, who in their identification of logic and metaphysics put the Logos above everything else, and in doing this forgot that which goes beyond all reason, and which therefore must be grasped and experienced with the entire spirit. The enjoyment of life, and work, are described both on their light and dark sides, and in their various stages, until the modern stage is reached in which all interests are swallowed up in “business,” which has taken the place of work. He then passes on to speak of the Beautiful and Art, and gives an historical survey of æsthetic ideas. Of these, that of the colossal is allotted to the East, that of sublimity to the Hebrews, that of beauty to the Greeks, the ideas of elegance and dignity to Romans, the characteristic and fantastic to the Middle Ages, and the brilliant and critical to modern times. In the account of the religious life which follows, Lotze states that the cosmological element is predominant in Paganism, and the moral element in Judaism and Christianity, while he finds in the more modern philosophical dogmatics a return to the ascendancy of cosmology. The fact that the East is the cradle of religion, is to be explained by the circumstance that there men’s thoughts are always directed to the whole; while in the West, on the contrary, attention is bestowed on the universal. The last chapter is occupied with showing the progress which has been made in public life and society. Family and patriarchal States, the kingdoms of the East, despotism as political tutelage, the political work of Art of the Greeks, the civic commonwealth and law in Rome, the autonomy of society, rational and historical law, are discussed here; and the book ends with a statement of the postulates which can be realized, and those which cannot. Lotze takes up a position of decided antagonism to the deification of the State, a manifestation of which he sees in the fact that the State is conceived of as an end in

itself ; but he takes up the same position, too, in reference to the revolutionary disregard of existing rights. In the last book of the whole work he treats of the connection of things, and by gathering together all the threads of the thoughts which have been so far developed, he is able to point out the foundation upon which all the investigations have rested. What is here stated has naturally many points of contact with what was said in the *Metaphysics*. In the first chapter the being of things is treated of ; and it is shown that there is no other kind of being than that which consists of "standing in relation," and therefore that a form of existence which is absolutely without relation involves a contradiction. It is further pointed out that the relation of two existences is not a relation between them, but a relation actually within them, since they are reciprocally related ; and it is shown, finally, that this reciprocity is possible only through a substantial unity which exists in the individual things in such a way that their inter-actions are the states of an existing thing. In the second chapter, which treats of the world in space and the world beyond sense, the theory of space, as being the form, not of perception, but of perceptions, and which had already been developed in the *Metaphysics*, is fully worked out and compared with the theories of Kant and Herbart. It is also shown, how the place of the thing in our perception corresponds to its position in the intellectual order, and how its motion in space which we perceive, corresponds to the alteration it undergoes. It is thus under the form of space that relations appear to us ; and since being consists of these, it is also under this form that being appears to us. In the third chapter, which is entitled "The Real and Spirit," the truth of the spiritualism previously referred to is established by showing that reciprocal action, or rather, reciprocal passion, is possible only in the case of beings which take note of this interaction, or feel it, or in the case of beings which exist for themselves ; and that thus it is only beings which exist for themselves, or spirits, which can be real. This is followed, in the fourth chapter, by a discussion of the personality of God. The relation between faith and knowledge is here considered, the arguments for the being of God criticized, Fichte's objections to the personality of God closely examined, his conception of God and the pantheistic conception criticized ; and it is shown that selfhood, or being-for-itself in general,

does not postulate a non-ego as standing over against it, but that it does this only when it appears as conditioned. The concluding chapter treats of God and the world, and takes up the origin of eternal truths and their relation to God, creation, preservation, the origin of reality and evil, the Good, forms of goodness and love, and, finally, the unity of the three principles in love. The modest caution which in general is characteristic of Lotze, comes out particularly at the close, where he foreshadows as the goal of knowledge—a goal which he thinks it will be difficult to reach—a standpoint from which it might be possible to find a solution of the three questions, Wherefore? By what means? For what end? by answering the last, and from which the laws according to which things exist, the forces by means of which they exist, and the ends for the sake of which they exist, could be all known at once, or, what comes to the same thing, a standpoint from which it could be seen that in mathematical and mechanical knowledge, ethical demands are at the same time satisfied. The substance of his views is contained in the concluding remarks, in which the universal is described as being everywhere of less value as contrasted with the particular, and the species as compared with the individual; and in which the living personal Spirit of God, and the world of personal spirits which He has created, are described as representing true reality. Any one who has read Lotze's *Microcosmus* with attention will hold that he is too modest in what he says about it in the introduction to the ninth book, and will, in spite of his polemic against the notion that every one should have his place allotted to him in the history of the development of philosophy, assign him a place in it, and certainly none of the lowest. The fact that our exposition ends with him shows how high we rank him.

14. In his *History of Æsthetics in Germany* (Munich, 1868), Lotze appeared for the first time in the historical sphere. Instead of making, as has been done, loud complaint, that in Lotze's case the philosophical writer on æsthetics has spoiled the historian, we have here to record our gratitude that this book is a compensation for the many in our day which promise to supply us with philosophy and actually give history. By giving a clear paraphrase of the thoughts expressed in the theories which he describes, instead of simply reproducing them, he has rendered even the mere comprehension of them much

easier than if he had given careful excerpts. It was, of course, far more necessary when it came to be a matter of distinguishing what is permanent from what is transitory, that the narrator should make way for the critic. This work is also divided into three books, the *first* of which gives an account of the *History of General Standpoints* (pp. 1-246). Although the period which is covered by the names of Baumgarten, Winkelman and Lessing could supply in the labours of the first of these, nothing beyond a systematic basis for the discussion of the entire subject, and by means of what was done by the other two, only an awakening of criticism, and the feeling for Art, still the fact that questions which had hitherto been kept apart were united together under the one heading of æsthetics was a circumstance of no small importance; and, indeed, it has come to be of particular importance that Baumgarten should have held to the doctrine of the best possible world. The science which he created has inherited from him a means of protection against that discontent which leads men to despise the world, and also an aversion to all that is heterocosmical. It is true, that he also left as a legacy to those who came after him the kind of feeling which led them for a long time to treat the taking of delight in the beautiful as a weakness which stood in need of being defended. Kant, even, is by no means free from this feeling, though he certainly laid the foundation of scientific æsthetics. We must recognise it as his greatest merit, that he laid such stress upon the thought of the Beautiful as existing only for us, and so strongly emphasized the subjectivity of æsthetic judgments, although the knowledge which supplies the complement of this escaped him, namely, that the perceiving subject is equally a part of the world, and that its conception of reality, or the phenomenal, is the most essential part of what exists under the name of the "course of the world." However deplorable in many respects is Herder's attack on Kant, which is taken up in the third chapter, still the stress he laid upon the significance of the Beautiful directed attention to a very important point. All that is beautiful is really in so far a symbol as it (for instance, in symmetry, balance, harmony) has an analogy with some good which is attainable by us. Schiller's attempt to reconcile beauty and morality, which is discussed in the fourth chapter, gives evidence of a conflict in his mind between the theory of Kant, which he had formerly adopted, and a preference for his "ad-

hering beauty ;" and we see that in this conflict Schiller is constantly on the point of breaking the fetters of the system. The fifth chapter treats of the enormous advance which was made in æsthetics owing to the influence of Schelling's idealism. It consists in the fact that Schelling conceived of the world as a *beautiful* Whole, in which the enjoyment of the Beautiful is an essential and necessary process. The very same defect in Schelling's system, which brings him into variance with the natural sciences, is fatal also for æsthetics, and this in spite of all the distinction he has won for himself in connection with the latter. This defect consists in the fact that he refuses to recognise the distinction between ideas and appearance. The former represent what has moral worth, things that have to be done, things that *ought* to be, while in the latter mechanism holds sway, *i.e.*, rigid causal connection, or necessity. Schelling, instead of conceding the truth there is in the latter, claims to have demonstrated the existence of the necessary by presenting to us what involves the idea of what *ought* to be ; and thus, out of ideas which can work actively within their own sphere, he made ideas to conjure with, and turned science into his enemy. But besides, it now became impossible for him to realize the æsthetic truth, that the beatific feeling of surprise which we have at the sight of the Beautiful in nature, is based on the fact that something which ought to be or has moral worth, has come to exist under the wholly different conditions of what is governed by necessity. The fact that the manifold which presents itself to perception, has play in these ideal forms, although it is not bound by any moral obligation to appear in them, fills us with a feeling of reverential delight occasioned by the aspect of a world in which the eternal laws of what ought to be, take on the outward form of flesh and blood. We can moreover recognise in Schelling's beautiful world, Baumgarten's aversion to the heterocosmical. In the following chapter, the attempts of Solger and Schleiermacher to represent Fancy as the creator of the Beautiful are criticized, the latter very severely. Krause and Schopenhauer are only briefly mentioned. Since the difference between Schelling and Hegel is held by Lotze to consist simply in the dialectic method employed by the latter, this is examined in detail in the seventh chapter ; and its cardinal error is held to consist in the fact that it asserts of conceptions what is true only of things. But it is admitted at the

same time, that the influence which this method has exercised for such a long time on men's minds, becomes intelligible when its genesis is more carefully inquired into. This is done in a very delightful way in the same chapter in which Lotze comes to the conclusion respecting Hegel's *Æsthetics*, that although the gain is small as regards the most general questions, all the more inexhaustible is the wealth of stimulating and delicate thoughts which Hegel here presents us with, in connection with the arts and works of art. With Hegel, he connects Weisse and Vischer, in the following chapter. A warm eulogium is pronounced upon Weisse, and it is recognised that he has done the most perfect work in the direction of the idealistic treatment of the subject. His divergence from Hegel is based on the fact, that while Hegel's Absolute Spirit exists only in so far as it has intercourse with finite spirits, Weisse sought from the beginning to find in the person of the living God the termination and conclusion of all his thoughts. Weisse's work in this department is marred only by one thing, namely, by his being wedded to the dialectic method; and the same is true of Vischer. In the case of the latter, we have also to lament the conflict he carries on with all forms of theism, which is entirely a barren one, so far as æsthetics is concerned. The fundamental definition of the Beautiful is borrowed from Vischer, and then in the last chapter he passes on to Herbart. He admits that it is part of the work of æsthetics to discover those ultimate relations which are the cause of our pleasure in the Beautiful; but, on the other hand, he finds fault with Herbart for attacking idealism, which seeks to get at the definite meaning of the Beautiful, and also with his purely formal conception of Beauty; and Zimmerman is very often adversely criticized by Lotze for maintaining the correctness of this conception of Herbart's. He still further finds fault with the philosophy of Herbart for taking its stand on the fact that certain relations are productive of pleasure, as if this were an ultimate principle; and finally, he complains that in Herbart's philosophy sufficient stress is not laid on the importance of feeling in connection with the estimate formed of the Beautiful. The *Second Book* (pp. 249-438) contains the *History of the Separate Fundamental Æsthetic Conceptions*. After having, to begin with, called attention to the error which has been fallen into, of denying that there are any distinctions of degree in the Beautiful, an

error which has arisen particularly owing to the neglect of the element of feeling, and in consequence of which a great deal that certainly occupies a subordinate place in the Beautiful, but is yet akin to it, has been excluded from it, he treats first of all of the agreeable in sensation, as an element which operates in connection with æsthetic judgments. He shows here that neither the physiological explanation,—and not even that of Helmholtz,—nor the purely psychological explanation given by Herbart, is sufficient to solve the problem as to why certain relations of tone and colour are felt to be beautiful, *i.e.*, are felt to be symbols of what has moral value. The element which gives rise to an agreeable feeling in connection with perception, is discussed in the second chapter; and in this connection he treats especially of rhythm and symmetry, which also produce pleasure only by means of the feeling of moral value which they cause in us—*i.e.*, because they give us an experience of something which is analogous to those tasks set before us in ethics. The beauty of reflection is treated of in the fourth chapter, in which he discusses the sublime, the ugly, and the ridiculous. The various theories which have been propounded are criticized and improved, and finally in a half-earnest, half-humorous way, he proposes to adopt a modification of the dialectic arrangement given by Weisse and Vischer. In the following chapter, he discusses the æsthetic moods of Fancy. Just as, in constructing a theoretic science of the world, the method of investigation adopted by one may be mechanical, and by another morphological or teleological, so the conception formed of the world by fancy may be sentimental or naïve, ironical or humorous. These conceptions are discussed in this order, with reference to the utterances of Schiller, the Romanticists, Solger, Hegel, and others; and in particular, Lotze frees humour from the mephistophelian character which is ascribed to it by most writers on æsthetics. In the sixth chapter, he treats of æsthetic ideals, and declares that he essentially agrees with Weisse in holding that we must here distinguish between three æsthetic theories of the universe, the classical, romantic, and modern, which have derived their importance, not from individuals, but from races. Lotze also expresses agreement with Weisse, in holding that beauty as understood in modern times is characterized by purity (*i.e.*, it is not mixed up with the religious and the moral, etc.), and by universality; only he seeks to find a basis for these character-

istics by calling attention to the fact that the recognition of the place of mechanism is one of the most pregnant traits of the modern conception of the world. Under the heading "Artistic Activities," he mentions and criticizes the views of Kant, Fries, Schelling, Weisse, Schleiermacher, H. Ritter, and others, on talent, taste, and genius. The *Third Book* (pp. 491-672) is called *Aids to the History of Theories of Art*, because its aim is simply to make a contribution to the subject. In it he shows how the system of the arts is to be constructed according to Schelling, Solger, Hegel, Weisse, Zimmermann, Knoson, Zeising; and how he himself would construct it, as best suited to his own views. According to this, music comes first as the art of free beauty, which is conditioned only by the laws of its materials, and not by any definite end, or by anything which it has to imitate. The great work done by Helmholtz in connection with the subject is treated of in detail, Hanslick's somewhat paradoxical statements with regard to the relation between music and the feelings are criticized in connection with the views of older theorists; the peculiar relationship between music in particular and what has been called after Weisse the modern ideal, is emphasized; and Lotze then passes from a consideration of Weisse's division of musical works to speak of R. Wagner's position in reference to instrumental music; and finally, he points out the dangers with which the German predilection for music is attended. In connection with architecture, stress is laid, in the third chapter, on the following point as one that is essential: that a multiplicity of heavy material elements be held together by the force of a single principle, so as to form a permanent equilibrium on a supporting ground. He next joins issue in a very decided way with the genteel habit of despising the useful, which is not to be confounded with what can simply be used. Finally, while making some critical remarks on the views of Schnaase, K. Bötticher, Forchhammer, Hübsch, Semper, and others, he gives in this chapter a warning against the one-sidedness involved in rejecting a style of architecture which is historically warranted. In the following chapter, on the plastic arts, he first states the views of Winckelmann and Lessing, and then allows anatomy to give its vote in connection with the Laocoon question. A. von Feuerbach, and Schelling's well-known address, lead to the subject of the more favourable position which was granted to the plastic artist in an-

tiquity. The chapter concludes with the expressed wish, that, instead of erecting statues of the poets, we might set up plastic representations of their creations, which contain that modern mythology for which Schelling longed. In treating of painting, Lotze first contrasts the art of painting with the architectonic and plastic arts by showing that it has to do with "the historical element in things and persons," and from this he deduces those characteristics which other writers on æsthetics have laid down as being fundamental, as, for instance, the connection with the background, colour,—which was employed by the plastic arts also in antiquity,—light-effects, etc. He then examines the connection between painting and poetry, discusses the question of imitation and idealizing, style and manner, and finally treats of the classification of paintings into historical (sacred) pictures, genre pictures,—including in these pictures of incident, which form the culminating point of this class,—and landscape pictures. In the last chapter, on the art of poetry, Lotze hurries almost too much. In treating of the epic, he takes W. von Humboldt's celebrated criticism of *Hermann and Dorothea* as his starting-point, though he does this only to find that it gives "correct descriptions, but insufficient explanations." The writers on æsthetics who follow Humboldt have, Lotze thinks, directed their attention too exclusively to the Homeric epic, while seeking to characterize the epic in general, and accordingly think only of epics with finished characters. Hence their inability to appreciate the novel properly, which presents to us a picture of the gradual growth of natures capable of development, and in circumstances which are already complete in themselves. Those who take offence at the prose of novels, forget that beautiful prose,—and, indeed, who writes it now?—is also artistic, *i.e.*, beautiful, language. In discussing the lyric, he takes as his starting-point what Goethe said as to the origin of his poems, and what Schiller said by way of criticism on Bürger. This was something quite different from Humboldt's criticism above referred to; for Lotze finds that we have simply to comment on what they have said, exactly as, from the fact of the existence of lyrics by Goethe and Schiller, we can deduce the justification of direct and reflective poetry. Weisse's demand, that in the lyric, not only the subject, but the subject *as* poet, should be put into the foreground, is explained from his (legitimate) preference for Rückert, and estimated accordingly. Nowhere has

the reader so strong a feeling that Lotze is hastening to the end as in what he says of dramatic poetry. It is only since Schelling, he thinks, that it has become possible to form a right estimate of tragic poetry. The characterization of the general conception of this part of poetry was begun by A. von Schlegel, and was completed by Vischer. In the appreciation of Shakespeare, "German æsthetics has spoken through Gervinus its last word."

15. A wish which had been long entertained by Lotze's many admirers,—or rather, not so much simply a wish as a justifiable expectation,—was fulfilled when he gave to the world his *System of Philosophy* (Leipsic, 1874), *i.e.*, as he modestly says in the preface, the sum of his personal convictions in a systematic form. Unfortunately, only the first part of it has as yet appeared—the three books of the Logic, which treat of thought, investigation, and knowledge, or of pure, applied, and methodological logic. The *first* book (pp. 1–185) serves at the same time as an improved edition of his little *Logic* published in 1843, and which has long been out of print. Starting from the distinction between the cases where, in the process through which our ideas go, two ideas simply encounter each other, and those in which they have an affinity with each other (partly because the causes which produce them are always united), Lotze vindicates for thought the capability of adding to the first ideas by the aid of certain subsidiary thoughts the title to affinity. The forms which thought employs for this purpose are treated of in systematic connection, when it is proved that there exists in them an increasing series in which each member that appears later seeks to do away with the defect of the one before it, which is that the need of proving the existence of the affinity has not yet been satisfied. We must not, therefore, as is now often proposed, begin with judgment but with conception, which is distinguished from general presentation, in that it not only attaches the indefinite subsidiary thought of totality to the qualities, but the definite ground or reason of their union. A careful consideration of conception gives Lotze the chance of expressing his views on universal and particular conceptions, on extension and content, abstraction and determination; and the result arrived at is, that the formation of the conception is a process the justification of which is proved by the doctrine of the judgment, to which

for this reason he now passes. In this, the main point is, that the different forms of judgment depend on the different significations of the copula, *i.e.*, on the different subsidiary thoughts which we construct for ourselves with regard to the union of subject and predicate. Since then, as Lotze attempts to show, the differences of quantity, quality, and modality do not in any way alter the relation of the two constituent parts of the judgment, it is only necessary to examine those of relation; and this is done by discussing along with the categorical judgment, the *principium identitatis*, along with the hypothetical judgment, the *principium rationis sufficientis*, and along with the disjunctive judgment the *dictum de omni*, and the *principium exclusi medii*. All the forms of connection here discussed are logical and not psychological, since the question is as to the relation between the contents of two ideas, and not as to any relation existing between the ideas. We are bound, therefore, to regard them as objective, *i.e.*, as valid for every conscious being. But though we can thus prove that objectivity belongs to them, this does not decide anything whatever as to their real or metaphysical significance, *i.e.*, as to whether we have the same or an analogous connection between things outside of consciousness corresponding to the connection between these forms. The unsolved problem, which is indicated in the disjunctive judgment, forces us to go further, namely, to the syllogism. Just as, in passing to the judgment, it was seen that its first form, the impersonal judgment, contains scarcely anything more than the conception, so too something similar is seen in connection with the first form of the syllogism, the syllogism of subsumption of the first figure, which is simply an explication of the disjunctive judgment. The syllogisms of induction and analogy, which correspond to the second and third figures, go in many respects beyond it. This is still more the case with the mathematical inferences which we meet with in the syllogisms of substitution and proportion, as also in the syllogism formed by constitutive comparisons. In thus putting such a high value upon the various syllogisms it is not meant that, like Aristotle, we should abide by only the one point of view, and think only of what service these syllogisms are in the process of proof, but that we should ask, what increase of fresh knowledge do they secure for us? This is done by the systematic forms which enable us to put

different things side by side, and which are applied both in artistic and natural classification, and done by these to a much greater extent than by syllogistic reasonings and mathematical inferences. It is also done when we apply a theory to explain something, and finally when we see living development in the sum of the elements of which the world is composed. With this form of thought, which makes thought speculative, we also reach the stage which points beyond the sphere of logic. Speculation, by seeking to find a basis for the direction taken by the development of the world "in the nature of what constitutes a supreme principle, indicates by this that the final completion of all logical effort to reach truth is made possible, not by means of new logical forms, but only by means of the actual knowledge of what it assumes as the supreme self-developing principle." The *second* book (pp. 187-462) treats of investigation, or contains the applied logic. That is to say, it supplies us with directions as to how to deal with the hindrances which arise from the fact that the special peculiarities of various subjects render it more or less difficult to arrange them under the logical forms. In harmony with what Lotze had said in the year 1843, when he was dealing only with pure logic, he here infers from the task which belongs to applied logic, that rigid systematic treatment of the subject must here be sacrificed; and that, on the ground of utility, we must choose, from among the various methods by which it has been contrived to get over that difficulty, that method which science, so far as it has gone, has taught us to recognise as having weight and as being productive of results. "The limitlessness of the materials which have come under scientific observation renders it unfortunately impossible to set forth with that completeness which is in itself desirable, this the most brilliant part of logic, which has to do with the inventive power that distinguishes modern times." In accordance with what is here said, the ten chapters into which this, the most difficult part of Lotze's book, is divided, contain some very instructive separate discussions of points which however might well have been arranged in a different order. They have to do with definition, the limitation of conceptions, the schematic arrangement and connection of conceptions (here, among other things, there are criticisms of the ancient and modern philosophies of nature, and of the Hegelian dialectic), the forms of

proof, the discovery of the grounds of proof, with special reference to mechanics, errors in proof and dilemmas, universal propositions gathered from perceptions, discovery of laws (law, rule, hypothesis, etc.), characterization of singular facts, (probability and the estimate of its value), methods of the smallest squares, election and votes. The *third* book (pp. 463-597) treats of knowledge. (The attempt to justify the title, Methodology, will convince few that the operations discussed in the second book are not methods, and that what is treated of in the third book can rightly be described as method.) In this third part, Lotze takes up the question as to how far a whole composed of thoughts, which by means of all the help got from pure and applied logic we were enabled to construct, can lay claim to be a knowledge which answers to what we are forced to believe and assume to be the object and occasioning cause of our ideas. We now here first see that when scepticism, which is considered in the first chapter, holds it to be possible that things in themselves may be wholly different from what they are as we are compelled to think of them, it ends in pure absurdities, and reaches a knowledge which is not a knowledge of things but simply a knowledge that things are, etc.; and that a theory of knowledge should not seek to play the part of metaphysics, but must content itself with gaining established points of certainty within the world of presentation. Such points Plato rightly saw in the world of Ideas (ch. 2), *i.e.*, in those predicates of things which in their essence have an eternal validity independent of actual existence—a validity such as we attribute to the laws of nature. (The fact that Plato gave to these eternal truths the form of conception, instead of that of judgment, reminds us of the circumstance that Kant sets up categories from which he deduces the fundamental principles of the pure understanding; and perhaps it is based on the same reason.) In the third chapter, entitled “Apriorism and Empiricism,” Lotze brings forward, in opposition to the separation made between the receptivity and the spontaneity of the mind, which has been pushed too far, a proof of the fact that even sensations, are a joint product of the individual activity, while on the other hand, a great deal of what appears to us as a necessity of thought is mixed with purely empirical elements, and calls for a criticism of mental prepossessions. But we are still further warned against con-

founding the ascertained genesis of things with what they are when conceived of in thought, and against expecting in any way that the significance of logical forms will be discovered by observing how ideas are in the habit of uniting together in us, or when the bodily processes which occasion them become known to us. In the *fourth* chapter (The Real and Formal Significance of the Logical) Lotze distinguishes between the three contrasts implied in the terms, subjective and objective, formal and actual, formal and real, and once more goes over the forms which were examined in the pure logic; and for the most part refers to metaphysics the final decision of their nature. In the *fifth* and last chapter (The *a priori* Truths), he attacks the positions of empiricism, particularly in its English form, according to which it is held that mathematical knowledge rests simply on the principle of identity, that experience contains simply synthetic judgments *a posteriori*, and finally, that every truth, in order to be universally valid, requires to be tested by experience. Lotze holds, on the contrary, that we have an immediate certainty regarding what is universally valid, and upon which all conviction rests—a certainty which, call it intuition, or give it some other name, must be admitted to exist, although its origin is unexplained and will likely remain so. Such a certainty is the sure fact that all that happens happens in accordance with law; and there are synthetic truths which have this note of certainty, and which Hegel in his dialectic, certainly, and perhaps Plato too before him, have attempted to deduce from one supreme principle. “In the face of the universal deification which is bestowed at the present time on experience, and all the more cheaply and confidently the less chance there is of finding any one who does *not* understand its importance and indispensableness—in face of this fact, I at all events desire to close with the confession, that I consider that very form of speculative intuition, which is so much despised, as the supreme and not simply as the unattainable end of science; and also by expressing a hope that German philosophy will continue, with more moderation and self-restraint but with equal enthusiasm, to address itself anew to the attempt to *understand* the course of the world, and not merely to *describe* it.” Thus ends the work of a man who has no need to fear the reproach, that he speaks of what philosophy is and may accomplish, as a blind man speaks

of colour.—[In the spring of 1881, Lotze yielded to a second urgent call to the University of Berlin, but died there after an activity of only a few weeks, on July 1st. His most important work not mentioned here, was the Second Part of the *System of Philosophy*, the *Three Books of Metaphysic*, which appeared in 1878. The Third Part, which was to have treated of Ethics, Æsthetics and Philosophy of Religion, was never completed. The only portion of it found in condition for publication appeared in *Nord und Süd*, for June, 1882, as *The Principles of Ethics*. A second edition of the First Part of the *System* was issued in 1880. An English translation of the Logic and Metaphysic, edited by B. Bosanquet, was published at the Clarendon Press in 1884 (2 vols.); 2nd eds. Metaphysics (2 vols.), 1887, Logic (2 vols.), 1888. See also Lotze's Outlines of Philosophy in six parts, ed. Ladd (Boston, 1884-87); Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, tr. Brastow & Ladd (London, 1887); Microcosmus, tr. Hamilton & Jones (Edinburgh, 1888).—Ed.]

D.—FOURTH GROUP. CONCLUSION

§ 348.

1. The works which have been partly mentioned and partly summarized in the last four sections, afford a proof that alongside of the process of the breaking up of the Hegelian school, philosophical works did not fail to appear in Germany, which either had no share in that process, or shared in it only in so far as it prepared the soil upon which they grew up. They prove, however, at the same time, that the complaint which meets us in almost all of them, that there is no longer any interest taken in philosophy, points to a fact which cannot be explained by saying that too few philosophical systems have been offered to the public. On the contrary, the numbers in which, and the rapidity with which, they have followed and are still following each other, leave even to the professional philosopher only the alternative of glancing through works which are the result of severe toil, or of entirely ignoring men who have bestowed a great deal of labour on their works. This same circumstance renders it impossible for the youth of our quick-living time to supply a contingent of pupils even to men like Weisse and Lotze, and perhaps explains how at the present day the majority of people regard our pursuit of

speculation very much as Savigny, when he published his epoch-making work, regarded the activity shown in his day in connection with the construction of systems of law. But just as he did not conclude from this that people should not trouble themselves about law at all, but that, instead of occupying themselves with vain attempts at constructing a system of law, men should occupy themselves with the fact that law had come to have its actually existing forms; so too in the department of philosophy, those who feel at the present time very much as he felt then,—at least those who are qualified to speak on the subject,—have directed their attention to the history of philosophy, and have entirely given themselves up to the study of it. The undeniable fact that, where there is still an interest felt in philosophical study, it does not consist in the impulse to engage in speculation for its own sake, but in the desire to see how others have speculated, is the counterpart of a phenomenon which also belongs to the present day, namely, that literary historians have taken the place of poets, and biographies have taken the place of great men. It is, in short, a proof that the system which taught us to paint grey in grey, and with which the history of philosophy became for the first time an integral part of the system of philosophy,—namely, the Hegelian system,—has not vanished without leaving a trace. And it is just on account of its historical element, that a well-informed opponent remarked years ago, that it was exactly the right philosophy for the historical school of law.

2. How very much the philosophical interest has fallen into the background in comparison with the historical, is proved above all by the fact that so many of a philosophical turn have gained a reputation exclusively in connection with this department. There is the less necessity for referring to their names and works, as they have been mentioned partly in § 13, and partly in their proper places in the present work. Many of these writers, besides their historical works on philosophy, have published purely philosophical works; but the latter have either been almost entirely ignored in favour of the others, as has been the case with the elder Sigwart and Zeller, or have been given a far inferior place in comparison with the historical works, a fact which no one will deny so far as Ritter and Prantl are concerned. The very same must be said of Kuno Fischer, who, though lauded as an historian of

philosophy, is undervalued as a philosopher; and what is more, in cases in which a writer valued the works on the history of philosophy which he undertook at a lower rate than his peculiarly philosophical works, the reading public has judged differently. Ernst Reinhold, Michelet, Chalybäus, are known as historians of philosophy in a much wider circle than as independent philosophers; and it must be said even of Trendelenburg, that his *History of the Doctrine of the Categories*, and some historical and critical articles, are far more read than his *Logical Investigations*, not to mention the favourable way in which the two former were received. The same statement might be repeated word for word in reference to Braniss. In fact, this preponderance of the historical element is manifest even in the speculations themselves. What a large space is occupied in philosophical works by the critical discussions, and particularly by the historical introductions! If we except the works of Weisse and Lotze,—which in this point also are distinguished from the others,—it may be stated as the rule, that if we leave out these discussions and introductions, the works might be compressed into one half their present size. They might often be put into still smaller bulk, for Wirth's *Idea of the Godhead*, Hillebrandt's *Organism of the Philosophical Idea*, are almost nothing more than a sketch of the history of philosophy. And just as the authors seem to pass unwillingly from the historical part to the peculiarly philosophical part, so this disinclination seems to be met by a perfectly similar disinclination on the part of the readers. Many of those philosophers do not know that there are libraries in which the critical and historical part of their works is quite thumbed, while the speculative part is not cut; and most of them must be prepared to find that the historical portion is read with interest, and that therefore what is said in it is retained in the memory, while the speculative part is read simply from a feeling of duty, and thus is without any lasting influence. It is to this circumstance, and not, as the evil-disposed assert, to the *associations d'admiration mutuelle*, that we may attribute the fact that men whose standpoints are very different, yet praise each other's books, and agree with the views expressed in them. These agreements have reference to the critical and historical investigations, while the thetic or positive investigations are ignored. When one hears Ulrici speak of Chaly-

bäus and Trendelenburg as if his views were entirely in accord with theirs, we must not think in this instance of the soul-ether of the former, nor of the doctrine of matter held by the latter, but of the wrath of both against the Hegelians, and of the thorough examination by Trendelenburg of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories. In the same way, Ulrici has received many compliments for his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy; but, so far as regards his theory of distinguishing activity, he stands pretty much alone. And so a large number of cases might be cited which would afford a proof that the historical point of view has driven the philosophical into the background.

3. There may be some who are glad of this, just as there are some who see in the history of literature a compensation for the poetical works which no longer appear, or who even, because they have written the biography of a great man, see one in themselves. Those who are favourably disposed towards philosophy will hardly think after this fashion; and many have stated it as their opinion,—and this was done in France still earlier than in Germany,—that all this is really a symptom of philosophical decrepitude. Still, a consideration in which there is some consolation may be connected with this fact. We were reminded above of Savigny's celebrated work. Since the appearance of it and of Savigny's historical writings, a new impetus has been given, not only to the study of the history of law, but also to that of law itself. And why? Because the study of the history of law was prosecuted by him in the spirit of a true jurist. So, too, the predominating interest taken in the history of philosophy may yet be made use of in the interests of philosophy, if readers, by having its history presented to them in a philosophical way, are led to think in a philosophical way about it along with the author. What we speculate about is at bottom a matter of indifference; and therefore at every period philosophy has taken for its object just what was of most interest for the time—as, for instance, nature, the State, dogma, etc. Why then should it not now take up the history of philosophy? It has been already remarked at the close of § 13, that now it is the custom to treat the history of philosophy only in a philosophical way. Against the complaint, therefore, that there is no longer any philosophical speculation, but that it is only the study of the history of philosophy which is cultivated, and that philosophers

have turned into historians, we may put the certain fact that the historians of philosophy are themselves in the habit of engaging in philosophical speculation; and so perhaps here too, the same lance which gave the wound will heal it.

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